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Abstract
In a critical evaluation of the influence of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 on India’s patent 
regime, this thesis considers whether India can retain its pre-eminent role as the 
pharmacy of the developing world. Using Amartya Sen’s conception of justice, 
development as freedom and capability approaches as thematic foundation, I have 
problematised key domestic and international developments in the area of patent law 
and access to essential medicines.
With the help of original case studies, this work provides an in-depth and thorough 
analysis of major controversies which are currently dominating the global discourse 
about patents and access to medicines. The Gleevec patent saga in India highlights the 
problem of evergreening in patent law; the tensions between the right to health and the 
right to property; and the role of international law. The next case study -  the Pfizer, 
Natco controversy -  highlights the limitations and shortcomings of the World Trade 
Organization’s rules on compulsory licensing for exports. The Indian experience shows 
that implementation of the Waiver Decision 2003 is extremely cumbersome and India’s 
domestic regulations have also failed to address this problem. The third case study of 
this thesis deals with the detention of generic drugs in transit and border enforcement 
measures, and shows that barriers to access to essential medicine are sometimes 
operating beyond the limits of patent laws and domestic regulations.
In addition to calling for a modernisation of Indian patent law, this thesis also considers 
new models of medical innovation in the Indian context. It maintains that the ongoing 
debate in India about the regulation of publicly funded research should be fully 
informed about the consequences of excessive patenting. India should consider adopting 
open source drug discovery models by facilitating and participating in patent pools.
Two alternative models of medieal innovation -  the Health Impact Fund and Prizes -  
are discussed in the Indian context to show how India can maintain its pre-eminence in 
the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector.
This study concludes that a number of multilateral and bilateral initiatives mandating 
TRIPS-Plus standards have the potential to further compromise India’s access to a 
medicines regime. It is argued that the Indian government should resist entering into 
any TRIPS-Plus trade agreement, which could limit its ability to manufacture cheap and 
affordable generic drugs. The World Trade Organization should reconsider the mandate 
of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 2001 in the light of domestic 
experiences to provide a readily available and easy to implement export mechanism. 
The World Health Organization should take a leadership role in promoting and 
implementing alternative models of medical innovation. The thesis also recommends 
that the World Intellectual Property Organization needs to substantively implement its 
Development Agenda in order to promote access to medicines.
Chapter 1
Introduction
I. Introduction
In the foreword of a collection of short stories, poems, photographs and essays, AIDS 
Sutra: Untold Stories from India, Professor Amartya Sen referred to the disturbing 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS in India, notwithstanding the country’s international role in 
providing access to affordable treatment of this epidemic. He writes that:
There is a peculiar -  and rather bitter -  irony in the fact that no country has done 
more than India in cheapening the production cost of known antiretroviral drugs 
(CIPLA is something of a world leader in this), and yet most HIV affected people 
in India cannot afford to get and use these drugs. India’s role in supplying cheap 
lifesaving drugs to the world is, of course, to be much applauded (if anything 
demands cooperation across the national boundaries today, the global AIDS 
epidemic surely does), but this country itself should also have a more effective 
system of delivery and use within its borders. There are, to be sure, the barriers of 
organization and medical assistance, but the costs of the drugs, even when 
lowered by domestic production, tend to be well beyond the means of the less 
affluent patients.1
The concern raised by Sen clearly depicts the typical role of India as a leading
manufacturer of affordable generic drugs while the Indian populace suffer epidemics,
poor health infrastructure and extreme poverty. Despite its domestic limitations and
1 Amartya Sen, ‘Understating the Challenge of AIDS (Foreword)’ in Negar Akhavi (ed), AIDS Sutra: 
Untold Stories from India (United Kingdom: Vintage Books, 2008) 1,9.
poor health services, India has emerged as an important player in the global 
pharmaceutical market and its generic drug industry is tipped to be the most reliable 
source of affordable essential medicines across the world.
The relevance and importance of Indian generic drugs is evident from the fact that:
Most of the ARVs currently available at affordable prices come from India. In 
2008, an estimated 3 million people in low and middle income countries received 
ARV therapy for HIV/AIDS. It is estimated that approximately 60% of the ARVs 
come from India, including up to 80% of first-line treatments.2
For this crucial role, India is often described as the pharmacy of the developing world.3 
Recognising the crucial role of Indian generic drugs in the implementation of major 
humanitarian projects, it is pertinent to raise questions about the sustainability and 
future of these supplies amidst rapid legal, political and economic transformations 
taking place in India. The most significant change in this regard is the implementation 
of the Trade-Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS 
Agreement 1994)4 which has changed India’s longstanding tradition of prohibiting
2 Ellen F.M.’t Hoen, The Global Politics of Pharmaceutical Monopoly Power: Drug patents, access, 
innovation and the application of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (The 
Netherlands: AMB Publishers, 2009) 7.
3 Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Tndian Court Ruling in Novartis Case Protects India as the 
‘Pharmacy of the Developing World’ (Press Release August 6, 2007) at http://wvvw.accessined- 
msf.org prod/publications.asp'.Ncniid^i^OO? 1632152&contenttypc=PARA&. Also see: Ashley .1.
Stevens and April E. Effort. ‘Using Academic License Agreements To Promote Global Social 
Responsibility’ (June 2008) XLII1 (2) Les Nouvelles Journal o f  the Licensing Executives Society 
International 85-101,89 at http:/Avvvw.med4al 1 .christina-
pohlmann.de/fileadmin/med/pdf/Les Nouvelles Xl.lll 2 85-101 June 2008 2 .pdf
4 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994,
2
patents on pharmaceutical products. India’s decision to accept the TRIPS Agreement 
1994 and consequently amend its domestic laws to provide stronger patent protection to 
pharmaceutical products, has very significant and long-term implications for the global 
access to medicines regime. It will eventually change the existing structures and 
arrangements for obtaining cheaper and affordable generic drugs from India. The ability 
of Indian drug manufacturers to produce generic drugs will be significantly 
compromised under the new patent law.
This thesis considers the prospects for India’s future as the pharmacy of the developing 
world in a post-TRIPS world. In doing so, it has sought answers to three important 
questions, first, what are the key policy and legal changes which India has introduced 
since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 affecting the existing state of access to 
medicines regime, and how have domestic political and systemic influences shaped the 
outcome of legislative changes? Second, how are India’s new laws responding to 
implementation and enforcement challenges, and to what extent have these laws 
managed to accommodate the exceptions and safeguard provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994? Third, how does India interact within the international system to 
advocate legal transformation of the kind required to address the needs of developing 
countries, and what policy options is India adopting in the process of internalisation of a 
global patent regime?
II. Development as Freedom
The problematisation of patents and access to medicines issue needs a holistic approach
which can define key constituents of this problem and its possible solutions. From the
perspective of this thesis, a comprehensive theoretical framework is required which can
1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1C (‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights’).
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explain three key questions dominating the discourse on patents and access to 
medicines. First, what is the precise nature of the access to medicines problem and its 
possible nexus with the patent regime, and how may the sufferings of individual 
patients be linked with the mainstream discourse on human rights and development? 
Second, what are the best means to address this problem both at the level of developed 
and developing countries, and how can individual and collective social responsibilities 
be allocated in this regard? Third, what future policies and strategies should be adopted 
at national and international levels to promote affordable and equitable access to 
essential medicines?
In an attempt to devise a defining and holistic theoretical framework, I have mainly 
relied upon Professor Amartya Sen’s theory of development as freedom. In his seminal 
book, Development as Freedom, Professor Sen provides an expansive and articulate 
view of development and the capability approach. His development as freedom model 
can be briefly summarised with the help of the following four points.
First, Sen’s conception of development goes beyond the accumulation of wealth and 
economic growth and emphasises that poverty is indeed a deprivation of basic 
capabilities rather than living in a state of low income. He states that:
Development has to be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the 
freedom we enjoy. Expanding the freedoms that we have reason to value not only 
makes our lives richer and more unfettered, but also allows us to be fuller social 
persons, exercising our own volitions and interacting with -  and influencing -  the 
world in which we live.’
5 Ibid. 14.
4
These freedoms, according to Sen, can be either constitutive or instrumental. The 
constitutive freedoms are valued on their own as they enable individuals to lead the type 
of lives they have reason to value. On the contrary, instrumental freedoms have 
functional value in contributing to the achievement of constitutive freedoms.6 Sen also 
provides a non-exclusive list of five basic types of freedoms -  including political 
freedoms; economic facilities; social opportunities, such as access to health and access 
to education' transparency guarantees, and protective security. 7
Amartya Sen’s conception of development and freedoms has great relevance from the 
perspective of this thesis. India needs to learn a lot from Sen’s views on development 
which go much beyond economic growth and wealth generation. These views are 
particularly helpful for India at a time when we often see the dilemma of Indian policy 
makers struggling to balance its role both as an emerging global economy and a poor 
developing country. This problem is evident from the case studies in this thesis which 
establish that India lacks a coherent, consistent and pro-poor policy on patents and 
access to medicines. India should understand that the development process is complex 
and painstakingly long-term, and a quick rush to a strong patent regime will not help its 
poor consumers.
The implementation of a stricter patent regime in India may affect several substantive 
freedoms which are highly regarded by Professor Sen. Individual freedoms associated 
with social opportunities will inevitably suffer with the introduction of a product patent 
regime resulting in high drug prices. The lack of transparency in global patent law rules- 
making and standards development is squeezing political freedoms. In the process of
6 Ibid. 36.
7 Ibid. 38-40.
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implementing TRIPS-plus intellectual property standards, the freedoms constituting 
transparency guarantees are often compromised and neglected by contracting parties.
The second feature of Sen’s conception of development as freedom is about 
functionings and capabilities. Driving the notion of functionings from Aristotelian roots, 
Sen describes it as the various states of being which an individual may value. Basic 
functionings include values such as being free from diseases, adequately nourished, and 
having access to reasonable shelter. Among the complex functionings, Sen includes the 
individual’s desire for self-respect and other higher values of society. The ability of an 
individual to achieve desired functionings in his or her capability, is a key component of 
Sen’s developmental framework/ He notes that:
[Tjhere is a strong case forjudging individual advantage in terms of capabilities 
that a person has, that is, the substantive freedom he or she enjoy to lead the kind 
of life he or she has reason to value. In this perspective, poverty must be seen as 
the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely a lowness of income, 
which is the standard criterion of identification of poverty.1'
From the perspective of patents and access to medicines, Sen’s capability approach is 
relevant for two reasons. With the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and 
other intellectual property instruments, the individual's capabilities are severely 
undermined in the area of access to affordable health and prevention of diseases. There 
is no doubt that a patent regime is one factor among many others which contribute 
towards the state of un-freedom which poor patients face in the developing world. 
However, it is becoming increasingly more relevant and serious in terms of systemic 
consequences as it is not generally addressed through development policies. Sen
8 Ibid.74-75.
9 Ibid. 87.
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ascribes great importance to individuals’ capabilities'" and insists that the state of 
freedom can be effectively calculated and measured at that level. Thus, the economic 
performance of a country like India is not relevant here when its poor population is not 
living up to its capabilities.
Second, the individual’s capabilities, according to Sen, are a function of both process 
and endowment." Processes are institutions that give freedom such as political and civil 
rights, and endowments are the individual’s personal and social circumstances. This 
distinction is extremely important for us. A system may apparently have adequate 
processes which ensures the individual’s attempts to harness their capabilities, but the 
actual personal and social circumstances of individuals may not allow them to 
materialise their objectives. At a national level, the case of Indian patent law is a perfect 
example in this regard. The Patents Act 1970 (India) contains some prominent 
safeguard provisions in the form of compulsory licensing, opposition proceedings, and 
parallel importation. Thus, the process is aptly laid down. However, the actual use of 
these safeguards (the endowment aspect) suggests that some of these provisions work 
well while others fail to deliver. In the case of opposition proceedings, the political and 
economic circumstances work well for some of the leading Indian pharmaceutical firms.
10 Patents and the access to medicines problem can be approached both as individual and collective 
capabilities. Though Sen's own conception is confined to an individual's capabilities, this notion is now 
widened to see how collective capabilities influence the process to development. See: Peter Evans 
‘Collective Capabilities, Culture, and Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom’ (Summer 2002) 37(2) 
Studies in Comparative International Development 54-60. Also sec: Solava S. Ibrahim, ‘From Individual 
to Collective Capabilities: The Capability Approach as a Conceptual Framework for Self-help’
(November 2006) 7(3) Journal o f Human Development and Capabilities 397-416.
11 Aaron Cosbey, A Capability Approach to Trade and Sustainable Development: Using Sen 's 
Conception o f Development to Re-Examine the Debates (Manitoba, Canada: International Institute for 
Sustainable Development and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, November 2004) 12.
7
On the contrary, compulsory licensing provisions could not be used for a multiplicity of 
reasons as discussed in this thesis. At the international level, the failure of the Waiver 
Decision 2003 can also be analysed in this context. The individual circumstances of 
developing countries often prevent them from invoking the cumbersome compulsory 
licensing scheme envisaged under the Waiver Decision 2003.
The third important feature of Amartya Sen’s development as freedom approach is his 
articulation of a ‘goal-rights system’. Sen is not satisfied with both libertarian and 
utilitarian views of rights and he advances his own consequentialist approach as 
follows:
I have argued, elsewhere, against the necessity of opting for one or the other 
approach in this dichotomy, and have presented arguments for a consequential 
system that incorporates the fulfilment of rights among other goals. It shares with 
utilitarianism a consequentialist approach (but differs from it in not confining 
attention to utility consequences only), and it shares with a libertarian system the 
attachment of intrinsic importance to rights (but differs from it in not giving it 
complete priority irrespective of other consequences). Such a “goal-rights system” 
has many attractive properties as well as versatility and reach.12
This is an important observation and intellectual construct which can be potentially used 
in justifying some alternative models of pharmaceutical innovation. The proponents of 
prize models and the Health Impact Fund13 often extend similar justifications to override 
adverse consequences of patent rights. However, their accounts, as we discuss in this
12 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1999), 212.
13 Sen offers specific critique of John Rawls’ conception of justice which has influenced Thomas Pogge’s 
work on the Health Impact Fund. For Pogge’s evaluation of the capability approach see: Thomas Pogge, 
‘Can the Capability Approach be Justified?’ (2002) 30(2) Philosophical Topics 167-228.
8
thesis, are limited to particular solutions unlike Sen’s theoretical framework which 
contextualises his ‘goal-rights system’ in a broader perspective, providing a useful 
analytical platform for this work. Sen does not offer specific comments on the nature of 
patent rights and their limitations in his book, Development as Freedom. However, his 
dissatisfaction with the existing state of global access to medicines and the role of 
patents therein is quite clear from his evidence before the United Kingdom’s House of 
Common’s Treasury Committee. Answering a question about the institutional reforms 
needed to share the benefits of globalisation fairly, he said that:
1 think institutional reform has to be of many different kinds ... To give one 
example, patent law would be one of them. The patent law issue is interesting ... 
quite often this has been seen as being basically confrontational to the richer 
countries’ interest, because they introduced pharmaceuticals and so on. The 
picture is a bit complicated now, partly because of the dynamism of the nature of 
the world economy. For example, India, which we were discussing earlier, which 
began primarily as an importer of drugs, has ended up now being one of the 
bigger producers of drugs. So in some ways the identification of interests have got 
much more muddied over time.14
He further noted that:
If you look at the patent laws, I think they are very unsatisfactory and the WTO 
reforms, which have tried to do something, have not really got as far as they could 
have got. To see the issue of equity and incentive at loggerheads with each other, I 
do not think is the right way of thinking about it. Just consider one of the issues. 
That is why for many of us, including, as I was mentioning earlier, Oxfam and
14 Evidence to House of Commons Treasury Committee, Globalization: Prospects and Policy Responses, 
London, 30 November 2006, 71 (Professor Amartya Sen)
9
Medecins Sans Frontieres, there exist drugs, for example for AIDS, which people 
cannot afford and cannot therefore buy in the poorer parts of the world, and the 
question is that you can produce them at an extremely low cost, but you may be 
prevented from doing that on grounds of loyalty and patent rights."
Sen’s stance on the limitations of patent rights and their impact on the access to 
medicines regime has been made conspicuously clear in these statements. He favours a 
wide range of solutions ranging from differential drug prices to more radical changes in 
the pharmaceutical innovation system. 16 This approach is perfectly justified in the light 
of his consequentialist theory of rights. 17
The fourth explanatory feature of Sen’s development as freedom approach deals with 
his position on ‘market versus state and efficiency versus equity’ . 18 Here, he again 
adopts a middle course by allocating relevant importance and roles to both institutions. 
The role of the market in wealth generation cannot be neglected and substituted and 
reliance on the market in this regard is fully justified. He also recognises that markets 
can sometimes become counterproductive and need stringent regulations. For this 
regulatory reason, the role of the state is always important. 14 Sen’s point also 
strengthens the argument, which this thesis has developed, about the critical role of the 
Indian government, and for that purpose governments of other developing countries, in
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 On the issue of nature of intellectual property rights and its possible limitations see: Anupam Chander 
and Madhavi Sunder, ‘Is Nozick Kicking Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual Property and Social Justice’ (200707) 
40 U.C. Davis Law Review 563-579.
18 Bhupinder Chimni, ‘The Sen Conception of Development and Contemporary International Law 
Discourse: Some Parallels’ (2008) 1(1) The Law and Development Review Article 2.
14 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1999), 112-117.
10
accelerating the cause of access to essential medicines. In a situation where market 
forces have failed to direct sufficient resources for the research and development of 
drugs needed in the developing countries, the primary responsibility lies with 
governments to offset its negative impacts.
The work of Amartya Sen, who won the Nobel Prize in 1998, was applauded by Kofi A. 
Annan in the following words:
The world’s poor and dispossessed could have no more articulate or insightful a 
champion among economists than Amartya Sen. By showing that the quality of 
our lives should be measured not by our wealth, but by our freedom, his writings 
have revolutionized the theory and practice of development.20
This thesis is an original application of Amartya Sen’s development as freedom model 
in the context of patent law and access to medicines. It argues that Sen’s conception of 
freedom provides an appropriate analytical basis to study the role of India as the 
pharmacy of the developing world. The key components of this thesis -  Indian patent 
law and its development, the application of safeguard provisions and enforcement 
issues, the regulation of publically funded research and alternative models of 
pharmaceutical innovation, the emergence of TRIPS-plus standards and the WIPO 
Development Agenda -  can be sufficiently explained with the help of Sen’s theorisation. 
There is evidence that some scholars have recently used Sen’s model to understand the 
changing dynamics of the global intellectual property movement. Madhavi Sunder 
presents a theory of cultural analysis of intellectual property, noting:
I draw upon Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to 
human development, the social relations approach to property, and what I call a
20 Amartya Sen. Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1999), Back title.
1 1
“New Enlightenment” analysis of culture, in which the core values of 
Enlightenment-reason, democracy, freedom of expression, and the call, in Kant’s 
words, to “think for [onejself’ are extended to the cultural sphere. My 
reinterpretation of intellectual property applies to suburban American fan fiction 
authors and rural Indian weavers alike: all seek greater capacity for accessing and 
participating in crafting new knowledge of the world. In turn, these cultural 
capabilities structure our social relations. 21
This work, however, does not specifically analyse the issue of patents and access to 
medicines but mainly deals with theoretical justifications of the intellectual property 
system. Other scholars have also used Sen’s discourse in areas such as the 
developmental dimensions of intellectual property22 and the regulation of bio­
technologies. 22 Arguably, such an approach has great explanatory power in making 
sense of the conflicts over patent law and access to essential medicines in India.
III. Indian Patent Law and Access to Medicines
The academic interest in India’s patent law and pharmaceutical policy is a longstanding 
phenomenon and there is no dearth of literature on this topic. Several accounts of the 
historical development of Indian patent law and its different phases have been recorded, 
and India is one of a few developing countries which have attracted considerable 
research and academic interest in this regard.
21 Madhavi Sunder, MP3’ (November 2006) 59(2) Stanford Law Review 257-332, 264.
22 Borges Barbosa, Margaret Chon and Andres Moncayo von Hase, ‘Slouching Towards Development in 
International Intellectual Property’ (2007) 71 Michigan State Law Review 71-141, 127-128 at
http: 7papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id= 1081366
2l Julie Clague, ‘Patent Injustice’ in S. Deneulin et al (eds), Transforming Unjust Structures: The 
Capability Approach (The Netherlands: Springer Link: 2006) 177.
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The United States patent scholar, Professor Janice M. Muellerm has highlighted the 
historical evolution of Indian patent law with an aim to elaborate the rationale of recent 
changes in a specific policy perspective.24 While discussing different stages of patent 
law development in India, Mueller concludes that India will continue facing substantive 
policy challenges in balancing its role as an emerging economy and a leading 
developing country. India’s ‘mosaic view’ of patents is a direct outcome of multiple, 
sometimes conflicting, influences and India has managed to develop a patent law which 
is fairly balanced in its outlook. Mueller goes one step further and concludes that 
Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) is the most controversial provision, and its 
‘negative impact on an important form of indigenous innovation should not be 
ignored’.25 Mueller considers that Indian law is adequately equipped with multiple 
safeguard provisions which the Indian government can use to facilitate access to 
medicine programs. The specific reference in this regard is made to the compulsory 
licensing provisions.26
Sudip Chaudhuri acknowledges that the traditional wisdom of not granting product 
patents in developing countries is still applicable and the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
presents a peculiar case in this regard.27 He highlights the innovative capabilities of
~* 24 *&Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and 
the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 491-641 at 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edU/issues/68/68.3/Mucller.pdf 
25 Ibid. 558.
2" Janice M. Mueller, ‘Taking TRIPS to India-Novartis, Patent Law and Access to Medicines’ (February
8, 2007) 356(6) The New England Journal o f Medicine 541-543, 543 at
http:., www.contcntneimon;.zuom.info/cgi/rcprint/356/6/541.pdf
27 Sudip Chaudhuri, Ts Product Patent Protection Necessary in Developing Countries for Innovation? R
& D by Indian Pharmaceutical Companies after TRIPS’ (September 2007) Indian Institute of 
Management Calcutta Working Paper Series, WPS No. 614, 17 at
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Indian pharmaceutical firms and argues that some leading Indian firms will build 
capabilities to develop drugs both for regulated and non-regulated markets. The 
technological advancement which Indian companies have demonstrated in the case of 
HIV/AIDS medicines will continue strengthening a particular segment of the 
pharmaceutical market.
In another study, Sudip Chaudhuri argues that India needs to initiate public-private 
partnerships for the development of new drugs in India.28 He thinks that the Indian 
patent regime goes beyond the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, and 
safeguard provisions such as compulsory licences should be effectively utilised to 
overcome the problems associated with drug patents.21' This approach fails to address the 
practical limitations which developing countries have traditionally faced in using the 
safeguard provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. Furthermore, any suggestion to 
implement a public-private initiative needs to explore innovative options which can 
resolve issues of the patent rights of leading pharmaceutical companies.
Continuing this theme, Padmashree Gehl Sampath confirms that several Indian 
pharmaceutical companies face difficulties with India’s TRIPS compliance and ‘product 
patent protection in India is emerging to be a very decisive factor in determining access 
to medicines, both in India and other third countries in Africa’.'" Alka Chadha also
htt p:/, vvw vv. i i mca 1 ,ac. i n/res/upd/Sud i p%2 0 Wp%2 0614.pdf
28 Sudip Chaudhuri, R c£ D for Development o f New Drugs for Neglected Diseases: How Can India 
Contribute? (March 31,2005) A study prepared for the World Health Organization Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, 37 at 
http:■■/vvwvv.who.int intellectualproperty/studies/S.%20Chaudhuri.pdf
2" Sudip Chaudhuri, ‘TRIPS Agreement and Amendments of Patents Act in India’ (Aug. 10-16, 2002) 37 
(32) Economic and Political Weekly 3354-3360.
30 Padmashree Gehl Sampath, ‘Economic Aspects of Access to Medicines after 2005: Product Patent
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explores the relationship between innovation and pharmaceutical exports in the case of 
Indian generic companies.'1 The issue of domestic innovation and the technological 
capabilities of Indian pharmaceutical companies is further discussed by Biswajit Dhar 
and K. K. Gopakumar.32 They argue that Indian firms have successfully launched some 
extraordinary research and development projects.
Martin J. Adelman and Sonia Baldia argue that a phased and full implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994 will eventually benefit Indian consumers, scientist and 
industry.33 This view is, nevertheless, confronted in other studies. Jayashree Watal 
calculates the welfare losses which India will bear on the eve of the full implementation 
of patent provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.34 These losses will mainly emerge from 
price increases which, according to Jayashree Watal, could be offset by an effective use 
of price control and compulsory licensing. These studies, however, do not provide a 
systematic policy solution which India should employ to design its long term strategy 
dealing with existing and future challenges in the area of patents and access to 
medicines.
Protection and Emerging Firm Strategies in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’(undated) Institute of 
New Technologies, United Nations University, 5 at
http://vv\vw.who.int/intcllectualpropertv/studics/PadmashreeSampath Final.pdf 
Alka Chadha, ‘Product Cycles, innovation and exports: A Study of Indian pharmaceuticals’ (2005), 
Department of Economics, National University of Singapore Working Paper No. 0511 at 
http://vvwvv.fas.nus.cdu.sg/ccvs/pub/wp/vvp051 1 .pdf
■'2 Biswajit Dhar and K. K. Gopakumar, ‘Post-2005 TRIPS scenario in patent protection in the 
pharmaceutical sector: The case of generic pharmaceutical industry in India’ (2006), UNCTAD, IDRC 
and ICTSD at http://wvvw.measwatch.org/autopage/lile/MonMarch2000-14-25- 16-lndianlNDUSTRY.pdf 
33 Martin J. Adelman and Sonia Baldia, ‘Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement: The Case of India’ (1996) 29 Vanderbilt Journal o f  Transnational Law 507-533.
4 Jayashree Watal, ‘Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices and Welfare Losses: Policy Options for India under 
the WTO TRIPS Agreement’ (December 2002) 23 (4) World Economy 733-752, 747.
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Shamnad Basheer argues that most of the recent changes in Indian patent law contain a 
positive outlook from the public interest perspective and in this regard India has 
successfully implemented the obligation of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. The exceptions 
and safeguard provisions of Indian patent law will help Indian companies to continue 
production of affordable generics.3" He has, however, pointed out elsewhere that some 
safeguard provisions, such as Section 3(d) and the requirement for the use of local 
workers, are susceptible to a WTO dispute settlement challenge, and India needs to 
adopt detailed and clear guidelines in this regard.36
Amy Kapczynski clearly applauds this provision of the Patents Act 1970 (India) and 
insists that these safeguard provisions should be evaluated and understood in the context 
of pharmaceutical patents and the problem of evergreeningA She further notes that:
The Indian example shows that TRIPS leaves developing countries with a more 
diverse and wide-ranging set of flexibilities at the formal level than the existing 
literature typically suggests. If India implemented its adopted flexibilities to their 
full potential, it could generate significant scope for competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector without ever issuing a compulsory license ... Rather than 
reject TRIPS, Indian government actors have engaged in creative acts of legal
33 Shamnad Basheer, ‘India’s New Patent Regime: Aiding “Access” or Abetting “Genericide”?’ (2007) 9 
(2) International Journal o f Biotechnology' 122-137, 122 at 
http://paiiers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsBvAuth.cfm7per id=339749
36 Shamnad Basheer and Prashant Reddy, ‘“Ducking” TRIPS in India: A Sega Involving Novartis and the 
Legality of Section 3(d)’ (2008) 2(2) National Law School o f India Review 131-155. Also see: Shamnad 
Basheer,’India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005' Volume 1,2005 The Indian 
Journal o f Law and Technology 15-46, 43 at http://papcrs.ssrn.com/soI3/papcrs.cfm7abstract id=N29464 
' Amy Kapczynski, ‘Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in 
India’s Pharmaceutical Sector' (2009)97 California Law Review 1571-1650, 1591 at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id— 1557832
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interpretation that take extensive advantage of known TRIPS flexibilities, and that 
have also generated new ones. In the process, India has paved the way for new 
interpretive disagreements over the meaning of TRIPS. The dynamic has clearly 
operated beyond India as well.38
This is indeed a very positive evaluation of the Indian patent regime with ambitious 
expectations attached to the implementation of relevant provisions. This thesis, on the 
other hand, establishes that not all safeguard provisions have been effectively used and 
interpreted in India and there are strong political and economic constraints which inhibit 
a robust implementation process. Despite having very strong compulsory licensing 
previsions, India has so far tailed to use this channel both for domestic and export 
purposes. An overemphasis on the potential of Indian patent law is perhaps misplaced 
and lacks evidence.
In 1997, Jean O. Lanjouw concluded that implementation of a product patent regime in 
India will not lead to ‘heartless exploitation of the poor’.39 The reason attributed in this 
regard is not the merit of the patent system. It is about the extreme poverty in India 
where poor patients were already not receiving medicines despite the low prices of 
generics. The debate about product patent, according to Jean O. Lanjouw, is irrelevant 
tor 70% ot the population living without access to pharmaceuticals. However, the role 
ot the pharmaceutical sector and the implementation of a product patent regime should 
be now re-evaluated in the light of two factors. First, during the last decade or so, the 
Indian government has launched several treatment access programs and the situation has
38 Ibid. 1642-1643.
',9 Jean O. Lanjouw, ‘The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: “Heartless Exploitation 
of the Poor and Suffering”?’ (Discussion Paper No. 775, Economic Growth Centre, Yale University, 
August 1997) 31 at http://www.nbcr.oru/papers/w6366
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improved in many cases, though the overall impact may still be incremental. Second, 
the impact of the product patent regime in India should not be solely worked out within 
its limited geographical boundaries. Indian generics may not reach the poorest segment 
of its own population but they play a crucial role in international humanitarian aid and 
access to medicine projects. Neglecting this aspect will eventually be a bad news for 
those poor patients who benefit from Indian exports.
Padmashree Gehl Sampath thinks that the product patent regime will be a decisive 
factor in determining access to medicines both within India and outside. On the issue of 
the relevance of compulsory licensing and access to medicine, she notes that:
Theoretically, compulsory licensing, as provided for under the TRIPS Agreement, 
or merely the threat of its use, could be used as a price leveraging instrument in 
developing countries. But the introduction of product patent protection in 
countries such as India may have far-reaching consequences on access to 
medicines at affordable prices in a large number of developing and least 
developed countries. Indian pharmaceutical firms, have in the past, offered strong 
price competition through the production of cheaper generic versions of drugs 
patented elsewhere.40
Cheri Grace also notes considerable challenges which India will face amidst the 
implementation of a product patents’ regime. There could be devastating consequences 
from the perspective of public health and access to medicines, and India may use the 
flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 to overcome some of these problems.
4(1 Padmashree Gehl Sampath, ‘Economic Aspects of Access to Medicines after 2005: Product Patent 
Protection and Emerging Firm Strategies in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry^undated) Institute of 
New Technologies, United Nations University, 3 at
hit p://www. who. int/intellectualproperty/studies/PadmashreeSampathF inal.pdf
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However, the practieal usage and implementation of these safeguard provisions is a big 
question according to Cheri Grace.41 K Balasubramaniam also concludes that 
compulsory licensing and parallel importation are not a permanent solution and mostly 
beyond the capacity of developing countries. The need for a long term and sustainable 
solution to the problem of patents and access to medicines, is still felt.42 This thesis 
supports the underlying rationale of this argument with the help of case studies showing 
the practical limitations of compulsory licensing and other safeguard provisions.
IV. The TRIPS Agreement and Trade Law
While studying India's role as the pharmacy of the developing world, 1 have focused 
upon the changes wrought to Indian patent law by the TRIPS Agreement 1994.
The inadequacies of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 have become evident during the 
implementation process and, contrary to popular perception, the Indian regime will 
show less promising results when it comes to the global access to medicines campaign. 
The situation is further aggravated by India’s domestic political and economic policies 
geared towards trade liberalisation and deregulation. The role of different bilateral and 
multilateral trade and intellectual property negotiations is further negatively impacting 
the state of access to medicines.
41 Cheri Grace, ‘Update on China and India and Access to Medicines’ (Briefing Paper for Department for 
International Development, Health Resource Centre, November 2005) 3 at
http: Vvcbarchive.nationalarchivcs.uov.uk/1 /http://wwvv.dfid.ttov.uk/Documents publications/atm-ehina- 
india.pdf
4~ K Balasubramaniam, ‘Access to Medicines and Public Policy Safeguard Under TRIPS’ in Christophe
Bellmann et al (eds), Trading In Knowledge: Development Perspectives on TRIPS, Trade, and 
Sustainability (United Kingdom: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003), 137.
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A substantial part of the patents and access to medicines problem is linked with the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994. Fredrick M. Abbott highlights the balancing nature of the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994 and asserts that despite its turbulent history, the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 can be inteipreted and used in a manner consistent with the 
expectations of the developing world. He advocates a broader understanding of the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994 in a human rights context and asserts that:
Throughout the history of international IPRs regulatory system, rights granted to 
creators have been subject to balancing against other social interests. This 
balancing has typically taken place at the national or regional level in the 
framework of a constitution. The TRIPS Agreement has largely removed IPRs 
regulation from the traditional constitutional framework, giving broad rights to 
producers and exceptional rights to public. The most evident means for 
resurrecting and maintaining a balance is for WTO Members to apply their 
constitutions to the application of TRIPS Agreement rules. The national and 
regional constitution will in most cases advance individual and group human 
rights ... Yet in some cases the national constitution and its application will also 
require protection at the multilateral level, and it is here that the AB (Appellate 
Body) will need to step in to identify and apply relevant human rights principles 
that will maintain a reasonable semblance of balance.43
He further notes that ‘implementation of the TRIPS Agreement potentially conflicts 
with human rights, both core and relative’.44
43 Fredrick M. Abbott, ‘TRIPS and Human Rights Preliminary Reflections’ in F. Abbott, Christine 
Breining-Kaufmann and Thomas Cottier (eds). International Trade and Human Rights: Foundations and 
Conceptual Issues (United States: University of Michigan Press 2006) 320.
44 Ibid. 314.
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Abbott maintains that the right to health has been confirmed in the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration 2001)45 establishing that 
the TRIPS rules be flexible in terms of national policy to the extent that human rights 
interests can be accommodated.46 I have used Abbott’s analytical framework in Chapter 
4 to elaborate the scope and contents of the Doha Declaration 2001 and the WTO 
General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 (Waiver Decision 2003).47 It is important 
to note that Abbott’s rights-based approach adequately describes several provisions of 
the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and the adoption of the Doha Declaration 2001. However, 
post Doha Declaration 2001 developments and the complicated nature of the final 
outcome pose several questions about a smooth reading of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 
as a balancing act.
Peter Drahos also points to the role which India has historically played in developing its 
domestic patent law and to influence international intellectual property standards.48 He 
argues that India adopted a patent law earlier than some European countries but its 
delicate balance was a key factor in fostering industrial development in some sectors. 
However, after the TRIPS Agreement 1994 some developing countries including India 
were worse off than in the past. Relying upon the notions of regulatory ritualism and
4 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc WT/M1N(01 )/DEC/2 (14 
November 2001) at http:/7vvw\v. vvto.org/english/fhewto c/'ministc/min01 c/mindccltrips c.htm 
4(1 Fredrick M. Abbott, ‘The ‘Rule of Reason’ and the Right to Health: Integrating Human Rights and 
Competition Principles in the Context of TRIPS’ in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. Biirgi (eds). Human 
Rights and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 279.
4 Implementation o f Paragraph 6 o f the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WTO Doc WT/L/540 (30 August 2003) (Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003) at 
http://www.wto.org/enttlish/tratop e/trips e/implem para6 e.htm
48 Peter Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting’ (2002) 
5(5) The Journal o f World Intellectual Property 765-789.
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rules complexity, Peter Drahos maintains that developing countries have lost the gains 
of the Doha Declaration 2001 in subsequent negotiations.49 He does not share the same 
level of excitement and expectation which other commentators have shown with regard 
to the outcome of the Doha Declaration 2001 and the Waiver Decision 2003.
Peter Drahos also discusses the possibility of a developing countries alliance which can 
collectively negotiate global intellectual property standards. This alliance, a developing 
country quad comprising India, Brazil, China and Nigeria, can enhance the negotiation 
capacity and bargaining position of developing countries and it would ultimately help in 
designing balanced domestic patent regimes. This proposal, however, fails to appreciate 
the internal political and economic dynamics of India which are evident from India’s 
bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations.
Professor Rochelle C. Dreyfuss assigns a great importance to the flexibilities of the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994. She thinks that a group of leading developing countries, like 
India, have demonstrated that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 does not necessarily contain a 
one-size-fits-all approach, and it is evident from recent amendments in Indian patent 
law.’"
Professor Jerome H. Reichman shares the position of optimism and constructive 
engagement advocated by Abbott.’1 He thinks that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 was
49 Peter Drahos, ‘Four Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations over Access to 
Medicines’ (2007) 28 (11) Liverpool Law' Review> 39 at
hi tp://vvw vv.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/pdfs/2007fourlcssonsforde veountries.pdf 
M) Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, ‘TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size Fit All? Making the WTO 
Responsive to the Global Health Crisis’ in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer and Kim Rubenstein (eds) 
Incentives for Global Public Health: Patent Law' and Access to Essential Medicines (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 2010), 35.
51 Frederick M. Abbott and Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The Doha Round Public Health Legacy: Strategies for
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definitely a huge undertaking for developing countries which were not ready to adopt 
stricter and higher intellectual property standards. Reichman argues that developed 
countries should halt the process of further harmonisation of a global patent regime by 
allocating more time and resources for developing countries. The trade bilateralism and 
the widening of the intellectual property negotiation agenda through data exclusivity 
and patent term extension, is a bad strategy on the part of developed countries and they 
may end up losing existing common grounds for negotiations. " 2 Reichman notes that:
The system needs to survive the shocks and pitfalls likely to be encountered in the 
post-transitional phase of the TRIPS Agreement. Let me, therefore end with a plea 
for restraint and for a more cooperative and less confrontational approach than 
that which has sometimes characterized relations between developed countries 
during the transitional phase. Once the developing countries see that they, too, 
have a big stake in the global intellectual property system, the long-term prospects 
for that system would become bright, indeed. In the long-term we should expect 
the economic stimulus of the TRIPS standards to influence business and 
investment decisions everywhere, without regard to those North-South divisions 
inherited from the Cold War that seems increasingly anachronistic in principle, if
the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions’ (2007) 10(4) 
.Journal o f International Economic Law 921-987, 941.
"2 Jerome H. Reichman, ‘Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the 
TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement’ (1995) 29(2) The International Lawyer 345-388. Also see: 
Jerome U. Reichman, ‘Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property 
Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach’ (2009) 13(1) Marquette Intellect Property Law Review 1 - 
68 .
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not in practice. The trick, however, is to reach that long-term understanding 
without capsizing the vessel on which we collectively embarked in 1994/'
With the benefit of a little hindsight we can now evaluate the optimism which was 
attached to the TRIPS Agreement 1994. It is evident from the failure of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 to facilitate the access to medicines regime, and with the subsequent 
emergence of the TRIPS-plus agenda, that developed countries could not follow the 
advice of restraint and cooperation. Instead, we have seen a rigorous and fresh round of 
patent law harmonisation aimed at narrowing the policy space afforded under the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994.
V. Innovation
The patent law and access to medicines debate is not complete without suggesting 
appropriate solutions to resolve the problems of affordable access amidst the crisis of 
pharmaceutical innovation. Delivering essential medicines to the poorest population of 
the world is a moral obligation but who precisely bear this responsibility? The answer to 
this question is not simple as most of the governments in developing countries lack 
adequate resources to fulfil their legal and constitutional obligations. Pharmaceutical 
innovation and drug development is in the private domain and dominated by companies 
based in the most affluent countries. These firms have as such no moral obligation to 
ensure access to essential medicines in the developing world. These firms often tend to 
focus on producing drugs which are needed in developed countries and a large segment 
of poor patients living in developing countries are missed out. This particular dilemma 
is aggravating the problem of access to medicines in the developing world.
53 Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the 
Developing Countries?’ (2000) 32 Case Western Resen’e Journal o f International Law 441-470, 469.
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William W. Fisher and Talha Syed approach this problem as follows:
Each year, roughly nine million people in the developing world die from 
infectious diseases. The large proportion of those deaths could be prevented, 
either by making existing drugs available at low prices in developing countries, or 
by augmenting the resources devoted to the creation of new vaccines and 
treatments for the diseases in question. 54
To overcome this problem, they need to identify a package of reforms that would result 
in lowering the drug process in developing countries. This package will include 
measures aimed at limiting firms’ patent rights, re-prioritising pharmaceutical research 
and development strategies and stimulating the role of governments in drug 
development and distribution. Who will bear the cost of this reform package? For 
William W. Fisher and Talha Syed the answer to this question is straightforward: the 
developed countries’ residents and they advance plenty of historical, social and moral 
reasons in this regard?'
Thomas Pogge also considers this question in his discourse on the Health Impact Fund. 
He contextualises the problem of access to medicines in a poverty and human rights 
framework and argues that it is in the self-interest of developed countries to allocate 
resources for reforms such as the Health Impact Fund. Pogge’s earlier suggestion of 
imposing a Global Resources Dividend (GRD) tax provides sufficient moral arguments 
to build a case for financing an alternative model of pharmaceutical innovation? 6
"4 William W. Fisher and Talha Syed, ‘Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the 
Developing World’ (2007) 40 UC Davis Law Review 581-678, 581 at 
http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Vol40/lssue3/DavisVol40No3 Fisher.pdf 
55 Ibid. 585.
M’ Thomas Pogge, ‘A Global Resources Dividend’ in David A. Crocker and Toby Linden (Eds), Ethics o f
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Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz has long been advocating the use of prizes as motivation in 
an alternative model of pharmaceutical innovation. My work in Chapter 7 is partly built 
upon his arguments about the limitations of the patent system and the relevance of a 
prize model. In a recent article with Arjun Jayadev, Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz 
maintains that:
Most importantly, the prize fund mechanism is a way in which to provide a 
certain guaranteed return to an innovator to cover the (considerable) costs of 
production. Under such a system, a guaranteed prize (let us say US $ 1 billion) 
will be provided to the first producer of a viable therapy for a neglected disease. 
Once produced and paid for by the prize, the drug can be provided at cost. Drugs 
that provide little additional therapeutic value will be provided compensation from 
the fund, but at a substantially reduced amount. Such a program can be funded 
either by industrialized countries or philanthropic organizations.57
One possible limitation of the prize model is its implementation cost which is expected 
to be far above the reach of developed countries. Stiglitz suggests that such a model can 
be implemented through a mutual financing of developing countries suffering from a 
particular neglected disease. However, the likelihood of such partnerships are quite low. 
There are two possible solutions which can help in overcoming this problem. First, the
Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship (United Kingdom: Rovvman & Littlefield, 
1998), 501.
^ Joseph E Stiglitz and Arjun Jayadev, ‘Medicine for Tomorrow: Some Alternative Proposals to Promote 
Socially Beneficial Research and Development in Pharmaceuticals’ (2010) 7(3) Journal o f  Generic 
Medicines 217-226, 221 at
http://policvdialouue.org/files/publieations/JES JournalGenericMedicine Medicine for tomorrow, pdf. 
Also see: Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York, W.W. Norton & Co: 2007) and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York, W.W. Norton & Co: 2003).
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cost should be allocated solely to affluent countries and the justifications in this regard 
can be borrowed from William W. Fisher and Talha Syed. 58 Second, the use of 
miniature prize models should be encouraged instead of one large prize initiative. It will 
minimise cost related risks and constraints and developing countries will willingly 
consider participating in this system. James Love has suggested some miniature prize 
models and I have preferred this solution in this thesis in the context of India and the 
access to medicine problem. 54
Two more solutions, open source drug discovery and patent pools, are discussed in this 
thesis in the purview of equitable licensing and publicly funded research. I have used 
the theoretical construct of Yochai Benkler to develop a case for reforms in the existing 
Indian policies of proprietary ownership. Benkler presents a compelling case for 
commons-based peer production utilising the creative input and skills of a large number 
of people who work and participate for all sorts of intrinsic reasons beyond commercial 
gains and profit-making. 60 Benkler first introduced this idea in his seminal paper, 
‘Coase’s Penguin’61, and elaborated a comprehensive theory of social production in his 
book, The Wealth o f Networks. In his book, Benkler briefly discussed the possibilities of
William W. Fisher and Talha Sycd, ‘A Prize System as a Partial Solution to the Health Crisis in the 
Developing World’ in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer and Kim Rubenstein (eds) Incentives for Global 
Public Health: Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
2010), 181.
54 James Love, ‘Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Technologies, and New' Methods of Stimulating 
Medical R & D’ (2006) 40 U.C. Davis Law Review 679-715.
60 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth o f  Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006).
1,1 Yochai Benkler, ‘Coase’s Penguin, Or Linux and the Nature of the Firm’ (2002) 112 Yale Law Journal 
369-446 at http://yalelawiournal.org/1 12/3/369 voehai bcnkler.html
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social production of essential medicines to meet the needs of developing countries.62 
However, the details and practical arrangements in this regard were largely missing 
from earlier accounts of Benkler’s work. Professor Arti Rai took a lead by proposing an 
open source drug discovery model in the form of the Tropical Disease Initiative.63 I have 
used these theoretical frameworks to justify and develop a case for open source drug 
discovery in the Indian context.
This thesis also discusses the potential of patent pools in resolving the problem of 
access to essential medicines. Several commentators have sporadically discussed the 
option of creating a patent pool in the Indian context but this thesis for the first time 
comprehensively conceives a case for a patent pool and its implications for India. Using 
the theoretical foundations of Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, I have 
argued that India should actively consider participating in patent pool initiatives both 
for its domestic needs and pharmaceutical exports. In 1998, Michael A. Heller and 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg coined the term ‘tragedy of anticommons’ to demonstrate the 
problem of excessive patenting in the field of biomedical and pharmaceutical research.64 
They argued that the tragedy of anticommons lies in under-utilisation of resources 
resulting in millions of poor patients living without access to secure life-saving drugs. 
Patents create barriers not only to access the patented products but also to develop and 
improve related technologies which are the crucial, and in some cases exclusive, means
62 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth o f Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006) 355.
63 Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai and Andrej Sali, ‘Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an 
Answer?’ (December 2004) 1 (3) Public Library o f Science Medicine 183-186 atl 84 at 
http://www.plosmedicine.Org/article/info:doi/10.1371/iournal.pmed.OO 10056
64 Michael A. Hellerand Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research’ (1 May 1998) 280 (5364) Science 698-701 at 
http://www.scienceiTum.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698
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of scientific research and development. '15 Heller further discusses various options of 
overcoming the problem associated with the tragedy of anticommons.66
VI. Comparative Law
This thesis is fundamentally focused on India and the case studies which are presented 
in this work provide an explanation of access to medicines related implication of 
ongoing policy and legislative developments in India. In doing so, I have drawn up 
comparative analysis of laws and cases in the light of jurisprudence developed in other 
jurisdictions. The reference to the laws and cases of the United States are frequently 
used in the analysis to show similarities, differences and future policy options. The 
reason for using the Unites States as a comparator is due to its leadership role in shaping 
global intellectual property norms. This role has not always been appreciated by 
developing and least developing countries. The policies employed by the United States 
have been instrumental in the development and the adoption of bilateral and multilateral 
intellectual property frameworks. Moreover, the domestic developments in the Unites 
States and cases dealing with patents are also providing a lead in determining the future 
direction of patent law. The trade flows between India and the United States are also 
increasing and emerging bilateral ties between both countries will definitely redefine 
existing regulatory framework in India. To forecast India’s future role as the pharmacy 
of the developing world, it is important to evaluate how India will adjust its domestic 
policies while solidifying its partnership with the United States.
The United States is, however, not the single comparator used in this thesis for
65 Ibid.
66 Michael A. Heller. The Gridlock Economy: IIow Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stop 
Innovation, and Costs Lives (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 69-75.
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comparative analysis. This thesis does explore the historical origins of Indian patent law 
-  and highlights the imperial role of the United Kingdom in shaping principles, rules, 
and practices in this area. I have also referred to legislation and case law of the United 
Kingdom especially in Chapter 2, The Making o f Modern Indian Patent Law, to provide 
historical linkages of Indian patent regime with early patent laws of the United 
Kingdom.
This thesis also explores contemporary European conflicts involving access to 
medicines. In Chapter 5, Patent Enforcement, Border Measures and Access to EssentiaI 
Medicines, I have extensively dealt with the European case law to analyse the 
implications of the EU Border Regulation on access to medicines. As this issue is 
closely linked with the detention of generic drugs by the European Custom authorities, 
so it was appropriate to provide an overview of the case law and legal opinions of 
different European courts.
Chapter 8, India, TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and the Future o f 
Access to Essential Medicines, focuses on TRIPS-plus regimes and its impact on India. I 
have deliberately selected United States as a comparator in this chapter despite the fact 
that the EU is currently negotiating a free trade agreement with India. This is done for 
following reasons. First, the EU does not have any standard FTA template which can be 
used as an analytical tool to judge the scope and implications of TRIPS-plus demands. 
The scope and depth of EU’s economic partnership agreements and FTAs are varying 
and it is difficult to identify a single European approach on TRIPS-plus issues. Second, 
this chapter is primarily dealing with the impact of TRIPS-plus measures on access to 
medicines. The position of the European Union on TRIPS-plus is diverse and relatively 
mild. To provide a complete analysis of TRIPS-plus measures in Indian context, it was
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important to compare with a full-fledged TRIPS-plus regime and the United States is 
the only comparator in this regard. Third, although the EU is negotiating a free trade 
agreement with India, the discussions remain unresolved. There has been no official text 
released which can illuminate the IP provisions and their impact. In the absence of a 
uniform and standard practice of the EU, it is even hard to presume how India would 
deal with such framework. So for the sake of predictability and in-depth analysis of 
TRIPS-plus measures, I have focused on the Unites States approach towards FTAs.
VII. Structure and Chapter Outline
This thesis examines the future of India as the pharmacy of the developing world in the 
light of some core case studies, and the analysis of key national and international 
developments influencing the debate of patents and access to medicines. The thematic 
focus is, therefore, on Indian law, international rules governing patents and access to 
medicines and the future dimensions of this debate. This thesis focuses, in particular, 
upon the time period between 2005 and 2010, in order to evaluate the implementation of 
the TRIPS Agreement 1994 in India. The law is stated as at December 2010.
The original contribution of this thesis lies in its case studies which provide a solid basis 
for evaluating the efficacy and robustness of the international patent regime. These case 
studies show the complex dynamics of the process of internalisation which developing 
countries such as India, face in the course of the legislative and enforcement process. 
This thesis also uniquely elaborates the structural problems of the international patent 
regime in the context of India, and the access to medicines debate. Building upon the 
existing literature, this thesis for the first time contextualises the application of the 
World Trade Organization’s rules related to TRIPS and access to medicine, and 
concludes that India has so far failed to use the flexibilities of the system. The blame
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partly goes both to India and the World Trade Organization for the lack of political will 
and the severity of relevant rules. This thesis further fills an important gap in the 
existing literature on the Indian patent regime. It has for the first time studied the scope 
and relevance of alternative models of pharmaceutical innovation in the Indian context. 
The regulation of publicly funded research in India is also discussed in the thesis to 
suggest an appropriate policy response in the form of equitable licensing arrangements.
Chapter Two, ‘The Making of Modem Indian Patent Law’, traces the historical 
evolution of Indian patent law and its significance in the emergence of the domestic 
pharmaceutical industry. With a brief introduction relating to the earlier patent regime 
in India, this chapter focuses on developments taking place after India signed the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994. I have, thereafter, discussed key amendments in the patent law with an 
in-depth focus on the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India). Unlike other works on 
Indian patent law, this thesis traces the legislative history of the Patents (Amendment) 
Act 2005 (India) in the light of Parliamentary debates and argues that the existing state 
of the Indian patent regime should be construed in India’s typical political context. The 
chapter concludes that, contrary to general perception, the Indian Parliament failed to 
devise an holistic and long term patent policy for the country. Most of the debate on 
Indian patent law is dominated by a few politically more sensitive issues and there is a 
general lack of clarity and understanding about systematic implications of the patent 
regime on the pharmaceutical sector and access to essential medicines.
Chapter Three focuses on the judgment of the Chennai High Court in Novartis AG v.
Union o f India, highlighting the interpretation of Indian patent law and international
treaty standards. This case, which mainly deals with the legality of Section 3(d) of the
Patents Act 1970 (India), depicts the precise nature of the tension which developing
countries are experiencing in the process of implementation of the TRIPS Agreement
1994. Examining the legality of Section 3(d) in the light of patent law, constitutional
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provisions and the threshold of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, reveals that developing 
countries can gain from intelligently designing national patent regimes. The chapter 
concludes that India should retain and proactively apply the requirements of Section 
3(d) to discourage evergreening of patents. It will help to smooth the transition to a 
product patent regime in India with relatively less adverse impacts on access to 
medicines.
Chapter Four considers the Pfizer-Natco controversy, establishing the limitations of 
WTO rules in the compulsory licensing of patents for humanitarian purposes. Indian 
pharmaceutical exports play a very important role in the global access to medicines 
campaign and among the potential threats to this source is the introduction of a product 
patent regime in India. With the help of the Natco compulsory licensing controversy, I 
argue here that both the international law framework and Indian patent law have failed 
to devise a workable and efficient access to medicine regimes to facilitate drug exports 
to countries with little or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. The futility of the 
Waiver Decision 2003 is evident from the Natco compulsory licensing saga when an 
Indian manufacturer failed to export medicine to a neighbouring least-developing 
country, Nepal. The chapter concludes that the objectives of the Doha Declaration 2001 
cannot be achieved, without substantial reforms to the Waiver Decision 2003.
Chapter Five considers the impact of strategies for patent enforcement and border
measures, upon the ease of access to medicines in developing countries. First, I discuss
the case, Roche v. Cipla, in highlighting some of the contentious issues of patent law
enforcement in the domestic context. This case mainly involves the grant of injunctive
relief in an alleged case of non-authorised manufacturing of Roche’s patented drug,
Tarceva. Cipla, the defendant in this case, maintained that injunctive relief should not be
granted in this case for a variety of reasons including the exorbitant price of Roche’s
patented drug. Upholding the position of Cipla in this case, the Delhi High Court laid
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down detailed criteria for granting injunctive relief in patent infringement matters 
including the public health implications of such cases. In the light of recent cases in the 
United States, I have argued that this position is fully consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 and other jurisprudential norms. The second part of this chapter 
explores the impact of recent instances of seizure of Indian generic exports by European 
customs authorities. These developments are clearly against the spirit of the Doha 
Declaration 2001 and developing countries should resist this trend both at bilateral and 
multilateral forums.
In Chapter Six, I consider the relevance of equitable licensing, open source drug 
discovery and patent pools in the context of India and access to essential medicines. The 
chapter starts with a critical analysis of the Bayh-Dole Act 1980 (US) to show that this 
model is not appropriate for India. Indian policy makers should develop a regulatory 
framework suitable to the needs of Indian industry and poor consumers. In its existing 
form, the Protection and Utilisation o f Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill 2008 
(India) fails to accommodate the concerns of patient groups, human rights activists and 
the community of academics and scholars. As an alternative to the proprietary model of 
publicly funded research, I further discuss in this chapter, the relevance of the open 
source drug discovery initiative with respect to India. Using Yochai Benkler’s peer 
production and commons-based social production framework, a case is developed to 
implement open source drug discovery projects in India as an alternative to patent-based 
incentives. India’s comparative advantage in the form of highly skilled labour, 
information technology expertise and a scientific workforce can play a decisive role in 
this regard.
The final part of Chapter Six deals with the proposal for creating patent pools to address
the problem of pharmaceutical research and development in the area of neglected and
tropical diseases. Drawing upon Heller and Eisenbergs’ theory of the tragedy of
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anticommons, I argue in this chapter that India can benefit from the proposed patent 
pool both at international and national levels. Any successful implementation of a patent 
pool, such as the one suggested by the UNITAID, will eventually strengthen India’s role 
as the pharmacy of the developing world. The chapter finally argues that a delicate mix 
of open source innovation strategy and patent pools should shape India’s future patent 
policy and any attempt to prescribe a strong patent regime must be discouraged.
Chapter Seven presents two alternative models of medical innovation designed to 
promote the discovery of drugs needed for the treatment of poor patients. The first 
model discussed in this chapter deals with prizes, particularly as depicted by Professor 
Joseph Stiglitz and James Love. There are many promising features of a prize model 
which can help in overcoming the problems of patents. For the first time, this thesis 
contextualises the prize model in an Indian perspective and argues that India will 
substantially gain from successful implementation of the prize system. The second 
alternative model elaborated in this chapter deals with the Health Impact Fund 
developed by Professor Thomas Pogge I discuss the meaning and relevance of this 
model for India with a conclusion that India may be reluctant to participate in a global 
Health Impact Fund. The main constraint is this regard is its huge implementation cost 
which will become a disadvantage for developing countries.
Chapter Eight contends that TRIPS-plus intellectual property standards may
compromise the interests of developing countries and poor patients in having access to
affordable medicines and health-care. These TRIPS-plus standards, which mainly
reflect the provisions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
o f 1984 (US), shrink the policy space which India is enjoying under the TRIPS
Agreement 1994. The potential impact of typical TRIPS-plus provisions -  patent term
extensions, patent-regulatory approval linkage, data exclusivity and restrictions on
compulsory licensing and parallel importation -  are discussed in this chapter to suggest
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an appropriate policy response for India. India should refrain from signing a TRIPS- 
Plus free trade agreement with any of its trading partners as it will hinder the global 
access to medicines campaign.
Chapter Nine presents an overall conclusion and a set of recommendations for key 
stakeholders. The future of the Indian access to medicine regime largely depends upon 
several factors and developments which are discussed in this thesis. Unless the Indian 
government seriously revisits its policy options, Indian generic drugs will face a setback 
amidst the implementation of new patent law. The flexibilities and safeguard provisions 
of Indian patent law cannot effectively work in isolation and there is a pressing need to 
reform global patent norms and practices to provide better incentives and a regulatory 
structure for access to essential medicines. Existing approaches taken at multilateral 
forums have failed and should be completely revamped. The chapter then provides 
policy recommendations to the Indian Government, the World Trade Organization, the 
World Health Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization, to 
streamline and coordinate their efforts in the area of patents for access to medicines.
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Chapter 2
The Making of Modern Indian Patent Law
I. Introduction
Paradoxically, the more the past is neglected, the more control it is able to wield 
over the future.
Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, 
The Making o f Modem Intellectual Property LaW’6 7
On May 6, 1981, the ex-Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi delivered a keynote 
address at the thirty-fourth World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization, 
lamenting the problem of the lack of affordable and equitable access to patented 
medicines and pharmaceutical drugs:
Affluent societies are spending vast sums of money understandably on the search 
for new products and processes to alleviate suffering and to prolong life. In the 
process, drug manufacture has become a powerful industry, subject to the same 
driving considerations of other big industries, that is, concentration on profit, 
fierce competition and recourse to hard-sell advertising. Medicines, which may be 
of the utmost value to poorer countries, can be bought by us only at exorbitant 
prices, since we are unable to have adequate independent bases of research and 
production. This apart, sometimes dangerous new drugs are tried out on 
populations of weaker countries although their use is prohibited within the 
countries of manufacture. It also happens publicity makes us victims of habits and 
practices which are economically wasteful or wholly contrary to good health ...
6 Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making o f Modern Intellectual Property’ Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2.
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My idea of a better ordered world is one in which medical discoveries would be 
free of patents and there would be no profiteering from life or death.68
This utopian vision of a "better ordered world’ evoked the Patents Act 1970 (India) 
which excluded pharmaceutical drugs from the scope of patentable subject matter. This 
session of World Health Assembly resulted in the adoption of the Global Strategy for 
Health for All,69
It is, however, paradoxical to observe that Indian patent law underwent a paradigm shift 
in the same decade. On September 12, 1989, India announced that it would principally 
accept the international enforcement of intellectual property rights within the framework 
of the Uruguay Round Negotiations.70 This major shift in the Indian stance was perhaps 
the most significant development in the negotiation history of the Trade-Related 
Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement 1994). Between 
1986 and 1989, the developing countries led by India and Brazil vehemently resisted the 
inclusion of intellectual property rights in multilateral trade negotiations under the 
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, in 1989, 
India abandoned its long lasting opposition and agreed to negotiate trade related 
intellectual property rights within the Uruguay Round context."' This process
68 Robert Ostergard, Jr., ‘Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right?’ (1999) 21(1) Human Rights 
Quarterly 156-178 at
http://muse. ihu.edu/journals/humanrights C|uarterly/v021 /2 1.1 osteruard.html#FOOT69
69 World Health Organization, World Assembly Resolution Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year 
2000, WHA 34.36 of 22 May 1981 at http://www.un.ore gophcr-data/ga/rccs/36/43
7(1 Susan Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization o f Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 109.
71 Ibid.
38
culminated in the form of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 which ultimately wrought drastic 
changes to Indian patent law.
The history of Indian patent law is rich, complex and multifaceted. It demonstrates the 
intricacies of the Indian political and legal systems which had undergone a massive 
transformation since independence. Professor Amartya Sen comments on the diversity 
of Indian culture and history and notes that:
India is an immensely diverse country with many distinct pursuits, vastly 
disparate convictions, widely divergent customs and a veritable feast of 
viewpoints. Any attempt to talk about the culture of the country, or about its past 
history or contemporary politics, must inescapably involve considerable 
selection. 2
This observation is fully applicable in the case of the history of Indian patent law which 
is often simplistically narrated and interpreted without considering the widely divergent 
political and social factors underpinning the development of India's modem patent 
regime.
Modern Indian patent law requires an understanding of its historical origins.
Unfortunately, most of the literature dedicated to the history of Indian patent law often
tends to simplify the context in which Indian patent law ultimately developed and
shaped. ' The most popular account is a post-colonial narrative which explains Indian
patent law as a response to India’s post-independence policy shift. In this regard,
commentators and authors discuss the impact of earlier laws on the pharmaceutical
72 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005) ix.
1 Feroz Ali Khader, The Law o f Patents: With a Special Focus on Pharmaceuticals in India (New Delhi, 
India: LcxisNexis Butterworths: 2007).
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sector. While these narratives are partly true they have failed to consider the intricacies 
of political discourse which dominated the process of patent law development. Today, 
for this reason, we are very much familiar with an earlier judicial committee’s report but 
little is known about the political process which precipitated a national consensus on 
this issue. As Professor Brad Sherman and Professor Lionel Bently have observed, the 
evolution of patent law should not be seen as the pre-destined outcome of higher 
philosophical discourse. 74 It should instead be construed in the light of a complex 
mixture of social, political and economic developments.
Professor Amartya Sen argues that India has a longstanding tradition of public 
discussion and reasoning which forms the very core of Indian democracy.7’ He suggests 
that this tradition has been extremely useful in building and shaping today’s India. This 
construction of Amartya Sen, the Argumentative Indian, is clearly reflected in the 
process of development of Indian patent law. A historical account of Indian patent law 
shows how different stakeholders have eventually shaped Indian patent law as a 
continuous process of public discourse and political process.
This chapter seeks to build upon a tradition of critical historiography of intellectual 
property. In a review essay for the Sydney Law Review, Kathy Bowrey and Natalie 
Fowell have called for the writing of nuanced histories of intellectual property, which 
are attentive to both the particulars of history and the limits of positive law:
The weight of the present, where global decisions about intellectual property loom
large, is bound to filter into our understanding of history and our human
4 Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making o f Modern Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
5 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity (New York: 
Farrar, Straits and Giroux, 2005) 12.
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responses. It is also difficult to escape from current understandings of the world, 
technology, the built environment, communications, social organisation and 
progress. But, at the same time, we are hoping for the human element we supply 
as writers and readers of intellectual property law to be more than antipathy or 
empathy toward particular policy winners and losers. An understanding of history 
should also lead to a more nuanced understanding of legal power and its relation 
to politics -  including of law’s essential incompleteness, limits and complications 
in readily securing political objectives. For this reason, we think we need to 
understand more critically what it is about the construction of the present global 
institution of intellectual property that presses so much on us, that we have begun 
to read legal history as primarily just a record of policy choices, identifying 
winners, losers and compromises. 76
Accordingly, this chapter engages in a critical reading of the histories of Indian patent 
law, and attends to the interplay between domestic national politics and international 
trade negotiations, and the relationship between law and power.
This chapter charts the historical evolution of Indian patent law, highlighting key 
landmarks in the political debate and legislative change. Given the diversity of political 
opinions, the debates about amendments in India patent law were intense and 
passionate. Among the typical stakeholders who rigorously participated in the 
discussions and public consultations were business organisations, patients’ rights 
groups, local and international non-govemmental organisations, political workers and 
community activists. The political environment which has shaped the patent statute in 
India deserves a better understating across the party lines. The dynamics of political
6 Kathy Bowrcy and Natalie Fowcll, ‘Digging Up Fragments and Building IP Franchises’, (2009) 31 
Sydney Law Review 185 at 186.
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coalitions which prompted important policy debates about the relevance of patent law 
could not find appropriate space in academic literature. The role of the Indian 
Parliament in the adoption of the most recent amendments in Indian patent law has been 
generally ignored and an overwhelming focus is on transnational and non-political 
actors. Part II of this chapter deals with the colonial and post-colonial era of Indian 
patent law, and considers early developments of Indian patent law under British rule 
and further reforms initiated after Indian independence in 1947. This part discusses key 
features of the Patents Act 1970 (India). Part III considers the changes which emerged 
after 1994 when India signed the TRIPS Agreement 1994. In this part, I have separately 
discussed first, the Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 (India), and second, the Patents 
(Amendment) Act 2002 (India), amendments to the Patents Act 1970 (India). Part IV 
specifically deals with the most recent amendments in Indian Law -  the Patents 
(Amendment) Act 2005 (India).
II. Evolution of Indian Patent Law: Impact of Nehru’s Socialist 
Economy
A. The Colonial Era o f Indian Patent Law
India has its own established tradition of patent law and policy. Although the initial 
patent regime was a legal transplantation of British colonial law, the Indian legal system 
has since developed and implemented local reforms and innovations.
After the Great Indian Rebellion, the British Empire gained full control of India in 
1857, and introduced massive legal and institutional reforms. The first Indian patent 
statute was passed by the Legislative Council of India in 1856 which was based on the 
Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852 (United Kingdom).77 The Act VI of 1856 introduced
77 Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks-Government of India, History of Indian Patent
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certain exclusive privileges to inventors of new manufactures for a period of 14 years. 
This Act was subsequently repealed in 1857 because it had been enacted without the 
approval of the British Crown. A new law was enacted on March 19, 1859 with the 
sanction of the Crown which introduced a broader definition of the terms ‘invention’ 
and ‘manufacture’.78
In 1872, the Patents and Designs Protection Act (India)74 was promulgated which was 
later amended through the Protection o f Invention Act 1883 (India) to introduce an 
amendment to novelty with regard to the international exhibition held in Calcutta, India 
in 1883-84.80 A major step was taken in 1888 towards the consolidation of patent laws 
in India when all three enactments, the Acts of 1859, 1872 and 1888, were repealed with 
the promulgation of the Inventions and Designs Act 1888 (India).81 This law shifted the 
administration of patent-related matter from the Home Department to the Department of 
Revenue and Agriculture. The Act also elaborated the specification of invention 
requirement in terms of best mode disclosure and enablement.82 It is pertinent to note 
that the Inventions and Designs Act 1888 (India) was modelled on the British Patent 
Law Amendment Act o f 1852 (United Kingdom) despite the fact that a revised patent 
system had already been implemented in the United Kingdom as a result of Patents,
System (4 January 2010) at http://\vw\v.patentofficc.nic.in/ipr/patcnt/patents.htm 
N James Fraser, A Hand-Book o f Patent and Copyright Law: English and Foreign (London: Sampson 
Low, Son & Co., 1860) 64.
' 1 Dcbashis Chakraborty and Amir Ullah Khan, The WTO Deadlocked: Understanding the Dynamics o f 
International Trade (New Delhi: Sage Publications Ltd, 2008) 244.
80 Tanuja V. Garde, ‘India’ in Paul Goldstein et al (cds), Intellectual Property in Asia: Law, Economics, 
History and Politics (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 58.
81 Vcd P. Mithal, ‘Patents in India’ (1948) 30 Journal o f  the Patent Office Society 62-69, 62.
82 Tanuja V. Garde, ‘India’ in Paul Goldstein et al (eds), Intellectual Property in Asia: Law, Economics, 
History and Politics (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 58.
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Designs and Trademarks Act 1883 (United Kingdom). The reason behind this was 
explained in 1910 when further amendments were considered and it was stated with 
regard to the Inventions and Designs Act 1888 (India) that the ‘time was not yet ripe in 
(India) for introducing the English practice in its entirety as the volume of patent work 
was then small’.83
In 1911, the colonial Patents and Designs Act 1911 (India) was enacted. This law 
provided for the first time the establishment of a patent administration system in India 
in the form of the Controller of Patents. By that time, India had already developed a 
reasonable industrial base with the expansion of the technology sector. Although India 
continued to be thriving as an agriculture based economy, it increasingly developed an 
industrial manufacturing base.84 At the time of World War I, India was ranked 
fourteenth among the industrialised countries with most of the industrial activity in 
textile, food processing and metals sectors.8’ It was then realised that the process of 
patent filing in India should be upgraded in light of the Patents and Designs Act o f 1907 
(United Kingdom).
The Patents and Designs Act 1911 (India) created a priority system between India and 
the United Kingdom to facilitate Indian patent applications.86 The term of patent was 
fixed at sixteen years from the date of filing with a possibility for extension of up to
83 Ibid.
84 For a comprehensive analysis of Indian economic history: Tapan Raychaudhuri, Irfan Habib and 
Dharma Kumar, The Cambridge Economic History o f  India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982).
85 Denis Judd. The Lion and the Tiger: The Rise and Fall o f the British Raj, 1600-1947 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 100.
86 Section 78 A of the Patents and Designs Act 1911 (India)
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seven years.x7 Under the Act, the word ‘patent’ was substituted for the term ‘exclusive 
privileges’ which was earlier used, and it also provided for the compulsory examination 
of patent applications. Under the Act, the Patents and Designs Rules 1912 (India) were 
framed for the first time to streamline the functioning of the Indian Patent Office.88 The 
Patents and Designs Act 1911 (India) was amended several times to establish reciprocal 
arrangements between British India and the United Kingdom for the mutual protection 
of inventions and designs. The Act continued until the enactment of new laws in 1970.
The Patents and Designs Act 1911 (India) was an important precursor of future 
developments in the area of Indian patent policy. The Indian pharmaceutical industry 
could not benefit from the provisions of this law and its progress was effectively stalled 
by multinational pharmaceutical companies. According to Sudip Chaudhuri, the Patents 
and Designs Act 1911 (India) was used to prevent Indian drug companies from 
manufacturing products which were invented abroad.80 The patent filing record also 
shows that the Indian domestic pharmaceutical industry rarely benefited from the 
opportunities incorporated in the law. Out of a total 1,099 patent applications filed in 
1930, 80% were filed by foreigners.90 The accumulative total reached 2,610 patent 
applications at the time of independence in 1947 when the Indian population was almost
87 Section 14 of the Patents and Designs Act 1911 (India)
88 Ved Mithal, ‘Patents in India’ (1948) 30 Journal o f the Patent Office Society 62-69, 63.
8) Sudip Chaudhuri, The WTO and India's Pharmaceuticals Industry: Patent Protection, TRIPS, and 
Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 128-132.
00 Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and 
the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 491 -641, 
508 at http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu/issues/68/68.3/Mueller.pdf
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400 million.1'1 The basic drug manufacturing which later became a hallmark of the 
Indian drug industry was virtually non-existent before World War II.
B. The Nationalist Era o f  Indian Patent Law
A new era of economic development and policy framework followed after the 
declaration of Indian independence in 1947. Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National 
Congress took charge of the newly created independent state of India.
Under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, the Indian Government 
engaged in extensive social and economic policy-making.92 Soon after resuming the 
charge of prime ministership, Jawaharlal Nehru introduced the mechanism of 
centralised planning in the form of the Planning Commission of India which charted the 
government’s investments in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The Industrial 
Policy Resolution 1956 (India) recommended the growth of diverse manufacturing and 
heavy industries.93 A focus on the pharmaceutical industry emerged in this context.
In the sphere of social policy, Jawaharlal Nehru’s administration faced multiple 
challenges. A large number of Indians were living in rural areas and the health care 
system was completely inadequate to meet the requirements of the masses. Drug prices 
were high and almost all critical medicines such as insulin and penicillin were imported
91 Ibid.
92 For an overview of Indira Gandhi’s economic and political legacy: Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi 
(India: National Book Trust: 2006). Also see for a critical perspective: Charles Robert Hankla, ‘Party 
Linkages and Economic Policy: An Examination of Indira Gandhi’s India’ (2006) 8(3) Business and 
Politics Article 4.
93 M. Mustafa, ‘Genesis of Private Entrepreneurship in Large Scale Sector in India’ in Sami Uddin et al 
(eds), Entrepreneurial Development in India (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1990) 165.
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in the absence of local manufacturing.44 According to India’s first Five Year Plan 1952, 
multinational companies controlled more than 90% of the drug industry.45 India had the 
largest reservoir of epidemic diseases and it was reported that these diseases accounted 
for 5.1% of total deaths. In 1961, US Senator Estes Kefauver remarked that Indian drug 
prices ranked among the highest in the world.46 The provision of effective and 
affordable medicines became a top priority agenda of the government. There were 
mainly two restraints in this regard. First, the absence of large scale local manufacturing 
of pharmaceuticals as the market was dominated by foreign companies. Second, price 
control mechanisms were absent and multinational firms were leading the trend 
according to their priorities.
In order to address such concerns, the Indian Government appointed a Patent Inquiry
Committee in 1948.* 4 The Committee headed by Justice Bukshi Tek Chand submitted its
report in 1949 which was introduced in Parliament in 1953. However, this report lapsed
when a Patent Bill could not be passed in light of the Committee’s recommendations
with the dissolution of Lok Sabha.4* Justice Bukshi Tek Chand Report analysed the
44 Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India's Patent System and 
the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 491 -641, 
508 at http://lavvreviewJavv.pitt.edU/issucs/68/68.3/Mueller.pdf
” Srividhya Ragavan, ‘Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round’ (2006) 10 (2) Marquette Intellectual
Property Law Review 273-304, 280 at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=895007 
46 Srividhya Ragavan. ‘Can’t We All Get Along? The Case for a Workable Patent Model’ (2003) 35 
(01 17) Arizona State Law Journal 1-100, 21 (footnote 108) at 
http://papcrs.ssrn.com/sol3/papcrs.cfin7abstract id=360040.
4 Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and 
the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 491-641,
511 at http://lavvrevievv.iavv.pitt.edu/issues/68/68.3/Mueller.pdf
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failure of the Indian patent system to stimulate innovation and proposed the introducton 
of a compulsory licensing regime in India. These recommendations were similar to tiat 
of the Swan Committee Report in the United Kingdom.1'9
Although this report could not be adopted, India’s future patent policy was largely 
informed from the recommendations of the Justice Bukshi Tek Chand Report. All oiits 
recommendations were further elaborated and expanded in another influential report 
which is known as the Shri Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar Report.10" This landmark 
1959 report studied comparative patent regimes and identified several polcy 
recommendations to overhaul the Indian patent system. The operational part of he 
Ayyangar Report can be summarised as follows:
(i) identification of the types of inventions for which patent protection should be 
available;
(ii) determination either to prohibit the granting of Indian patents to foreign entiies 
or to require working of such patents in India; and
(iii) determination to withstand international pressures on India to join internatknal 
intellectual property conventions such as the Paris Convention, which requred 
national treatment.101
http://vvwvv.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/DraftPatent Manual 2008.pdf
99 UK Board of Trade, K. R. Swan, Patents and Designs Acts, Second Interim Report o f the Departmeital 
Committee, 1945-46 ((1946). Also see: Tanuja V. Garde, ‘India’ in Paul Goldstein et al (cds), Intellecual 
Property' in Asia: Law, Economics, History and Politics (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 59.
100 Shri Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Report on the Revision o f the Patent Law (Government of Inlia: 
September 1959) 3 at http:/7vvww'.spicvip.com/ip-resources
101 Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent Systen 
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 49 -
48
This report is largely believed to be the most influential doeument in the history of 
Indian patent law as it shaped the future direction of Indian patent law which provided a 
cutting edge to the local pharmaceutical industry.
The Ayyangar Report evaluated the effectiveness of the Indian patent regime in an 
historical context. Adopting a comparative methodology, the Committee’s Report 
frequently refers to the evolution of patent regimes in countries like United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany and Australia. The report attends to patent reforms and 
revisions in other Commonwealth countries, such as Australia. 102 It is, however, 
interesting to note that the substantive part of the Ayyangar Report was not very well 
informed from the Australian experience. Most of its analysis on the patentability of 
pharmaceuticals and chemical substances was confined to European jurisprudence.
Ayyangar rejected the notion that India should completely abandon a patent-based 
incentive strategy and observed that:
With all the handicaps which the system involves in its applications to under­
developed countries, there are no alternative methods for achieving better results. 
As present there is no country in the world that does not adopt the patent system 
of rewarding inventors ... Even a country which has adopted a socialistic 
economic system such as U.S.S.R the law makes provision for the grant of patents 
in the same manner as in the rest of Europe ... I consider that the Patent system is 
the most desirable method of encouraging inventors and rewarding them.10'
641,512 at hltp://lavvrcvicvv.law.pitt.cdu/issues/68/68.3/Mucllcr.pdf
l0^  Shri Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Report on the Revision o f the Patent Law (Government of India: 
September 1959) 3 at http: \v\v\v,spicvip.com/ ip-resourccs 
103 Ibid. Paragraph 39-40.
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This clearly shows that an attempt was made to devise an innovative solution within the 
framework of a patent system. Although Jawaharlal Nehru had already introduced a 
semi-socialistic economic model in India, there was no popular demand for the abolition 
of the existing patent system. Such situation did not even appear later when Indira 
Gandhi tightened the State’s grip over economic activity under her socialist agenda.
One of the key recommendations of the Ayyangar Report was about the patentability of 
pharmaceutical products and chemical substances. After studying the historical 
evolution of pharmaceutical patents in several European countries, Ayyangar 
recommended that patents on pharmaceutical product chemical substances should not be 
granted in India following the German tradition of process patents and the law of the 
People’s Republic of China.1"4
Despite two successive reports developing an arguably convincing case for patent law 
reforms in India, the Indian Parliament could not immediately adopt such appropriate 
legislative measures. With the death of Jawaharlal Nehru on May 27, 1964, the Indian 
National Congress went through a leadership crisis which was finally resolved in 
January 24, 1966 when his daughter Indira Gandhi finally became Prime Minister.105 
Indira Gandhi gradually assumed a strong leadership role and enacted a new patent law 
on September 19, 1970 which had repealed the Patents and Designs Act 1911 (India). 
The new legislation, the Patents Act 1970 (India) came into force on April 20, 1972.106 
The Patents Act 1970 (India) brought a major policy shift in the Indian patent regime 
and India delinked itself from the colonial legacy of patent law. This law was 
extensively debated in both Houses of the Indian Parliament. A joint Select Committee
104 Ibid. Paragraph 60-61.
Ilb Duncan B. Forrester, ‘After Nehru'’ (November 1965) 19 Parliamentary Affairs 208-217.
106 The Patents Act 1970 (India), Act 39 of 1970 at http:/7w\vvv.patentofliee.me.in ipr patent patents.htm
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thoroughly scrutinised this law in light of the reports of Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar 
and Justice Bukshi Tek Chand.107
There were two stated objectives of the Patents Act 1970 (India): the development of a 
national pharmaceuticals industry and the provision of affordable access to medicines 
for Indian consumers. To achieve these objectives, the Patents Act 1970 (India) 
imposed substantial limits on patent rights to encourage indigenous inventions and 
secure their production in India on a commercial scale. Pharmaceutical products were 
declared non-patentable. Drug companies were permitted to patent only a single process 
for making a pharmaceutical.108 A patentee could not block competition by patenting all 
possible processes for manufacturing a drug. Moreover the term for pharmaceutical 
process patents was reduced to five years from the grant of the patent or seven years 
from application filing, whichever was less.'09 For the first time in the history of India, 
the Patents Act 1970 (India) introduced broad compulsory licensing provisions in 
respect of pharmaceutical process patents."0 Within three years of the grant, the patents 
were deemed ‘licenses of right’, meaning that anyone could use the process if a royalty 
was paid.1"
After the enactment of the Patents Act 1970 (India), Indian pharmaceutical firms thrived 
and greatly increased their market share within a few years. According to Jean O.
1(1 Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System 
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 491 - 
641,512 at http://lawrevicvv.law.pitt.edU/issucs/68/68.3/Mucller.pdf 
,ox Section 5 of the Patents Act 1970 (India), Act 39 of 1970 at 
http://vvwvv.patcntoflicc.nic.in/ipr/patent/patcnts.htin
109 Section 24B of the Patents Act 1970 (India).
110 Section 84 of the Patents Act 1970 (India).
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Lanjouw, the number of patents granted in India ‘fell by three quarters from 3,923 in 
1970-71 (of which 629 were to Indian applicants, 3,294 to foreign applicants) down to 
1,019 in 1980-81 (349 Indian, 670 foreign)’."2 In 1970, Indian companies held only 
15% of the local market as compared to 85% by foreign firms. In terms of total sales 
tumoversale in 1970, only two firms in the top ten firms were Indian and the rest were 
subsidiaries of multinational companies. By 1982, Indian firms had increased their 
market share to 50%, and by 1999, Indian firms were holding 61% of the market share.. 
This trend was to become a lasting feature of the pharmaceutical market in India."’
Commentators are almost unanimous that the Patents Act 1970 (India) was the most 
important single policy measure which provided a solid foundation for the emergence to 
the Indian pharmaceutical sector."4 It would be, however, simplistic to presume that the 
Patents Act 1970 (India) had alone changed the complete structure of the 
pharmaceutical industry in India. There are at least two additional factors which are 
often ignored in the context of patent policy and pharmaceuticals.
First, early developments in the domestic pharmaceutical scene started with the setting 
up of government-owned pharmaceutical companies in 1960s. The initial precursor in 
this regard was the establishment of Hindustan Antibiotics Limited which was
112 Jean Lanjouw, ‘The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: “Heartless Exploitation 
of the Poor and Suffering”?’, NBER Working Paper No. 6366 (1996) 3 at 
http: // w w w. o i p r c. o x, a e. u k- EJWP0799.pdf
" ’ Padmashree Hehi Sampath, ‘Economic Aspects of Access to Medicines after 2005: Product Patent 
Protection and Emerging Firm Strategies in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’ (Accessed on December 
12, 2009) 22, Institute of New Technologies, United Nations University at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualpropertv/studies/PadmashreeSampathFinal.pdf
114 Philippe Cullet, ‘Patents and Medicines: The Relationship between TRIPS and the Human Right to 
Health’ (February 2003) 79(1) International Affairs 139-160. Also see: Ashok V. Desai, T he Or.gin a nd 
Direction of Industrial R & D in India’ (January 1980) 9( 1) Research Policy 74-96.
52
inaugurated in 1954 with the support of WHO and UNICEF."1 *5 The Indian Drugs & 
Pharmaceutical Limited was established in 1961 and thereafter twelve companies were 
setup all over the India to locally manufacture active pharmaceutical ingredients."6 Such 
companies provided a catalyst for the private sector in pharmaceutical drugs.
The second factor was India's strict price control regime under the Drug Price Control 
Order 1970 (India)"7, which helped bring the drug prices within the means of a wider 
range of Indian patients. Most of the multinational companies decided to limit their 
operations in India after strict price control was introduced in 1970.
IIS. India and the TRIPS Agreement 1994: Some Early Responses
After the promulgation of the Patents Act 1970 (India), India staunchly defended its 
position on the non-patentability of pharmaceutical products and compulsory licensing 
for two decades. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, India participated as an active 
member of the Group of 77 which took a lead role in the negotiation of the 
International Code o f Conduct for Technology Transfer from the platform of United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)."s The failure of these
1" Asha Laxman Datar, India 's Economic Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe, 1953 to 1969 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) 70.
116 Padmashree Hchi Sampath, ‘Economic Aspects of Access to Medicines after 2005: Product Patent
Protection and Emerging Firm Strategies in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’ (Accessed on December 
12, 2009) 22, Institute of New Technologies, United Nations University at
http://wwAv.who.int/intcllcctualpropertv/studies/PadmashrccSampathFinal.pdf
11 Mansi Shah and Amit Patel, ‘Drug Price Control in India: An Overview’ in Albert Wertheimer and 
Mickey Smith (eds), International Drug Regulatory’ Mechanisms (London: Routlcdge, 2004) 122.
118 Carlos Correa, ‘Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries?’ 
in Keith Maskus and Jerome Rcichman (eds) International Public Goods and Transfer o f Technology 
Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
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negotiations in 1985 was a substantial disappointment for developing countries, such as 
India. In the meantime, India refused to sign the Paris Convention for the Protection o f 
Industrial Property o f 1883 and vehemently resisted any move to change its patent law.
A watershed shift occurred in 1989 when India was willing to discuss intellectual 
property rights as part of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations."4 At the time of 
signing of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, the Indian National Congress was in power and 
the P. V. Narasimha Rao led government was severely criticised domestically for its 
‘compromising stance’ on an important issue of national sovereignty.
Scholars have put forward a range of rationales to explain the shift in India’s stance on 
the TRIPS Agreement during the Uruguay Round Negotiations. Peter K. Yu comments 
that four narratives and discourses are put forward to explain the origins of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994.'2() The first, bargain narrative is the most widely accepted explanation 
which suggests that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 as a package deal of WTO was a win- 
win situation for developing countries like India. Under this theory, India benefited 
from certain agreements and accepted a compromised deal in other sectors realising the 
overall impact of the new regime for its economy and development.
The second discourse provided a coercion-based theory to explain India’s position to 
sign the TRIPS Agreement 1994. Professor Jagdish Bhagwati observes that:
TRIPS does not involve mutual gain; rather, it positions the WTO primarily as a 
collector of intellectual property-related rents on behalf of multinational
227.
119 Susan Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization o f Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 109.
120 Peter Yu, ‘TRIPS and Its Discontents’ (2006) 10 (2) Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 369- 
402.
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corporations (MNCs). This is a bad image for the WTO and in the view of many, 
especially the non-governmental organizations, reflects the “capture” of the WTO 
by the MNCs.121
India’s bilateral relationships with the United States and its placement on a priority 
Watch List of Section 301, are also mentioned in this regard.
The third set of explanations about India’s engagement w ith the TRIPS Agreement 1994 
provided a narrative of ignorance, which presumed that Indian negotiators could not 
fully appreciate the implications of a global intellectual property regime and they had 
ultimately failed to protect India’s interest.122 This narrative was particularly popular 
within India where politicians and public servants were generally blamed for their 
failure to safeguard India’s interest during the Uruguay Negotiations.
The final narrative is about self-interest theory which was also widely accepted among 
commentators. This narrative suggests that India among other developing countries 
wilfully agreed to sign the TRIPS Agreement 1994 because it had realised the relevance 
and importance of an intellectual property regime for its economic future. Professor 
Edmund Kitch has provided a detailed account of this narrative in his analysis of the 
patent policy of developing countries.123
121 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, United Kingdom, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights 
and Development Policy (London: September 2002) 177.
122 Peter Yu, ‘TRIPS and Its Discontents’ (2006) 10 (2) Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 369- 
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With the benefit of hindsight, and a close reading of Parliamentary debates in India, 1 
would contend that India’s decision to sign the TRIPS Agreement 1994 is best explained 
by two theories -  the bargain theory and the self-interest theory.
A. Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 (India)
The first amendment to the Patents Act 1970 (India) was a direct outcome of WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings between India and the United States.
As a signatory to the Uruguay Round Agreements, India had decided to avail itself of 
the benefit of a maximum transition period which was allowed under the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994. With the status of a developing country, India had flexible timelines to 
implement its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement 1994. The first timeline in this 
regard was the creation of a mechanism for receiving mailbox applications by January 
1, 1995.124
To meet this obligation, Shankar Dayal Sharma, then President of India, promulgated 
Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994 (India). This Ordinance sought amendments in 
the Patents Act 1970 (India) and provided that patent applications for pharmaceutical 
and agricultural chemical products would be accepted. However, these applications 
would be handled only after 1st January, 2005.12:1 The Ordinance also established an 
Exclusive Marketing Regime (EMR) for applications filed under the amended 
provisions of the Patents Act 1970 (India).126
124 Article 70 (9) of the TRIPS Agreement 1994.
Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994 (India) at 
http://ww\v.vvipo.int/clea/en/text pdf.isp?lanu-FN&id-2390 
126 Section 24 A of Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994 (India) at 
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The Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994 (India) lapsed on March 26, 1995 when the 
Indian Parliament failed to pass follow-on legislation which was mandated under 
Article 123(1) of the Indian Constitution. In March 1995, the Lok Sabha passed a 
Patents (Amendment) Bill 1995 (India) to give permanent status to the Patents 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1994 (India). This Bill, however, could not be passed in the 
Upper House of the Indian Parliament, the Rajya Sabha. In the Rajya Sabha, the Bill 
was referred to the Select Committee of the House which could not report before the 
dissolution of Lok Sabha in May 1995. The Bill ultimately lapsed.12
In May, 1996, the Office of the United States Trade Representative added India to its 
Priority Watch List and stated that:
India fails to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical 
products. It also has not legislatively established mailbox and marketing 
exclusivity systems in accordance with Article 70(8) and 70(9) of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Therefore, the United States will initiate formal consultations under 
WTO dispute settlement procedures in Geneva in the near future.12*
In July, 1996, the United States formally initiated World Trade Organization dispute 
settlement proceedings against India and a WTO Dispute Panel was formed on 
November 20, 1996.12'' The United States alleged violations of Article 70 (8) and Article
1 Panel Report, India -  Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical anti Agricultural Chemical Products, 
World Trade Organization WT/DS50/R (5 September 1997) at 
http: v  vvAYAv.Yvto.org/english/trat op e/dispu e/cases e/ds50 e.htm
l2s Executive Office of the President, Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Announces 
Two Decisions: Title VII and Special 301 (April 30, 1996) 3 at 
http:/7keionlinc.org/sites/default/files/ustr special301 1996.pdf 
2 Panel Report, India -  Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
World Trade Organization WT/DS50/R (5 September 1997) at
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70 (9) of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. The Panel reported its findings to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body on September 5, 1997 and found that India had failed to 
comply with its obligations under Article 70(8)(a) and in the alternative, paragraph 1 
and 2 of the Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994.m On India’s request, the 
Appellate Body released its report on December, 19, 1997 and it upheld the findings of 
the Panel Report regarding Articles 70(8) and 70(9) of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
However, the Appellate Body reversed the findings of the Panel Report regarding 
paragraph 1 and 2 of the Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994.1,1 It was concluded 
that:
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that India’s filing system based on 
“administrative practice” for patent applications for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products was inconsistent with Art. 70.8. The Appellate 
Body found that the system did not provide the “means” by which applications for 
patents for such inventions could be securely filed within the meaning of Art. 
70.8(a), because, in theory, a patent application filed under the administrative 
instructions could be rejected by the court under the contradictory mandatory 
provisions of the existing Indian laws: the Patents Act of 1970 ... The Appellate 
Body agreed with the Panel that there was no mechanism in place in India for the 
grant of exclusive marketing rights for the products covered by Art. 70.8(a) and 
thus Art. 70.9 was violated.132
http://vvwvv.wio.org/english/tratop c/'dispii e/eascs c/ds50 c.htm
130 Ibid.
131 Appellate Body Report, India -  Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products -  A B-1997-5, WT/DS50/AB/R (19 December 1997) at
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Although some commentators such as Jerome Reichman133 have praised the balanced 
outcome of this dispute, the Indian political reaction to the adjudication was fierce. Mr 
Kushabhau Thakre, president of the Bharatiya Janata Party, demanded that India should 
leave the WTO.134 Given the political and economic policies of Bharatiya Janata Party, 
this demand was unusual as the party was committed to economic reforms and trade 
liberalisation.135
Finally, India enacted the Patents (Amendment) Act J999 (India) with a retroactive 
effect starting from January 1, 1995. It provided for the creation of the mailbox 
provision to receive patent applications which would not be examined before January 1, 
2005.136 The Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 (India) also established an exclusive 
marketing regime."7 One of the innovative features of the law was related to 
compulsory licensing provision. Pursuant to Section 24C, any time after the expiry of
Jerome Reichman, ‘Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement after US v India’ (1998) 1 (4) 
Journal o f International Economic Law 585-601. He observes that: ‘The decision of the WTO Appellate 
Body in India-Mailbox ease was a critical step in affirming the WTO-consistcncy of pursuing national 
and regional policies which take advantage of the absence of strict harmonization of IPRs standards at the 
worldwide level. The India-Mailbox decision suggests that the WTO will accord substantial deference to 
national and regional rules which manifest good faith compliance with the basic standards of the TRIPS 
Agreement.’
14 David K. Tomar, ‘A Look into WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute between United Sates and India’ 
(1999) 17 (3) Wisconsin International Law Journal 579-603, 589.
135 Julia Brummer, India ’s Negotiation Position at the WTO, Dialogue on Globalization: Briefing Papers 
(Geneva: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2005) 4 at http://1 ibrarv.fcs.dc/pdf- 
fi Ies/bueros/genl750205 ,pd f
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137 Section 24 A of the Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 at 
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two years from the date of approval by the Controller for exclusive marketing rights to 
sell or distribute under Section 24B, any person interested may make an application to 
the Controller alleging that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the 
exclusive marketing rights have not been satisfied or that the product enjoying exclusive 
marketing right is not available to the public at a reasonable price and pray for the grant 
of a Compulsory Licence.
The enforcement of exclusive marketing rights granted under the Patents (Amendment) 
Act 1999 (India) was always a point of concern for applicants. Eli Lilly’s exclusive 
marketing right of Cialis was stayed by the Calcutta High Court and it could not be 
enforced.I?s According to the sources of the Indian Patent Office, a total of 8,926 
mailbox applications were filed for examination.139
B. Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India)
The second deadline for India to amend its patent law was January 1, 2000 when a five 
year transition period ended. A comprehensive package of amendments was introduced 
in the form of Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India) which had changed several 
provisions of the Patents Act 1970 (India).
In 2002, the government of the Bharatiya Janata Party led National Democratic Alliance 
was quite stable and the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, successfully introduced 
several economic reforms. After 1998, the Bharatiya Janata Party abandoned its
1 'x P.T. Jyothi Datta, ‘Eli Lilly’s Exclusive Marketing right under Legal Cloud’ (Mumbai: September O, 
2005) The Hindu Business Line at
http://www.thchindubusinesslinc.com/blinc/2004/09/09/stories/2004090901240400.htm.
L’9 Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System 
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University o f  Pittsburgh Law Review 491 - 
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opposition to patent law reforms and the party was confident to move its next legislative 
agenda after successful adoption of the Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 (India).140 
Although some sections of the Indian National Congress were arguing against any 
change in the Patents Act 1970 (India), the predominant view in the party was in favour 
of new legislative changes.141 The only bloc opposing the patent law amendments 
comprised the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Communist Party of India. 
The Patents (Second Amendment) Bill (India) was introduced in the Rajya Sabha in 
1999 and was referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee of both Houses of 
Parliament.142 In its 39 meetings over a period of two years, the Committee reviewed 42 
memoranda and heard testimonies from 52 witnesses and 19 individuals and 
organisations.14' With the consensus of both mainstream parties, the Patents 
(Amendment) Act 2002 (India) was passed by the Parliament.
In the social realm, several non-governmental organisations played an important role in 
the improvement and adoption of patent law' amendments. The National Working Group 
on Patent Law was established in 1998 and it played a key role in mobilising civil 
society response to law amendments in India. In 2005, when a third amendment was 
made in the Patents Act 1970 (India), many local and international non-governmental 
organisations were active in lobbying efforts. However, the pioneering work of the 
National Working Group on Patent Law was instrumental during the second round
14(1 Anitha Ramanna, ‘India’s Patent Policy and Negotiations in TRIPs: Future Options for India and other 
Developing Countries’ (Paper presented at the National Conference on TRIPs: Next Agenda for 
Developing Countries, Hyderabad, India, October 11-12, 2002) at 
http://vvwvv.iprsonlinc.org/ictsd/does/RcsourccsTRlPSanita rainanna.doc 
141 Ibid.
I4~ Dwijen Rangnekar, ‘Context and Ambiguity in the Making of Law: A Comment on Amending India’s 
Patent Act’ (2007) 10 (5) The Journal o f World Intellectual Property 365-387, 375.
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amendment in the patent law. In 2000, international advocacy groups such as Medecins 
Sans Frontieres, Oxfam and the Consumer Project on Technology (now called 
Knowledge Ecology International) started working with local groups and non­
governmental organisations to understand the broader impact of Indian patent law.144 An 
important development occurred when the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health 2001 was adopted in the 4th Ministerial Conference of the WTO.145 It 
has given rise to the pro-reform stance among local non-governmental organisations and 
with the support of their international partners, these organisations started extensive 
lobbying for appropriate amendments in the patent law.146 The establishment of the 
Fourth People’s Commission under the Chairmanship of I. K. Gujral was a major step 
in this regard, which is discussed in next section.
The position of the pharmaceutical industry also evolved gradually and the most critical 
voices against patent law reforms had been diluted over a period of time. Anitha 
Ramanna comments that a few large pharmaceutical firms in India revised their stance 
because of a belief that they could benefit from the new patent system:
We can partly explain the rise of a pro-IPR stance among Indian industry by 
noting that firms with the ability to transform their potential into patents became 
votaries of reform. Those firms with greater sales, export competition and R&D 
investment are the firms that are in a position to transform their capacity into
144 R.V.Vaidyanatha Ayyar, Public Policymaking in India (India: Pearson Education, 2009) 259.
145 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01 )/DEC72 (14 
November 2001) at http:/Avvvw. wto.org/english/thcwto e/minist e/minOl e/mindccl trips e.htm
14(1 Anitha Ramanna, ‘Interest Groups and Patent Reform in India’ (New Delhi: March 2004) Indira 
Gandhi Institute of Development Research Working Paper WP-2003-06, 11 at 
http://www.i»idr.ac.in/pdff'publication/W P-2003-006.pdf
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gains from patents and therefore shifted their interests towards promoting rather 
than opposing patent reform.147
The commentator concludes: ‘Domestic firms, while supporting the patent reform, have 
also attempted to influence the policy process to promote their interests in generic 
manufacturing.’148
In this context, the Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India) was passed by the Parliament. 
An overview of debates in the Lok Sabha reveals the concerns and issues which were 
raised when the bill was tabled in the Parliament. At the time of presenting the Patents 
(Amendment) Act 2002 (India) in the Lok Sabha, Shri Murasoli Maran, the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry observed that:
It is now necessary for us to set aside the international and internal “pharma 
politics” and look at the future. The Indian drug and pharma industry has made 
the fullest use of the Patents Act of 1970 and we now are not only the net-exporter 
of generic medicines but also emerging as the new leader of the knowledge-based 
drug industry in the world, following software and IT. Now it is the time for the 
rest of the industry to come out of its “reverse engineering” mode and move 
forward into the era of innovative “research and development” mode, clinching 
the opportunities.149
This is an important statement showing the confidence of the government on the 
proposed changes and their possible implications for the Indian pharmaceutical
l4/ Ibid. 7 
148 Ibid. 7
l4v Shri Murasoli Maran, India, Parliamentary Debates-Discussion on the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 
2002 Lok Sabha, May 14, 2002 at http://164,100,47,132/LssNe\v/pseardvResult 13.aspx'.)dbsb 4 154
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industry. There is, however, a clear reflection of ‘shining India’ rhetoric which the 
Bharatiya Janata Party had introduced in 2002-03 after the success of the Indian 
information technology boom. The law was passed with the bipartisan support of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party and the Indian National Congress as a result of lengthy 
consultations in the Joint Standing Committee.
The members of the Indian National Congress supported this law in the Lok Sabha but 
some of them raised certain critical issues. Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar, Congress’s 
Member of Parliament from Mayiladuthurai, who later became Union Cabinet Minister 
for Petroleum and Natural Gas in 2004, stated that:
We need to take advantage of the international patents regime to become front­
runners in the exercise of pushing forward our own new technology but at the 
same time we need to recognise that if our death rates have collapsed ... between 
1970 and 2002, ... it is because of the Patents Act of 1970. If we do not exercise 
the utmost care, there is the danger that in respect of HIV AIDS or some other 
epidemic we might find ourselves in India in the same situation in which South 
Africa found itself not so long ago.150
The dilemma of the Indian National Congress was evident from this statement. The 
party had justifiably been taking pride in the success of the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry achieved in part due to the Patents Act 1970 (India). In political terms, it was a 
difficult decision for the Indian National Congress to support this legislation especially 
after the decision of the Left parties to oppose this Bill.
150 Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar, India, Parliamentary Debates-Discussion on the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 
2002 Lok Sabha, May 14, 2002 at http://164.100,47.132/l.ssNew/psearch/Rcsult i j.aspv.’dhsl 4154
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To overcome any potential political backlash, Congress proposed several amendments 
in the law. Referring to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health 2001, Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar demanded that the Minister ‘continue to strive to 
protect the Indian national interest especially in the public health sphere, in the TRIPS 
Council as well as in the WTO'.151 The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Murasoli 
Maran, played a key role in mobilising developing countries against the position of G7 
countries during the ministerial meeting in Doha.152
Shri Rupchand Pal Hoogly of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) wrote a 
dissenting note in the Joint Standing Committee. He raised several objections on the 
proposed law in his Lok Sabha speech:
It was said that TRIPS Agreement 1994 is a part of the WTO agreement. It was to 
provide better health opportunities, better scientific research, better agricultural 
production, sharing of technologies and transfer of technologies, but, today, we 
find that it has never happened in the matter of transfer of technology. The 
developed countries are as reluctant as they have been earlier and we are at the 
receiving end. We continue to be at the receiving end. The WTO as also the 
TRIPS are heavily biased against the developing countries and the poorer 
countries of the world."3
The politician expressed the fear that the Indian pharmaceutical industry would be 
jeopardised by the TRIPS Agreement 1994: ‘We are deviating from that 1970 Act which
151 Ibid.
1 ” Murasoli Maran, ‘At Doha’ The Indian Express (November 25, 2003) at 
http://vvwvv.indianexpress.eom/oldStorv/3593 1/.
I5' Shri Rupchand Pal Hoogly, India, Parliamentary Debates-Discussion on the Patents (Amendment)
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had tried to provide protection not only to our health care needs but also to our 
pharmaceutical industry.’154 He then referred to the provisions of compulsory licensing 
in the context of the South African situation and demanded further deliberations on the 
law.
The Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India) introduced more than 70 changes to the 
Patents Act 1970 (India). The provision dealing with exclusions of patentable subject 
matter was amended in light of the Article 27 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 to cover 
abstract theories, mathematical or business methods, and computer programs.155 To 
address concerns regarding bio-piracy and misappropriation of biological resources, the 
provisions relating to patent application and examination were also revised.156 Several 
amendments were made in Chapter XVI to revise the operation of compulsory 
licensing, working of patents and revocation. These provisions are separately discussed 
in Chapter 4. The Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India) also introduced provisions 
which fulfilled India’s obligations under the Paris Convention for the Protection o f 
Industrial Property o f 1883 and Patent Cooperation Treaty 1970A7
IV. Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India)
The final deadline for India to comply with the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement 
1994 was January 1,2005. By this date, India was obliged to extend patent protection to
Lv4 Shri Rupchand Pal Hoogly, India, Parliamentary’ Debates-Discussion on the Patents (Amendment) 
Bill, 2002 Lok Sabha, May 14, 2002 at http://164,100,47.132/LssNew psearch/Result 13.asp\?dbsl=41 54 
1:0 Section 4 of the Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India) at http://ipindia.nic.in/iprpatentpatentg.pdt~
156 Section 10 and Section 25 of the Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India)
157 Section 3 (b) of the Patents (Amendment) Act 2002 (India) adding the definition of a convention 
country and Section 3 (e) defining the international application and Section 3 (k) referring to the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, signed 19 June 1970 (entered into force 24 January 1978).
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pharmaceutical and agrochemical products which were originally excluded from 
patentability. Given the long history of non-patentability of pharmaceutical products in 
India and its importance for the Indian drug industry and consumers, it was 
controversial to amend domestic laws to comply with the TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
Unlike the earlier two amendments in the patent law, the political situation by that time 
had substantially changed and the incumbent government faced considerable challenges 
in the Parliament to enact relevant legislation. In May 2004, Manmohan Singh became 
Prime Minister of India after the Bharatiya Janata Party lost the elections. The new 
government of the Indian National Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
had the backing of several small parties including the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist).
In a timely attempt to meet the deadline of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, the President of 
India promulgated the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 (India) on December 26, 
2004.15S Soon after its promulgations, the Ordinance was severally criticised by different 
stakeholders and it was lamented that the government had adopted the Patents 
(Amendment) Bill 2003 (India) without further deliberation. This Bill was tabled by the 
previous government of the Bharatiya Janata Party and it had lapsed with the dissolution 
of the Lok Sabha.
On December 29, 2004, the Joint Action Committee Against Amendment of the Indian 
Patents Act159 issued the following statement:
l5<s Patents (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 (India) at
hnp:.;'Vvvwvv.patcntofllcc.nic.in/ipiy'patcnt/ordinancc 2004.pdf
19 The Joint Action Committee (JAC) was a forum of trade unions, political parties and non­
governmental organisations. It was formed to oppose the amendment of the Indian patent law. 
Participating NGOs included the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, the Centre 
of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), and the Federation of Medical and Sales Representatives’ Associations
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The Amendment is ostensibly intended to introduce a full-fledged product patent 
regime to make our patent legislation compatible with TRIPs. The ultimate 
undoing of the Patents Act 1970 is thus sought to be accomplished in a non­
transparent manner without any deliberations in the Parliament. Such a complex 
legislation of far reaching importance should have been a subject matter of a 
thorough, public examination by an Independent Commission. At the minimum, it 
should have been referred to the deliberative bodies of the Parliament such as a 
Joint Parliamentary Committee or the relevant Standing Committees of the 
Parliament for their considered views and recommendations.160
The Committee appealed to all members of Parliament to oppose the proposed 
Amendment to the Patents Act when the ordinance appeared before the Parliament for 
approval.
In a fracturing of any political consensus on the topic of patent law reform, the Left 
Front announced that it would oppose the Ordinance when it was tabled in Parliament, 
because of a belief that it would exacerbate poverty in India.161 The National Working 
Group on Patent Law also announced its opposition to the Patents (Amendment) 
Ordinance 2004 (India) and started lobbying to reopen the issue of compulsory 
licensing and other flexibilities.162 Reji K. Joseph explained that: ‘The
of India (FMRAI). See ‘JAC Formed against Amendment of the Indian Patents Act’, People’s 
Democracy, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, January 2, 2005.
160 Declaration of Joint Action Committee against Amendment of the Indian Patents Act (December 2D, 
2004) at http://Yvww.cptcch.Org/ip/hcalth/c/india/ngodcclaration 122920Q4.html
161 Sreenivasarao Vepachedu and Martha Rumore, ‘Patent Protection and the Pharmaceutical Industry in 
Indian Union’ (October 2004) Intellectual Property Today 44-46, 46 at
http: //w w w. ve pac hed u. co m/ip i nd. pd f.
162 R.V.Vaidyanatha Ayyar, Public Policymaking in India (India: Pearson Education, 2009) 255.
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Recommendations of the Commission became the breeding ground for the protests from 
various comers when the UPA attempted to introduce the final amendment Bill in 
December 2004.’163 The recommendations of this group along with many other 
proposals provided a strong basis for the revision of the Patents (Amendment) 
Ordinance 2004 (India).
Meanwhile, several regional treatment campaigns and international non-governmental 
organisations also started writing letters to key figures of the Indian government and the 
Indian National Congress urging them to carefully consider patent law amendments.164 
The New York Times also wrote a damning editorial, observing that:
India’s government has issued rules that will effectively end the copycat industry 
for newer drugs. For the world’s poor, this will be a double hit -  cutting off the 
supply of affordable medicines and removing the generic competition that drives 
down the cost of brand-name drugs. But there is still a chance to fix the flaws in 
these rules, because they are contained in a decree that must be approved by 
Parliament. Heavily influenced by multinational and Indian drug makers eager to 
sell patented medicines to India’s huge middle class, the decree is so tilted toward
l6j Rcji K Joseph, ‘Political Economy of India’s Engagement with the WTO: An Analysis in the Context 
of Amendment of India’s Patents Act (accessed on December 29, 2009) at 
http://vvwvv. urfw.cdu/hri/WTO/Paper%5 B 1%5 D%20-%20reii.pdf
164 See: Affordable Medicines Treatment Campaign, ‘Letter to Sonia Gandhi on the Amendments to the 
Patent Act’ (December 20, 2004); Medecins Sans Frontieres, ‘Letters to the President, Prime Minister and 
National Advisory Council of India’ (February 22, 2005); Health Gap, ‘Letter to Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh on the Upcoming Amendments to India’s Patent Law’ (November 8, 2004. For further 
details and more documents: http://www.cptech.Org/ip/health/c/india/patents-act-amendments.html
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the pharmaceutical industry that it does not even take advantage of rights 
countries enjoy under the WTO to protect public health.165
Seeking to appease such protestors, the ruling Indian National Congress agreed to 
consult other Parliamentary parties to improve the provisions of the Patents 
(Amendment) Ordinance 2004 (India).
Mr Pranab Mukherjee, the Defence Minister at the time, played a key role in convincing 
Left parties to adopt a new position on patent law amendments. He persuaded Mr Jyoti 
Basu, the leader of the Communist Party (Marxist), to support this legislation. Mr 
Pranab Mukherjee had to struggle with his own party colleagues and pressed his fellow 
Cabinet Minister, Mr Kamal Nath, Commerce Minister to agree on the compromised 
text stating that ‘an imperfect legislation is better than no legislation’.166 In order to 
appease its Left Front partners, the government agreed on several amendments to the 
patent regime. In the final bill, some of the most contentious matters were dropped from 
the Patents (Amendment) Bill 2005 (India) and it was decided to refer them to a 
committee of experts for final resolution. In April 2005, the Patents (Amendment) Act 
2005 (India) was enacted with the support of the Indian National Congress and the Left 
Front. The Bharatiya Janata Party did not show the reciprocal courtesy to the ruling 
party and vehemently opposed the Bill which it had initially introduced in the 
Parliament. It is worthwhile highlighting some of the key themes in the parliamentary 
debates over patent law.
165 Editorial, ‘India’s Choice’ The New York Times, 18 January 2005, at 
http:/7\vwvv.nytinies.com/2005/01 /18/opinion/18tues2.html? r^I&oref-login.
166 Aditi Phadnis, ‘Pranab: The Master Manager’ (March 29, 2005) Recliff at 
http://www. reditT.com/monev/2005/mai729patents.htm
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A. Effects on Domestic Pharmaceutical Industry
There was a strong popular discourse that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and the new 
patent regime would adversely affect the growth of the local pharmaceutical industry 
which had managed to attract many friends within the policymakers.
A strong reflection of these concerns can be seen in the Parliamentary debates when the 
Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) was tabled for discussion. Shri Uday Singh of 
the Bharatiya Janata Party stated that:
It seems that the Government is getting unduly influenced by the multinationals 
and the large Indian companies because by some sheer chance, the Hon. Finance 
Minister has decided to take away the concessional rate of duty on generic 
medicine to put it on par with branded medicine. Now, what is going to happen to 
the thriving generic drug industry in India on which not only we are dependent, I 
again repeat, many other countries are dependent?167
He surmised that the intent of the legislation was To kill the generic drug industry in 
India' in favour of The influence of multinationals’.168
The influential member of Bharatiya Janata Party, Shrimati Maneka Gandhi, 
commented:
India has benefited from the low cost generic industry to dominate 30 per cent of 
the low cost drugs in the world. We achieved leadership status by a strong case in
167 Shri Uday Singh, India, Parliamentary Debates-Combineddiscussion on the Statutory Resolution 
regarding disapproval o f Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No. 7 o f2004) and the Patents 
(Amendment) Bill, 2005, March 22, 2005 at 
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71
the WTO for flexibilities that protect consumers’ rights against multinationals. 
We are about to give up these advantages that we gained for the developing world 
in this Act. We are also putting at risk, the lives of hundreds of millions of people 
all over the world, not just in our country. 169
Many other members of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha reiterated this argument in 
their opposition to the Bill.
Rebutting this argument, Shri Kamal Nath, the Minister of Commerce and Industry 
stated in the Lok Sabha that:
I would like to emphasise, with everything at my command, that in the changing 
world, in the changing India, it is not for securing the multinationals ... The new 
reality is beginning to seep in that the Indian scientists are ready to face the 
challenge of a post-patent era; the Indian companies have, over the past few years, 
invested heavily in technology and research infrastructure ... We must not 
undermine the achievements of our own scientists, the scientists coming back 
from abroad, coming back to India to join our research laboratories. 170
It is quite clear from this statement that the Indian government was mainly considering 
the position of large-scale pharmaceutical firms which had started their own research
169 Shrimati Maneka Gandhi, India, Parliamentary Debates-Combined discussion on the Statutory 
Resolution regarding disapproval o f Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No.7 o f2004) and the 
Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2005, March 22, 2005 at
http://164.100,47.132/LssNew/psearch/ result 14.aspx?dbsl=1866
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and development initiatives. This line of argument does not explain the implications of 
new patent regime on medium and small scale generic manufacturers which are 
contributing enormously in lowering India’s domestic burden of disease.
Further promoting a strong patent regime in India, Shri Kapil Sibalji, the Minister of 
Science and Technology claimed that India should provide an enabling regulatory 
framework to attract foreign investment in the neglected areas of medical innovation. 
He asserted that:
The WTO today in this context is a great opportunity for us to be able to discover 
new molecules. I will give you an example. Just the other day, the CSIR in 
collaboration with Lupin discovered a new molecule in tuberculosis called 
subotern. This new molecule in tuberculosis has not been discovered for 43 years. 
But CSIR and Lupin discovered it and today after having passed animal trials, we 
are into human trials. I daresay this is going to be successful and the treatment of 
tuberculosis is going to be reduced from a long treatment of four to five months to 
a bare treatment of two months. This is going to help the poor. And who is 
helping the poor? It is India because we are the hub of the knowledge economy, 
we are the hub of the intellectual property that is going to be generated in the 21st 
century.171
This statement also shows a dramatic shift in the pharmaceutical policy of the 
Government of India. It is now focused on a research-based pharmaceutical industry 
which may lead to the emergence of a low-volume, high-quality pharmaceutical sector 
in India.
1 1 Shri Kapil Sibalji, India, Parliamentary Debates-Debates on Indian Patent (Amendment) Bid 2005 
Rajya Sabha, March 23, 2005 at http://164,100,47.5 ncwdebate/deb ndx/204/23032005/5toö.htm
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ß. Access to Essential Medicines
The impact of a strong pharmaceutical product patent regime on the availability and 
affordability of essential medicines is a widely debated and contentious matter. Many 
members raised this issue during discussions in both Houses of the Parliament and a 
heated debate was generated in this regard. Members of Opposition parties were 
concerned that the new regime would result in a price hike and drugs would become 
inaccessible in India. They also raised the issue of pharmaceutical exports and 
maintained that a price increase would also affect consumers living in other developing 
countries. The proponents of the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) did not agree 
with these propositions. They insisted that the issue of pricing should not be linked with 
the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) as there was a separate regulatory regime 
governing price allocation. Shri C. Kuppusamy of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
Party observed:
An apprehension is created in the minds of the public that once the Amendment 
Bill is passed, drug prices, especially, life-saving drug prices will go up, and other 
commodities that are of common use would also go up. The Government should 
come forward to allay the apprehension. While carrying forward the reforms 
further like countries like Britain, France, etc. did, India also_should take steps to 
protect the national interests.172
The same apprehensions were shared by other members including Shri C. K. 
Chandrappan, Shrimati Maneka Gandhi and Shri Uday Singh.
172 Shri C. Kuppusamy, India, Parliamentary Debates-Combined discussion on the Statutory Resolution 
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The discussion also covered the issue of affordability in the context of Indian drug 
exports to other developing countries. Shri Uday Singh noted that:
This Bill is perhaps one of the most important pieces of legislation that this 
Parliament is considering. I say this because it directly concerns the lives of 
billions of people and the livelihood of millions of people not only in India but in 
the lesser developed countries which are dependant on India for medical treatment 
from where medicines go. To give you an example, 70 per cent of the medicines 
used for AIDS treatment in the lesser developed countries are medicines made in 
India. They go from here only for the reason that they are available at prices 
which are affordable.17'
Members also referred to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health 2001 to remind India of its obligations toward the provision of 
affordable drugs to other poor and developing nations.174
In rejoinder, the Minister of Commerce and Industry strongly defended the existing 
price system in India and mentioned that a new patent regime would not have any 
adverse implications on the government’s pricing policy.
173 Shri Uday Singh, India, Parliamentary> Debates-Combined discussion on the Statutory> Resolution 
regarding disapproval o f Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No. 7 o f2004) and the Patents 
(Amendment) Bill, 2005, March 22, 2005 at 
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referred to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 during their 
submissions in Lok Sabha.
75
C. Safeguard Provisions
A considerable time during the Parliamentary discussion was dedicated to issues rela:ed 
to safeguard provisions incorporated in the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) -  in 
particular compulsory licences, the lifting of restrictions on parallel importation, pre­
grant opposition proceedings, and a patentability threshold.
The most prominent issue which emerged from the debates of the Lok Sabha and the 
Rajya Sabha was about the scope and operations of compulsory licences under the 
Patents Act 1970 (India). Shri Yashwant Sinha, a former Finance Minister in the 
government of the Bharatiya Janata Party declared that compulsory licensing provisions 
were only of symbolic, ceremonial importance: ‘I still believe that our provisions are 
weak, that we need to strengthen them in order to give advantage to our companies.” 5
Other members also highlighted this point to show their distrust of existing compulsory 
licensing provisions. Shrimati N. P Durga of the Telugu Desam Party evaluated the 
proposed compulsory licence provisions in the context of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001, and stated that:
Compulsory licensing ... is helping the domestic enterprises in meeting the ever- 
increasing demands of the pharmaceutical products at competitive prices ... But 
the problem is that the procedure is very complex and cumbersome and leaves 
many loopholes. As a result, the patent-holders will delay or prevent the grant of 
such licenses. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health has 
recognized the gravity of public health in the developing countries. But, the 
Ordinance promulgated last December imposes an unnecessary hurdle on many
173 Shri Yashwant Sinha, Shri Kapil Sibalji, India, Parliamentary' Debates-Debates on Indian Patent 
(Amendment) Bill 2005 Rajya Sabha, March 23, 2005 at 
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developing countries. Now, the Ordinance requires them to grant compulsory 
licenses even if the drug is not patented there. This is not required under “waiver” 
to Article 3 1(f)-176
He called on the Minister to remove these limitations ‘so that India’s generic producers, 
who produce them for local needs and for exports, will be able to continue their 
successful supply of low-cost products to the Indian and world markets’.17 Such 
concerns have been supported by the episode of Tarceva and Sutent Compulsory 
licences which are discussed in Chapter 4. The parliamentary debate did not adequately 
address problems related to export orientated compulsory licences which hinder the 
ability of importing countries to get generic drugs from India.
At the time of introducing the Patents (Amendment) Bill 2005 (India) in the parliament, 
Mr Kamal Nath claimed that concerns regarding compulsory licences under the Patents 
(Amendment) Act 2005 (India) had been addressed: ‘If we were to look at what 
provisions of compulsory licensing be put where there is the question of prices, where 
there is the question of public interest, all these issues have been adequately taken care 
of.’17* Given the lack of practical know-how about the issuance of a compulsory licences 
in India, such confidence would appear to be misplaced.
176 Shrimati N.P Durga, Shri Yashwant Sinha, Shri Kapil Sibalji, India, Parliamentary Debates-Debates 
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The second point raised related to parallel imports. At the moment, pharmaceutical 
imports are not significant in India because most of the widely used drugs are locally 
produced. Nevertheless, parallel importation provisions were referred during the debate 
because of future apprehensions. Shri Pawan Kumar Bansal stated the importance of 
parallel imports and said that:
Despite the fact that a particular medicine may be patented here by any other 
company, we have the right to import that patented commodity from anywhere in 
the world, where it is cheaper, even though it is patented here. Earlier however, 
this required that the foreign exporter was duly authorised by the patentee. That 
was the condition earlier ... Now, the law would be, as it has been included here 
in the Bill before us now, that “no longer do we only need to stick to that 
condition that the foreign exporter was duly authorised by the patentee to sell and 
distribute the products.” The position now would be that “the foreign exporter be 
authorised under the law, thus making the parallel imports easier.” This 
mechanism, as you know, would help in price control.171'
Apparently under this provision, an Indian pharmaceutical company could set up its 
manufacturing facility in a least developing country like Nepal to produce and export 
medicines to India. Given the absence of a patent in Nepal, such company would 
presumably be ‘duly authorised’ under the laws of Nepal to sell or distribute the
l7g Shri Pawan Kumar Bansal, India, Parliamentary Debates-Combined discussion on the Statutory’ 
Resolution regarding disapproval o f Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No. 7 o f2004) and the 
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product. Some commentators suggest that such a broad interpretation of parallel 
importation provisions may contravene the TRIPS Agreement 19942s0
The third safeguard provision related to pre-grant opposition proceedings. A detailed 
opposition mechanism was included in the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) 
including pre-grant and post-grant oppositions. The idea of pre-grant opposition was 
mainly referred to during the Parliamentary debates and it was largely interpreted as an 
important safeguard provision against frivolous patent applications. Pre-grant 
opposition was not included in earlier versions of third amendments: Patents 
(Amendment) Bill 2003 (India) and the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 (India). 
Many members had raised doubts about the efficacy of pre-grant opposition provisions 
in the law. Shri Yashwant Sinha asserted that:
We must have very strong pre-grant opposition provisions and nothing should be 
done to dilute this because ultimately this is going to stand us in good stead. If 
there is any weakness in this area, then we are going to be the loser, and I will 
hasten to add that there is absolutely no TRIPS requirement. TRIPS does not lay 
down that pre-grant opposition should be modified and should be dealt with in 
any manner. It is not called for. So, why not let the provisions of the earlier statute 
stand with regard to pre-grant opposition?181
At least two members apprehended that a pre-grant opposition mechanism would hinder 
the functioning of the Patent Office and it would unnecessarily delay the grant of
IMI Shamnad Bashcer, 'India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005’ Volume 1, 2005 
The Indian Journal o f Law and Technology’ 15-46, 30 at 
http://papers.ssrn.eonvsol3/papers.ctm?abstract id-829464.
m Shri Yashwant Sinha, India, Parliamentary Debates-Debates on Indian Patent (Amendment) Bill 2005 
Rajya Sabha, March 23, 2005 at http://164,100,47.5/newdebate/deb ndx/204/23032005/5to6.htm
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patents. Shri Sharad Anantrao Joshi of Swatantra Bharat Paksh Party was critical of he 
idea of pre-grant opposition, claiming that it would lead to unnecessary delays end 
compromise the secrecy of the patent system.1X2
Shri Kharabela Swain of Bharatiya Janata Party also shared some of these concerns and 
proposed that a time limit should be prescribed for the conclusion of pre-grant 
proceedings to avoid frivolous objections.1X3 Shri Kamal Nath defended the provisions: 
‘India will be one of the few countries in the world which is going to have a pre-grant 
and a post-grant opposition.’184 In practice, several Indian companies and non­
governmental organisations have initiated pre-grant opposition proceedings before the 
Indian Patent Office, with mixed results.185
Fourth, the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) introduced rigorous requirements for 
the patentability of pharmaceutical and chemical substances. The main apprehension in 
this regard was the so called phenomenon of evergreening which was frequently
182 Shri Sharad Anantrao Joshi, India, Parliamentary’ Debates-Debates on Indian Patent (Amendment)
Bill 2005 Rajya Sabha, March 23, 2005 at
http://164.100.47.5/newdebate/dcb ndx/204/23032005/5 to6.htm
183 Shri Kharabela Swain, India, Parliamentary Debates-Combined discussion on the Statutory’ Resolution 
regarding disapproval o f  Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No. 7 o f2004) and the Patents 
(Amendment) Bill, 2005, March 22, 2005 at
http://l 64.100,47,132/LssNew/pscarch/rcsult 14.aspx?dbsl= 1S66
1X4 Shri Kamal Nath, India, Parliamentary Debates-Combined discussion on the Statutory> Resolution 
regarding disapproval o f Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No.7 o f2004) and the Patents 
(Amendment) Bill, 2005, March 22, 2005 at 
http://164.100.47,132/LssNew/psearch/result 14.aspx?dbsl= 1866
188 For a detailed analysis of Pre-grant opposition provisions of Indian Patent law see: Feroz Ali Khader, 
The Touchstone Effect: The Impact o f Pre-grant Opposition on Patents (Nagpur, India: Lexis Ncxis 
Butterworths Wadhwa, 2009).
80
referred to by the members of Parliament. Members were concerned that a product 
patent regime might lead to a situation where trivial patents would restrict the ability of 
generic manufacturers to launch their legitimate products. Shri Kamal Nath assured the 
Parliament that the Indian government was fully aware of concerns regarding 
evergreening and appropriate measures were taken in the law. He concluded that:
In regard to evergreening, I just want to read out section 3(d) which says that a 
mere discovery of a new property or a new use for a known substance or the mere 
use of a known process in a new product -  these are exceptions, these will not be 
granted any patent -  and substances obtained by a mere ad-mixture resulting only 
in aggregation of properties of the components thereof or, processes of producing 
such substances will not be given patents.186
Shrimati Maneka Gandhi lamented that the law had failed to address the problem of 
evergreening. She said that ‘it is vague about the evergreening effect in which 
companies extend their patent rights by switching from capsules to tablets, for 
instance’.18 By contrast, Shri Kharabela Swain once again disagreed with the majority 
of Lok Sabha members and rejected the notion of any threat associated with
18,1 Shri Kamal Nath, India, Parliamentary Debates-Combineddiscussion on the Statutory Resolution 
regarding disapproval o f Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No. 7 o f2004) and the Patents 
(Amendment) Bill, 2005, March 22, 2005 at 
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/pscarch/rcsult 14.aspx?dbsl= 1866
18 Shrimati Maneka Gandhi, India, Parliamentary Debates-Combined discussion on the Statutory 
Resolution regarding disapproval o f Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No. 7 o f2004) and the 
Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2005, March 22, 2005 at 
http:/'/164.100.47.132/LssNew/pscarch/result 14.aspx?dbsl= 1866
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evergreening. He said that patents should be granted in respect of incremental 
innovations.188
In addition to the discussion of safeguard measures, there was also some discussion of 
patent administration, the patent protection of micro-organisms, and TRIPS-Plus 
standards of patent protection during the Parliamentary debates.
V. Conclusion
The Patents Act 1970 (India) played a strong role in nurturing the emergence and 
development of a strong and vibrant pharmaceutical industry in India. This sympathetic 
policy environment enabled India’s national pharmaceutical firms to expand their 
operations through reverse-engineering and follow-on research. In response to 
international trade law, India has made three significant amendments to the Patents Act 
1970 (India). The Indian Parliament played a pivotal role in the development and 
modernisation of national patent law. In an otherwise polarised political environment, 
the emergence of bipartisan support for patent law amendments was extraordinary. This 
political consensus, albeit brief, reflected a range of factors -  including India’s desire to 
play an active role in the global economy; the emergence of a strong knowledge 
economy in India; and the influence of pro-reform actors on domestic policy-making. 
The debate in Indian Parliament shows that Indian legislators were clearly well- 
informed about key concerns related to TRIPS-plus provisions. This could be seen in 
extensive debates on data exclusivity, compulsory licensing and evergreening of 
patents. There is clear political commitment at this level to protect India’s industrial and
188 Shri Kharabela Swain, India, Parliamentary Debates-Combined discussion on the Statutory’ Resolution 
regarding disapproval o f Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No.7 o f2004) and the Patents 
(Amendment) Bill, 2005, March 22, 2005 at 
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/result 14.aspx?dbsl=: 1866
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health interests through safeguard provisions mentioned in new patent law. There was 
indeed a considerable degree of reluctance to accept TRIPS standards but India, 
somehow, managed to implement a TRIPS-compliant patent law. Despite this positive 
note, the political debate in India was somewhat ad hoc and expedient, lacking a strong 
foundation of policy research.
I would argue that TRIPS-plus patent provisions are not suitable for India because they 
have the potential to undermine public health and access to essential medicines. In his 
Report, Anand Grover, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, cautioned 
developing and least developing countries about the negative consequences of TRIPS- 
plus clauses. He recommended that “developing countries and LDCs should review 
their laws and policies and consider whether they have made full use of TRIPS 
flexibilities or included TRIPS-plus measures, and if necessary consider amending their 
laws and policies to make full use of the flexibilities. ” 1*9 Similar recommendations have 
also made in other studies. 190
Furthermore, I would argue that TRIPS-plus patent provisions are not suitable for India, 
given its stage of economic development. In view of its importance for access to 
medicines and treatment programs all over the world, it is important to preserve Indian
1X9 United Nations Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (31 
March 2009) 27 at http;//www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcoiincil/docs/11 scssion/A.HRC. 11.12_cn.pdf
110 For detail sec: Mohammed K., El Said, Public health related TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral trade 
agreements.a policy guide for negotiators and implementers in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region 
(Cairo, World Health Organization, Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean: 2010)
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generic industry as one of the most important and reliable sources of generic drugs. A 
study published in 2010 shows that Indian companies supply 20% of the global market 
for generic medicines. In case of antiretroviral drugs, this share increases up to 80% of 
global purchase volume.191 From a public health policy perspective, it is crucial to 
maintain existing level of drug supplies from India. It will be almost impossible to 
implement scale-up programs and treatment targets without cost effective Indian 
generics. India’s political leadership has failed to devise a comprehensive and holistic 
patent policy, which can cater to the economic and social needs of an emerging 
economy. Innovation and research culture has its roots in India and several scientific 
and research institutions are producing valuable knowledge. The question of public 
sector research was completely ignored during the Parliamentary discourse and the 
focus of debate is still on the narrowly defined pharmaceutical sector. Earlier changes in 
patent law were informed from by the expert Justice Ayyangar and Tek Chand Reports. 
No such study was available this time to suggest suitable amendments in the Patents Act 
1970 (India). As a consequence, Parliament had failed to address certain key issues 
which were otherwise very important for the future of the Indian drug industry. These 
include the issues pertaining to biotechnology patents where Indian firms are rapidly 
gaining important results.
The Indian Parliament could have focused more systematically on the issues of Indian 
innovation and its role in empowering poor masses in India. This approach can help 
designing and expanding existing safeguard provisions in Indian patent law which are
191 Brenda Waning, Ellen Diedrichsen and Suerie Moon, 'A lifeline to treatment: the role of Indian 
generic manufacturers in supplying antiretroviral medicines to developing countries’ (2010) 13:35 
Journal o f the International AIDS Society> 1 at
http://wwvv.nebi.nlm.nih.uov/pmc/artieles/PMC2944814/pd 171758-2652-13-35.pdf
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currently limited and narrow. An Indian roadmap to harness the role of the local 
scientific community through open source and sharing models should serve as guiding 
principles in this regard. Moreover, I would argue that India should not adopt a TRIPS- 
Plus regime, because it would undermine multilateral institutions, such as the World 
Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization, and fragment 
international intellectual property. The multilateral intellectual property institutions and 
norms setting process are already under crisis after the emergence of Anti- 
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 f 2 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 
If this process continues and middle income developing countries like India are also 
pushed to adopt stricter intellectual property standards through bilateral and plurilateral 
trade and IP agreements, it would disturb the delicate balance which global IP system 
has so far achieved. The active role which India has played along with other developing 
countries at World Intellectual Property Organization and World Trade Organization 
will be severely affected if India backtracks from its current positions and policies.
142 Sara Bannerman, ‘WIPO and the ACTA Threat’ (January 2010) PIJIP Research Paper Series at 
http://diaitalcommons,\vcl.american.edu/cgi.wieweontent.cui?article=1004&contcxt-research
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Table 4.1 shows that although four Indian firms are among the top ten suppliers by 
volume, in terms of value only two appeared in the top ten, because of their lower 
prices.333 Another source cites the data of Global Fund’s suppliers in terms of brand 
names and generics. It shows that in 2004, brand name, patented, manufacturers 
supplied 40.7% of total procurements by volume but their share in expenditure terms 
was around 53%, whereas, generic manufacturers supplied almost 59.3% of the volume 
of total drugs with only a 47% share of expenditures.334 Other international humanitarian 
agencies like UNICEF and the Clinton Foundation rely heavily on importing affordable 
drugs from India. Indeed 84% of the ARVs that Medecins Sans Frontieres prescribes to 
its patients worldwide come from Indian generic companies.33-'
There has been much debate as to whether India will be able to continue to be such a 
dominant supplier of generic medicines, in an era where it must be compliant with the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994. Several studies consider whether compulsory licensing will be 
an effective tool to maintain the current level of supplies from Indian generic 
manufacturers.336 We can see four different strategies bearing on the relevancy and
lndianlNDUSTRY.pdf.
333 Ibid. 56.
334 Kenneth C. Shalden, ‘The Political Economy of AIDS Treatment: Intellectual Property and the 
Transformation of Generic Supply’ (2007) 51 International Studies Quarterly 559-581,564.
Gustavo Capdevila, ‘Indian court rejects Novartis’ drug patent suit’ Asia Times online, 8 August 2007, 
http://www.atimcs.eom/atimes/South Asia/1 F108Dffll .html.
336 See for example: Biswajit Dhar and K.K. Gopakumar, ‘Post-2005 TRIPS scenario in patent protection 
in the pharmaceutical sector: The case of generic pharmaceutical industry in India’ (2006), UNCTAD, 
IDRC and ICTSD, 56; Alka Chadha, ‘Product Cycles, innovation and exports: A Study of Indian 
pharmaceuticals’ (2005), Department of Economics, National University of Singapore Working Paper 
No. 0511 at http://wvvw.fas.nus.edu.sg/ees/pub/wp/wp0511 .pdf. Also see: Padmashree Gchl Sampath, 
‘Economic Aspects of Access to Medicines after 2005: Product Patent Protection and Emerging Firm
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usefulness of compulsory licensing as a means of providing access to medicines. First 
of all, multinational brand-name pharmaceutical companies represented by 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) have favoured a 
narrow and limited scope for compulsory licensing mechanisms. Accordingly, this 
industry is largely comfortable with the Waiver Decision 2003 and the way in which 
limitations and restrictions are imposed on the issuance of compulsory licences. Second, 
a number of academics and commentators contend that the compulsory licensing 
arrangements under the Waiver Decision 2003 will have a positive impact on 
pharmaceutical export mechanisms. Scholars like Frederick Abbott and Jerome H. 
Reichman belong to this group when they argue that export mechanisms can be boosted 
through a well-designed implementation strategy.3-7 Third, civil society groups such as 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) hold 
critical positions about the negative implications of the Waiver Decision 2003 on export 
mechanisms. They argue that the complicated and cumbersome procedure envisaged 
under the Waiver Decision 2003 will inevitably limit the ability of export markets to 
meet the demands of poor and developing countries. Finally, there is a group of 
commentators who contend that the Waiver Decision 2003 has a symbolic significance, 
even though its practical, tangible impact is negligible. Employing the themes of rule 
complexity and regulatory ritualism, Professor Peter Drahos has highlighted the 
limitations of the Waiver Decision 2003 to show the futility of outcome. 338
Strategies in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’ Institute of New Technologies, United Nations 
University at http://ww\v.who.int/intellcctualpropertv/studies/PadmashrceSampathFinal.pdf.
" Frederick M. Abbott and Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The Doha Round Public Health Legacy: Strategies for 
the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions’ (2007) 10(4) 
Journal o f  International Economic Law 921-987, 941.
Peter Drahos, ‘Four Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations over Access to 
Medicines’ (2007) 28( 11) Liverpool Law Review 39 at
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Chapter 3
The Novartis Case in India:
The Evergreening of the Gleevec Patent
Another important issue is that of inequitable patent laws which can 
serve as counterproductive hurdles for the use of lifesaving drugs.
Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence193
I. Introduction
On 17th May 2006, the Swiss pharmaceutical company, Novartis filed two cases in the 
Chennai High Court, India. Through these two writ petitions Novartis challenged the 
decision of the Indian Patent Office to reject its patent application for the cancer drug 
imatinib mesylate (brand name Gleevec). It further challenged the constitutionality of 
section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) on the basis of which the Patent Office had 
rejected the patent application. The appellant also raised the issue that section 3(d) is 
incompatible with the Trade-Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(TRIPS Agreement 1994). Later, Novartis dropped its first plea and went into an appeal 
before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB).
On 6th August 2007, the Madras High Court ruled against Novartis, holding that section 
3(d) is not unconstitutional. The Madras High Court held that it was not the proper 
forum to decide whether the Indian patent law was TRIPS Agreement 1994 compliant or 
not. The High Court also held that section 3(d) was not vague or arbitrary and therefore 
did not violate the Indian Constitution.
I4' Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006) 140.
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The Madras High Court's ruling triggered important policy debate about the scope and 
interpretation of Indian patent law and its possible implications for innovation and 
health policies. The ruling was also important to the policy debate over access to 
medicines as patients in many developing countries exclusively relied upon affordable 
Indian exports of generic medicines and the judgment helped in maintaining the future 
hopes in this regard. Section 3(d) of the Patent Act 1970 (India) represents India’s 
unique attempt at striking a balance between innovation and public health, given its 
status as a technologically proficient developing economy. Although the Madras High 
Court rightly ruled that section 3(d) was constitutional, its conclusion that it did not 
have jurisdiction to rule on the TRIPS Agreement 1994 issue deserves a critical review.
On the question of the constitutional validity of Section 3(d), the High Court again 
adopted a cogent policy by declaring the provision absolutely valid and applicable. The 
findings of the court on this point are well informed and practical stating that parliament 
can only provide some broader principles. Nevertheless, it is submitted that terms such 
as ‘efficacy’, which provides a useful policy lever, need to be construed carefully by the 
patent office. If pegged too high, it may hurt the innovative strengths of emerging local 
drug manufacturers and such policy can jeopardise local research and development 
initiatives.
This chapter primarily deals with the judgment of the Madras High Court. It starts with
a brief introduction to the background of Imatinib Mesylate development and Part II
elaborates the story of Gleevec, its patents and the role of Novartis in this regard. Part
III specifically deals with the contents of the judgment from a patent law perspective
and the earlier decision of the Indian Patent Office is also discussed in this part to
develop a comprehensive overview of the Novartis patent application and its subsequent
rejection. In Part IV, the contents of the judgment are discussed from an international
law perspective and this part elaborates issues such as compliance of the TRIPS
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Agreement 1994 and the validity of Section 3(d) in view of existing patenting norms. 
Part V explores the legality of Section 3(d) of the Patent Act 1970 (India) in view of 
Constitutional provisions. Part VI surveys the responses and reactions which were 
widely reported after the announcement of the judgment.
II. From Philadelphia Chromosome to Imatinib Mesylate: The Story 
of Gleevec
Since the identification of leukaemia as a deadly sub-disease of the cancer family, 
scientists have sought to develop therapeutic solutions.
Peter Nowell and David Hungerford discovered in 1960 that Chronic Myelogenous 
Leukaemia (CML) patients have a unique chromosome, which was later named as 
Philadelphia chromosome.'1'4 CML is generally known as a cancer of bone marrow and 
the findings of Peter Nowell and David Hungerford establish that in the white blood 
cells of CML patients, a portion of their chromosome is missing.14' Dr Janet Rowley, 
haematologist at the University of Chicago, found in 1973 that the Philadelphia 
chromosome was a hybrid of two normal chromosomes which have fused together and 
in the 1980s researchers discovered the fused gene (Bcr-abl). In CML patients the exact 
chromosomal defect in Philadelphia chromosome is the translocation when parts of two 
chromosomes, 9 and 22, swap places. The result is that part of the Bcr (breakpoint 
cluster region) gene from chromosome 22 is fused with part of the abl (abl stands for 
‘Abelson’, the name of a leukaemia virus which carries a similar protein) gene on
144 David Cameron, ‘A Slow Sega of Success’ (2007) Paradigm Magazine 
http://vvww.wi.mit.edu/news/paradignvspring 2007/glcevec.html
l4:’ Margie Patlak, ‘Targeting Leukemia: From Bench to Bedside’ in Breakthroughs in Bioscience (United 
States, Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology: 2001) at 
http://opa.faseb.org/pdt/leukemia.pdf
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chromosome 9. Ln 1990, George Daley created animal models of CML to establish that 
the Bcr-abl gene was sufficient to cause the disease.
Ciba-Geigy, which later became Novartis, had a cancer research program searching for 
molecules that inhibited cancer causing tyrosine kinases.196 Novartis decided to focus on 
the kinase enzyme and Drs Zimmerman and Buchdunger of Novartis, created and tested 
400 molecules to find one that would target this kinase enzyme. It was a difficult 
exercise to identify one enzyme without disrupting any of the hundreds of other similar 
enzymes in a healthy cell.197 After a couple of years of testing, they developed the 
molecule that would become Gleevec.198 The most significant development was the 
findings of Dr Brian Druker and Nicholas Lydon in 1996 when they highlighted one 
compound in particular and their work enabled Novartis to focus on this compound.199 
Among the different compounds tested, one named ST 1571 responded extraordinarily 
well and paved the way for the development of Gleevec.200
196 David Cameron, ‘A Slow Sega of Success’ (2007) Paradigm Magazine 
http://w\vw.wi.mit.cdu/ncws/paradigm/spring 2007/gIeevee.html 
19 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
http://vvwvv.phrma.ora/glecvec, 2004/
198 Ibid
199 David Cameron, ‘A Slow Sega of Success’ (2007) Paradigm Magazine 
http://vvww.wi.niit.cdu/ncws/paradigm/spring_2007/glecvcc.html
2011 Margie Patlak, ‘Targeting Leukemia: From Bench to Bedside’ in Breakthroughs in Bioscience (United 
States, Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology: 2001) 6-7 at 
http://opa.faseb.org/pdfieukemia.pdf
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A. Novartis
In the same year, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merged and formed the pharmaceutical giant 
Novartis.201 In 1998, the compound ST 1571 went through an extensive human trial 
phase which revealed its effectiveness whereby all 31 patients in the trial experienced 
complete remission. Finally, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) granted 
‘fast track’ designation to the drug and on May 10, 2001, only ten weeks after the 
company submitted a New Drug Application, the FDA approved Gleevec for the 
treatment of Philadelphia chromosome-positive CML patients in the blast crisis, 
accelerated phase or the chronic phase after failure of interferon therapy.202
Gleevec proved to be a blockbuster product for Novartis and the product earned 
significant profit for the company. In its 2006 Annual Report, Novartis ranked Gleevec 
among the top selling products of the company which surpassed US$2.5 billion in sales, 
representing an annual sales growth of more than 17% in local currencies.20’
Some commentators doubted the enthusiasm of Novartis in the development of 
Gleevec. According to Arnold S. Reiman and Marcia Angell:
[T]here was little corporate enthusiasm for undertaking further clinical work on 
imatinib. Druker nevertheless persisted, and Novartis finally agreed to support 
cautious, limited tests of the drug in Druker’s clinic and two other sites ... So 
Novartis’s R&D investment in testing imatinib for the treatment of CML was
201 Information about Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz (1970-1996) at http://www.novartis.com/about- 
novartis/company-historv/2companies.shtml.
202 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “FDA Approves Gleevec for Leukemia Treatment’ (Press 
Release, May 10, 2001) http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001 /NFW00759.html
203 Novartis International AG, Novartis Annua! Report (2006) 143.
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made several years after there was already good scientific evidence to suggest that 
it might be useful.204
Dr John R. Seffrin, then Chief Executive Officer of the American Cancer Society, and 
President of the International Union Against Cancer, has reminded us about the 
significant role of public and non-profit sectors in the development of Gleevec. On 
October 16, 2003 while addressing at the National Press Club, he said: ‘The real story 
of Gleevec is yet to be told. That is, that Gleevec still wouldn’t be with us today if all 
three sectors -  the private, the public and the non-profit sector -  hadn’t each played a 
key role in bringing Gleevec to market.’205
B. Gleevec Patents
Having developed a large and lucrative portfolio of patents, Novartis considers that it 
‘will continue to resist the pressure to soften its position on the need to vigorously 
protect intellectual property in favour of short-term political gain’.206 The company is of 
the view that weakening intellectual property rights would jeopardise, rather than 
expand, long-term access to medicines by removing incentives for innovation. After the 
invention of ‘Phyrimidineamine Derivatives’ in the early 1990s in Novartis labs, patent 
applications were filed to secure the propriety rights over these compounds which have 
demonstrated some inhibitive characteristics against CML. Novartis filed a patent
204 Arnold S. Reiman and Marcia Angell, ‘How the Drug industry Distorts Medicine and Politics: 
America’s Other Drug Problem’ (December 16, 2002) The New' Republic 27, 32.
2lb John R. Seffrin, Ph.D, Breakthroughs in Cancer Research: What’s Real and What's (16 December
2003) at hnp://\vww.cancer. prostate-help.org/cabreakt.htm
206 Novartis International AG, Novartis Annual Report (2006) 7.
91
application in Canada on April 1, 1993 which was granted on November 26, 2002.207 It 
also holds a patent for the same compound in the European Union.208
Later, as a result of subsequent research and development, Novartis filed additional 
patent applications for a ‘beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate’ in over 50 
countries. Novartis claims that by 2006 it had already been granted patents in 35 of 
them.209 This new invention was basically a particular form of methanesulphonic acid 
addition salt of a particular ‘Pyrimidineamine Derivative’ (‘imatinib Mesylate’) in 
crystal form. Novartis scientists had invented it in two forms, Alpha and Beta: the ‘Beta 
form stores better, is less hygroscopic, is easier to process and guarantees a constant 
quality of the final drug product’.210
In India, in the absence of a product patent regime for pharmaceutical products, 
Novartis secured Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMR) for Gleevec under Chapter IV A 
(Exclusive Marketing Rights) of the Patents Act 1970 brought in by the Patents 
(Amendment) Act 1999 (India) with retrospective effect from January 1, 1995. After the 
promulgation of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 15 o f 2005 (India), the Novartis patent 
application regarding the ‘beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate’ (sold under the 
brand name Gleevec/Glivec) was scrutinised by the Indian Patent Office. On the 25lh 
January 2006, the Assistant Controller General of Patents and Designs rejected this 
application in pre-grant opposition proceedings on the grounds that the application
207 Zimmermann, Jurg (2002), 'Pyrimidine Derivatives and Processes for the Preparation Thereof, 
Canadian Patent No: 2093203 at http://patentsl .ic.gc.ca/details7patcni numbcr=2093203 
21,8 Zimmermann, Jurg et al (filed in 1998), ‘Crystal Modification of a N-Phenyl-2-Pyrimidineamine 
Derivative, Processes For Its Manufacture And Its Use’, PCT Application No: PCT/EP1998/004427 at 
http://\vwvv.vvipo.int/petdb/en/wo.isp?wo=:1999003854&lA-WOI999003854& DISPLAY=STATUS
209 Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006) Writ Petition No. W.P.NO.24759 OF 2006 Paragraph 9(10).
210 Ibid Paragraph 9 (4).
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claimed only a new form of a known substance.2" Novartis then filed the writ petitions 
in the High Court of Judicature at Madras.
III. Judgment
Novartis filed two separate writ petitions in the High Court of Judicature at Madras.212 
On 6th August 2007, Justice R. Balasubramanian and Justice Prabha Sridevan of a 
Division Bench of the Madras High Court disposed of both the writ petitions together as 
the matter involved the same facts and legal questions. Through these writ petitions, 
Novartis had sought a declaration that Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) as 
amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) was unconstitutional. In the first 
writ petition there was an additional prayer to direct the Controller General o f Patents 
and Designs to allow the petitioner’s patent application No. 1602/NAS/98. However at 
a later stage, this prayer has been dropped by the petitioner with the approval of the 
Court.21’
In this challenge, Novartis questioned the validity of Section 3(d) upon two grounds. 
The first ground was related to the constitutional validity of the law. Novartis pleaded 
that Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) was ‘unconstitutional as it is vague, 
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution’.214 The second ground 
was related to the incompatibility of Section 3(d) with the TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
Justice R. Balasubramanian considered all relevant arguments while delivering the 
Common Order of the Court. His ruling cut across patent law, international trade law 
and constitutional law.
1 Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006) Writ Petition NO. 24754 Paragraph 3.
212 Writ Petition Nos. 24759 and of 2006 and 24760 of 2006. Full texts available on fde.
" ’ Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), P. 3-4.
214 Ibid 6.
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A. Patent Law
On 17th July 1998, Novartis filed an Indian patent application for an invention titled 
Crystal Modification o f A N-Phenyl-2-Pyrimidineamine Derivative, Processes for its 
Manufacture and its Use.2'5 The applicants claimed a Switzerland priority date of 18th 
July, 1997 and the application was gazetted on 17th July, 1999. Seventeen different 
claims were made in the complete specification submitted along with the patent 
application.216 It is pertinent to note that a relatively lesser number of claims were made 
in patent applications for Gleevec filed in other jurisdictions. For instance, a Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application (No.PCT/EP 1998/004427) has made only 
thirteen claims.217
The invention, as disclosed in the specification, was related to a B-crystal form of 
methanesulphonic acid salt of 4(4-methylpiperazin-l-ylmethyl)-N-[4-methyl-3[4- 
pyridin-3-yl)pyrimidi-2-ylamino)phenyl]-benzamide (commercially known as imatinib 
mesylate/brand name Gleevec). The patent specification particularly mentioned that the 
preparation of the base compound, 4-(4-methylpiperazin-l -ylmethy)-N-[4-methyl-3[4- 
pyridin-3-yl)pyrimidin-2-ylamino)phenyl-benzamide had already been disclosed in the 
European Patent publication No. EP-A-056409. This base compound is generally 
termed as imatinib and its use as an anti-tumour agent is well known. Novartis asserted 
in the patent application that This compound is exemplified in these publications only in
2I:> Zimmermann, Jurg et al. (filed in 1998) ‘Crystal Modification of a Nphcnyl-2-Phenyl-2- 
Pyrimidineamine Derivative, Processes For Its Manufacture and Its Use', Indian Patent Application No:
1602/M AS/1998 at http://india.bigpatents.org/apps/lQ\v8vVu
216 Complete Specification submitted by Novartis AG under the Patent Act 1970 on 17 July 1998. Full 
text is available on file.
2,7 WO/1999/003854 at
littp:/7www.wipo.int/pctdb/eivvvo.isp?wo:= 1999003854&I A-W O1999003854& DISPFAY^ST ATUS
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free form (not as a salt)’.218 This assertion was primarily made to establish the novelty of 
the new compound and it later become a major point of controversy during opposition 
proceedings.
Subsequent to filing the patent application, the Controller General of Patents and 
Trademarks of India issued the first EMR to Novartis for imatinib mesylate 
(Gleevec).2ig On 26th September 2005, after the promulgation of The Amended Act 2005, 
the Cancer Patient Aid Association (CPAA) filed a submission in the office of the 
Patent Controller, Chennai showing its willingness to initiate opposition proceedings 
under Section 15(1) of the Patents Act 1970 (India). A request for hearing was also 
made under Rule 55 of the Patents Rules, 2003 as amended by Patent (Amendment) 
Rules, 2005.22{) In response to the aforesaid submission, Novartis reiterated its position 
maintained in the patent application by rejecting the arguments of CPAA with regard to 
patentability of imatinib mesylate. The CPAA filed a rejoinder to the statement and 
reply of the applicant on 12th December, 2005 and the matter went through pre-grant 
opposition proceedings before the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs. After 
hearing the parties and analysing the written submissions and affidavits, the Patent 
Office refused to proceed with the application of Novartis for the grant of the Gleevec 
patent. There was doctrinal argument about the novelty and the inventive step of the 
patent application.
"|g ‘Novartis Receives EMR for Glivec’, Express Pharma Pulse, November 12th, 2003.
22,1 Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, Order 151205 of Assistant Controller of 
Patents and Design in the matter of application for patent No. 1602/M AS/98 (25th January, 2006) 2. Full 
Text available on file.
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B. Lack o f  Novelty
In its written submissions, the CPAA maintained that the invention, B-crystal form of 
methanesulphonic acid salt of 4(4-methylpiperazin-l-ylmethyl)-N-[4-methyl-3[4- 
pyridin-3-yl)pyrimidi-2-ylamino)phenyl]-benzamide, was not a new product as it had 
been published previously. So under Section 25 (l)(b)(i) the Patents Act 1970 (India), 
the application should be rejected on the ground that ‘the invention so claimed in any 
claim of the complete specification has been published before the priority date of the 
claim’.221 The CPAA also traced the earlier patent applications of Gleevec in Canada 
and the United States and argued that: ‘[0]n a reading of the specifications for which 
the patent was granted in Canada and subsequently in the USA, it is clear that the patent 
was granted not only for the compound in its free state, but also for all its salts’.222
Novartis, on the contrary, argued that the disclosure made in 1993 in US patent No. 
5521184 was different from the one which was claimed in the existing patent 
application. This invention, according to Novartis, involved two-fold improvements 
over the prior art as the compound was exemplified in the earlier patent applications 
only in its free form, not as a salt. In this invention ‘(i) the imatinib free base has been 
chemically changed into a salt form (ii) a particular crystal form of the salt has been 
made through human intervention’.22 5 Novartis also argued that its 1993 US patent did
221 Mr Y.K. Sapru for Cancer Patient Aid Association, ‘Pre-Grant Representation By Way of Opposition 
under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act 1970)39 of 1970) and Rule 55( 1) of the Rules as amended By the 
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005’, 22nd September, 2005. Full Text available on file.
222 Ibid.
22' Order 151205 of Assistant Controller of Patents and Design in the matter of application for patent No. 
1602/M AS/98, 25th January, 2006, 3. Text available on file.
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not carry an example for the preparation of imatinib mesylate and that ‘the claims of the 
1993 patent embrace imatinib mesylate’.224
In its rejoinder on 8th December, 2005, the CPAA maintained that despite the statement 
of the two-step process, the invention was still unpatentable under Indian law because it 
was anticipated through the 1993 patent that imatinib mesylate could be obtained with 
the addition of methanesulphonic acid. Alternatively, if not so, it was ‘an obvious 
improvement over the free base in the light of the prior art’.22:1 The plea of Novartis that 
in fact the claims of the 1993 patent embraced imatinib mesylate was rebutted by the 
CPAA: ‘Even if a prior publication does not expressly disclose in words one or more 
elements of a patent’s claims, it may nevertheless be anticipating if a person of ordinary 
skill in the art could have combined the publication’s description of the invention with 
his/her own knowledge to make the claimed invention.’226
After hearing the parties, Mr V. Rengasmy, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 
concluded that the CPAA had succeeded in proving that the imatinib mesylate was 
anticipated by prior publication. First, it was held that methanesulphonic acid was 
disclosed in the 1993 patent as one of the salt forming group with this disclosure that in 
the patent specifications the required acid additions salts were obtainable in a customary 
manner. Second, the ruling found that some of the 1993 patent claims (Claims 6 to 23) 
categorically mentioned a pharmaceutically acceptable salt of the base compound which 
by analogy included a beta crystalline form of imatinib. Third, imatinib mesylate was 
specifically mentioned as a product in a patent term extension certificate for the 1993 
patent issued by the US Patent Office.
224 Ibid.
Mr Y.K. Sapru for Cancer Patient Aid Association, ‘Rejoinder to the Statement and Reply of the 
Applicant, Novartis AG’, 8lh December, 2005. Full Text is avialble on file.
226 Ibid.
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A PCT application for the same compound was filed on 16th July, 1998 claiming a 
priority date of 18,h July, 1997.22 During opposition proceedings, the CPAA raised that 
Switzerland was not a convention country on 18,h July 1997 and it was notified to be a 
convention country only on 30,h November 1998. Hence, Novartis could not claim any 
priority from its Swiss application. Novartis submitted that priority date was only a 
facility provided to the applicants to avoid anticipation by publication of the invention 
between priority date and the filing date. The patent office agreed with the contention of 
the CPAA.228
The question of prior disclosure and the novelty of imatinib mesylate came under 
discussion in the PCT International Preliminary Examination Report and the novelty of 
the compound was recognised.221' Nevertheless, this reasoning could not persuade the 
Indian Patent Office and the compound was declared to be a part of the prior art. The 
issue of novelty and prior disclosure did not come ahead during the High Court 
proceedings and the judgment as such is silent about this issue.
C. Obviousness
Another issue raised with regard to the Gleevec patent application was related to 
obviousness. The CPAA submission alleged that the purported invention as disclosed in 
the patent application was obvious to a person skilled in the art. Thus, the invention did 
not involve an inventive step within the meaning of Section 2(ja) of the Patents Act 
1970 (India). According to the CPAA, the process disclosed in the specifications to
22 International Preliminary Examination Report, 8, PCT/EP98/04427 at 
http://www.wipo.int/patcntscope/search/docscrviccpdfjpct/id00000009366618
228 Order 151205 of Assistant Controller of Patents and Design in the matter of application for patent No. 
1602/MAS/98, 25th January, 2006, 5. Text available is available on file.
229 Ibid.
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obtain a beta crystal form was too simple, being 'merely processing the substance in the 
alpha form with alcohol in the presence of some water or mixtures at a particular 
temperature and then initiating crystallisation by adding the beta form as the seed’.230
So, the process did not involve any technical improvement as compared to the existing 
knowledge and any person with ordinary skills in the art could prepare corresponding 
pharmaceutically acceptable salt benefiting from the information disclosed in the 1993 
patent specifications. It was further demonstrated with the support of affidavits and 
reports from the Indian Institute of Technology and Indian Institute of Chemical 
Technology that the purported salt was found to steadily exist in the beta crystalline 
form and it was the most thermodynamically stable form in which imatinib mesylate 
inherently existed.231 Novartis was of the opinion that the beta crystalline form was not 
inherently formed when the 1993 patent specifications were filed and that earlier patent 
applications only disclosed the free base, not any salt of imatinib. Thus the invention 
was not obvious to a person skilled in the art.232
However, the patent office did not agree with the arguments of Novartis and held that 
‘the Opponent has reasonably succeeded in establishing this ground of opposition 
too'.233 Contrary to the findings of the Indian Patent Office, imatinib mesylate was 
considered a non-obvious invention in the PCT International Preliminary Examination
2 0 Mr Y.K. Sapru for Cancer Patient Aid Association, ‘Pre-Grant Representation By Way of Opposition 
under Section 25( 1) of the Patents Act 1970)39 of 1970) and Rule 55( 1) of the Rules as amended By the 
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005’, 22nd September, 2005. Full Text is available on file.
Manisha Sing Nair, ‘India: Novartis Denied Patent for Gleevec’, (31st May, 2006) Lex Orbis 
Intellectual Property Practice at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp7article id=40082 
2 ,2 Order 151205 of Assistant Controller of Patents and Design in the matter of application for patent No. 
1602/MAS/98, 25lh January, 2006, 3. Text available is available on file.
233 Ibid 4.
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Report. Initially it was acknowledged in the Report that ‘the isolation of a crystalline 
form of a known salt cannot in itself be regarded as being inventive, since it falls within 
practice followed by a person skilled in the art’.234 But, some distinct characteristics of 
the beta crystalline form as compared to the alpha form were established in the 
application which was not disclosed in the US Patent application. It was observed that 
‘Since the prior art D1 gives no indication of the existence of a particular crystalline salt 
with superior storage properties at high humidity levels, an inventive step can be 
acknowledged for the crystalline form of the salt as claimed in claims 1-9, and 
compositions, uses and synthesis thereof (claims 10-12).’235
IV. International Law
A considerable portion of the Novartis judgment pertains to the issues which are 
somehow related to international law. The petitioners challenged the validity of Section 
3(d) ‘both on the ground that it violates not only Article 14 of the Constitution of India 
but also on the ground that it is not in compliance to TRIPS’.236 The judgment includes 
elaborate arguments in light of relevant case law and the court finally disposed of the 
matter against the petitioners by declining its jurisdiction over an issue related to treaty 
obligations and their domestic enforcement. It is argued here that despite its valid 
conclusion of declining to afford any remedy to the petitioner, the court could not 
provide a sound basis for its conclusion of lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners’ challenge to Section 3(d) on the basis of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, 
was twofold. First, it argued that Section 3(d) was not compliant with the substantial
2,4 International Preliminary Examination Report, 8, PCT/EP98/04427 at 
http://\vvv\v.\vipo.int/patentscope/search doeservicepdf pct/id00000009366618
235 Ibid.
236 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f  India (2006). 5.
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requirements of patentability as laid down in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and thus it 
should be declared invalid. Alternatively, Novartis maintained that if for some reason 
the court could not invalidate the said provision then at least a declaration should be 
issued stating the incompliance of Section 3(d) with the TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
Novartis contended that the new language in the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) 
was contrary to Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. It was argued that:
The Union of India had in fact not carried out its obligations arising out of 
“TRIPS’' and instead, by amended section making that the discovery of a new 
form of a known substance, which does not result in the enhancement of the 
known efficacy of that substance as not patentable, the right to have an invention 
patented guaranteed under Section 27 of the “TRIPS” is taken away ... Under 
Article 27 of “TRIPS”, all inventions, subject to paragraph 2 and 3 of that Article, 
are patentable. Reading Article 27 as a whole, it is argued that the drug invented 
in the case on hand is patentable.2'"
The petitioners further argued that Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 had clearly 
established the patentability criteria and the requirements of Section 3(d) were narrower 
and beyond the scope of this article ‘which is not at all permissible under the TRIPS 
Agreement’.2”
Finally, the petitioner ‘submitted that where the policy of government and parliament is 
to implement an International treaty like TRIPS Agreement and where legislation is 
enacted after its acceptance and ratification, it must be presumed that parliament intends 
to give effect to the obligations under International law’.239 The petitioner maintained:
Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 9-10.
238 Write Petition No. 24759 of 2006, Novartis AG v Union o f India. 9.
239 Ibid.
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‘Since section 3(d) is in direct violation of TRIPS, it must be declared that it is not in 
conformity with the obligation taken by India in signing and ratifying the TRIPS 
Agreement.’240
In response to this assertion, the respondents replied on two different lines. It was first 
argued that the question of compliance of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 could not be 
raised before this court and, secondly, the existing Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 
(India) was fully compatible with the TRIPS Agreement 1994. In its reply filed by the 
Cancer Patient Aid Association, India, the respondent maintained that the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 could not be the basis of a challenge to statutory law in India:
The TRIPS agreement is not enforceable per se and its compliance or non- 
compliance cannot be a ground for a constitutional challenge to a domestic law 
that is the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 which is validly passed by a competent 
legislature. It is pertinent to note that India being a dualist nation, TRIPS 
agreement does not get implemented automatically. It is only through the 
domestic law that it can be implemented. Therefore this court has no jurisdiction 
to decide whether the statute violates the TRIPS agreement. In any event the 
proper forum for the same is the WTO Disputes Panel.241
Other respondents including the Union of India were of the opinion that under the 
scheme of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, every member state had been given enough room 
to transform their treaty obligations into national laws keeping in view the needs of their 
citizens and there was no incompatibility with international law obligations.242
240 Ibid.
241 Affidavit for the Respondents No. 6 in the High Court of Judicature at Madras, Writ Petition No.
24759 of 2006, 2.
242 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 12.
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Respondents also relied upon some English cases to establish that Indian courts had no 
jurisdiction to determine the validity of a municipal law on the ground that it was in 
violation of an international treaty.24' In the alternative, the respondents also argued that 
Section 3(d) was fully compliant with the TRIPS Agreement 1994.
Finally, on the issue of jurisdiction, the court agreed with the respondents and declined 
its jurisdiction by stating:
Therefore we have no difficulty at all that Article 64 of “TRIPS” read with World 
Trade Organisation’s understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the 
settlement of disputes provides a comprehensive settlement mechanism of any 
dispute arising under the agreement ... When such a comprehensive dispute 
settlement mechanism is provided as indicated above and when it cannot be 
disputed that it is binding on the member States, we see no reason at all as to why 
the petitioner, which itself is a part of that member State, should not be directed to 
have the dispute resolved under the dispute settlement mechanism referred to 
above ... we see no compelling reasons to deviate from such judicial approach 
when we consider the choice of forum arrived at in International Treaties. Since 
we have held that this court has no jurisdiction to decide the validity of the 
amended section, being in violation of Article 27 of “TRIPS”, we are not going 
into the question whether any individual is conferred with an enforceable right 
under “TRIPS” or not. For the same reason, we also hold that we are not deciding 
issue No. (b) namely, whether the amended section is compatible to Article 27 of 
“TRIPS” or not.244
4' Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006) 24. 
244 Ibid. 27-28.
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The court agreed not only with the interpretations and the case law cited by the 
respondents but also based its judgment on the theory of the contractual nature of treaty 
obligations which thus bind parties to an international covenant. Honourable Justice R. 
Balasubramanian while writing for the court rejected the relevance of the decision of the 
House of Lords in Equal Opportunity Commission & Another v. Secretary o f  State fo r  
Employment245 which was presented by the petitioners. It was clearly observed that this 
case involved the scrutiny of local law on the basis of a European Council Directive 
75/117 which had already been transformed into national law. Instead, the court relied 
upon the case of Salomn v. Commissioner o f  Customs) holding that ‘in our opinion, this 
is the direct judgment on the point’.246
Furthermore, on the basis of the covenant theory of international treaty obligations, the 
court held that the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 were essentially in the 
nature of a contract and it had evolved its own dispute settlement mechanism which 
could only be invoked in case of any controversy. After elaborating the relevant clauses 
regarding the dispute settlement, the court concluded that it had no jurisdiction in the 
given case and such a matter could only be settled under the dispute settlement 
mechanism of WTO.247 The court also considered the possibility of issuing a declaration 
and declined to do so.
A. Assuming Jurisdiction: Is it that Problematic?
The jurisdiction of a court in cases such as Novartis is definitely a crucial issue with the 
possibility of triggering some overwhelming consequences. With regard to the TRIPS
245 Equal Opportunity Commission & Another v Secretary o f State for Employment (1994) 1 ALL ER,
910.
246 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006) 25.
247 Ibid. 26.
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Agreement 1994, this question has not been raised for the first time in the Novartis case. 
However, the Novartis court responded to this issue in a unique way by declining its 
jurisdiction altogether instead of differentiating between the questions of the court’s 
jurisdiction and the petitioner’s standing. Indeed it refused to deal with the question of 
standing by surrendering its own jurisdiction without actually looking into trends set out 
elsewhere in matters pertaining to similar issues.
Most of the courts in other jurisdictions, which were confronted with matters pertaining 
to the validity of national laws in view of the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, 
had clearly assumed their jurisdictions and then disposed of the matters on the basis of 
respective legal systems and individual merits. Interestingly, none of these courts 
refused to deal with the matters merely on the ground that such matters could only be 
raised before the dispute settlement body envisaged under the TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
Under the rubric of the doctrine of direct effect, these courts sometimes refused to 
afford any relief to the challenging parties, but in very clear terms there was no attitude 
of avoidance as we can observe in the Novartis judgment.
The most recent example is the judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
Merck Genericos -  Produtos Farmaceuticos Lda v. Merck & Co. Inc., Merck Sharp & 
Dohme LdcC48 where on a question referred by a Portuguese court concerning Article 33 
of the TRIPS Agreement 2004, the Court declared that ‘national courts may 
independently decide whether to apply the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) directly in the field of patents’.249 In this case,
~4S Merck Genericos -  Produtos Farmaceuticos Ld“v. Merck & Co. Inc., Merck Sharp & Dohme Lcf'Case 
C 431/05 , http://curlcx.europa.eu/LexUriScrv/LcxUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0431 :EN:11TML.
~49 ECJ Assessed the Direct Applicability of TRIPS in the Field of Pharmaceutical Patents: National 
Courts May Decide on the Direct Effect,
hitp:./\vw\v.roschier.eoni Rosehier/rhavvwvvnew.nsf/sivut/Pub 13 1 1200722/SFILE/13.1 1.2007 HTML.hi
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based upon its earlier decisions, the ECJ did not decline its jurisdiction despite the fact 
that the European Community had not yet exercised its powers in the field of patents or 
that their exercise was not to date sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the sphere 
would currently fall within the scope of Community law. This is absolutely in 
consonance with the ECJ’s earlier decisions in Parfüms Christian Dior SA v. TUK 
Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v. Wilhelm Layher GmbH 
& Co. KG and Layher BV.250
In this regard it is also useful to look into the treaty-making provisions of the Indian 
Constitution which do not put any such bar on Indian courts which the Novartis Court 
had assumed. Article 51 and Article 253 of the Indian Constitution refers to 
international law and treaties. Article 51 elaborates one of the directive principles of the 
state’s underlying responsibility to promote world peace and friendly international 
relations, and ‘to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations’. Article 253 
states that the ‘Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the 
territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other 
country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association 
or other body.’ Traditionally, Article 253 has been interpreted as barring the direct 
effect of treaties in India. Nonetheless, Indian courts always resorted to Article 51 to 
illuminate Indian laws and the Constitution, especially in terms of enforcing social and 
economic rights.251 For Indian courts, it was not possible to develop a great deal of 
m#LifcScicnceArticle 1.
250 Judgment of the Court of 14 December 2000. -  Parfüms Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV 
and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV, Joined 
cases C-300/98 and C-392/98.
hnp://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61998J0300:EN:HTML.
2M M. Shah Alam , ‘Enforcement of International Human Rights Law By Domestic Courts: A Theoretical 
and Practical Study’ (2006) LIII Netherlands International Law Review 399-438, 428.
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human rights jurisprudence without assuming jurisdiction in cases which they decided 
on the basis of principles and guidelines enumerated in international treaties. In this 
way, Indian courts, unlike the Novartis court, had always distinguished between the 
question of their jurisdiction and the possibility of direct effect.
The Madras High Court reliance on WTO’s dispute settlement system is also 
questionable as Indian courts traditionally do not recognise any forum established under 
a treaty which has not been internalised in the form of domestic legislation. In India the 
WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement o f Disputes 
has not been domesticated and any reference to a forum created under this agreement 
does not fit in the earlier jurisprudence of the Indian courts on this point.
The reliance of the Novartis court on the argument of the contractual nature of treaty 
obligations and the WTO dispute settlement procedure is also problematic. The Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO is the only appropriate forum for dispute 
settlement inter se states and by no way was it designed to preclude the national courts 
from ruling on the content of WTO law. The Novartis court was right in determining 
that it could not strike down a provision of domestic law on the basis of contravention 
with the treaty obligations but it was fully competent to determine the scope and 
contents of domestic law on the basis of its inherent jurisdiction.
B. Patentability under Section 3 (d)
Novartis objected to Section 3 of the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) whereby in 
Section 3 of the Patents Act 1970 (India), for clause (d), the following has been 
substituted:
(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result 
in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery
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of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a 
known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new 
product or employs at least one new reactant.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, 
metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, 
combinations and other derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be 
the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to 
efficacy.
Though both the Novartis petition and the judgment are focused on the constitutionality 
and compatibility of Section 3(d) with regard to Article 14 of the Indian Constitution 
and Article 27 of TRIPS Agreement 1994, this section is dedicated to analyse the nature 
and scope of Section 3(d) mainly from a patent law perspective.
For an holistic understanding of Section 3(d) in an appropriate historical context Justice 
R. Balasubramanian has reproduced following two earlier versions of Section 3(d):
Unamended section 3(d): The mere discovery of any new property or new use of a 
known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus 
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new 
reactant.
Amendment to section 3(d) under Ordinance 7/2004: The mere discovery of any 
new property or mere new use of a known substance or of the mere use of a 
known process; machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new 
product or employs at least one new reactant.2-2 (Emphasis in original)
22 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 7-8.
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According to Novartis Section 3(d) amendments were proposed to meet the obligations 
of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and in this regard amendment to Section 3(d) under the 
Ordinance 2004 was compatible to the TRIPS Agreement 1994. However, Novartis 
counsel maintained: 'without any rhyme or reason, the proposed amendment sought to 
be introduced by the Ordinance had been completely given up and instead, the 
offending amended section was brought up’.253 Novartis also contended that in its 
existing form, ‘Section 3(d) contradicts to various articles of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 
and the main thrust was with reference to Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement 19942254
The objection was mainly about the wording of amended Section 3(d) stating: ‘which 
does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance’ and related 
explanation to the extent ‘unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to 
efficacy’. Novartis considered that after the introduction of the new amendment the 
right to have an invention patented under Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 has 
been taken away. Moreover, the Indian government has failed to comply with its 
obligations under Article 1 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 which mandates every 
member country to give effect to the provisions of the TRIPS and ‘India being a 
member country, in implementing the various provisions of “TRIPS” brought in the 
amended section violating their obligations under “TRIPS’” .25"'
The High Court has refrained from deliberating upon the merits of the petitioners’ plea 
on the incompatibility of the amended Section 3(d) with Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 on account of the lack of jurisdiction. It was held that:
253 Ibid. 9.
254 Ibid.
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Since we have held that this court has no jurisdiction to decide the validity of the 
amended section, being in violation of Article 27 of “TRIPS”, we are not going 
into the question whether any individual is conferred with an enforceable right 
under “TRIPS” or not. For the same reason, we also hold that we are not deciding 
issue No. (b) namely, whether the amended section is compatible to Article 27 of 
“TRIPS” or not.256
Notwithstanding the aforementioned conclusion of the court, it will be pertinent to trace 
the basis of this controversy in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and related patent literature 
to determine the suitability of amended Section 3(d) with regard to the ‘enhancement of 
known efficacy’ controversy. Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 elaborates the 
patentable subject matter in terms of patentability requirements. It provides that patents 
shall be available for any invention, whether products or process, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application.2''' Article 27.2 provides different grounds on the basis of which 
member states may exclude certain inventions from patentability.
Novartis claims that the requirements of Section 3(d) as mentioned earlier are beyond 
the obligations of Article 27 and thus violate the treaty obligations. There is no doubt 
that subject to Article 27.2, the criteria of patentability enumerated in Article 27.1 is 
novelty, inventive step and industrial application. Flowever, the TRIPS Agreement 1994 
does not provide definitions of these terms and it is equally silent about the definitions 
of product and process.
Some commentators consider that it is a leeway available to the member states and the 
treaty obligations can be transformed into domestic law in numerous ways given the
256 Ibid. 28.
257 Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994.
socio-economic conditions of a country. So, while adhering to its TRIPS Agreement 
1994 obligations a member state can define the patentability criteria in a distinct and 
unique way because of ‘considerable room to develop their own patent and other 
intellectual property laws in response to the characteristics of their legal systems and 
developmental needs’.2'’8 In this context Section 3(d) of the Patent Act 1970 (India) is 
absolutely compatible with the TRIPS obligations because there is enough flexibility 
that permits member countries to keep different criteria to assess patentability. Professor 
Carlos Correa observes specifically about Section 3(d):
The amendment introduced to the Indian Patent law in 2005 adopted a specific 
policy with regard to claims regarding salts, esters and other “forms” of existing 
products. The objective of the Indian provision is clearly to limit the proliferation 
of patents around existing pharmaceutical products.259
This view also gains strength from the Final Report of the UK Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights when it recommends: ‘Developing countries should aim for 
strict standards of patentability to avoid granting patents that may have limited value in 
relation to their health objectives.’260
Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries 
(Geneva, Switzerland: South Centre, 2000) at 3.
2y) Carlos Correa, ‘Pharmaceutical Inventions: When is the Granting of a Patent Justified?’ (2006) 1 (1-2) 
International Journal o f Intellectual Property Management 4-21 at 8.
2('(l Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy (2002) 7-8.
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However, some authors consider that Section 3(d) is ‘the most controversial provision 
which prohibits patents on derivatives of known substances, unless such derivatives 
display significant enhanced efficacy’.261
This provision reflects the strong resentment towards evergreening of drugs patents. 
Justice R. Balasubramanian recognises such policy concerns when he observes:
We have borne in mind the object which the Amending Act wanted to achieve 
namely, to prevent evergreening; to provide easy access to the citizens of this 
country to life saving drugs and to discharge their Constitutional obligation of 
providing good health care to its citizens.262
Under Section 3(d), the key question regarding the exclusion from patentability will be 
the extent of a claimed derivative’s ‘efficacy’. The first paragraph of Section 3(d) 
allows the patenting of a derivative which provides an ‘enhancement of the known 
efficacy’ of a ‘known substance’ but the explanation of the second paragraph lay down 
another restriction by requiring that the derivatives and the known substance ‘differ 
significantly in properties with regard to efficacy’. So ‘Section 3(d) thus raises both 
qualitative and quantitative questions i.e. what kind of data will be required to establish 
“efficacy” and how great an improvement over the efficacy of the prior art invention 
will be required to obtain a patent.’263
261 Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System 
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (Working Paper No. 43, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law Working Paper Series, 2006) 71.
262 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 88.
263 Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System 
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 491 - 
641, 553 at http://lawreview.law.pitt.edU/issucs/68/68.3/Mueller.pdf.
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Precisely this point was raised by Novartis during the arguments that the efficacy of a 
known substance may be well known but the Patent Controller will exercise 
uncontrolled discretion without some guidelines in the law itself to understand the 
expression ‘enhancement of the known efficacy’.264 Though the Court did not agree with 
the petitioners’ contention about the invalidity of Section 3(d), for all practical 
purposes, the patent office and practitioners require at least a functional definition and 
interpretation of the terms employed in this section. Shamnad Basheer highlights this 
problem:
Drawing out guidelines for determining “efficacy” is indeed the need of the hour. 
While the Madras High Court judgment is being celebrated, it does come with 
certain problems -  it wishes away the “efficacy” problem as something to be 
defined in each specific fact situation ... Unfortunately, apart from a categorical 
statement that it did not agree, the patent office did not really tell us as to what 
they thought the term “efficacy” meant and why Novartis alleged invention did 
not demonstrate enhanced efficacy. Given this background, isn’t it only fair for 
Novartis for plead that they are clueless as to what the term means.265
Obviously a court cannot be expected to provide a definition of such terms and it has 
approached the issue purely from the constitutional perspective.
One possible difficulty in defining and interpreting the language of Section 3(d) is the 
lack of any earlier guidance on this point. Indian law is unique in a sense that it has 
incorporated a broader exclusion from patentability and no jurisprudence is available in 
patent law to settle such inherent statutory ambiguities. Generally, discussions about
_<’4 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 10.
265 Shamnad Basheer, ‘The Novartis Patent Dispute: Of “Spins” and Empty Rhetoric’ on Spicy IP (August 
11 2007) at http: / sp icyipindia.blouspot.com/.
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patentability revolve around the scope and application o f novelty and inventive step but 
the Indian law goes beyond that by providing new restrictions on evergreening. It is 
pertinent to mention that the language o f Section 3(d) is largely derived from the 
definition contained in the European Union Directive 2004/27/EC, which provides: 
‘The different salts, esters, ethers, isomers, mixtures o f isomers, complexes or 
derivatives o f an active substance shall be considered to be the same active substance, 
unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to safety and/or efficacy.’266 
There is the potential for linguistic confusion through the migration o f such terms into 
patent law -  guidelines could help resolve any problems.
V. Constitutional Law
In its petition before the Madras High Court, Novartis heavily relied upon the argument 
that Section 3(d) o f the Patent Act 1970 (India) violated Article 14 o f the Constitution 
of India because it was vague, arbitrary and conferred un-canalised powers upon the 
statutory authority. The litigation raises three distinct questions o f constitutional law. 
The first set o f issues is related to the question o f contravention o f Article 14 o f the 
Constitution which concerns equality before the law. The second set o f issues is about 
the discussions associated with the possibility o f granting a declaratory relief under 
Article 32 o f the Constitution of India. The third set o f issues is about the right to life 
and its interpretation and application in this case.
A. Article 14 o f  the Constitution o f  India 
Article 14 o f the Constitution o f India states:
266 Council Directive of2004/27/EC o f 31 March 2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the
Community’ Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use [[2004] OJ L/ 136, 34 at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriSe»v.do?uri=CHLBX:32004L0027:EN:HTML.
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14. Equality before law.—The State shall not deny to any person equality before 
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
The main grounds of the attack to the validity of the Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 
1970 (India) were that, it was vague, arbitrary, and confers un-canalised powers on the 
statutory authority i.e. the patent office which was assigned quasi-judicial functions 
under the statute. Therefore, it should be struck down under the ‘equality’ clause 
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners submitted overlapping 
arguments in favour of their position to establish a case of contravention of the basis of 
the three grounds stated earlier. The petitioner argued that through the amended Section 
3(d) under the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) ‘a further clause was added to the 
effect that the discovery of a new form of a known substance should result in the 
enhancement of a known efficacy of that substance and if it does not, then, it is not an 
invention’.267 Such a clause, according to the petitioners, was not part of the Patents 
Ordinance 2004 (India) and it had been added later without due deliberations.
Novartis alleged that in the absence of any guidelines in the Patents (Amendment) Act 
2005 (India) regarding the exact interpretation and scope of terms such as ‘efficacy’ and 
‘the enhancement of known efficacy’, an unguided discretion was vested with the 
statutory authority and therefore the amended section was bad in law. Furthermore, the 
explanation added at the end of Section 3(d) was also attacked on the same ground as it 
had also limited the scope of patentability. It was submitted that:
In other words, the submission is that, both the amended section as well as the 
Explanation to the amended section must prescribe in clear terms for the 
Authority constituted under the Act, the guidelines to decide in what 
circumstances it can be held that the discovery of a new form of a known 
26 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 39.
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substance had resulted in the enhancement of the known efficacy o f that substance 
and when the derivatives are found to differ significantly in properties with regard 
to efficacy. Though the expression “efficacy” has a definite meaning, yet, no 
definite meaning could be attributed to the expression “enhancement o f the known 
efficacy” and “differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy” . These 
expressions are ambiguous.268
In response to this contention, respondents submitted that in view o f advancement o f 
technology and rapid developments in scientific research, the legislators adopted a 
general expression and the statutory authority was left free to apply its mind to 
determine the interpretation of an impugned section in different cases. Therefore it 
would be unwise to insist upon a statutory interpretation o f these terms as having regard 
to individual inventions; the patent office would determine whether the new form o f a 
known substance had resulted in the enhancement of known efficacy.266
While deciding the matter, the court agreed with the petitioners that the amended 
Section 3(d) under the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) was substantially 
different from the one originally incorporated in the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance 
2004 (India) and thus from the Patents Bill 2005 submitted to the parliament. The court 
also declared that the scope of Section 3(d) was wider and in no way was it limited to 
pharmaceutical products. However, the exception stated with this section was 
specifically designed for inventions related to the pharmacology field, namely drugs.270
After a careful examination of relevant facts the and arguments o f the parties, the court 
rejected the plea o f the petitioners that amended Section 3(d) was in violation o f Article
268 Ibid. 40.
269 Ibid. 41.
270 Ibid. 44.
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14 of the Constitution of India. It was declared that the speeches made during the 
parliamentary debates and a statement of objectives and reasons associated with 
legislation was of less significance in the interpretation of a legal provision. The court 
relied upon an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Aswini Kumar v. 
Arabinda Boss11', which held: ‘The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the 
Bill should be ruled out as an aid to the construction of a statute.’272
Therefore, the court rejected the contention of Novartis that the while adopting the 
amended Section 3(d), the legislator had ignored the spirit behind the introduction of 
this law contained in the Minister’s statement of objectives.
The court declared that such interpretation could not be construed to invalidate a 
provision of law which was duly approved by the legislator. Many cases were cited in 
this regard to reject the Novartis stance on this issue.272 It was then concluded that ‘it is 
not possible to sustain the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsels that 
having shown section 3(d) in a particular form in Ordinance 7/2004 and bringing it in a 
totally different form in Amending Act 15/2005, the amending section ex-facie stands in 
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India’.274
The court went further with the issue of interpretation and scope of the terms ‘efficacy’ 
and ‘the enhancement of known efficacy’, as it was a major argument of Novartis. The 
Madras High Court resolved this matter in terms of therapeutic efficacy by referring to 
the simple meanings of terms in different medical dictionaries. After determining the
1 Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Boss AIR 1952 SC, 369.
2 2 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 44-45. 
273 P.S. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 SCC, 622; K.S. Paripoornan v. State o f Kerala, 
(1994) 5 SCC, 593.
~74 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 51.
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statutory scope of an ‘explanation’ in view o f the established case law, the court 
declared that scientifically it was possible to show with certainty the properties of a 
substance. The court endorsed the opinion o f the Additional Solicitor General, India: 
‘The writ petitioner is not a novice to the pharmacology field but it, being 
pharmaceutical giant in the whole of the world, cannot plead that they do not know 
what is meant by enhancement of a known efficacy and they cannot show that the 
derivatives differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.’27''
The court also scrutinised the argument o f Novartis that the Parliament should have 
provided and disputed terms in Section 3(d) in the light o f previous case law and 
statutory interpretations. In view of Benilal v. State o f  Maharashtra21* and the Registrar 
o f Co-operative Societies v. K.Kunjabmu211, parliament could not foresee things that 
may arise in the future and ‘parliament expresses its object and puipose in general terms 
when enacting Statute’.27* Thus, the court concluded that the petitioners could not make 
a case under Article 14 o f the Constitution:
It is not shown by the learned senior counsels appearing for the petitioners before 
us that in the exercise o f the discretionary power by the Patent controller, any of 
the petitioner’s fundamental rights are violated namely, to carry on the trade or the 
petitioner stand singularly discriminated.279
Finally on the issue o f invalidity on the basis o f Article 14 o f the Constitution, the court 
differentiated the way in which both economic and social legislations could be
275 Ibid. 59.
~76 Benilal v. State o f Maharashtra 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 238.
27 Registrar o f Co-operative Societies v K.Kunjabmu 1980 (1) SCC 340.
2 s Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f  India (2006), 60. 
279 Ibid. 73.
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construed. In light of R.K. Garg v. Union o f India2*0 the rule was highlighted that the 
laws relating to economic activities could be viewed with greater latitude than laws 
about civil rights such as freedom of speech. The Patents Act 1970 (India) could only 
be construed in this context as it had been amended over the periods keeping in view the 
economic conditions of the country. Therefore from the very beginning, the Parliament 
was aware about the change in the economic conditions of the country, which made 
them amend the earlier laws to suit the prevailing economic conditions. It was held that 
the petitioners failed to demonstrate any legal ground relating to equality before the law 
to invalidate the amended section.281
B. Declaratory Relief under Article 226
Another dimension of the Constitutional debate was the possibility of issuing a 
declaration in this case which was filed under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. 
Novartis presented a case that if the court could not strike down Section 3(d) of the 
Patents Act 1970 (India) on the basis of contravention of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 
then at least, as an alternative remedy, a declaratory relief could be pronounced to the 
effect that the impugned Section was inconsistent with the obligations of the agreement. 
The Petitioners stated that Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) as amended by 
the Patents (Amendment) Act (India), was invalid, illegal and unconstitutional on the 
grounds of contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the petitioners 
were entitled to a declaration.
The court addressed this issue mainly from a Constitutional perspective and it declared 
that the scope of declaratory relief in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution 
of India was limited to the situations where such relief could actually provide real
280 R.K. Garg v. Union o f India (1981) 4 SCC 675.
281 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 82.
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benefit to a party. Thus, in other cases where such relief has a mere notional value, the 
court should abstain from exercising its Constitutional jurisdiction.282 The Court 
established through the case law that the scope of declaration under Article 226 was 
quite limited; however, a court exercising its jurisdiction under the provisions of the 
Constitution could rely upon Article 32 to afford such a relief.283
Then the High Court analysed the case law under Article 32 to determine whether a 
declaration could be issued on the Novartis application and noted that the Supreme 
Court of India had held that it would not hesitate to grant a declaratory relief under 
Article 32 of the Constitution of India where fundamental rights had been violated. 
After elaborating this standard, the court held that the amended Section 3(d) did not 
totally take away the right of the petitioner to carry out the business and trade in India 
and thus a case for declaration could not be established. Furthermore, petitioners were 
not satisfied with the amendments in a statute but ‘it is a settled position in law that 
nobody can compel the Parliament to enact a law’.284 Based upon this settled point, the 
court questioned the usefulness and utility of such a declaration even if the court could 
consider declaring that the amended provision was not in the discharge of India’s 
obligations under Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. Thus, in view of Katakis v. 
Union o f Indicr85, a declaration could not be given where it would serve no useful 
purpose to the petitioner.
Some experts, however, view it differently. If a court is exercising discretionary powers 
under writ jurisdiction then it should keep in view the treaty obligations and make
orders accordingly. In the words of Justice R. K. Abichandani: ‘While the role of
Ibid. 35.
283 Ibid. 30.
284 Ibid. 34.
285 Katakis v Union o f India Writ Petition No. 54/68 of 28-10-1968 (Unreported)
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judiciary is confined to the four comers of the statutory provisions governing the 
intellectual property rights, its discretionary powers enable it to legitimately take into 
account the ramifications that its discretionary orders would have in the context of the 
wider horizons of the intellectual property rights.’286
C. Right to Health under Article 21
The human rights based approach adopted in and around the Gleevec patent litigation 
had intensified the importance of the case throughout the world. Novartis claimed that 
its intellectual property right had been abridged and the case was filed to protect its 
strategic assets. The patient groups argued that an attempt to get a patent on imatinib 
would threaten their right to health by narrowing down the options to access affordable 
medicines. The submissions of one respondent, the Cancer Patients Aid Association, 
were quite conspicuous in this regard and they heavily relied upon the related provisions 
of the Indian Constitution and other international instruments.
In its written reply to the Novartis petition, the Cancer Patients Aid Association 
maintained that India was bound by a Constitutional duty to comply with the positive 
obligations of the right to health of its citizens including those affected by Chronic 
Myelogenous Leukemia (CML). In this regard reference was made to the right to life 
guaranteed under Article 2 1287 of the Constitution of India. It was also submitted that the 
non-availability and non-affordability of any form of Imanitib Mesylate to CML
~S6 Justice R.K. Abichandani, 'Role of Judiciary in the Effective Protection of Intellectual Property Right’, 
(undated) 11, at
http://vvwvv.ccstat.gov.in/Articles?/o20bv0/o20Prcsident/Role%20ot%20Judiciary%20in%20thc%20Effecti 
ve%2QProtection%20of\,T2(.)lntellectual%20Propertv%20Ri tiht.doc
Article 21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—No person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law.
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patients would also violate the rights of the CML patients under Articles 14 and 21 of 
the Constitution.288
It is worthwhile mentioning that the Indian Constitution does not recognise the right to 
health as a fundamental right per se. However, the Supreme Court of India in Vincent 
Panikurlangara v. Union o f India2*9 recognised the enforceability of the right to health 
within the scope of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Later, the Supreme Court 
through an expansive interpretation of Article 21 (right to life) in its landmark judgment 
of Paschim Banag Khet Samity v. State o f West Bengal, declared that the right to life 
included the right to health and the right to emergency medical care.2 '0
In addition to their reliance upon the Constitutional provisions, the Cancer Patients Aid 
Association also referred to various international instruments to highlight India’s 
commitments and obligations to protect the health of its citizen’s by adopting 
favourable administrative and legislative measures. In this regard, Article 3 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of person.’ Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, 
Article 6 of the International Covenant in Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which 
India is a party and Article 12.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1976 (ICESCR) were specifically mentioned to establish India’s 
obligations in this regard. In Vishakha v. State o f Rajasthan, the Supreme Court also 
declared that Article 21 of the Constitution of India had to be interpreted in the light of 
international instruments.201 Respondents also referred to the poverty profile of India
288 Affidavit for the Respondents No. 6 in the High Court of Judicature at Madras, Writ Petition No.
24759 of 2006, 12.
284 Vincent Panikurlangara v Union o f India (1987 (2) SCC 165.
290 Paschim Banag Khet Samity’ v State o f West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37.
291 Vishakha v. State o f Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241.
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and the need to devise an intellectual property policy to stimulate the research and 
development in the best interests of poor and marginalised groups who are badly in 
need of affordable quality medicines.292
The judgment of the Madras High Court mainly deals with the legal and technical 
aspects of the dispute. However, the court could not fully avoid the appeal of such 
analysis and it had sporadically reflected upon those arguments by upholding the use of 
policy style reasoning to validate the contentious provision of a law. The court observed 
that:
Lengthy arguments have been advanced ... that India, being a welfare and a 
developing country, which is pre-dominantly occupied by people below poverty 
line, has a constitutional duty to provide good health care to its citizens by giving 
them easy access to life saving drugs. In so doing, the Union of India would be 
right, it is argued, to take into account the various factual aspects prevailing in this 
big country and prevent evergreening by allowing generic medicine to be 
available in the market. As rightly contended by the learned Additional Solicitor 
General of India, the Parliamentary debates show that welfare of the people of the 
country was in the mind of the Parliamentarians when Ordinance 7/2004 was in 
the House.293
Finally, concluding in its own words, the court stated that: ‘We have borne in mind the
object which the Amending Act wanted to achieve namely, to prevent evergreening; to
212 Affidavit for the Respondents No. 6 in the High Court of Judicature at Madras, Writ Petition No. 
24759 of 2006, 12-13.
-9'1 Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Novartis AG v Union o f India (2006), 70.
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provide easy access to the citizens of this country to life saving drugs and to discharge 
their Constitutional obligation of providing good health care to its citizens.’294
The statement is clear to the extent that a policy-style reasoning can be used to construe 
the scope and limitation of a law and public interest can play a vital role in this regard.
D. The Right to Health versus the Right to Property
It is pertinent to note that the petitioners did not argue along the same lines by raising 
the plea of right to property as compared to the respondents’ reliance on right to health. 
The reason perhaps is the fact that the Indian Constitution does not recognise the right 
to property as a fundamental right and Novartis could not rely upon the counter 
argument of fundamental right to property which it had raised in an earlier case in South 
Africa. On 18 February 1998, forty-two pharmaceutical companies including Novartis 
South Africa (proprietary) Limited brought an action before the High Court of South 
Africa against the Government of South Africa to challenge the constitutionality of 
some of the provisions embodied in the Medicines Amendment Act 90 o f 1997.29? One of 
the grounds of this challenge was the violation of the right to property which was 
guaranteed as a fundamental right in the Constitution of South Africa which was 
adopted on 8 May 1996, and amended on 11 October 1996.
It was alleged that Section 15C of the Medicines Amendment Act 1997 authorised the 
Minister of Health, in conflict with Section 25 of the Constitution, to deprive owners of 
intellectual property in respect of pharmaceutical products and alternatively to 
expropriate such property without any provision for compensation to be paid in respect
294 Ibid. 80.
295 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association o f South Africa and Others
v The President O f The Republic O f South Africa and Others (18 February 1998) Case No. 4183/98 at 
http://www.epteeh.oru/ip/health/sa/pharniasuit.html.
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thereof. In response to this plea, South African governments relied upon the 
fundamental right to health to justify its action under the impugned legislation. As the 
case was finally settled out of the court, a determination on these competing interests 
could not be made.296
As compared to the South African situation, until 1978, the right to acquire, hold and 
dispose property was recognised as a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution 
by virtue of Article 19(1) (f). Under Article 31 of the Constitution this right could be 
deprived subject to various provisions of applicable law and the payment of adequate 
compensation. As part of its agenda of land reforms, the Indian Government sought to 
limit the jurisdiction of the courts in the cases of compulsory acquisition of property.2'’ 
Nevertheless, the Indian judiciary continued to interpret the right broadly.24* In Golak 
Nath v. State o f Punjab, the Supreme Court held that fundamental rights including the 
right to property were part of an unamendable core of the Constitution.299 Subsequently 
the Congress was able to reform the area.200 Finally, by virtue of the Forty Fourth 
Amendment Act 1978, Article 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 were deleted from the
~96 Tshimanga Kongolo, ‘Public Interest versus the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Monopoly in South Africa' 
(2001) 4 The Journal o f World Intellectual Property 609, 619.
297 Jaivir Singh, ‘(Un) Constituting Property: The Deconstruction of the “Right to Property’ in India’ 
(Working Paper No.GSLG/WP/04-05, Centre for the Study of Law and Governance Jawaharlal Nehru 
University New Delhi-India, 2004-05) 8.
29X West Bangui v Mrs Bela Banerjee AIR 1954 SC 170, Dwarkadas Srinivas v The Scholapur Spinning 
and Weaving Company Ltd. AIR 1951 Bombay 86 and State o f Gijrat v Shuntilal Mangaldas AIR 1969 
SC 624.
299 Golak Nath v State o f Punjab (1967) 2 SCR. 726.
"l0° Tom Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, l sl ed, 2000) 53.
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Constitution. Article 300-A provides the weaker, unenforceable right: ‘No person shall 
be deprived of his property save by authority of law.’301
In this context, the reluctance of petitioners to address the respondents’ right to health 
argument through a counter plea of the right to property is fully understandable. 
Novartis mainly relied upon the argument of violation of its fundamental rights under 
Article 14 of the Constitution of India but the court rejected this plea stating that 
petitioners could not make a case under Article 14.
VI. Responses
The Novartis case has become a cause celebre in the recent policy debates about the 
global harmonisation of patent regimes. The importance of the decision is evident from 
the immediate responses and comments to the announcement of the High Court’s 
verdict.
A. Government Responses
A day after the Madras High Court decision, Indian Commerce and Industry Minister 
Kamal Nath said that India’s patent laws were in conformity with the intellectual 
property rules laid down by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Minister Nath told 
the press that: ‘Our patent laws are WTO compliant’ and it is ‘only one company that 
has raised its voice’.302 In April 2007, Indian Health Minister, Anbumani Ramadoss,
301 Jaivir Singh, '(Un) Constituting Property: The Deconstruction of the “Right to Property’ in India’ 
(Working Paper No.GSLG/WP/04-05, Centre for the Study of Law and Governance Jawaharlal Nehru 
University New Delhi-India, 2004-05, 17-18.
302 Gaurav Choudhury, ‘Novartis case may not reach WTO', Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 8 August 
2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/StorvPaae/StorvPaee.aspx7id-5dbl 5736-9ab0-4b65-b75f- 
be56c8da6a3e£&Headline=Novartis+casc+may+not+reach4 WTO .
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urged Novartis to step back saying India had not used compulsory licensing yet and 
‘shouldn’t be pushed towards that’.303
By contrast, the Swiss government announced that it would not pursue the allegation by 
Novartis that Indian patent law is incompatible with the TRIPS Agreement 1994 at the 
dispute settlement board of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Doris Leuthard, 
Federal Councillor, Department of Economic Affairs of the Swiss Confederation said: 
‘We accept any case settled in India. It is normal litigation, in which one party happens 
to be a company and another is a country.’304 It is worthwhile mentioning that Leuthard 
was in Delhi to sign a memorandum on cooperation in international property rights with 
India.30"
It is important to note that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the 
European Union (EU) Trade Commissioner have not shown any response to the 
Novartis judgment. Traditionally, the USTR has always shown a great concern about 
the IP norms and enforcement in India and according to USTR 2007 Special 301 Report 
India will remain on the Priority Watch List in 2007. The Report highlights the concerns 
of the US government about inadequate IPR protection and enforcement in India.306 
Likewise the EU Trade Commissioner has not commented on the Madras High Court 
judgment. In early 2007, at the height of the Gleevec dispute, Novartis was actively
303 Ruth David, ‘Novartis Set Back In India Patent Fight Over Glivec’, Forbes. July 7, 2007 at 
http://wwvv.forbcs.conVmarkcts/20Q7/08/07/novartis-glivcc-generics-markcts-equitv- 
ex rd 0807markcts02.html.
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’n<’ United States Trade Representative, 2007 Special 301 Report, (2007) [26],
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lobbying the Eli Parliament and urging its 785 members not to sign a written 
declaration opposing its stance on India’s 2005 patent law.307 Prior to that five Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs) representing four parties issued a ‘declaration’ 
asking Novartis to drop the case and the European Commission and Council to take a 
position on it.308
B. Non-Governmental Organisations
During the Novartis trial, several Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), working in 
the areas of humanitarian aid and public health, launched specific campaigns to support 
the action of the Indian Patent Office on Novartis patent application. On 7th August 
2007, four NGOs issued a joint statement welcoming the decision. The Cancer Patients 
Aid Association (CPAA), the Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit, the Delhi Network 
for Positive People (DNP+) and international medical humanitarian organisation 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) said in a joint statement: ‘The landmark decision by 
the Madras High Court upholding India’s Patents Act in the face of the challenge by 
Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis is a major victory for patients’ access to 
affordable medicines in developing countries.’309 In their joint statement these 
organisations hoped that India will continue to be the ‘pharmacy of the developing
107 Ed Silverman, ‘Novartis Woos EU Politicians’, Pharma/ot, March 21st 2007 
http://wwvv.phanmlot.com/2007/03/novartis vvoos cti politicians/.
'os Tove Gerhardsen, ‘Opposition Gains Support Against Novartis Patent Lawsuit In India’, Intellectual 
Property Watch, 15 February 2007,
http://www. ipwatch.org/weblog/index. php?p=535&res=&res=1024&print=0.
~m NGO Statement on Patent Ruling: Joint Statement by CPAA, MSF, DNP+ and Lawyers Collective on
Novartis Judgment the Cancer Patients Aid Association (CPAA), the Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS 
Unit, the Delhi Network for Positive People (DNP+) and Medecins Sans Frontiercs, 
http://ww'W.keionline.oru index.php?option^comcontent&task^view&id-UO&ltemid-l.
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world’ given the fact that developing countries and international agencies like UNICEF 
and the Clinton Foundation rely heavily on importing affordable drugs from India. 10
Another alliance of international NGOs termed the decision an important victory for 
global public health and hoped that the decision would protect India’s special role as the 
world’s leading provider of affordable medicines to the poor. In a joint statement, 
CARE International and Oxfam International, and the church-based advocacy network, 
the Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance declared: ‘This ruling is a lifeline for the millions of 
people who cannot afford brand-name drugs, and ensures that essential medicines from 
India will reach those who rely on them.’311
Immediately after the challenge of the Indian Patent Office decision by the Novartis, 
MFS launched a campaign for the withdrawal of the case. The campaign was run with 
the help of several MSF partner non-governmental organisations, and massive lobbying 
efforts were made in the US, EU and Canada to solicit support for the Indian patent law. 
On August 6,h 2007, a Press Release by the MSF, declared the Madras High Court 
decision a landmark judgment and a major victory for patients’ access to affordable 
medicines in developing countries. Dr Tido von Schoen-Angerer, Director of the MSF 
Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines commented: ‘This is a huge relief for 
millions of patients and doctors in developing countries who depend on affordable 
medicines from India.’312 In its Press Release MSF also reminded about the petition
310 Gustavo Capdcvila, ‘Indian court rejects Novartis’ drug patent suit’ Asia Times online, 8 August 2007, 
http://www.atiincs.com/atimcs/South_Asia/IH08Df01 .html.
1,1 Matt Grainger, Oxfam, ‘Indian ruling against pharmaceutical giant Novartis a victory for public 
health’ (Press Release August 6, 2007).
http://www.oxfam.orG.uk/applications/blous/pressoffice/2007/08/indian ruling against pharmace.html 
' l_ Medecins Sans Fronticres (MSF), ‘Indian Court Ruling in Novartis Case Protects India as the 
‘Pharmacy of the Developing World’ (Press Release August 6, 2007) at http://www.msfaccess.oru/about-
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signed by over 420,000 people worldwide urging Novartis to drop the case because of 
the devastating impact Novartis’ actions could have on access to essential medicines.
C. Response of Industry
Subsequent to the judgment issued by the Madras High Court, Novartis dissented that 
the decision will have long-term negative consequences for research and development 
into better medicines for patients in India and abroad. Ranjit Shahani, Vice-Chairman 
and Managing Director, Novartis India Limited expressed his disagreement with the 
ruling: ‘Our actions advanced this essential debate in India; now local and international 
leaders in both industry and academia recognize the inadequacies of Section 3(d) and 
are raising serious concerns about the deficiencies of the Indian patent system.’31' He 
added: ‘Because India does not have strong intellectual property law, no company will 
launch their latest patent product as a result of this judgment.’314 He was of the opinion 
that in the absence of a strong IP regime foreign companies will prefer to invest in 
China and he called on the WTO and the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce to 
push for stronger intellectual property laws.315
Carrie Scott, a spokeswoman for Novartis International AG, said: ‘We disagree with 
this decision, and are considering our options.’316 The Novartis spokesman further said
us/mcdia-room/prcss-rclcascs/indian-court-ruling-novartis-casc-protocts-india-pharmacy 
jlj Novartis Media Relations, ‘Novartis concerned Indian court ruling will discourage investments in 
innovation needed to bring better medicines to patients’ (Press Release 06-08-2207). 
http://cws.huginonline.coin/N/134323/PR/200708/l 144199 5 2.html.
' I4 Sarah Hiddleston, ‘The Madras High Court rejects pharma major Novartis’ petition against a provision 
of the Indian patent law’, Frontline, 24(16), August 11-24, 2007, 
http://frontlineonnet.com/fl2416/stories/20070824503410500.htm .
31 Ranjit Shahani interview at http://www.hinduonnet.eom/fline/stories/20070824503410500.htm .
’16 http://eorporate.lexisnexis.com/news/corporate-counsel,intellectual-
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that the Gleevec patent has been granted in nearly 40 countries including China, Russia, 
Taiwan and Novartis firmly believe the same should be the case in India.
The Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance, a group of generic companies, has been relieved by 
the verdict. D.G. Shah, secretary-general of the Alliance said: ‘The court's decision is a 
sigh of relief from expensive and lengthy litigation in the future, and allows companies 
to continue to market not only imatinib mesylate (Gleevec) but also other similar 
molecules for which patents are claimed for trivial changes in India.’317 Yusuf Hamied, 
chairman of the Indian pharmaceutical company Cipla, also described it as a positive 
ruling.318 In a subsequent statement, the U.S. -  India Business Council (USIBC) hoped 
that the Indian High Court’s decision in the Novartis case will encourage responsible 
debate and bring about changes in India’s laws to ensure that medical innovation is 
encouraged.314
D. Editorials and Columns
Several newspaper editorials and columns devoted considerable attention to the 
Novartis decision and analysts have considered the future implications of the judgment. 
In a leading article contributed to The Hindu., an Indian daily, Feroz Ali suggests that
property7cat200003 doc644952378.html .
31 Sarah Hiddleston, ‘The Madras High Court rejects pharma major Novartis’ petition against a provision 
of the Indian patent law’, Frontline, 24:16, August 11-24, 2007, 
http://frontlineonnet.com/n2416/stories/20070824503410500.htm.
Is Amelia Gentleman, ‘Setback for Novartis in India Over Drug Patent’, The New York Times, August 7, 
2007,
hup://www.nytimcs.com/2007/08/07/busincss/worklbusincss/07drug.html?cx=l 187409600&cn=958c444 
fcae7d0b6&ci—5070.
U.S.-India Business Council; USIBC Encourages Medical Innovation, Science Letter, k, 21 August 
2007 through http://global.factiva.eom/ha/default.aspx.
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the decision should be understood in an overall context by knowing what it permits and 
what it prohibits. He considers that section 3(d) is a trendsetter provision and nowhere 
in the world can such a provision be found in the patent legislation.320 It seems an 
overstatement as developing countries are increasingly following model patent laws 
developed by different NGOs which contain provisions similar to the Indian patent law. 
Feroz Ali further writes: ‘What section 3(d) actually does is to allow genuine 
improvements and at the same time bar frivolous “tweakings” which are passed under 
the garb of incremental innovation.’321
A commentator in The Economic Times criticised that some NGOs had given 
misleading statements after the decision and an impression has been given that the 
weakening intellectual property rights (IPRs) would magically give the poor the best 
drugs available. The authors noted: ‘This “patients not patents” campaign has a 
simplistic appeal but it undermines growth and it distracts attention from the real causes 
of ill health, delaying difficult reform where it is most needed.’322 The author argues that 
the patent debate had diverted attention from the barriers to access to healthcare such as 
health infrastructure, doctors and nurses and the patients are suffering from the current 
fixation with patents and prices.
,2tl Feroz Ali, ‘Novartis: do Indian patent laws stifle research?’, The Hind„ August 9, 2007, 
http://vvwvv.hindu.coni/seta/2007/08/09/stories/2007080950161500.htm.
321 Ibid.
■l22 IP fixation is bad for health, The Economic Times, 13 August 2007,
http://economictimes.indiatinies.com/Cjuest Writcr/lP fixation is bad for health/articleshovv/2276398.c 
ms.
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The New York Times approached the decision with a caption: ‘Setback for Novartis in 
India over Drug Patent.’323 It has noted that now Indian companies will be free to 
manufacture cheaper generic versions of patented medicines.
An editorial in The Wall Street Journal Asia criticised the patent policy of the Indian 
government which allowed the incorporation of some last minute loopholes in the 
patent law in 2005, which later provided the basis for the rejection of the Novartis 
patent application. The editorial noted that Indian patients and the drug manufacturers 
will be the losers in the wake of the High Court judgment. It further stated that: ‘There’s 
a good reason why major pharmaceutical companies have set up shop in Singapore and 
China rather than on the Subcontinent.’324
Praful Bidwai writing for the Inter Press Service revealed that, despite the Court’s 
verdict, the Indian government was planning to amend the patent law to encourage 
incremental innovation by pharmaceutical drug companies.325 In an article for The 
Economic Times Sanjeev Choudhary also confirmed this report when he stated: ‘We are 
looking for ways to award patents for discovery of a new form of a known substance 
which results in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance.’326
323 Amelia Gentleman, ‘Setback for Novartis in India Over Drug Patent’, The New York Times, August 7, 
2007,
littp://vv\vvv.nvtimes.eom/2007/08/07/business/worldbusiness/07dru«z.htmr.)ex=l 187409600&cn=958e444 
Icac7d0b6&ci=5070.
'^4 Editorial, ‘Drug Patents in India’, The Wall Street Journal Asia, 14 August 2007, 
http://aw s j. c o m. h k/ lac t i v a - n s.
325 Praful Bidwai, ‘Health-India: Novartis Patents Case Far From Dead’, Inter Press Service (IPS), August 
9 http://ipsnews,net/news.asp?idnews=38840
3-6 Sanjeev Choudhary , ‘Novartis to divert India investment after patent case The Economic Times- 
India’, The Economic Times, August 9, 2007.
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VII. Conclusion
The judgment of the Madras High Court not only establishes the validity of Section 3(d) 
of the Patent Act 1970 (India) but also sets the tone of judicial response to the question 
of interpretation of patentability criteria in India. The case has been an influential 
precedent. The Kolkata patent office has rejected Eli Lilly’s patent application for 
Forteo, an osteoporosis drug after hearings on a pre-grant opposition filed by the 
domestic drug manufacturer USV Ltd. The application was rejected on the grounds of 
prior knowledge, incremental innovation and the failure to establish enhancement of 
known efficacy.327 Abbott Laboratories also faced opposition proceedings on the same 
grounds for its application to patent Aluvia, a ’heat stable’ form of an antiretroviral 
drug, consisting of Lopinavir and Ritonavir.328 The High Court has appropriately 
suggested that the meaning of the terms ‘efficacy’ and the ‘enhancement of known 
efficacy’ could be judged in light of the therapeutic effect of the new form. So, the 
burden of proof is on the applicant to show the enhanced efficacy. This may help in 
reducing the possibility of evergreening but the patent office should develop some 
guidelines to sustain its practices in future by setting aside the possibilities of any 
misuse of powers under the relevant clauses.
On the issue of international law compliance and the jurisdiction of national courts, the 
judgment highlights the need to adopt a proactive engagement strategy to interpret the 
law cohesively in the light of treaty obligations and national policy objectives. The 
TRIPS Agreement 1994 assumes a critical role in the national courts for the enforcement 
of obligations under the agreement, and the courts should respond to this duty by
327 C.H. Unnikrishnan, ‘India turns down Eli Lilly’s patent plea’, The Wall Steet Journal, August 29 
2007, http://wwvv.livemint.com/2007/08/29000400/lndia-tuins-dovvn-Eli-Lilly82.html.
328 I-MAK Summary of Patent Challenges on Lopinavir/Ritonavir tablet in Europe and India (accessed on 
12 July 2009) at http://wwvv.i-mak.onz/lopinavirritonavir/ .
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devising appropriate interpretations. Nonetheless, the judgment will assist in 
maintaining the current flow of Indian drugs exports to poor patients in many 
developing countries across the world.
135
Chapter 4
The Pfizer-Natco Controversy:
Indian Patent Law and Compulsory Export Licences
Injurious Commissions also include severely restrictive -  and 
inefficient -  trade barriers that curb exports from poorer countries.
Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence329
I. Introduction
A 2005 publication of UNAIDS, AIDS in Africa: Three Scenarios to 2025, contains 
several moving stories about HIV/AIDS in Africa, describing how the AIDS epidemic 
in Africa could evolve over the next 20 years.330 The scenarios set out to answer one 
central question: over the next 20 years, what factors will drive Africa’s and the world’s 
responses to the AIDS epidemic, and what kind of future will there be for the next 
generation? Amongst the various aspects of the problem, access to and uptake of AIDS 
treatment is discussed and highlighted throughout the document. The publication 
highlights how crucial Indian pharmaceutical exports are for the treatment of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa.
African nations and many other developing countries require access to essential 
medicines to address public health concerns. The creation of a safe, secure and reliable 
access to an essential medicines regime depends upon a number of factors ranging from 
mobilisation of resources to administration of drugs to those who badly need them in 
extreme poverty situations. Factors such as resources prioritisation, adequate
329 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006) 140.
330 United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), AIDS in Africa: Three scenarios to 2025, 2005 
at http://www.unaids.orii/unaids resources/i mages/A1 DSScenar ios/AI DS-scenarios-2025 report en.pdf
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procurement policies, supporting infrastructure and trained personnel are definitely very 
crucial for any successful essential drugs program. However, the most critical factor is 
the very availability of the medicines which could then be provided to those who need 
them. The most crucial and the daunting barrier increasingly faced in this regard is the 
accessibility to safe and affordable medicines to keep up the life expectancy trajectory 
of millions of poor patients around the world.
According to available research, Indian generic pharmaceutical companies provide a 
major portion of pharmaceutical products which are procured by various international 
and regional organisations for their treatment projects related to HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis.3'1 The following table shows the list of top ten suppliers of Antiretroviral 
(ARV) drugs under the Global Fund’s procurement program.
Table 4.1: Top Ten Suppliers of ARVs under Global Fund in Terms of 
Consignments (June 2003-Jan 2006)
Manufacturer Total No. of Consignments
Cipla Ltd. 342
Aspen Pharmacare 221
Bristol Myers Squibb 158
GlaxoSmithKline Ltd. 144
Abbott Laboratories 88
Merck 73
Ranbaxy Laboratories 45
Hetro Drugs Ltd. 35
Roche 32
Boehringer Ingelheim 25
Source: Global Fund as cited by Biswajit Dhar332
Padmashree Hehi Sampath, ‘Economic Aspects of Access to Medicines after 2005: Product Patent 
Protection and Emerging Firm Strategies in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’ (Accessed on July 12, 
2009) Institute of New Technologies, United Nations University at 
http://wAvw.w-ho.int/intellcctualpropcrtv7studies/PadmashrceSampathFinal.pdf.
Biswajit Dhar and K.K. Gopakumar, ‘Post-2005 TRIPS scenario in patent protection in the
pharmaceutical sector: The case of generic pharmaceutical industry in India’ (2006), UNCTAD, IDRC 
and ICTSD, 57 at http://www.measwatch.org/autopaue/file/MonMarch2009-14-25-16-
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This chapter contends that the compulsory licensing mechanism for exports under the 
Waiver Decision 2003 lacks efficacy. It argues that the Indian compulsory licensing 
regime fails to facilitate affordable drug supply to other developing countries, because 
of the rigidity and complexity of treaty rules; economic considerations; technological 
constraints and capacity; and a fickle lack of political commitment. The main 
hypothesis extended is that without a viable, affordable and continuous generic supply 
from India, the success of Doha Declaration 2001 would be substantially compromised. 
Part II of this chapter deals with the key provisions in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 
dealing with the exports of pharmaceutical drugs. Part III considers the Doha 
Declaration 2001 and the subsequent Waiver Decision 2003. Part IV considers the 
various species of compulsory licensing under Indian patent law. Part V considers the 
first Indian compulsory licensing instance under the new law and the Natco’s 
application for the grant of compulsory licences of Tarceva and Sutent.
II. The TRIPS Agreement 1994 and Pharmaceutical Exports
Before the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, developing countries were largely 
free to determine the scope, term and availability of patent protection as a part of their 
overall industrial and public health policy objectives. Although many developing 
countries were members of the Paris Convention for the Protection o f Industrial 
Property o f 1883 (Paris Convention 1883), they retained the flexibility to legislate on 
domestic pharmaceutical production and access to essential medicines. In terms of 
substantive rule-making, patentable subject matter, local usage and enforcement 
measures, the Paris Convention 1883 leaves considerable space for Member States to
hup://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/pdfs/2007fbui lessonsfordevcounnies.pdf.
devise and implement their own patent systems. Indeed, it even allows Member States 
to deny protection for certain subject matters such as pharmaceutical products.
However, under the TRIPS Agreement 1994, all Member States are now required to 
comply with the minimum standards set out in the treaty. The obligations of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 include the extension of patent protection to all qualifying inventions 
without the discrimination of any field of technology and origin of subject matter.339 
Thus the developing countries were obligated to extend patent protection to 
pharmaceutical products pursuant to the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
Since the expiry of the limited transition period in 2005, the situation has radically 
changed in developing countries and they have introduced new laws and governing 
regulations dealing with the patentability of medicines and related components. In 1994, 
India decided to take advantage of the transitional period allowed under the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 for developing countries, which ultimately ended in 2005.
The TRIPS Agreement 1994 recognises the right of member countries to issue 
compulsory licences subject to procedural requirements laid down in Article 31. 
However, the option of invoking Article 31 flexibilities to meet public health objectives 
had no real meaning for many developing and least developing countries because they 
lacked any local pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities. The problem is directly 
linked with the language of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 which, after 
initially allowing the grant of a compulsory licence, restricts the operation of this option 
by stating:
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market of the Member authorizing such use;
'v'9 Article 27.1 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects o f  Intellectual Property Rights (The TRIPS 
Agreement 1994) at http://www.vvto.org/enulish/tratop e/trips e/t agnv4 e.htm#Footnote 13.
141
However, in practice, many developing and least developing countries lacked sufficient 
manufacturing capacity for the production of highly advanced and technologically 
sophisticated medicines to address public health epidemics. They did not have even a 
possibility of getting cheaper medicines from India, China or Brazil under a compulsory 
licence because any such production in these countries was supposed to be 
predominantly for the supply of the local market and only a fraction of total produce 
was allowed to be exported to the countries which mainly needed these drugs.
The WTO Ministerial Conference adopted the Doha Declaration 200P40 in November 
2001. This was the product of an extensive lobbying effort of international humanitarian 
organisations, NGOs and the governments of developing and least developing countries. 
The Doha Declaration 2001 reaffirmed the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement 
1994, including the right of Member States to issue compulsory licences on public 
interest grounds.341 The Declaration then specifically addressed the problem of Member 
States lacking the capacity to manufacture cheaper generic substitutes and which are 
otherwise not capable of exploiting the flexibilities under the existing Article 3(0 
requirement. Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 2001 mandated the relevant WTO 
body to work out a suitable solution, keeping in view the limitations of such countries 
with an aim to ensure access to essential medicines.342
After almost two years of extensive discussions at WTO a solution, initially embodied 
in the form of a Waiver, was reached on 30 August 2003 (Waiver Decision 2003)243 In
'4° Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01 )/DEC/2 (14 
November 2001) at http:/Avvv\v. wto.org/englisMhewto  ^e/minist c/min01 e/mindccl trips c.htm.
'4I Ibid. Paragraph 5(b).
342 bid. Paragraph 6.
343 Implementation o f Paragraph 6 o f the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WTO Doc WT/L/540 (30 August 2003) (Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003) at
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the light of various proposals and discussions, it was decided that this Waiver Decision 
2003 would be rendered as permanent in the form of an amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 as Article 31 bis?44 The ratification of the proposed amendment is still 
pending while Member States consider their options. Meanwhile the waiver reached on 
30 August 2003 is effective and would continue to operate. The Waiver Decision 2003 
and the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement 1994 are summarised in the following 
section along with a brief analysis of some provisions.
III. The Waiver Decision and Proposed Article 31 bis
In 2001, paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 2001 recognised that the countries with 
limited or virtually no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector had 
difficulties in invoking the compulsory licensing mechanism set out in Article 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994. Subsequently based upon the mandate of the Doha Declaration 
2001, the WTO General Council’s Waiver Decision 2003 paved the way to allow 
countries with sufficient manufacturing capacity to make and export pharmaceutical 
products to countries which require such medicines for public health needs. This 
objective is achieved through a mechanism whereby restriction of Article 31(f) is 
waived for the exporting countries (by relaxing the requirement of manufacturing 
predominantly to the supply of domestic market), and restriction of Article 31(h)345 is 
waived for importing countries. Proposed Article 31 bis essentially reflects the terms of 
the Waiver Decision 2003 by establishing the waiver of certain obligations of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 as mentioned earlier. 
http://vvwvv.vvto.org/cnglish/tratop_ e trips e/implem parab c.htm.
44 WTO General Council Decision o f 6 December 2005 Amendment o f  the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641, 
(8 Dec. 2005) (Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement’ with Annex setting out Article 3 Ibis) at 
http://vvwvv.vvto.org/cnglish/tratop_e/trips_eAvtl641 _e.htm.
'4’ Remuneration requirement is explicitly waived. This aspect is discussed further hereafter.
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A. Scope and Coverage of Diseases
Paragraph 1 of the Waiver Decision 2003 defines ‘pharmaceutical product’ broadly 
without limiting application of the solution to certain specific diseases. It reads:
(a) “pharmaceutical product” means any patented product, or product 
manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to 
address the public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the 
Declaration. It is understood that active ingredients necessary for its manufacture 
and diagnostic kits needed for its use would be included.346
The definition is sufficiently broad as active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and 
diagnostic kits are expressly covered. The definition is also sufficiently broad to cover 
vaccines because vaccines are ‘products of the pharmaceutical sector’.
The negotiations prior to the adoption of Waiver Decision 2003 were quite extensive 
with regard to the scope and coverage of diseases to be covered under the proposed 
mechanism. The United States proposed to restrict the candidate list of diseases to HIV- 
AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and a relatively small group of infectious diseases. The US 
proposal also sought to limit the countries that would benefit from the solution and 
considered it to be the Ministers’ intention at Doha.347 At some later stage of 
negotiations, the EC had demonstrated a relatively more flexible approach and 
suggested that the solution be confined to grave public health problems and a potential
346 Implementation o f Paragraph 6 o f the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WTO Doc WT/L/540 (30 August 2003) (Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003) Paragraph 
1 at http:/7\vw\v.vvto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/implcm parab e.htm.
347 Cecilia Oh, ‘Developing countries criticise attempts to limit scope o f diseases in Paragraph 6 
negotiations', Update on 5 Feb 2003 informal meeting of TRIPS Council and Background to the 
Negotiations on Para 6, Page 4. at h11p://\vww.twnside.org.sg/ti11 e/TR1PS-Feb5.doc.
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role of WHO was also mentioned to identify such grave situations.348 On 28 January 
2003, India together with several developing countries submitted that they would not 
accept the USA and EC proposals as they would narrow down the scope of paragraph 1 
of the Doha Declaration.340
India’s position prevailed. Paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration 2001 does not mention 
any limitation on the application of the Declaration to certain specific diseases or 
medicines and the position of developing countries was finally reflected in the Waiver 
Decision 2003. The proposed Article 31 his mirrors this stance.
B. Notification Requirement and Eligible Countries
Both the Waiver Decision 2003 and the proposed Article 31 bis contemplate two 
important notification requirements. The first is a general notification of intent which is 
required from all importing member countries that use the system, other than least 
developing countries.350 The group of members belonging to least developing countries 
are thus free to invoke the mechanism without any notification of intent. The second 
notification requirement is with regard to exporting member countries when they
consider exporting pharmaceutical products manufactured under compulsory licening 
system. The mechanism also provides that any Member State may notify the TRIPS 
Council that it does not intend to use the system as an importing country or that it only 
intends to use it in a limited way. Almost all OECD countries have practically opted out 
by notifying their intention not to use the system or to use it in a limited way.351 A
34S Ibid.
344 Ibid. 3
Paragraph 1(b), WTO Genera! Council Decision o f  6 December 2005 Amendment o f  the TRIPS 
Agreement, WT/L/641, (8 Dec. 2005) (Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement’ with Annex setting out 
Article 31 bis) at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/wt!641 e.htrn. 
ol Ibid. Footnote 3 to Paragraph 1(b).
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number of Member States (Hong Kong, China, Israel, Kuwait, Macao Chian, Mexico, 
Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates) notified their 
intention to use the system only in cases of national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency.352 By analogy, one can construe that other non-notifying Member 
States may then use the system liberally in situations other than national emergency or 
circumstances of extreme urgency.
On 19 July 2007, Rwanda became the first WTO Member State which notified its 
intention to use the system to import some 260,000 packs of TriAvir, a fixed-dose 
combination product of Zidovudine, Lamivudine and Nevirapine, from a Canadian 
pharmaceutical firm Apotex, Inc.3''3 It is pertinent to note that Rwanda had no obligation 
to notify as such being a designated least developing country and it was eligible to use 
the system without following any procedural formalities. However, a notification 
requirement is imposed upon the potential exporting WTO Member States pursuant to 
paragraph 2(c) of the Waiver Decision 2003. In response to the request of Rwanda, the 
Canadian Government notified the TRIPS Council of the terms of the export licence it 
had issued in this regard.354 Some commentators have criticised the elaborate and 
lengthy procedural notification procedure in the Canadian regime.
352 Duncan Matthews, kWTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?’ (2004) 
7(1) Journal o f International Economic Law 73-107, 95.
Rwanda- Notification under Paragraph 2(A) o f the Decision o f 30 August 2003 on the Implementation 
o f Paragraph 6 o f the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/N/9/RWA 1(19 
July 2007) at http://www.vvtQ.org/cnglish/tratop e/trips e/public health notif import e.htm.
354 Canada-Notification under Paragraph 2(A) o f the Decision o f30 August 2003 on the Implementation 
o f Paragraph 6 o f the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ,  WTO Doc 
IP/N/10/CAN/1 (18 October 2007) at
http://\vww.wto.org/english/tratop e trips e/public health notif export e.htm.
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C. Determination of Manufacturing Capacity
According to Article 31 bis least developing countries are automatically eligible to 
import medicines under the system envisaged in this regard. In addition to this, any 
country making a determination that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity of 
a particular pharmaceutical product, can also become an eligible importing state.'55 This 
Article further provides that the determination of manufacturing capacity in this regard 
by the importing country excludes the production facilities which are owned or 
controlled by the patent holders. It states:
Where the Member has some manufacturing capacity in this sector, it has 
examined this capacity and found that, excluding any capacity owned or 
controlled by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient for the purposes of 
meeting its needs. When it is established that such capacity has become sufficient 
to meet the Member’s needs, the system shall no longer apply.356
The language of the Article 31 bis about the definition of pharmaceutical product and 
determination of manufacturing capacity would be helpful for a developing country that 
wants to use this system merely to import pharmaceutical products to manufacture 
medicines locally for justified public health needs.
355 Paragraph 2(a) (ii), WTO General Council Decision o f 6 December 2005 Amendment o f the TRIPS 
Agreement, WT/L/641, (8 Dec. 2005) (Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement’ with Annex setting out 
Article 31 bis) at http:/7www\ w4o.org/english/tratop e/trips e/wt!641 e.htm.
356 Ibid. Appendix to Annexure.
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D. Licensing Scheme
Both the Waiver Decision 2003 and proposed Article 31 bis detail the procedural and 
substantive requirements that deal with the issuance of compulsory licences by 
importing and exporting countries.
As an importing country, members from least developing countries are entitled to use 
the system without meeting any notification requirement. Thus, these countries can use 
the system without issuing domestic compulsory licences which is otherwise required 
under the scheme. Likewise, any other Member State, where the desired medicine is not 
patented, can also use the system without issuing a compulsory licence. In all other 
cases, countries which are willing to use this system must issue a compulsory licence 
prior to importation and it must notify the TRIPS Council of such intention.357 The 
conditions which are generally set out in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 
should be complied with while the countries consider the option of issuing compulsory 
licence. So the solution evolved through the Waiver Decision 2003 and the proposed 
Article 31 bis should be construed and applied in conjunction with other substantive 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 unless specifically waived. The issuance of 
a compulsory licence itself entails several procedural and administrative complications 
within the overall scheme of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and it has yet to be seen how 
developing countries will overcome those legal and administrative barriers to 
implement the Waiver Decision 2003 in an effective and efficient way. However, 
Article 31 does not attempt to limit in any way the grounds upon which compulsory 
licences may be issued and its procedural requirements can be incorporated in domestic 
legislation in a way which would supplement the flexibilities designed under Article 
31 bis.
357 Ibid. Paragraph 2(a) (iii).
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Article 31 bis also suggests some disclosure obligations on importing country in terms of 
identification of product(s) and expected quantities to be imported. This should be 
notified to the TRIPS Council.35X This aspect has been specifically criticised by some 
commentators for being too restrictive and inhibitive as an exact determination of 
expected quantity can be unviable both practically and economically. Furthermore, no 
model exists to satisfy such procedural requirements and it may put the willing Member 
States in an unending exercise of monitoring and evaluation. '59 Some commentators do 
not consider it a critical obstacle and suggest that the proposed Article 31 bis does not 
demand a particular fixed formula, and there are various possibilities for complying 
with this obligation in efficient and innovative ways.360 In order to facilitate the usage of 
complex notification and determination procedure, a World Bank study in 2005 
developed some model forms which Rwanda had used in 2007 to notify the WTO about 
its intention of using Waiver Decision 2003.36‘
The proposed Article 31 bis and the Waiver Decision 2003 would also regulate the 
conditions for issuing a compulsory licence for exporting Member States.362 The 
Ibid. Paragraph 2(a) (1).
' 9 Rohit Malpani and Mohga Kamal-Yanni, ‘Patent versus Patients: Five Years after the Doha 
Declaration', Oxfam Briefing Paper (95) at
http://vv\vw.oxfam.org/cn/policv/briefingpapcrs/hp95 patcntsvspatients 061119.
y’° Frederick M. Abbott and Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The Doha Round Public Flealth Legacy: Strategies for 
the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions’ (2007) 10(4) 
Journal o f  International Economic Law 921-987, 941.
,'1 Frederick M. Abbott and Rupolph van Puymbrocck, ‘Compulsory Licensing for Public Flealth, A 
Guide and Model Documents for Implementation of the Doha Declaration Paragraph 6 Decision, World 
Bank Working Paper No. 61 (2005).
36~ Paragraph 2(b) (i), WTO General Council Decision o f 6 December 2005 Amendment o f  the TRIPS 
Agreement, WT/L/641, (8 Dec. 2005) (Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement’ with Annex setting out 
Article 31 bis) at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/wt!641 e.htm.
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authorised manufacturer from the exporting country can only manufacture and export 
the required quantities which the importing country has notified earlier.363 On the 
insistence of developed countries, the so called safeguards against diversion are also 
enumerated in this regard which requires that the product should be clearly identified as 
having being produced under this system. This may involve special packaging, 
labelling, special shaping or colouring provided that the distinctions are feasible and do 
not significantly affect price.364 Further conditions are put on the licensees to post 
destination and identification information on a website.365
Non-governmental organisations, international humanitarian organisations and 
academics have criticised the bureaucratic approach of the Waiver Decision 2003 and 
the Article 316/s.366 A 2006 report of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) notes:
Prolonged prior negotiations severely limit the ability to use the August 30th 
Decision and act as a disincentive to manufacturers to participate in the process ... 
Anti-diversion measures that generic companies must comply with are onerous 
and are further disincentives to their participation in the process.367
363 Ibid. Paragraph 2(b) (i).
,64 Ibid. Paragraph 2(b) (ii).
365 Ibid. Paragraph 2(b) (iii).
366 Medecins Sans Frontieres, Doha Derailed, A Progress Report on TRIPS and Access to Medicines 
(Switzerland: MSF Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, 27 August 2003) and Medecins Sans 
Frontieres, Neither Expeditious, Nor A Solution: The WTO August 30th Decision Is Unworkable: An 
illustration through Canada 's Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa (Prepared for the XVI International AIDS 
Conference, Toronto August 2006), and Oxfam International, Patents versus Patients, Five years after the 
Doha Declaration, Oxfam Briefing Paper 95, November 2006.
367 Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Neither Expeditious, Nor A Solution: The WTO August 30th 
Decision Is Unworkable: An illustration through Canada’s Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa, Prepared for
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Highlighting the need for a viable and robust supply of pharmaceutical drugs, the report 
also considered the challenging task of manufacturing and supplying under compulsory 
licensing arrangement. In this regard, the MSF report complains that ‘the Decision flies 
in the face of the practical reality of managing a health programme, where flexibility 
and rapidity of response to ever-changing circumstances are vital’.368 Some 
commentators have suggested that procurements strategies can incentivise the potential 
supplier and such policies can be used to overcome the problem of limited demand.369
E. Remuneration and Non-Authorised Importation
Article 31 bis provides that adequate remuneration need only be paid in the country of 
export by taking into account the economic circumstances of the importing country.370 
The system requires the importing countries to take reasonable and proportionate 
measures to prevent diversion or re-exportation of medicines supplied under this 
arrangement.371 The proposed Article 31 bis obligates Member States to enable patent 
holders to protect themselves against unauthorised importation of pharmaceutical 
products manufactured under the system, but no additional legislative or administrative 
measures are required in this regard. '"2
the XVI International AIDS Conference, Toronto, August 2006, 3
368 Ibid. 4.
369 Frederick M. Abbott and Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The Doha Round Public Health Legacy: Strategies for 
the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions’ (2007) 10(4) 
Journal o f  International Economic Law 921 -987, 943.
370 Paragraph 2, WTO General Council Decision o f 6 December 2005 Amendment o f  the TRIPS 
Agreement, WT/L/641, (8 Dec. 2005) (Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement’ with Annex setting out 
Article 31 bis) at http://www.wto.ortz/enalish/tratop e/trips e/wt!641 e.htm.
71 Ibid. Paragraph 3.
372 Ibid. Paragraph 4.
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F. Regional A rrangem ents
As the group of least developing countries from Africa was quite instrumental behind 
the development and adoption of the Doha Declaration 2001 because of limited drugs 
manufacturing capacity within the region, the final solution addresses the need of such 
countries in a somewhat specialised and preferential way. The proposed Article 31 his 
contains a special provision for Member States that belong to regional trade agreements 
of which at least half the members are currently least developing countries. '7 ' For such a 
regional group, a relaxation is designed with regard to re-exportation to a member 
country once the product is manufactured and exported to one country under the 
compulsory licence. However, importing countries have not been discharged from the 
obligation of issuing separate compulsory licences where otherwise applicable.'74
G. Implementation and Ratification
The Waiver Decision 2003 was adopted after much deliberation and difficult 
negotiations and it was hoped that it would open a window of opportunities for least 
developing countries to boost their public health coverage programs. With the 
finalisation of the Protocol of Amendment in the form of Article 31 his, commentators 
were keen to look at the practical aspects of the new system as there were a number of 
concerns regarding the cumbersome nature of the proposed solution. To date, thirty-one 
countries including European Communities have notified their acceptance of the 
proposed amendment of the TRIPS Agreement 199421'
~'73 Ibid. Paragraph 3.
374 Ibid.
‘,75 These countries include United States (17 December 2005), Switzerland (13 September 2006), El 
Salvador (19 September 2006), Rep. of Korea (24 January 2007), Norway (5 February 2007), India (26 
March 2007), Philippines (30 March 2007), Israel (10 August 2007), Japan (31 August 2007), Australia
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However, the export scheme was not used until July 2007 when one least developing 
country, Rwanda, notified its intention to benefit from the scheme set out initially in the 
Waiver Decision 2003.376
The proposed Article 31 bis would be rendered permanent in the form of an amendment 
to the TRIPS Agreement 1994 once it is ratified by two-thirds of WTO members. By the 
December 2007 deadline, only 13 of 151 WTO countries had ratified it. The WTO 
pushed back the ratification deadline to December 2009 and in the meanwhile, the 2003 
waiver remains in effect. With thirty-one countries accepting the proposed amendment 
in September 2010, it is anticipated that the Article 31 bis would not be included into the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994 in the wake of growing criticism and opposition of civil society 
organisation, and the situation may continue to be governed under the Waiver Decision 
2003. 77 Moreover, there is some confusion about the status of the acceptance 
notification of the European Communities and individual community members have yet 
to notify their intentions.37*
(12 September 2007), Singapore (28 September 2007), Hong Kong, China (27, November 2007). China 
(28 November 2007), European Communities (30 November 2007), Mauritius (16 April 2008), Egypt (18 
April 2008), Mexieo (23 May 2008), Jordan (6 August 2008)
Brazil (13 November 2008) Morocco (2 December 2008) Albania (28 January 2009) Macau, China (16 
June 2009) Canada (16 June 2009) Bahrain (4 August 2009) Colombia (7 August 2009) Zambia (10 
August 2009) Nicaragua (25 January 2010) Pakistan (8 February 2010) Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (16 March 2010) Uganda (12 July 2010); and Mongolia (17 September 2010). See: World 
Trade Organization, Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement (updated 17September 
2010) at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop c/trips c/amcndmcnt c.htm.
3 6 World Trade Organization, Members Accepting Amendment o f the TRIPS Agreement (17 December 
2010) at http://www.vvto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/amendment c.htm.
377 Ibid. 984.
Matthew Kennedy, When Will the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement Enter into Force? (2010)
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Most of the non-governmental organisations, humanitarian agencies and independent 
experts consider the system is defective in its design and modalities and it is extremely 
difficult for potential Member States to invoke it to meet their public health needs.379 
They maintain that conditions associated with the issuance of licences, notification 
requirements, the so-called safeguard clause and anti-diversion measures have 
unnecessarily over-burdened the system and it is very hard for least developing 
countries to overcome these barriers. James Love of the Consumer Project on 
Technology wrote about the Waiver Decision 2003: ‘The new agreement has very 
modest benefits, and it has very substantial costs, risks and uncertainties.’380
This view is further augmented by the European Generic Medicine Association (EGA) 
declaring that WTO compulsory licensing system is unworkable and will not improve 
access to medicine. Mr Greg Perry, Director General of the EGA expressed his views 
recently at the WTO Public Forum 2008 and said: ‘The WTO’s 2003 August 30 
Decision concerning compulsory licenses is complicated, unworkable and unable to 
deliver any significant improvement in access to medicines.’381
13(2) Journal o f International Economic Law 459-473.
'79 MSF Access to Medicines Campaign. Doha Derailed, A Progress Report on TRIPS and Access to 
Medicines, 27 August 2003 and Neither Expeditious, Nor A Solution: The WTO August 30th Decision Is 
Unworkable: An illustration through Canada’s Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa, Prepared for the XVI 
International AIDS Conference, Toronto, August 2006, and Oxfam International, Patents versus Patients, 
Five years after the Doha Declaration, Oxfam Briefing Paper 95, November 2006.
3811 James Love, ‘CPTech Statement on WTO Deal on Exports of Medicines’, August 30, 2003 at 
http://vvwvv.cptech.org/ipAvto/p6/cptcch08302003.himl.
'sl European Generic Medicine Association, ‘WTO Compulsory Licenses System is Unworkable and 
Will Not Improve Access to Medicines’ (Press Release 25 September 2008, Brussels at 
http://wwvv.egagenerics.com/pr-2008-09-25.htm
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However, Frederick Abbott and Jerome Reichman construe the terms of the new system 
in a positive way suggesting that a better trade-off deal was practically not possible 
given the political and structural environment of trade negotiations at that time. They 
consider that most of the procedural requirements set out in the new system can be 
intelligently managed within national laws and willing Member States can overcome 
potential problems through pooled procurement strategies and innovative decision­
making.382
However, in the light of theoretical analysis and the two cases (Rwanda and India), it is 
hard to construe the Waiver Decision 2003 as a positive measure which can solve the 
problem of access to medicine. The decision is cumbersome and rigid and beyond its 
textual constraints, it also restricts the economic incentive which is essential to 
maintaining a manufacturing base.
IV. Indian Compulsory Licensing Regime
After the series of sporadic amendments, India finally brought its patent law into 
conformance with the TRIPS Agreement 1994 through the Patents (Amendment) Act 
2005 (India). It is important to see that India has incorporated the spirit of the Waiver 
Decision 2003 in its domestic law to facilitate the smooth flow of generics export to 
other countries. The Waiver Decision 2003 is merely an international instrument and its 
real potential will be demonstrated once put into operation under domestic laws and 
regulations. Through the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India), India has supposedly 
provided some robust and strong compulsory licensing avenues which yet need to be 
tested practically to judge its effectiveness.
3X2 Frederick M. Abbott and Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The Doha Round Public Health Legacy: Strategies for 
the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions’ (2007) 10(4) 
Journal o f International Economic Law 921 -987, 941.
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The principal provisions dealing with compulsory licensing consist of Section 84, 
Section 92 and Section 92A of the Patents Act 1970 (India). In addition to this, Section 
11A also provides a mechanism for automatic compulsory licensing in certain cases. 
Here, I am focusing on the compulsory licensing provision relevant to pharmaceutical 
exports.
A. Section 92A: Doha Style Compulsory Licence
The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) introduces a third compulsory licensing 
avenue which reflects the WTO Waiver Decision 2003 in domestic law. Section 92A 
provides for compulsory licences to enable exports of pharmaceutical products to those 
countries with no manufacturing capacity of their own. It states that:
Compulsory licence shall be available for manufacture and export of patented 
pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public 
health problems, provided compulsory licence has been granted by such country 
or such country has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the 
patented pharmaceutical products from India. The Controller shall, on receipt of 
an application in the prescribed manner, grant a compulsory licence solely for 
manufacture and export of the concerned pharmaceutical product to such country 
under such terms and conditions as may be specified and published by him.383
This Section also defines the term ‘pharmaceutical product’ in line with the language of 
the Waiver Decision 2003 and the proposed Article 3Ibis and includes ‘any patented 
product, or product manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical 
sector needed to address public health problems and shall be inclusive of ingredients
383 Section 92A( 1) and (2) of the Patents Act 1970 (India).
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necessary for their manufacture and diagnostic kits required for their use.’384 An 
application for the grant of a compulsory licence under this Section can be filed at any 
time after a patent has been issued.385
Section 92A provides a relatively flexible and fast track Doha style licensing 
mechanism in view of the Waiver Decision 2003 and the adoption of subsequent 
national laws in many Member States such as Canada, China, Norway and the European 
Union. It necessarily reflects the spirit of the Waiver Decision 2003 and employs a less 
restrictive language and procedural requirements to issue a compulsory licence. For 
instance, Indian law does not explicitly require as a pre-condition that an importing 
country should have issued a licence before Indian law comes into action, and it merely 
puts the condition of a notification or otherwise to allow exportation of patented 
medicines. This provision was first introduced through the Patents Ordinance 2004 
(India) and at that time it required that the exporter obtain a compulsory licence from 
the importing country as well.'86 However, this requirement was later dropped to 
accommodate situations where no such patent exists in the importing country and a 
notification would suffice in such cases.
The Section is completely silent about the requirements of specifying the amount of 
pharmaceutical products that will be manufactured under compulsory licence which is 
an important procedural aspect of the Waiver Decision 2003. Likewise, no requirements 
are mentioned with regard to separate packaging, colouring or shape. It is important to 
note that no such guidelines are currently under consideration when the Indian Patent
84 Ibid. Explanation.
~'88 Ibid. No post grant waiting period is maintained under this Section unlike Section 84 of the Act.
386 Shamnad Basheer, ‘Indian Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents 9Amendment) Act 2005' (2005) 1(1) The 
Indian Journal o f Law and Technology> 15-46, 28.
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Office is finalising its Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure f 1 This particular 
Section was scrutinised recently when the Indian generic manufacturer Natco applied 
for a compulsory licence for Roche’s patented medicine, Tarceva, for export to Nepal.
B. Section 11 A: Automatic Compulsory Licences
India was among those developing countries which opted to enjoy the full transition 
period allowed under the TRIPS Agreement 1994. Thus until 2005, India was not 
granting product patents for pharmaceutical and agro-chemical products and, in lieu, it 
had established a mailbox mechanism to determine priority matters in the post-2000 
scenario. By virtue of this mailbox facility, applications would be judged for ‘novelty’ 
on the basis of the filing date and not with reference to 2005, the year in which product 
patents were first incorporated into the patent regime. The Patents (Amendment) Act 
2005 (India) provides that where a patent is granted to any of those mailbox 
applications, an automatic compulsory licence would issue to those generic companies 
that made a ‘significant investment’ and were ‘producing and marketing’ a drug covered 
by the mailbox application prior to 2005. Such licence is subject to the payment of a 
reasonable royalty.388
There has been much discussion about the Indian compulsory licensing regime and a 
range of positions can be identified in this regard. First, the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturer of America (PhRMA) in its 2008 submission to USTRA termed the 
Indian compulsory licensing provisions as one of the most damaging provisions of the 
Indian Patent Law.389 Second, some commentators consider that the Indian export
18 Intellectual Property India, Draft Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure at 
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patenfDraftPatent_Manual 2008.pdf 
88 Section 11A Proviso of Patents Act 1970 (India).
'89 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturer of America, ‘Special 301 Submission 2008’, February 11,
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oriented compulsory licensing regime is the broadest in scope when compared with 
other jurisdictions and thus ‘widespread use of the Section 92A avenue for compulsory 
licensing to export patented medicines appears likely’.390
However, I would argue here that the Indian compulsory licensing provisions under 
Section 92A should be understood and analysed both in a legal and factual context. A 
study undertaken for WHO shows that very few Indian pharmaceutical companies think 
that the Indian patent law provides an economically lucrative option for them to retain 
their export sales. Of the 103 firms, only 25 firms thought it was an economically 
lucrative option, whereas 78 firms did not think so. It is important to note that out of 25 
firms which responded positively, only 6 firms have a strong technological base to meet 
export market demand on a sustainable basis.391
V. Tarceva and Sutent Compulsory Licences
The Indian compulsory regime has been tested by two separate compulsory licence 
applications for anti-cancer medicines involving Tarceva and Sutent.
2008, 68, at
http://vvwvv.ustr.uov/asscts/Tradc Scctors/lntcllectual Property/Special 301 Public Submissions 2008/a 
ssct upload file 109 14495.pdf
39(1 Janice M. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System 
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 491 - 
64 1 ,6 0 4  at http://lavvrcvievv.lavv.pitt.edU/issues/68/68.3/Mueller.pdf
91 Padmashree Hchi Sampath, ‘Economic Aspects of Access to Medicines after 2005: Product Patent 
Protection and Emerging Firm Strategies in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’ Institute of New 
Technologies, United Nations University at
http://vvww.vvho.int/intellectualpropertv/studies/PadmashreeSampathFinal.pdf
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A. Erlotinib hydrochloride (Tarceva)
Erlotinib which is marketed by Genentech, OSI Pharmaceuticals and Roche in different 
parts of the world under the brand name Tarceva, is prescribed for the treatment of non­
small cell lung cancer and pancreatic cancer. It is basically a small molecule human 
epidemic growth factor type 1/epidermal growth factor receptor inhibitor which was 
approved in November 2004 by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).392 The 
drug is primarily developed by OSI Pharmaceuticals and later business and marketing 
partnerships were developed with Genentech and Roche. Now OSI Pharmaceuticals and 
Genentech are marketing the Tarceva brand in the United Sates, and elsewhere it is 
marketed by Roche. After its marketing approval in 2004, Tarceva did quite well in the 
global oncology market by generating substantial revenue for marketing companies.
In its Business Report 2007, the Roche Group declared Tarceva among its top selling 
pharmaceutical products with sales of 1,062 million Swiss Francs. The Report indicates 
a 31% annual increase in sales.393 Genentech markets this drug jointly with OSI 
Pharmaceutical and in 2007 it reported US $417 million sales with a steady annual 
growth since 2006.394 For OSI Pharmaceuticals, Tarceva stands as the single most 
important drugs for business and revenue purposes. In 2007, it reported revenues of 
$340 million (up 41% on the prior year) and it was observed:
The business continues to be anchored around our flagship anti-cancer therapy 
Tarceva® which, just three years after the November 2004 approval in non-small
'92 U.S. Food and Drug Administration Consumer Information at 
hnp://www.fda.gov/cder/consuinerinfo/druginfo/Tarceva.HTM.
393 Roche, Annual Report 2007: We Innovate Healthcare (Switzerland: 2007), 19 at 
http://www.roche.com/ub07e.pdf.
394 Genentech, Annual Report 2007: In Business for Life (California: 2007) 23, at 
http://www.gene.com/gene/about/ir/historical/annual-report s/2007/2007annualreport,pdf
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cell lung cancer (NSCLC), exited the year with fourth quarter global sales of $250 
million -  an annualized run-rate of $1 billion, the recognized industry-wide metric 
of a blockbuster.345
B. Tarceva Patents
OS I Pharmaceuticals and Roche secured the patents of erlotinib (the active 
pharmaceutical ingredient of Tarceva) in the United States, Europe, Japan, and number 
of other countries. Indeed, Roche claimed in India that patents related to Tarceva had 
already been filed in more than 80 countries and in almost 50 countries it was granted.346 
In the United States, the Orange Book data shows two patents related to Tarceva which 
would respectively expire on March 30, 2015 (Patent No. 5747498) and November 9, 
2020 (Patent No 6900221).347 In addition to this, OSI Pharmaceuticals was granted 
patent term extension certificates which extend the United States patent to November 
2018 and a corresponding patent in Europe to March 2020.39K Further patenting activity 
is expected around Tarceva given its emerging importance and ongoing research 
regarding the possibility of future use of the same molecule for pipeline products. OSI 
Pharmaceuticals states in this regard:
345 OSI Pharmaceuticals, Annual Report 2007 (New York: 2007) 1, at http://mcdia.corporate- 
ir.nct/incdia llles/ii'ol/70 70584 2007 OSIP Annual Report.pdf
396 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Cipla (I.A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008) dated March 19 2008, 
paragraph 65, Full text is available at:
http://courtnie.nic.in/dhcordcr/dhcqrydisp J.asp?pn= 1031 &yi-2008.
34 Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations in Electronic Orange Book at 
http://www.acccssdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexclncw.cfm7Appf Nq: ^  1743&Product No-00 
l& tablelO B Rx
'4S OSI Pharmaceuticals Annual Report 2007, 12, at http:/7media.corporate- 
ir.net/media files/irol/70/70584/2007 OSIP Annual Report.pdf
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We are also currently pursuing U.S. and international patents for new inventions 
concerning various other formulations of erlotinib and related intermediate 
chemicals and processes in an effort to enhance our intellectual property rights in 
this compound. We have obtained a patent covering a key polymorphic form of 
Tarceva in the United States, which expires in 2020. We are also currently 
seeking patent protection for additional methods of use for Tarceva, including the 
use of Tarceva in combination with other compounds.
In India, Pfizer Inc. USA and OSI Pharmaceuticals jointly filed an Tarceva patent 
application on 30th March 1995. The invention claimed in the patent application was 
related to ‘Quinazoline Derivatives Compounds and Composition thereof with initially 
27 claims.400 It is worthwhile mentioning that the corresponding US patents showed a 
broader claim strategy where 79 claims were made under United States Patent No. 
6,900,221.401 The other US patent related to Tarceva contains 32 claims.402 However, 
realising the very broad scope of claims made in Patent No. 5,747,498 which may 
3W Ibid.
40(1 Decision of Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs in the matter of patent application No.
5 3 7/Del/1996 at
https://210.210.88.164/patentdccisionsearch/display uploaded.asp'?application ntnnber=537-DEL-1996- 
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401 Norris, Timothy et al (2005), ‘Stable polymorph on N-(3-ethynylphenyl)-6, 7-bis (2methoxyethoxy)-4- 
quinazolinamine hydrochloride, methods of production, and pharmaceutical uses thereof, US Patent No: 
6,900,221 at http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sectl=PT01&Sect2=HlTOFF&d=PALL&D=l&u=0/o2Fnetahtml,)/o2FPTQ%2Fsrehnum.htm&r=l 
&f=G&l=50&s 1 =6,900,221 ■PN.&OS=PN/6.900.221&RS-PN/6.900.221
4112 Schnur, Rodney Caughren (1998), ‘Alkynyl and azido-substituted 4-anilinoquinazolines’ United States 
Patent No: 5,747,498 at http://patft.uspto.go\7netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect 1 =PTO 1 &Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p= 1 &u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnuni.lnm&r= i 
&f=G&l=50&s 1 =5747498.PN,&OS=PN/5747498&RS=PN/5747498
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become ultimately susceptible to challenge under Paragraph IV procedure of the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman Act), OS I 
Pharmaceuticals filed an application in February 2008 to the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office to correct certain claims by deleting surplus compounds from the 
claims.403
The Indian Patent Office had already raised these objections with regard to the Tarceva 
patent application and on 22 January, 2006, eleven preliminary objections were raised in 
the First Examination Report of the Indian Patent Office including the lack of novelty 
and the inventive step.404 These objections were later removed and finally the applicants 
managed to secure a patent on the following two claims:
1. A novel [6,7-bis(2-methoxyethoxy)quinazolin-4-yl]-(3-ethynylphenyl) amine 
hydrochloride compound of the formula A, and
2. A process for preparing the compound as claimed in claim 1,405
C. Pre-Grant Opposition by Natco Pharma
After the case was put for the final grant of patent, Natco Pharma Ltd., a local generic 
manufacturer, filed an opposition to the grant of patent on 10th April 2007. This 
application was made under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) which deals 
with pre-grant opposition proceedings. The grounds on which pre-grant opposition may
411' OSI Pharmaceuticals Annual Report 2007, 12, at http:/7media.corporatc- 
ir.nct/mcdia filcs/irol/70/70584/2007 OSIP Annual Rcport.pdf
404 Decision of Assistant Controller of Patents & Designs in the matter of patent application No. 
537/Del/1996, 11. Full text available at
https: 210.210.88.164/patentdecisionsearch/displav uploaded.asp?application numbet-537-DEL-1996- 
154.
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be based include virtually all patentability criteria including anticipation, lack of 
inventive step and non-invention.406 In its opposition petition, Natco Pharma mainly 
raised concerns about whether the application was non-obvious, and whether there had 
been sufficient disclosure of the invention in the specifications.407
In view of these objections, the Indian Patent Office examined the question of the 
novelty and inventive step again in the light of prior art citation EP 0566226, published 
on 20.10.93 and EP 0520722 published on 30.12.92. In the end, it decided that none of 
the citations were specific for the claims made under the patent application. The 
opponent maintained that the claimed invention was an obvious derivative derived from 
4-Anilinoquinazoline nucleus and The combination of simple functional groups like 
alkoxy, alkyl, alkynyl, halo to already known basic nucleus or compound is obvious to a 
person of ordinary skill in the art’.40* Applicants also survived the attack on their claims 
on the basis of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) by showing the data 
regarding survival rate increase by the use of drug. The Patent Office decided in favour 
of applicants and the patent was granted accordingly against two claims agreed during 
the proceedings.
During the hearings, the parties could not agree on the nature of opposition proceedings 
with Natco considering it as a pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) and OSI 
Pharmaceuticals and others as a post-grant opposition under Section 25(2). This 
confusion basically arose because of an earlier decision by the Patent Office on its own
406 Section 25 (1) a-k of the Patents Act 1970 (India).
407 Decision of Assistant Controller of Patents & Designs in the matter of patent application No.
537/DeI/l996, 14. Full text available at
https://210.210.88.164/patentdecisionsearch/displav uploaded.asp?application ruimbei-537-DHF-1996- 
154.
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objections and the subsequent order for the grant of patent which was delayed due to 
internal processes. This distinction is important from the point of view of the possibility 
of filing a post-grant opposition, though Natco could not succeed in its pre-grant 
opposition. On this point, the Patent Office decided that the proceeding was a pre-grant 
opposition.41’1' The success in pre-grant opposition was an important victory for OSI 
Pharmaceuticals and other parties and its Annual Report 2007 states: ‘A patent 
corresponding to the U.S. composition of matter patent for Tarceva was granted in 
February 2007 in India and we, along with our collaborator Roche, successfully 
opposed a pre-grant opposition by Natco Pharma, Ltd. of Mumbai, India in July 
2007.’410
D. Sunitinib Malate (Sutent)
Sunitinib Malate is prescribed for the treatment of renal cell carcinoma, a type of kidney 
cancer. It is manufactured and marketed by Pfizer under the brand name Sutent and also 
used for the treatment of gastrointestinal stromal tumour (GIST). GIST is a cancer of 
the stomach and bowels which is caused by the uncontrolled growth of cells in the wail 
of the stomach or bowel. Sutent was the first medicine approved by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) simultaneously for two indications. While approving the 
drug in January 2006, Steven Galson, Director of FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research, observed: ‘Today’s approval is a major step forward in making 
breakthrough treatments available for patients with rare and difficult to treat forms of 
cancer.’4"
410 OSI Pharmaceuticals Annual Report 2007, 13, at http:/7media.eorporate- 
ir.net/media 111 es/iro1/70/70584/2007 OSIP Annual Report.pdf
411 U.S Food and Drug Administration, ‘FDA Approves New Treatment for Gastrointestinal and Kidney
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In Pfizer’s product portfolio, Sutent is still categorised as one of the new medicines 
which is performing very well with an increase of 166% in sales revenue during 2006.412 
Sutenfs sales revenue increased to US$581 million in 2006 and that was mainly 
because of its widespread and speedy marketing approval in Europe and many Asian 
countries.
E. Sutent Patents
In the United States, three patents were granted for Sutent which would expire on 
February 15, 2021 (Patent No. 6573293 and Patent No. 7125905) and December 22, 
2020 (Patent No. 7211600). In addition to this, a New Chemical Entity (NCE) 
exclusivity protection is also applicable until January 26, 2011.413 A PCT application 
(Application No. PCT/US1999/012069) was also filed in 1999 and the patents were 
granted in several designated countries between 2001 and 2005.414 The parallel Indian 
patent application was filed on August 9, 2002 under the title of Pyrrole Substituted 2- 
Indolinone Protein Kinase Inhibitors and a patent was granted on August 31, 2007.4'5 
This patent (Patent No. 209251) was granted jointly to Sugen Inc. and Pharmacia & 
Upjohn Company. Sugen was a small California based biotechnology company which
Cancer’, January 26, 2006, P06-11 at http://www.fda.go v/bbs/topics/news/20Q6/'NH WO 1302.html
412 Pfizer, Annual Review 2007 (New York: 2007) 7 
http://media.pfizer.com/filcs/annuaircport/'2007/aniHial/revicw2007.pdf
413 Approved Drug Produets with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations in Electronic Orange Book at 
http://vvwvv.accessdata.fda.uov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexclnew.ctin7Appl No=021938&Product NoA)0 
l& tab le lO B  Rx
414 Tang, Peng Cho et al (Filed in 1999), ‘Pyrrole Substituted 2-Indolinone Protein Kinase Inhibitors’,
PCT Application No: PCT/US 1999/012069 at
http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/enAvo.isp?WQ= 1999061422&I A=US 1999012069&D1SPLAY=STATUS
413 Government of India, Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks at
https://!24.124.220.66/patentgrantedsearch/(S(k3gh 1 m55vis3v 1 rkuvvtxc\55)) GrantedSearch.aspx.
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was acquired by Pharmacia & Upjohn Company in the late 1990s and subsequently 
Pharmacia & Upjohn Company was acquired by Pfizer in 2003. However, Pfizer kept 
using these distinct business identities as a business strategy.416
Patent protection is central in Pfizer’s business strategy and one of its foremost business 
strategies is to refocus and optimise its patent protected portfolio.417 In its Annual 
Review of 2007, Pfizer declared: ‘We are refocusing and optimizing our patent- 
protected portfolio to speed up the flow of new products, invest more in areas of 
strength, and deliver greater value to customers and patients.’41* In this context, an 
attempt to secure compulsory licences for these two drugs was really seen as an 
offensive move by the patent owners and both applications were fiercely contested in 
the patent office.
/  . Natco 's Compulsory Licence Application
Notwithstanding the unsuccessful attempt to block the Tarceva patent through a pre­
grant opposition procedure, Natco Pharma Ltd. applied for compulsory licences under 
Section 92A of the Patents Act 1970 (India). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
Section 92A provides the avenue for the grant of a Doha style compulsory licence 
solely for export purpose. In early January 2008, Latha Jishnu of the Business Standard 
reported that:
[T]he first application for a compulsory licence filed in India, has put a key 
provision of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 under the scanner. The
’ Pfizer Annual Review 2007, 14,
http:/ iTiedia.pfizer.com/files/anniialreport/2007/annual/review2007.pdf 
417 Ibid. 4.
4IX Ibid. 12.
167
application has been filed by Natco Pharma of Hyderabad for Roche’s erlotinib 
(brand name Tarceva), which is used in the treatment of lung cancer.414
In its application to the Patent Office for the grant of a compulsory licence under 
Section 92A, Natco asked for permission to manufacture 30,000 tablets of Tarceva for 
export to Nepal against a fixed royalty of 5%. Later, it was also reported that Natco 
applied for a compulsory licence of Sutent against the same terms and conditions.420
G. Nepal: Public Health Profile and Access to Medicines
Nepal is a least developing country in South Asia having boundaries with China in the 
north and India in the south. With a population of 27,641,000 its gross national income 
per capita is US$1,010,421 The share of annual health expenditure as a percentage of the 
national budget was 5.1% in 2001-03. Nepal’s rank in terms of the UNDP Human 
Development Index (HDI) is 142 among 177 countries.422
There have been a number of estimates of cancer incidence in Nepal. Some estimates 
show that the incidence of cancer is approximately 120 per 100,000 head of population, 
and it is assumed that there are 35,000 to 40,000 cancer sufferers in the country.423 The 
incidence of cancer is thought to be rising every year. The hospital based statistics
414 Latha Jishnu, ‘Cancer drug puts licence, patent rules to test’, Business Standard, January 16 2008, at 
http://in.redifT.com/monev/2008/ian/16dnm.htm
420 Tatum Anderson, ‘India Considers Compulsory Licences For Exportation of Drugs’, Intellectual 
Property Watch, 20 February 2008, at http://vvw\v.ip-watch.org/web 1 og/indcx.php?p - 933
421 World Health Organization Country Statistics at http://www.vvho.int/countries/npl/en/
422 World Health Organization, ‘2007/2008 Human Development Index rankings’ at 
http: //h d r. u n d p. o r g/e n/s t a t i s t i c s/.
423 Sunil Kumar Joshi, ‘Occupational Cancer in Nepal -  An Update’ (2003) 1(2) Kathmandu University 
Medical Journal 144-151, 144 at http://member.wnso.oru/drsunilki/Occupationalcancer.pdl'
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showed that there were 23% cases with malignancies in 1993 compared to 19% in 1989. 
The five most common malignant diseases in Nepal are bronchial cancer, breast cancer, 
cervical and ovarian cancer, stomach and colorectal cancer and leukaemia.424 The Nepal 
pharmaceutical industry is largely dependent upon the Indian market and most of local 
manufacturers are importing their raw materials from India and China (see Table 4.2)
Table 4.2: Top 15 Suppliers to Nepal
Rank Company Origin Value 
(in crore)
Market Share 
(% )
1 Nepal Pharma Nepal 13.2 3.85
2 Lomus Pharma Nepal 11.8 3.47
3 Aristo Indian 11.4 3.31
4 Deurali Janata Nepal 10.7 3.08
5 Knoll Pharma MNC 9.6 2.78
6 Dabur Indian 9.1 2.65
7 Lupin Indian 8.7 2.50
8 National Health Care Nepal 8.6 2.50
9 Hoechst MNC 8.1 2.35
10 Alkern Indian 7.8 2.27
11 Ranbaxy Indian 7.4 2.14
12 Cadila Pharma Indian 6.3 1.84
13 Cadila Health Care Indian 6.3 1.83
14 E Merck MNC 6.0 1.75
15 Novartis MNC 5.6 1.64
Source: Dr R. K. Srivastava425
Nepal joined the WTO on April 23, 2004426 and it is regarded as at least a developing 
country for implementation and enforcement of various treaty related obligations 
including the TRIPS Agreement 1994. Historically, Nepal had domestic intellectual 
property laws but it had to amend those laws in the light of obligations of the TRIPS
425 Dr R. K. Srivastava, ‘Nepal-New Emerging Pharma Market’ (undated) http://www.p-m-
e.com PMC°/o20WEB%20 articlcs/Nepal%20New%20Emerging%20Pharma%20Markct.doc
4"'’ World Trade Organization, ‘Member Information: Nepal and WTO’ (accessed on September 13, 2010)
at http://www.wto.org/etmlish/thewto e/countries e/nepal e.htm
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Agreement 1994 by January 1, 2006.427 This is of course subject to the Doha 
Declaration's extended deadline for least developing countries to apply provisions on 
pharmaceutical patents until 1 January 2016.42s
As a least developing country, Nepal has as yet no obligation to protect pharmaceutical 
products under patent law. According to the Patent, Design and Trademark Act 1965 
(Nepal), a patent is defined as ‘any useful invention relating to a new method or process 
of manufacture, operation or publicity of any material or a combination of materials, or 
that made on the basis of a new theory or formula’.429A patent is valid only for 15 years 
after registration.43" There has been a little patenting activity in Nepal and only 49 
Patents were registered until 2002.431
Natco’s compulsory licensing applications have generated substantial debate in India 
and elsewhere but surprisingly there is complete silence from Nepal. Though these 
compulsory licenses were intended to be used for export to Nepal but we can see 
virtually no debate in Nepal about this issue. With the status of a least developing 
country, Nepal has no obligation to respond to this situation with a domestic 
compulsory license and its mere notification should suffice in the given circumstances. 
In fact, there is no compulsory licensing related provision in the Patent, Design and
427 World Trade Organization, ‘WTO Ministerial Conference Approves Nepal’s Membership’ (accessed 
on September 13, 2010) at http://www.wto.org/english/nevvs c/pres()3 e/pr356 e.hlrn 
42N World Trade Organization, ‘The Doha Declaration Explained’ (accessed on September 13, 2010) at 
http://www.wto.int/english/tratop c/dda e/dohaexplained c.htm
429 Section 2(a) of the Patent, Design and Trade Mark Act, 1965 at 
http://vvww.vakilnol.com/saarelaw/nepal/patentandtrademarkact/chapierl .htm
430 Section 8(1) of the Patent, Design and Trade Mark Act, 1965 at 
http://vvvvvv.vakilno 1 .com/saarclavv/nepal/patentandtrademarkact/ehapterl .htm.
431 Sirjana Sharma, ‘Intellectual Property Law’ on Nepalese Lawyers in the US (January 11,2008) at 
http://anlus.vvordpress.eom/2008/01 /11 /article-intellectual-property-law/
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Trademark Act 1965 (Nepal). However, for a successful outcome of Natco’s application 
in India, at least two factors are important in Nepal. First, Nepal should determine and 
establish its public health need with regard to products which Natco is attempting to 
manufacture under compulsory license. Second, Nepal should notify the WTO about its 
intention to invoke the Waiver Decision 2003, much like Rwanda
Natco’s attempt looks half-hearted and apparently it rushed to the patent office without 
adequate preparation. These points were justifiably highlighted by the patentees before 
the patent office and played a decisive role in the final outcome. The matter is further 
discussed in subsequent sections. Pfizer’s presence in Nepal and its pricing policy there 
is another aspect of this debate which is not discussed by the commentators. Aiming 
clearly to counter Natco’s compulsory licensing application, Pfizer announced the 
launch of a free Sutent access program in Nepal.432 The decision was first revealed in 
April 2008, much later than the filing of the compulsory licensing applications in India.
H. Procedural Requirements
In contrast to the Doha Declaration 2001 and the Waiver Decision 2003, Section 92A 
adopts a straightforward and relatively fast track mechanism to issue a compulsory 
licence for export purposes. This provision does not stipulate the requirement of 
issuance of two back-to-back compulsory licences in importing and exporting countries 
along with separate notification obligations. In fact, the provision is silent about the 
royalty payment and no formula is referred for its calculation. However, the Patent
432 C.H. Unnikrishnan, ‘Pfizer to launch free Sutent access programme in Nepal; The Wall Street Journal, 
April 3. 2008 at http://\v\vw.livemint.com/2008/04/03004838/Pfizer-to-launch-free-Sutent-a.htmrM-l 
(Note that ‘The move may upset Indian generic drug maker Natco Pharma Ltd’s efforts to secure a 
compulsory licence for exporting copy-cat versions of the drug’.)
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Controller is authorised under the relevant provision to determine the terms and 
conditions of such licence.
Despite the gaps in Section 92A, it is important to note that the whole scheme is 
designed to meet the obligations of the Doha Declaration 2001 and any interpretation of 
this section should be construed against this background. In light of the Doha 
Declaration 2001 and related provisions of Indian law, Natco’s application can be 
analysed in the following way.
According to the Doha Declaration 2001, an importing country is obliged to notify the 
Council for TRIPS about the name and expected quantity of the drug which it intends to 
import under the scheme. The Declaration further requires that the member state must 
establish beforehand that it has virtually no, or a very limited, manufacturing capacity 
with regard to the drug which it wants to import and it should issue a compulsory 
licence if the product is patented in that importing country. In this case, Nepal is a least 
developing country and it does not need to establish its insufficient manufacturing 
capacity pursuant to the Doha Declaration 2001. Given that Nepal has no product 
patent regime, issuing a compulsory licence has no relevance. However, general 
notification of intent to the Council for TRIPS is required which Nepal has not made. In 
the very first Doha-style compulsory licensing case, Rwanda had notified its intention to 
use the mechanism of the Doha Declaration 2001233
It is unclear how the Indian Patent Office will operate in the absence of such a 
notification to the Council for TRIPS. Nepal has only reportedly issued an import letter 
in favour of Natco. The contents of this letter which was issued from the Nepalese
4,1 Rwanda- Notification under Paragraph 2(A) o f the Decision o f  30 August 2003 on the Implementation 
o f Paragraph 6 o f the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/N/9/RWA/1(19 
July 2007) at http://\vvvw.wto.oru/enulisli/tratope/trips e/public health notif import e.htm
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Ministry ot Health are not yet known so its adequacy in terms of satisfying the 
procedural requirement of Doha Declaration 2001 is yet to be established. This point 
was precisely raised by the patentees during a hearing before the Patent Office and an 
objection was raised as following:
Counsel for patentees further argued that the “notice” by the Nepal government 
that Natco was relying upon was insufficient to amount to a formal notification of 
an intent to import drugs produced under a compulsory licence. He alleged that 
Natco, in its application for a compulsory licence, had merely submitted a letter 
from the Nepal government recommending that one consignment of erlotinib be 
approved for import from India during the period 2006-2007. He argued that this 
was insufficient to demonstrate Nepal's intent to utilise the 30 August mechanism 
to import drugs produced under a compulsory licence. In contrast, he pointed to 
the formal notification provided to the WTO by Rwanda of its intent to utilise the 
paragraph 6 implementation.434
Setting aside the procedures of the Doha Declaration 2001 for a moment, Natco can 
argue that Indian law does not prescribe the requirement of notification to the Council 
for TRIPS and any document establishing the intent of the importing country should be 
considered satisfactory.
Indeed, a bare reading of Section 92A supports this assertion as it states:
Compulsory licence shall be available for manufacture and export of patented 
pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing
4'4 Chan Park, ‘Natco’s application for CL for Export -  Hearing in the Delhi Patent Office’ on Commons- 
Law Blog (March 20, 2008) at http://commonslaw.freeflux.net/blo&/archive/2008/03/20/commons-lavv- 
natco-s-application-for-cl-for-export-hearing-in-the-delhi-patent-office.html
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capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public 
health problems, provided compulsory licence has been granted by such country 
or such country has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the 
patented pharmaceutical products from India.435 (emphasis added)
Once the importing member country fulfils the requirement, then the exporting country 
can issue a compulsory licence under its domestic law. In this case Natco has applied to 
the Patent Office after securing a letter from Nepal stating its intent, the name of the 
product, required quantities and a royalty offer. This licence is necessary in India given 
the existence of a valid patent by OSI Pharmaceuticals and Pfizer.
In the absence of any notification from Nepal, it is difficult to determine the prevalence 
of a public health problem and its nature. Paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration 2001 
clearly spells out the intent by linking it with public health problems. It is not necessary 
for Nepal to show a national emergency before importing drugs from India under the 
Indian compulsory licence but such an action should definitely be related to a public 
health problem. The relevance of an anti-cancer drug contrary to an HIV/AIDS 
treatment may become a contentious point as we have already seen this line of argument 
the case of Thailand.436
43:1 Section 92A(1) and (2) of the Patents Act 1970 (India).
436 Jonathan Burton-MacLeod, ‘Tipping point: Thai Compulsory Licences Redefine Essential Medicines 
Debate’ in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer and Kim Rubenstein (eds), Incentives For Global Public 
tlealth: Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines (Cambridge University Press: 2010) 77. Also see: 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2009 Special 301 Report (April 30, 2009) 21 at 
http:/7\vv\;w.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full%20Version%20of/o20the%202009%20SPEC’lAL%20301 "o2 
0REPQRT.pdf
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/. The Right to a Hearing
In response to Natco’s application, Pfizer approached the Patent Office to contest the 
matter both on its merits and on procedural grounds. Indeed, the Patent Office itself 
identified some lacunas in Natco’s application and those were communicated to the 
applicant. Natco responded to those points and maintained that patentees had no right to 
be heard in this case. On the questions of maintainability of this application and the 
patentees right to become a party, two hearings were held and finally the Patent Office 
resolved this matter to the extent of a hearing right in favour of patentees.
It is pertinent to note that Section 92A of the Patents Act 1970 (India) is silent on the 
question of a patent holder’s right to a hearing and relevant rules along with draft 
Manual o f Patent Practice and Procedure are equally unhelpful in this regard. Natco 
interprets it as a fast track compulsory licensing avenue unlike other provisions and 
asserts that a hearing right would unnecessarily delay the licence issuance process. 
Patent holders believe that their right to a hearing is inherent and based upon natural 
justice and several provisions of patent law. This question arose in discussion during the 
first two hearings when deliberations on the merit of the application were set aside for a 
while and parties argued their position on this preliminary hiccup. The parties raised 
several crucial points in their submissions.
To resolve this matter and decide about the stay petition of Natco, the Delhi Patent 
Office held a hearing on March 19, 2008. This hearing was attended by the parties and 
representatives of the Lawyers Collective, the HIV/AIDS Unit and the MSF Access 
Campaign. The latter two parties attended the proceedings as observers and the counsel 
of patentees raised objections about their presence asserting the proceedings as a private
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hearing. However, it was finally resolved that the observers could attend the 
proceedings with the objection of patentees placed on the record.4 '
In favour of their position, patentees relied both on statutory and common law grounds 
to establish the right to hearing before a compulsory licence was issued. The Patentee 
argued that under the notion of ‘natural justice’ and ‘due process’, a hearing opportunity 
was fundamental before any decision adverse to their right was considered. Further 
reliance was made on Section 80 of the Patents Act 1970 (India) and Rule 129 of the 
Patents Rules 2003 (India). A joint reading of Section 80 and Rule 129 suggest that the 
Patent Controller is required to grant a patent applicant, or any party to a proceeding, a 
hearing before exercising any discretionary power adversely. Thus, it was argued, the 
patentees had a right to be heard before the grant of compulsory licence.438 Pfizer also 
relied upon a number of Indian cases to establish its position on the right to be heard 
and in this regard reliance was made on audi alterum partum,439 The same principle was 
upheld in several other cases such as Union o f India v. T.R. Verma440, Basudeo Tiway v. 
Sido Kanhu Uni441 and Udit Narayan Singh v. Additional Member Board o f Revenue f 2
In response to such assertions, the applicant (Natco) maintained that Section 92A was 
clear in its language and intention and such hearing was deliberately avoided at the time 
of amendments in the law. Section 92A was a clear response to the mandate of the Doha
437 Chan Park, ‘Natco’s application for CL for Export -  Hearing in the Delhi Patent Office’, Commons- 
Law Blog at http://commonslaw.frect1ux.net/blog/archivc/2008/03/20/commons-law-natco-s-applicatii>!!- 
ibr-cl-for-expon-hearing-in-thc-delhi-patcnt-ofIice.html
438 Ibid.
439 Maneka Gandhi v Union o f  India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
440 Union o f India v T.R. Verma AIR 1957 SC 882.
441 Basudeo Tiway v Sido Kanhu Uni (1998) 8 SCC 194.
442 Udit Narayan Singh v Additional Member Board o f Revenue AIR 1963 SC 786.
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Declaration 2001 and the legislature intentionally adopted a fast track and efficient 
mechanism to meet the public health challenges in importing countries. Thus, a clear 
distinction was made between the general compulsory licensing provisions (Sections 
84-92) and this provision (Section 92A). Domestic compulsory licensing provisions 
clearly provide a hearing opportunity and Section 92A is deliberately silent on this point 
to expedite the procedure. Natco insisted that Section 92A could be construed in the 
light of the Doha Declaration 2001 which prompted the need for rapid response in the 
case of a public health crisis. Natco maintained that:
On analysis of the section 92 (A) of the Indian Patents Act, it is clear that law 
specifically excludes any interference or intervention or even participation by the 
patentee. Therefore, the question of contesting the grant of license does not arise. 
The entire mechanism is a departure from the usual procedure of grant of 
compulsory license and is aimed at giving effect to and fulfilling the objectives of 
said Doha Declaration which emphasizes on the rapid response to the urgent 
needs ot the least developed countries or developing countries for immediate 
access to patented medicines.443
Natco also referred to the relevant Canadian legislation (Section 21.14) where no such 
right was incorporated in the law before the issuance of a compulsory licence.444 In 
response to the patentees’ position that certain matters could only be determined with 
the assistance of patentees, Natco relied on the joint publication of WHO/UNDP which 
could be used to work out adequate remuneration in such circumstances without the
44 5 Delhi Patent Office, Government of India, No. POD/HK/2008-09012942 Dated July 4, 2008 at 
llLUli2Zij4JJ4.220.66/patentdecisionsearch/displav uploaded.asp?application numbei-lN-PCT-2002- 
00785-DEL-l 67 
444 Ibid.
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involvement of the patentees.445 It further argued that the common law doctrine of 
natural justice could not be applied in an absolute manner and it had always been 
regulated under different situations and in view of the unambiguous language of Section 
92A, general rules could not be attracted.
The Patent Office finally resolved the matter of the hearing controversy on July 4, 2008. 
In his decision, Hrdev Karar, Assistant Controller of Patents and Design, dismissed the 
interlocutory petition of Natco and allowed the patentees to become parties to 
proceedings before the Patent Office in the matter under Section 92A. The Patent Office 
decision is important in view of future applications of Section 92A and it would 
eventually pave a way towards elaborative and lengthy proceedings before the grant of a 
compulsory license.
The decision is mainly about the patentee's right to participate in proceedings held 
under Section 92A and several other points were also discussed by the Assistant 
Controller regarding the maintainability of Natco’s application. For instance, it is 
noticed that Natco could not substantiate its application for the grant of a compulsory 
licence by producing a notification from the Government of Nepal. The letter which 
Natco had attached along with its original application was declared insufficient in the 
light of legislative requirement. Natco did not submit proof to suggest that there was a 
public health emergency in Nepal due to the lack of availability of the drug. The 
Assistant Patent Controller, therefore, stated in his order that one of the reasons for the 
‘hearing’ was to ensure that the provisions of 92 (A) were not ‘abused’.
44> In fact reference was made to: James Love, ‘Remuneration Guidelines for a non voluntary use of a 
patent on medical technologies, UNDP-WHO Health Economic and Drugs TCM Series No. 18 
(WHO/TCM/2005.1), (2005).
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The participation of patentees and their hearing right are recognised in the decision in 
purview of Section 92A and the applicant’s submission on this point was turned down. 
Agreeing with the patentees’ arguments on this point, the Assistant Controller of Patents 
and Design said:
It may be observed that the requirements as mentioned in section 92A and rules 
made thereunder impliedly demands the presence of the patentee, therefore the 
doctrine “necessary implication or the maxim expression ‘unius est exclusio 
alterius’ need not to be applied. The principle audi alteration partem would be 
more beneficial for proper administration of justice. Therefore, the patentee is 
required to be invited to the hearing in respect of proceedings of section 92(A).446
The hearing controversy is now resolved by this decision and the remaining matter is to 
be decided on its merits. This initial controversy raised important procedural questions 
which have the potential to stall a compulsory licence application for a considerable 
time. An unrestricted and full-fledged hearing right may hamper the development of a 
standard working procedure which can be later employed by other generic companies to 
apply for compulsory licences under Section 92A. This first case is highly important not 
only for Indian manufacturers but also for the rest of the developing world as the 
placement of a quick and efficient mechanism in India would help them activate their 
domestic regulations to important cheaper drugs from generic resources. Obviously any 
unnecessary delay or cumbersome procedure should be considered against the 
legislative intent and procedural requirements under Section 92A.
Ibid. 13.
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J. Withdrawal of Application by Natco
After this decision, it was expected that the matter would shift to normal proceedings 
and the patent office would decide about the grant of compulsory licence after hearing 
both parties. Though the decision was disappointing for Natco it was expected that 
Natco would strongly push its case on the merits for the grant of a compulsory licence. 
However, in September 2008, Natco requested the Controller of Patents to withdraw its 
applications for compulsory licenses for export of the generic anti-cancer drugs Sutent 
and Tarceva.447
Apparently it was an unexpected move although some commentators noted that it was 
anticipated after Patent Office’s decisions on Natco’s interlocutory petition. Shamnad 
Basheer observed that:
[P]atent office was concerned that the Doha CL process ought not to be abused by 
generic manufacturers that wished to make a quick buck. Therefore, the best way 
to ensure this was to hear the other side as well ... Natco’s decision to withdraw 
its application may have stemmed from a fear that it would lose on merits.448
The outcome is indeed disappointing for a variety of reasons. First, this case was a good 
chance for Indian generic companies to test the application of export oriented 
compulsory licences. Second, the decision of the Patent Office was unreasonable in that 
it had indeed determined the outcome of Natco’s application beforehand. The decision 
expressed serious doubts about the maintainability of a compulsory licensing
447 C.H. Unnikrishnan, ‘Natco withdraws plea on making patented cancer drugs’, Mint: The Wall Street 
Journal, Sep 28 2008 at http://www.livemint.com/2008/09/282 14903/Natco-withdraws-plca-on- 
making.html
448 Shamnad Basheer, ‘Breaking News: Natco Withdraws “Doha” Compulsory Licence Application’ on 
Spicy IP (September 28, 2008) at http:Apicvipindia.blo»spc)t.ajnv2(X)8/()()/bte-,tkinu-iiew's-tiatc<:vvvitl)clntws-cioha.htnil
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application at a stage when there was controversy about the hearing matter. Natco had 
also apparently rushed into this matter without completing its homework in Nepal, and 
it could not substantiate its case for the grant of compulsory licence on public health 
grounds.
VI. Conclusion
In conclusion, one possible way of maintaining Indian exports at their current level is 
through the strategic use of compulsory licensing provisions which are incorporated in 
Indian law. I have analysed this potential in the light of early compulsory licensing 
instances. Natco’s application for a compulsory licence highlights the ambiguities in the 
law and procedure. Contrary to the general assumptions, the system did not work 
efficiently in this first case for a variety of reasons which could be attributed to the 
Patent Office, patent law, the applicant and patent holders. However, the main reasons 
were procedural ambiguities and the lack of appropriate homework by the applicant
I have argued that both the international framework (WTO Waiver Decision 2003) and 
the domestic rules (Indian compulsory licensing provisions) will not help in achieving 
the objectives of the Doha Declaration 2001. Four main reasons are cited here to 
support this position. First, the complexity of rules is a vital constraint and it operates 
both on the levels of treaty law and domestic regulation. Second, pharmaceutical firms 
view the export potential in terms of market size and the profits involved in such 
supply. Because of the complexity of rules, and fragmented markets, the firms may be 
less inclined to engage in export oriented production if their commercial expectations 
are largely unmet. Third, the chances of supplies being available becomes more unlikely 
especially if the firms have to make specific technological investments to produce the 
drugs required for a limited time in a restricted territory. Such technological investment 
is essential to the manufacture of new drugs which are constantly in demand in most of
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the African countries. Fourth, the Indian government lacks the political will or 
enthusiasm to engage in the wide scale use of Section 92A.444 The Indian government 
has a vested interest in integrating into the global economy and trading network.
444 Sanjcev Choudhary and Khomba Singh, ‘Government may use Compulsory Licensing for Drug 
Companies only in Emergency’, The Economic Times, 3 April 2008, at
http://economietimes.indiatimes.eom/News/News By 1 ndustrv/Healthcare B iotech/1 lealtheare/Govt m 
av use compulsory licensing for drutz companies only in emerizeney/articleshovv./2921237.ems
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Chapter 5
Patent Enforcement, Border Measures and Access to
Essential Medicines
I. Introduction
On 30th April 2009, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released its 2009 
Special 301 Report.450 Professor Michael Geist has observed of the process:
[The USTR’s] Special 301 report has become a staple on the spring calendar. 
Toward the end of each April, the USTR issues the annual report card on 
intellectual property protection around the world. The report, which typically 
identifies 30 to 40 countries that the U.S. has targeted for legal reform, is at times 
reminiscent of the classic movie Casablanca, as the USTR rounds up the usual 
suspects and is shocked to find that their legal rules do not match those adopted in 
the U.S.451
The Canadian Professor observes that ‘the USTR report should be seen for what it is: a 
biased analysis of foreign law supported by a well-orchestrated lobby effort’.4"2
The 2009 Special 301 Report cast aspersions upon the poor state of intellectual property 
protection and enforcement in India. Along with China, Russia and several other 
countries, India is placed on the Priority Watch List. The report characterises at least
450 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘2009 Special 301 Report’, 30 April 2009 at 
http://www.ustr.aov/sites/default/files/FLill%20Vcrsion%20ot%20the%2()2009%2()SPEClAL%20301%2 
ORE PORT .pdf
4M Michael Geist, ‘The Sound and the Fury of the USTR Special 301 Report,’ (2007) 1 Knowledge 
Ecology Studies at http://kestudies.oiu/ois/index.php/kes/article/viewFilc/26/36 
452 Ibid.
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nine Indian destinations as notorious markets where massive infringement activities 
take place. It is observed that:
The United States also encourages India to improve its IPR enforcement system
... Piracy and counterfeiting, including of pharmaceuticals, remain a serious
problem in India.453
The USTR 2009 Special 301 Report has a different vision of enforcement and it aims at 
achieving the maximum level of intellectual property protection through effective and 
robust enforcement policies.
In a rejoinder to the 2009 Special 301 Report, Consumers International (Cl), an 
umbrella body of more than 220 consumer organisations from 115 countries, issued its 
first Intellectual Property Watch List.454 The list contains a survey of 16 countries and 
concludes that Indian consumers benefit the most from national intellectual property 
laws. South Korea stands second in the list of best rated countries and the United 
Kingdom is the top worst-rated country. The assessment criteria which is used in the list 
to determine the best intellectual property practices revolves around the themes of 
safeguard measures and flexibilities which consumers can use while dealing with 
protected subject matters. Three main themes are identified which help in determining 
the status of different countries. These include freedom to access and use, freedom to 
share and transfer and administration and enforcement policies. One of the interesting 
findings of the report is about the United States. It observes that the United States
453 Ibid. 18-19.
454 Consumers International, IP Watch List 2009 (London, United Kingdom: April 2009) at 
http://a2knetwork.org/sites/default/files/ip-watchlist09.pdf
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applies a double standard, with ‘far more flexibility for U.S. consumers than for people 
in the countries they criticize’.455
A focus on enforcement issues had typically dominated the debates throughout the 
negotiation history of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. The lack of effective enforcement 
norms was one of the main concerns of industrially advanced countries during the 
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (1986-1994) which ultimately culminated in the 
form of the TRIPS Agreement 1994.45b
The TRIPS Agreement 1994 is the first international agreement which contains specific 
enforcement noons which are binding upon its member states.4’ Despite successful 
adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, the offensive launched by the developed 
countries to achieve the highest standards of enforcement is still continuing.
However, these efforts are now pushed through a range of multilateral and bilateral 
forums and a clear trend of forum shifting can be observed in this regard. The 
enforcement agenda is no more on a priority agenda list of developed countries in the 
World Trade Organization and these issues are diverted to new forums.455 In October 
2007, the United States Trade Representative made an announcement about the 
negotiations, which has led tothe Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (ACTA). 
In addition to United States, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New
455 Ibid. 1.
456 Peter Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting’ 
(November 2005) 5 (5) The Journal o f World Intellectual Property 765-789.
45' Report of the Panel, China -Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement o f  Intellectual 
Property Rights -  Report o f the Panel -  WT/DS362/R (26 January 2009) at 
http://www.\vto.oru/enuhsh/tratop e/dispu e/cases e/ds362e.htm
45lS Susan K. Sell, ‘The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: 
The State of Play’ (June 9, 2008) IQsensato Occasional Papers No. 1 at http: //vv w w. i q se n sato. o rg/? p—69
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Zealand, and Switzerland initially agreed to participate in ACTA negotiations.454 In 
October 2010, the text of the agreement was published.460 The enforcement agenda is 
also pushed through the World Customs Organization (WCO) which has developed and 
promoted the adoption of Provisional Standards Employed by Customs for Uniform 
Rights Enforcements (SECURE).461 These standards include several provisions which go 
beyond the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and commentators have expressed 
their concerns about the organisational mandate of World Customs Organization to 
engage in these activities.462
The enforcement of intellectual property rights is also high on the agenda of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)463, The Group of 
Eight (G8 )464, the World Intellectual Property Organization (W1PO) and the World 
Health Organization (WHO).
459 For details see: Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA)' (accessed on 8 July 2009) at http://w'ww.ustr.gov/trade-iopics/intcllectual- 
propcrty7anti-counterfcitin»-trade-aizreement-acta
46,1 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Consolidated Text) 2 October 2010 at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/actaoct2010.pdf
441 For full text: World Custom Organization, ''Provisional Standards Employed by Customs for Uniform 
Rights Enforcement -SECURE ’ (June 2007) at
http://vvwvv.weoomd.org/files/1 .%20Publie%20filcs/PDFandDocumcnts/Enforccmcnt/SEClJRE E.pdf 
462 Carlos Correa, ‘The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for Developing Countries’ in 
The Global Debate on the Enforcement o f Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries 
(Geneva, Switzerland: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2009) at 49-50 at 
http:/ictsd.nct/do\vnloads/2009/03/iink-coiTea-web.pdf
4<" Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘OECD Project on Counterfeiting and 
Piracy’ (accessed on 8 July 2009) at
http://www.oecd.or». document/50/0,3343,en 2649 34173 39542514 1 11 EOO.html
444 G8 Presidency, ‘Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy: Draft Summit Declaration 2007’
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In 2006, the WHO supported the establishment of the International Medical Products 
Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT), and provided secretarial support. The 
IMPACT has developed Principles and Elements o f National Legislation against 
Counterfeiting Medical Products These principles are promoted as a model law and 
there are many enforcement-related provisions which are dubbed as anti-counterfeiting 
measures. Developing countries have shown their strong concerns both about the 
processes and agenda of IMPACT.
In addition to these developments, a large number of bilateral free trade agreements 
were negotiated by the United States and the European Union which provide TRIPS 
plus enforcement standards and effectively reduce the ability of their trading partners to 
rely upon the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement 1994.
This escalation of enforcement measures is disturbing for the developing world. Most of 
the developing countries are still coping with the higher standards of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 and finding it difficult to achieve the right balance between intellectual 
property enforcement and other policy considerations. A recent study by Professor 
Carsten Fink shows that the so-called economic benefits of intellectual property 
enforcement are quite ambiguous for developing countries.466 On the contrary, the costs 
associated with enforcement measures are considerably high. He concludes that: Tf 
(February 2007) at http://priccofoil.org/vvp-
contcnt/unloads/2007/04/Draft%20G8%20Feb%202007%20Version.pdf
465 International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, ‘Principles and Elements for National 
Legislation against Counterfeit Medical Products, Text endorsed by IMPACT General Meeting Lisbon,
(12 December 2007) at http://vvww.who.int/irnpact/events/FinalPrinciplesforLegislation.pdf
466 Carsten Fink, ‘Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Perspective’ in The Global 
Debate on the Enforcement o f Intellectual Property’ Rights and Developing Countries (Geneva, 
Switzerland: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2009) at 
http://ictsd.net/dovvnloads/2009/03/fink-correa-vveb.pdf.
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weak IPRs enforcement in developing countries reflects fundamental institutional 
deficiencies, it is not clear how far obligations in trade agreements or technical 
assistance activities can at all remedy such deficiencies. ’467
Realising the limitations of economic benefits which a country can get from strong 
intellectual property enforcement, there is a need to rethink the intellectual property led 
model of development promoted by the United States. While approving the importance 
of market forces and the need for adequate patent rights (as rules of operation), 
Professor Amartya Sen warns about the negative impact of patents on poor patients. He 
states that:
While it is certainly important not to create economic conditions such that the 
innovative research of pharmaceuticals dries out, there are, in fact, plenty of 
intelligent compromise arrangements ... that can provide good incentives for 
research while allowing the poor of the world to buy these vitally important drugs. 
It must be remembered that the non-buying of drugs by the poor which they 
cannot afford to buy can hardly add anything to the incentives of the drug 
producers; the issue is to combine efficiency-based considerations with demands 
of equity, in an intelligent and humane way, with an adequate understanding of 
demands of global efficiency as well as justice.468
This chapter addresses the question, how can countries like India adopt enforcement 
measures which are consistent with its international obligations and reduce the welfare 
loss to society at the same time? Focusing upon the Tarceva case, Part II of the chapter 
explores the changing dynamics of patent litigation and enforcement in India, which 
offers new risks and opportunities both for Indian consumers and pharmaceutical
467 Ibid. xvi.
468 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006) 140.
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manufacturers. Part III considers the challenges which India may face at international 
forums in the form of new and strict enforcement measures. The recent controversy of 
seizure of Indian generics is discussed in this part in the light of European Union laws 
and the TRIPS Agreement 1994. The chapter concludes that India needs to develop a 
coherent policy on patent enforcement, both domestically, and in international 
diplomatic negotiations. India should, however, be mindful of the fact that any TRIPS 
plus approach through bilateral trade negotiations would prejudice its interests in the 
pharmaceutical sector.
II. Domestic Enforcement of Patent Rights: Injunctive Relief in 
Indian Courts
Since receiving marketing approval in October 2007 from the Indian Government, Cipla 
Limited -  the second largest generic manufacturer in India -  has been manufacturing 
the pharmaceutical drug, Erlocip. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. (Roche) filed a case in 
the Delhi High Court to stop Cipla from manufacturing this drug and an interim 
application was also filed for the grant of a temporary injunction against Cipla. The 
matter is still pending before the Delhi High Court on its merits but on the question of 
interim relief and injunction, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat rendered his judgment on 19 
March 2008 whereby an interim injunction was refused subject to certain conditions.
This decision of the High Court of Delhi is important in view of earlier patent 
jurisprudence in India on the question of granting an ad-interim injunction and the 
overall context of generic companies’ strategies to manufacture cheaper versions of 
patented drugs by using the flexibilities of Indian patent law. It can be anticipated that 
injunctive relief issues will play an important role in future patent litigation in India and 
the development of case law in this regard is quite crucial from an enforcement
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perspective. The judgment of the High Court of Delhi in F. Hoffmarw-La Roche Ltd v. 
CipIcFw is discussed in this section of the chapter.
The suit was jointly filed by Roche, Pfizer and OSI Pharmaceuticals where the latter 
two were patent holders and Roche was the partner under a Development Collaboration 
and Licensing Agreement. The drug, Tarceva, was also registered with the Directorate 
General o f Health Services in the name of Roche. Roche was responsible for importing 
and marketing this drug in India and it was not as such manufactured in India by the 
rights holders.470 Though the judgment is mainly about the grant of an ad-interim 
injunction in patent infringement cases, it elaborates on certain other key matters related 
to patentability criteria, rules governing injunctions and the relevance of public health in 
matters pertaining to pharmaceutical patents.
A. Validity of Patent
In accord with standard practice in patent infringement suits, Cipla, in its written 
statement, has challenged the validity of the patent granted by the Patent Office.4 1 
Through its counter claim, Cipla raised the objections related to novelty, inventive step 
and proper disclosure. The plaintiffs vehemently opposed this move by seeking 
permanent injunction restraining infringement of their patent rights to the drug Tarceva. 
In addition, an application was filed seeking an ad-interim injunction, restraining the 
defendant from manufacturing, offering for sale, selling and exporting the drug Tarceva. 
This application was dismissed by the High Court of Delhi.
464 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Cipla (I.A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008) dated March 19 2008. Full 
text is available at: http://courtnic.nic.iii/dhcordcr/dhcqrvdispi.asp?pn=103 l&vr=2008
470 Ibid. Paragraph 3.
471 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Cipla (I.A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008) dated March 19 2008, 
paragraph 19, Full text is available at:
http://courtnic.nic.in/dhcordcr/dhcqrydispJ.asp7pn—1031 &yi-2008
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In their written submission and oral arguments, the plaintiffs heavily relied on the 
presumption of validity of their patent in view of its grant by the Patent Office after due 
process.472 The patent application was fded in 1995 with 27 claims but later on 25 of 
them were dropped and the patent was granted only on 2 claims. The whole process 
took a considerable time and close scrutiny, and the plaintiffs could secure a patent oniy 
after satisfying all requirements enumerated in law. Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ patent 
also survived a pre-grant opposition filed by Natco Pharma and in its final order, the 
Patent Office rejected all the objections raised by the opposing party. To defend the 
validity of their patent, the plaintiffs submitted that the current objections raised by 
Cipla in their written statement about the validity of the patent were substantially 
similar to those which the Patent Office had heard and rejected during opposition 
proceedings.
Cipla attacked the notion of presumption of validity of the patent by citing a number of 
Indian cases to demonstrate that the plaintiffs’ patent was new and such presumption 
could not be attracted at least before the expiry of six years after the grant of patent. 
Reliance was placed on Franz Zaver Humer v. New Yash Engineers47’ and other cases to 
establish the different treatment of new and old patents during infringement 
proceedings. Cipla also raised number of objections regarding the validity of the 
plaintiffs’ patent. It was alleged that the patent was liable to be revoked because it was a 
quinazolin derivative; a mere improvement from the existing prior art which would be 
obvious for a person skilled in the art. It was submitted that: ‘The patented compound of 
the Plaintiffs is a quinazolin derivative used for the treatment of cancer therefore, a
472 Ibid.
47’ Franz Zaver Humer v New Yash Engineers AIR 1997 Delhi 79.
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derivative of a known compound and hence not patentable under Section 3 (d) of the 
Act.’474
Cipla also mentioned at least three European patents dated 1993 which disclosed 
quinazolin derivatives. One of the these patents disclosed exactly the same chemical 
structure which the plaintiffs claimed except for one substitution, which was again 
claimed to be obvious. So in the absence of an established enhancement of efficacy 
pursuant to Section 3(d), a patent could not be granted and the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate this. It was also alleged that Tarceva was just a derivative of Gefitinib from 
Astra Zeneca for which a patent was refused in India, on the ground that the said 
product was already in prior use and was in the public domain. Thus, the defendant 
submitted that the Patent Office erred in granting a patent for Tarceva. It alleged that the 
plaintiffs’ attempt to protect Tarceva was not less than indulging in evergreening. 
Relying on the ruling of the Madras High Court in Novartis v. Union o f India, where the 
Court extensively relied on legislative debates in this regard475, the defendant argued 
that evergreening was clearly considered contrary to public policy and the statutory 
language employed in Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) was evident on this 
point.
In their response to the defendant’s arguments, the plaintiffs questioned the very notion 
of new and old patents and asserted that there was no statutory basis for such 
distinction. Instead, they maintained that the new patent regime in India put in place a 
multilayered scrutiny mechanism before the grant of a patent in terms of internal 
examination, pre-grant opposition, post-grant opposition and the possibility of
474 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Cipla (I.A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008) dated March 19 2008, 
paragraph 19, Full text is available at:
http://courtnic.nic.in/dhcorder/dhcqrydispi.asp?pn-103 1 &vr=20Q8
475 Ibid. Paragraph 11.
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revocation. So the old case law could not survive in this context. It was further argued 
that the objections raised about anticipation of invention, prior art and efficacy within 
the meaning of Section 3(d) had already been considered by the Patent Office during 
pre-grant opposition and the patent was granted after that. On the issue of the chemical 
structure familiarity, the plaintiffs asserted that sometimes a minute relocation or 
substitution in positions could add an extraordinary inventive step and such examples 
were not unknown in pharmaceutical sciences. They also rejected the plea that Tarceva 
was merely a quinazolin derivative and claimed a substantial enhancement of efficacy 
over the existing products.476
In the judgment, Justice Bhat refrained from going into the merits of opposing 
arguments about the patentability issue and kept his analysis limited to a decision on the 
interim application.477 He considered the standards of novelty and inventive step in 
judging prima facie validity of patents; as well as the principles guiding the grant of a 
temporary injunction.
Justice Bhat cited the decision of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal case in 
Windsurfing International v. Tabur Marine478 (GB) Ltd. to elaborate the steps to be 
taken into account while determining patentability as follows:
1. Identifying the inventive concept embodied in the patent;
2. Imputing to a normally skilled but unimaginative addressee what was common 
general knowledge in the art at the priority date;
476 Ibid. Paragraph 24-25.
477 F. Hoffinann-La Roche Ltd v Cipla (I.A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008) dated March 19 2008, 
paragraph 73, Full text is available at:
http://eourtnie.nie.in/dhcorder/dhcqrvdisp i.asp'/pn^UB 1 &yr-^2008
47x Windsurfing Internationa! Inc. v Tabur Marine (GB) Ltd. [1985] RPC 59.
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3. Identifying the differences if any between the matter cited and the alleged 
invention; and
4. Deciding whether those differences, viewed without any knowledge of the 
alleged invention, constituted steps that would have been obvious to the skilled 
man or whether they required any degree of invention.479
He then cited the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. o f Kansas 
Citym) to state the requirement of non-obviousness.
Justice Bhat declared that the Patent Office erred in its findings in the pre-grant 
opposition because it conflated anticipation with obviousness. On this point, he again 
relied on a recent United States case, KSR International Co v. Teleflex4*', to reject the 
application of tightly formulistic teaching, suggestion, and motivation (TSM) test. He 
states that:
A hint of this TSM method appears to have crept in the examination of the 
plaintiff s claim, in the Controller’s order, particularly at page 22, where he 
appears to have proceeded to rule out any motivational factors to the persons 
skilled in the art -  by looking into the prior art for finding out or predicting the 
improvement in the properties of the quinazolin derivative compound. The
479 F. IIoffmann-La Roche Del v Cipla (I. A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008) dated March 19 2008, 
paragraph 73, Full text is available at:
http://courtnie.nie.in/dheorder/dhcqrvdisp i.asp?ptv=103 l&vr=2008
4M) Graham et at. v John Deere Co. o f Kansas City et at 383 U.S. 1 (1966) at
http:/ycasclaw.lp.t]ndlaw.convscripts/getcase.pl?navbv-CASB&court-US&vol-383&paue-l.
4X1 KSR International Co v. Teleflex 550 US 1,(2007) at 
http://\vw\v.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/Q4-1350.pdf
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plaintiff too appears to be emphasizing this since its argument is that the 
prior art does not contain description of a similar compound.482
Finally on this point, the court rejected the plea of plaintiffs that the product of the 
defendant was inferior in quality because the product was clearly approved for a 
marketing purpose by the relevant authorities. Without prejudice to the rights of the 
plaintiffs, it was stated that:
The court should refrain from conducting a mini trial as to the strength of the 
parties, at the interlocutory stage. All that can be therefore said is that the 
plaintiff s case though arguable and though disclosing prima facie merit, has to 
answer a credible challenge to the patent, raised by the defendant.483
B. Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Cases
The main issue raised and discussed in the judgment was related to the grant of 
injunctive relief in patent infringement cases. In his analysis and findings, Justice Bhat 
did not confine himself to the particular issue of interlocutory injunction and considered 
the questions of remedies, more broadly. Displaying a cosmopolitan frame of reference, 
the judge referred to a range of Indian, British, and North American precedents on the 
question of injunctions.
In support of their application for an ad-interim injunctive relief, the plaintiffs again 
relied on the presumption of validity of their patent and asserted that a duly granted 
patent could attract an equitable relief which would otherwise cause an irreparable harm
482 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Cipla (I.A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008) dated March 19 2008, 
paragraph 76, Full text is available at:
http://eourtnie.nie.in/dheorder/dheqrvdisp i.asp'/pn^ 103 1 &yi-2008
483 Ibid. Paragraph 78.
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to the patentees. It was submitted that ‘it would not be appropriate that the remedy of 
injunction prescribed under section 108 of the Act is denied to the Plaintiff merely 
because the Defendant has raised a defense of invalidity of the patent’.4X4
On the contrary, the defendant argued against the granting of such relief in the light of 
several cases before the Indian courts. The defendant maintained that, as the patent was 
new, it had no presumption of validity and in such case, a refraining order from the 
court could be disastrous for the defendant. The defendant also adverted to the non­
working of patents in India and suggested that working of a patent was an essential pre­
requisite for the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. The plaintiffs had failed to 
manufacture this drug in India and their imported drugs were not within the reach of 
poor patients. Any injunction in this situation would be against the interests of the 
public at large.4X5
The judgment on this point is quite coherent and lucid and a detailed analysis of 
relevant case law has been done. Interestingly both the parties cited the celebrated 
triple-test enunciated in the English case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd.m' 
First, under the American Cyanamid test, the court has to consider whether there is a 
serious question to be tried. Second, the court has to see whether damages would be an 
adequate remedy for a party injured by the court’s grant of, or its failure to grant, an 
injunction. Third, if damages cannot be an adequate remedy, the court has to determine 
where the balance of convenience lies.
4X4 Ibid. Paragraph 16.
4So Ibid. Paragraph 13 and 14.
4X<> American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 2 WLR 316 at 
http://vvwvv.svvarb.co.Uk/c/hl/1975cvanamid__ ethicon.html
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Against the backdrop of this standard, Justice Bhat analysed the prevailing 
jurisprudence in India on this point. In Ramdev Food Products Ltd v. Arvindbhai 
Rambhai Patel and Others4*\ the Supreme Court had approved the American Cyanamid 
approach in the context of a trademark case. The earlier jurisprudence of Indian courts 
is consistent in that where the patent is of recent origin and its validity has not been 
tested, the courts should not grant injunctions where infringement is alleged; it has also 
been held that if the defendant alleges that the patent cannot be sustained, the injunction 
should be refused. This is upheld in several cases including, but not limited to, Manicka 
Thevar v. Star P/oro Works4**, Ram Narain v. Ambassador Industries4*9, Surendra Lai 
Mahendra v. Jain Galzers49{\ National Research and Development Corporation o f India 
v. Delhi Cloth General Mills491 and Standipack Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Oswal Trading Co. 
Ltd. and Ors.492
In another recent case of Bilcare v. Amartara Pvt. Ltd493, the High Court of Delhi 
reaffirmed that the mere grant of patent did not guarantee its validity and if a 
counterclaim of invalidity was filed then no validity presumption could be attached to 
such patent.494 Justice Bhat then discussed the relevance of eBay v. MercExchange and 
summarised the issue of interlocutory injunction as following:
4S' Ramdev Food Products Ltd v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel and Others 2006 (8) SCC 762 at
http://vvww.tmpsearchcrs.com/tradcmark_ cases/1 12-2005.php
4SS Manicka Thevar v. Star Plow Works 1965 Mad 327, paragraph 5.
489 Ram Narain v. Ambassador Industries AIR 1976 Del 87 (Paragraph 22, 23, 25).
490 Surendra Lai Mahendra v. Jain Galzers 1981 PTC 112.
491 National Research and Development Corporation o f India v. Delhi Cloth General Mills AIR 1980 Del 
132.
49~ Standipack Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Oswal Trading Co. Ltd. and Ors AIR 2000 Del 23.
494 Bilcare v Amartara Pvt. Ltd 2007 (34) PTC 419 (Del).
494 For an overview of Bilcare and its comparison with KSR: Joshua D. Sarnoff ‘ Bilcare, KSR,
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(i) In patent infringement actions, the courts should follow the approach indicated 
in American Cyanamid, by applying all factors;
(ii) The courts should follow a rule of caution, and not always presume that patents 
are valid, especially if the defendant challenges it;
(iii) The standard applicable for a defendant challenging the patent is whether it is a 
genuine one, as opposed to a vexatious defense. Only in the case of the former 
will the court hold that the defendant has an arguable case.445
After elaborating the applicable standard, the Court considered is application in the 
existing case and decided to resolve this matter on the question of the balance of 
convenience. The plaintiffs had made out an arguable case and, at the same time, the 
defendant’s challenge was genuine.
After considering a range of factors under the American Cyanamid approach, the Court 
ultimately declined to issue an ad-interim injunction. Justice Bhat established that on 
account of public interest in access to life saving drugs, the balance of convenience 
clearly tilted in favour of the defendant and subject to certain conditions (furnishing 
undertaking to pay damages, if awarded finally and maintenance of proper account), the 
defendant could continue manufacturing its drug until the final disposition of this matter 
on merits.
Regardless of the merits of this case, the Court’s reliance on recent United States case 
law is an interesting dimension of this debate. Justice Bhat referred to the Supreme
Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief, and Obviousness in Patent Law’ (2008) 25:3 Cardozo Arts 
and Entertainment Law Journal 995-1057 at http://ww\v.cardozoaeli.net/issues/08/Sarnoff.pdf 
445 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Cipla (l.A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008) dated March 19 2008, 
paragraph 65, Full text is available at:
hitp://courtnic.nic.in/dheorder/dhcqrvdisp i.asp?prv= 103 1 &yi-2008
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Court of the United States decision in eBay v. MercExchange496 to suggest that there is a 
traditional four factors test for issuance of an injunction. This is an important departure 
from the prevailing Indian jurisprudence on this point and its consequences. 
Traditionally Indian courts referred to English cases in corporate and commercial 
matters because of a shared heritage of legislation and case law. While discussing the 
application of eBay, Justice Bhat commented that plaintiffs failed to raise the issue of 
irreparable hardship which was otherwise an important factor. It is interesting to note 
that since the eBay case, many courts in the United States have given conflicting 
opinions on the point of survival of the irreparable harm doctrine in the eBay judgment. 
The post eBay cases which no longer consider the presumption of irreparable harm 
include z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation497, Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor 
Corporation^*, Voda v. Cordis Corp4", Torspo Hockey International, Inc. v. Kor 
Hockey Ltd.500
It would appear that Justice Bhat has considered the implications of American 
Cyanamid and eBay together on this point but ignored the post eBay developments in
496 eBay Inc v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) at 
http://www.suprcmecourtus.gov/opinions/03pdf7Q5- 130.pdf.
497 z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006), affd, No. 2006-1638, 
2007 WL 3407175 (Fed. Cir. Nov.
16, 2007) at http://www.cafc.uscoui1s.uov/opinions/06-l638.pdr
49S Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corporation Nos. 2006-16 10, 2006-1631,2007 WL 3024994 (Fed. Cir. 
Oct. 18, 2007) at http://dock.cts.iustia.com/’docket/court-txcdce/case no-2:2007cv00180/case id-103041 /
499 Voda v. Cordis Corp No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614 at 
http://www.uspto.uov/uo/com/sol/fedcirdecision/05-1238.pdt~.
500 Torspo Hockey International, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd 491 F. Supp. 2d 871 at 
http://dockets.iiistia.com/docket/court-mndce/case no-0:2007cv()0246/case id-88521/
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American courts which are struggling to apply eBay findings in different fields of 
technologies.
C. Public Health and Access to Drugs Considerations
Finally, the court considered the question of the balance of convenience and irreparable 
hardship in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution and public interest in access to 
life saving drugs. Cipla heavily relied on this argument in its submissions and stated the 
huge price difference between the two products time and again during the proceedings. 
It submitted that:
[I]t is in the interest of the patients that no injunction should be granted. The 
plaintiffs' capsule costs Rs.4,800/- per tablet and the equivalent tablet of the 
defendant costs Rs. 1,600/- . Thus, a month’s dosage for a patient undergoing 
treatment for cancer is Rs. 1.4 lakh whereas the equivalent cost of the defendant 
would be Rs.46,000/-. It is alleged that in the area of life saving drugs, it is in the 
public interest of the general public and patients suffering from diseases like 
cancer that medicines are made available at cheap and affordable prices so long."1
Though the plaintiffs tried to rebut this argument by showing that import duty was part 
of their calculated price, Cipla maintained that its product was also subject to excise 
duties.
Weighing up the factors of the balance of convenience, irreparable hardship, public 
interest and Article 21 of the Constitution, the court held
Thus, unlike in cases involving infringement of other products, the Courts have to 
tread with care when pharmaceutical products and more specifically life saving
Mil Ibid. Paragraph 14.
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drugs are involved. In such cases, the balancing would have to factor in 
imponderables such as the likelihood of injury to unknown parties and the 
potentialities of risk of denial of remedies ... Another way of viewing it is that if 
the injunction in the case of a life saving drug were to be granted, the Court would 
in effect be stifling Article 21 so far as those would have or could have access to 
Erloticip are concerned."02
To support this assertion, reliance was made on a United States case of Roussel Uelafv. 
G.D. Searle and Company Ltd.50i to establish the differential treatment of life saving 
drugs.
In its final deliberation on the issue of injunctive relief, the court also considered the 
public interest in protecting the property rights in the patent but while comparing the 
competing public interests, Justice Bhat observed that:
The National Cancer Registry Report released by the Indian Medical Council in 
2007 states that every hour 50 persons are diagnosed of cancer in the country. The 
same report states that 24% of all cancer incidents, are in relation to lung cancer. 
The figures of those suffering from the ailment that Tarceva and Erlocip seek to 
alleviate therefore, are significant. There is no empirical material, or statistical 
method by which the Court can deduce the numbers of such patients who would 
be using the plaintiff s product if injunction is refused; on the other hand, it is 
plain that a large number of them would be deprived of access to a life saving 
drug if injunction is granted. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that as 
between the two competing public interests, that is, the public interest in granting 
an injunction to affirm a patent during the pendency of an infringement action, as
502 Ibid. Paragraph 85.
503 Roussel Uelafv G.D. Searle and Company Ltd 1977 FSR 25.
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opposed to the public interest in access for the people to a life saving drug, the 
balance has to be tilted in favour of the latter.504
According to Justice Bhat, an applicant must show that there is an inventive step and 
that any new form listed in the explanation to Section 3(d) shows a significant 
enhancement of efficacy over known forms. So, ‘the test of patentability has become 
more precise and specific’.505
The importance of this decision is obvious in the light of new jurisprudence which it has 
created in the Indian judicial milieu. Some courts had adopted a cautious approach 
towards the grant of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases by avoiding a direct 
and immediate presumption of validity in favour of the patentee. This decision adds an 
important dimension of public policy as a part of an equitable formula which should be 
used in such cases.
A clear and unambiguous statement concerning people’s right to health and access to 
medicine is an important development and in conjunction with the flexibilities of patent 
law, it can really work well in favour of generic manufacturers. It is not clear how this 
decision would be interpreted in the larger perspective of the Patent Office’s practice, 
but its relevance for the pharmaceutical sector is direct, precise and clear-cut.
III. Detention of Transit Drugs: EU-India Dispute
On December 4, 2008, Netherlands custom authorities detained a shipment of generic 
medicine which was destined for Brazil. The medicine, losartan potassium, was 
manufactured in India by Dr Reddy’s Laboratories.506 The Laboratories had exported
504 Ibid. Paragraph 86.
Ibid. Paragraph 57.
Ml6 Dr Reddy’s Pharmaceutical Company, http://www.drrcddys.com/index.html.
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around 500 kilograms of losartan to Brazil under the instruction of EMS, a Brazilian 
importer. The shipment was en route when it was detained in the Netherlands on the 
suspicion of infringing patent rights.
Losartan potassium is an anti-hypertensive used in treating arterial hypertension and in 
most of the regulated markets around the world it is marketed under the brand names of 
Cozaar and Hyzaar. Both of these drugs are manufactured and marketed by Merck & 
Co. Inc., one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world. Losartan potassium 
was first approved by the United Sates Food and Drug Administration in 1995 followed 
by further approvals of additional dosages and new indication in 1998 and 2005.507 
Merck & Co. Inc. had secured three patents in the United States for different 
formulations of Cozaar and Hyzaar and it was also granted additional paediatric 
exclusivity.508 The earliest patent expiry was on August 9, 2009 while the last patent 
would expire on May 4, 2014.
507 United States Food and Drug Administration, ‘Electronic Orange Book Horne Page’ (accessed on July 
1,2009) at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/seripts/cder/ob/docs/tempai.cfm
508 See: Carini, David J. et al (1992), ‘Angiotensin II receptor blocking imidazoles’, US Patent No: 
5,138,069 at http://patft.uspto.gov/nctacgi/nph-
Parser?Scctl=PT01&Sect2=HIT0FF&d=PALL&p=l£u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPT0%2Fsrchnum.htm & r"l 
&f=G&l=50&sl=5138Q69.PN.&OS=PN/5138069&RS=PN/5138069: Carini, David J. et al (1992), 
‘Treatment of hypertension with angiotensin II blocking imidazoles’, US Patent No: 5,153,197 at 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netaegi/nph-
Parser?Sectl=PT01&Sect2=HlT0FF&d=PALL&D=l&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPT0%2Fsrchniim.him&r=l 
&f=G&l=50&s 1 =5153197,PN.&QS=PN/5153197&RS=PN/5153197: Carini, David J. et al (1993), 
‘Treatment of chronic renal failure with imidazole angiotensin-II receptor antagonists’, US Patent No:
5,210,079 at http://patft.uspto.gov/netacui/nph-
Parser?Sect 1 =PTO 1 &Sect2=H ITQFF&d=PALL&p= 1 &u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchmim.htm&r= 1 
&UG&K50&S 1 =5210079. P N. & OS- P N /5 210079&RS=PN/5210079 and Carini, David J et al (1997),
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According to the data of the World Intellectual Property Organization, at least 52 
patents are listed with losartan as a key ingredient. These patents which were filed under 
the arrangements of the Patent Cooperation Treaty 1970 (PCT) include a patent which 
was published on June 29, 1995.509 This patent application was jointly filed by the 
Merck and Co. Inc. and E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont). DuPont 
holds the patent rights of losartan potassium in most of the European markets and it has 
played a major role in the detention of Dr Reddy’s consignment to Brazil. It is 
important to note that losartan is not patented both in Brazil and India and it was 
detained in the Netherlands where a valid patent exists. On December 24, 2009, Dr 
Reddy’s Laboratories was notified about the confiscation of its shipment at Amsterdam 
Schiphol Airport. This notification from the lawyers of patent holders and its licensee 
categorically demanded the destruction of infringing goods. They also solicited a waiver 
from the shipper, Dr Reddy’s Laboratories, to the effect of surrendering its 
consignment.510 The consignment was held by The Netherlands custom authorities for
‘Polymorphs of Losartan and the Process for the Preparation of Form II of Losartan', US Patent No: 
5,608,075 at http: path.uspto.uov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Seet l-PTQl&Sect2-HITOFF&d=PALL&p=l &u-%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htni&r=l 
&f<i&K50&s 1 ~5608075 .PN.&OS=PN/5608Q75&RS=PN/56Q8075
509 Campbell, Gordon Creston Jr. et al (Filed in 1994), ‘Polymorphs of Losartan and the Process for the 
Preparation of Form li of Losartan’, PCT Application No: PCT/US1994/014768 at 
httn://w\vw.wipo.int/petdb/en/fctch.isD?LANG=ENG&DBSELECT=PCT&SERVER TYPE=19- 
10&SQRT=41298455-
KEY&TYPE FIELD=256&IPB=0&1DQC=1137128&CM0&ELEMENT SET=B&RESULT=l&TOT 
AL=1&START=1&DISP=25&FORM=SEP-0/HITNUM,B-ENG,DP.MC.AN.PA.ABSUM- 
ENG&SEARCH IA=US 1994014768£OUERY=%28WO%2iWO%2fl995%2fl)17396%29 
” ,) Frederick M. Abbott, ‘Worst Fears Realised: The Dutch Confiscation of Medicines Bound from India 
to Brazil' (March 2009) 13 (1) News and Analysis: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridges/44192-
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36 days and it was finally released and returned to Dr Reddy's Laboratories in India 
after an agreement was reached between the parties.'"
The detention of the generic version of losartan potassium triggered a controversy 
among the European Union, India and Brazil. The detention and threat of destruction 
was largely seen as a barrier to trade in legitimate generic medicines which play a vital 
role in access to the medicine program in many countries. Both India and Brazil 
strongly reacted against the action of the Dutch authorities and termed it against the 
spirit of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 (the 
Doha Declaration ). It was later on revealed that this detention was not an isolated 
incident. Such confiscations of shipments of generic medicines were frequently made at 
different European airports and the most of the detentions were carried out by the Dutch 
authorities. Initially it was reported that at least four separate instances of detention had 
occurred during the past few months involving different destinations. However the 
figure increased markedly when Dutch authorities released some details on an access to 
information request of Health Action International'12, a consumer group working in the 
areas of drug policy and access to medicines. According to this information, Dutch 
authorities conducted 17 seizures in the year 2008. Sixteen consignments originated 
from India and one from China. These shipments were destined for Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Portugal and Spain. These medicines were for the
" 1 Stephanie McAviney, ‘Ever Broader Border Controls?’ (2009) 4 (7) Journal o f Intellectual Property 
Law & Practice 255-457 at 455.
' I2 Health Aetion International Europe, ‘HAI Requests Government Documents on Generic Medicines 
Seizures’ (3 April 2009) at
http://wwvv.haiweb.om/19062009/3%20Apr%202009%201-LM%20requests%20izovernment%20documen
ts%20on%20seiz.ures.pdf.
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treatment of diseases such as cardiological ailments, AIDS, dementia and schizophrenia. 
Fifteen of the 17 consignments were destined to developing countries.513
The issue of the confiscation of losartan potassium came into the limelight immediately 
after the detention. India and Brazil along with several other developing countries 
challenged the validity of such actions under the TRIPS Agreement 1994. In the WTO
j
General Council Meeting on the 3 February 2009, the Indian representative 
vehemently rejected the action of Dutch authorities and stated that:
In addition to going against the spirit of a rule based trading system and impeding 
free trade, such acts represent a distorted use of the international IP system and 
circumscribe TRIPS flexibilities ... The WTO rule based system provides for 
freedom of transit by the most economical and convenient routes and without 
unnecessary delays and restrictions. The act of seizure by the Dutch authorities is 
therefore, a denial of the rule based system which we seek to build and strengthen 
in the WTO. The concept of “territoriality“ is a key stone in the edifice of the 
TRIPS Agreement. There are no indications that the drug consignment was meant 
for the markets of the EC. Seizure, and initiating procedures for destruction of 
such consignments, violates this key principle. Members have always strived for a 
balance between public health concerns and protection and enforcement of IPRs 
... It is ironical that while on one hand WTO has taken steps to promote access to 
affordable medicines and remove obstacles to proper use of TRIPS flexibilities,
513 Directorate-General for the Tax and Customs Administration, Ministry of Finance, The Hague, the 
Netherlands, ‘[Government Information Public Access] Request for Information about Action by 
Customs concerning Medicines in Transit’ (7 May 2009) at
hUp:/7www.haivYcb.org/19062009/7%20Mav%202009%20Dutch%20»overnment%20response%20to%20 
Freedom0. o20of%201nformation%20request%20(EN).pdf
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on the other hand some Members seek to negate the same by seizing drug 
consignments in transit. 514
The Indian representative further highlighted the adverse implications of the detention 
of generic medicines upon public health objectives.
Similar concerns were raised by the Brazilian representative, who stated that the trade in 
generic medicines was perfectly legal from the intellectual property point of view. The 
representative complained that the European regulation was against the spirit of free 
trade, because it empowered customs authorities to interfere with the transit of generic 
medicines. In its view, generic medicines should not be confused with counterfeit or 
pirated goods. Generic medicines were not sub-standard or illegal. It was further stated 
that:
The measure taken by the Dutch authorities clearly violates the freedom of transit, 
which is a right enshrined in GATT Article V. Only very exceptional 
circumstances warrant restrictions on that freedom. Brazil is not aware of any 
such circumstance in this concrete case. The decision to impede the transit of a 
cargo of generic medicines -  which was not headed for the Dutch market -  is 
unacceptable and sets a dangerous precedent. Worse still, there are indications that 
this is not an isolated case ... Under TRIPS, the medicines seized are generic 
under the law of the market in which they were meant to be commercialized. In 
this case, they are generic as regards Brazilian law, and Indian law, as we
514 World Trade Organization General Couneil Meeting, ‘Intervention by India’ (February 3, 2009) at 
http://www.ip-watch.org/files/lndia%20Statement%20to0/o20General%20Couneil0/o20Jan2009.doc
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understand it. Whether or not the medicines were generic under the law of the 
country of transit is an irrelevant question."'
The Brazilian representative concluded, indignantly: ‘What is not irrelevant is the 
decision taken by Dutch Customs authorities to block the transit and thus impede the 
access of Brazilian hypertension patients to safe and price-competitive generic 
medicines.’516 The diplomat lamented: Tn Brazil and in other countries, hypertension is 
a common but serious disease, often leading to death.’"
However, EU Ambassador Eckait Guth did not agree with these contentions and 
maintained that the Dutch seizure ‘is allowed by TRIPS and is based on provisions in 
EU customs law that allow customs to temporarily detain any goods if they suspect that 
these goods infringe an intellectual property right’.518 He also said that the goods were 
never seized and were merely detained under the law and ultimately returned to the 
owner. He also tried to underplay the significance of detention by stating that:
In the present case, it appears that, following a request by a company which has 
patent rights over the medicine in question in the Netherlands, the Dutch 
authorities temporarily detained (which does not mean seize, confiscate or 
destroy) a small shipment of drugs worth 55.000 euros in a Dutch airport, in order 
to control it. This action is allowed by TRIPS and is based on provisions in EU
World Trade Organization General Council Meeting, ‘Intervention by Brazil' (February 3, 2009) at 
http://vv\v vv.ip-vvatch.org/files/RemediosIntervcncao-do-Brasil-Conselho%20Gcral-
03%2002°/o202008.doc
516 Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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customs law that allow customs to temporarily detain any goods if they suspect 
that these goods infringe an intellectual property right.519
Some of these factual assertions were later on rebutted by evidence presented by Dr 
Reddy’s Laboratories. Other developing countries have also raised their concerns on 
generic seizure in support of positions of Brazil and India. They include Argentina, 
Bolivia, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela."20
A. Generics Detention and Access to Medicines
Indian pharmaceutical exports are crucial for global access to medicine initiatives as 
India alone exports generics of worth US$3.1 billion in the form of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients and finished products. Currently Indian generic 
manufacturers are exporting their products to more than 150 countries worldwide. Dr 
Reddy’s Laboratories is the largest pharmaceutical company in India with a market 
share of 10%. In the year 2006-07, the company has witnessed a strong growth of 138% 
in its export business.'21 Thus, any attempt to restrict pharmaceutical exports from India 
may affect access to medicines in many developing and least developing countries. This
519 World Trade Organization General Council Meeting, ‘EC Intervention’ (3 February 2009) at 
http://www.iD-wateh.onz/files/WTO GENERAL COUNClL.doc.
520 William New, ‘Concerns Erupts Over WTO System and Medicines Shipments; TRIPS Talks 
Rekindling’, Intellectual Property Watch (3 February 2009) at http://www.ip-
watch.org/wcblog/2009/02/03/conccrn-crupts-ovcr-wto-systcm-and-mcdicines-shipments-trips-talks-
rekind line/
521 Padmashree Gehl Sampath, India 's Pharmaceutical Sector in 2008: Emerging Strategies and Global 
and Local Implications for Access to Medicines (United Kingdom Department for International 
Development: 2008), 22 at
http://w'W'W.genomiesnetwork.ac.uk7'media/lndia’s%20Pharmaeeutieal%20Sector0'<)20in%202008. pdf
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realisation has prompted the strong reaction by the group of developing countries who 
raised their concerns in the WTO General Council Meeting on the 3rd to 4th February 
2009. Furthermore, the attempt to block the export of generics from India is not a rare 
incident. The pattem shows that it is gradually becoming a systemic problem where 
pharmaceutical trade between developing countries is deliberately targeted.
Given the public health implications of generic drug seizure during transit, seventeen 
non-governmental organizations sent a letter to the Director General of World Health 
Origination (WHO) asking to break its silence on the issue of the Dutch seizure of 
generic medicines.522 The letter states that the detention of generic medicines by the 
Dutch authority is in conflict with the resolution of the World Health Assembly which 
states that ‘international negotiations on issues related to intellectual property rights and 
health should be coherent in their approaches to the promotion of public health’.523 The 
letter refers to specific examples of the seizure of generics by the Dutch authorities and 
considers it a larger problem of the enforcement strategy of the European Union. It also 
anticipates that the practice of detention poses great risks for WHO, UNITAID and the 
Global Funds which are engaged in the supply and shipment of drugs.
The fears raised in the letter were realised on February 27, 2009 when a UNITAID 
funded consignment of 49 kilograms of abacavir sulfate tablets was detained by the 
Dutch authorities claiming that it contained counterfeited goods. The drug was 
manufactured in India and it was destined for Nigeria as a UNITAID funded shipment. 
UNITAID immediately responded to the situation issuing its statement declaring that:
22 BUKO Pharma-Kampagne et.al ‘Re: Seizures of Medicines as Goods in Transit to Developing 
Countries’ (February 18, 2009) at http://vvwvv.keionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/WHO seizures 18feb.pdf 
Ibid. 3. Referring World Health Organization, ‘Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property’ (May 24, 2008) WHA61.21 at 
htt p: //apps. who. i nt / gb/eb wha/pd f _fi les/A61 /A61 R21-en.pdf
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The tablets are NOT counterfeit nor does this shipment infringe other form of 
intellectual property to our knowledge. They are medicines used in second-line 
treatment of HIV/AIDS manufactured by Indian company Aurobindo. These 
medicines have been prequalified by the World Health Organization and have 
received tentative approval by the United States Food and Drug Administration. 
UNITAID is gravely concerned for the patients who are waiting for these urgently 
needed medicines, which were destined for a programme implemented by the 
William J. Clinton Foundation on behalf of UNITAID in Nigeria. Interruption in 
HIV therapy is extremely dangerous and can cause resistance to the medicines. 
We therefore strongly urge the Dutch government to release the medicines so that 
they can reach patients as soon as possible. UNITAID is worried more generally 
about the trend that seems to have taken hold in recent months where generic 
medicines are stopped or confiscated while transiting through the Netherlands. 
Generic medicines are not counterfeit medicines. The Aurobindo abacavir tablets 
are legitimate products and there is no reason to raise concerns related to 
counterfeiting.524
This shipment was later released on March 17, 2009 but this incident again established 
the existence of systemic problems both in law and practice of the European Union’s 
border control measures.
In March 2009, WHO issued a statement, observing that ‘recent events related to the 
handling of medicines in transit and the potential consequences for the supply of
’24 UNITAID, ‘UNITAID Statement on Duteh Confiscation of Medicines Shipment’ (accessed on July 6, 
2009) http://wwvv.unitaid.eu/en/20090304156/News/UN ITA I D-statement-on-Dutch-confiscation-of- 
medicines-shipment.html
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medicines in developing countries are of major concern to the organization’.525 
However, this brief statement indeed failed to address the concerns which were raised in 
the letter addressed to the Director General of World Health Organization. After the 
detention of the UNITAID consignment, it is clear that the problem is not just confined 
to a few confiscations and it indeed requires a strong institutional response from the 
international health regulatory body.
Contrary to WHO’s response, the matter was thoroughly discussed in the forum of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). The non-governmental organisations that sent the 
letter to the World Health Organization also sent a letter to Pascal Lamy, Director 
General of WTO, stating their concerns about the border control measures of the 
European Union. It was requested in the letter that the Director General, according to 
Article 5 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement o f Disputes, should take an ex-officio action to explore the risks associated 
with the European Union’s Custom’s rules."26 Pascal Lamy responded to this letter on 
March 4, 2009 and recognised the importance and relevance of this issue. He mentioned 
that the matter was thoroughly discussed both at the WTO General Council Meeting on 
February 3, 2009 and at the TRIPS Council Meeting on March 3, 2009. However, he 
did not agree with the proposition that the Director General should intervene in the 
matter. He said that parties would resolve this matter bilaterally as they had indicated in 
the discussion.527
'"~5 World Health Organization, ‘Access to Medicines’ (March 13, 2009)
http://vvwvv.who.int/mediacentre/news/statcinents/2009/access-mcdicines-200903 13/cn/indcx.html 
"26 BUKO Pharma-Kampagnc et.al ‘Re: Seizures of Medicines as Goods in Transit to Developing 
Countries’ (February 18, 2009) at http://wwvv.keionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/WTQ seizures 1 8feb.pdf 
"27 Letter from Pascal Lamy, Director General World Trade Organization, (March 4, 2009) at 
http: /www.kcionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/dglamyresponse.pdf.
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However, the resolve to settle this matter bilaterally could not work as another Indian 
shipment of generic medicine was detained in Frankfurt, Germany on May 5, 2009. 
This time the drug, amoxicillin, was destined for the Republic of Vanuatu in the Pacific 
and its 3,047,000 tablets (250 mg), equivalent to 76,000 courses of treatment, were 
confiscated on the ground that the brand name of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Amoxil, had 
been infringed.52x This incident again created an uproar. India raised this issue at the 
World Trade Organization Council on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (The TRIPS Council). This time the Indian representative directly attacked the 
relevant regulation of the European Customs’ regulation and stated that:
Since seizures have been recurring at different ports and on different grounds, it is 
therefore clear that rather than just being a problem of implementing a law by 
Dutch Customs authorities, it is the EC regulation 1383/2003 itself that is 
problematic and can be misused, and has been misused, to create barriers to 
legitimate trade. We, once again, call upon the EC to urgently review the 
Regulation and the actions of the national authorities based on the Regulation, and 
bring them in conformity with the letter and spirit of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
rules based WTO system and the DMD on Public Health ... India attaches the 
highest importance to protection and enforcement of IPRs in accordance with the 
TRIPS Agreement. However, we do not see the Agreement as divorced from the 
Objectives and Principles set out in Art 7 and 8 of the Agreement. Enforcement of 
IPRs in disregard of these Objectives and Principles and efforts to enshrine new, 
maximalist TRIPS plus enforcement provisions in other multilateral forums will
r'2X Khomba Singh, ‘Row over Generic Drugs Intensifies After Seizure in Germany’ The Economic Times 
(8 June 2009) at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/Nevvs-Bv-Industrv/Uealthcare-- 
Biotech/Pharmaceuticals/Row-over-genenc-drugs-intensifies-after-seizure-in- 
Germany/articleshow/4629426.cms
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seriously undermine the delicate balance in the TRIPS Agreement and raise 
systemic issues, particularly for developing countries.529
The statement clearly shows that the matter of contention in this issue is the European 
Union regulation which empowers the detention of generic medicines in transit. India 
considers that such measures are clearly built against the spirit of the TRIPS Agreement 
1994 and should be withdrawn by the European Union. By contrast, the European 
Union maintains that its relevant regulations are consistent with its obligations under the 
international law and that its member states can exercise detention powers on transit 
goods. It is worth considering the legality of these measures in the light of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 and the jurisprudence of European Court of Justice.
B. EC Border Measures Against Transit Generic Drugs
The detention of generic medicines in transit through the European Union is based on 
the Council o f the European Union Regulation No. (EC) 1383/2003 o f 22 July 2003 
(European Union).530 This regulation empowers the national Customs authorities to take 
action against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and a 
community-wide uniform procedure is devised in this regard. It was not the first time 
that such measures were introduced in the European Union.531 This regulation was
529 World Trade Organization Council on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (The 
TRIPS Council) (8 June 2009) at h ttp: // w \v w. i p - w a t c h. o r g/ w e b 1 og/wp-
content, uploads/2009/06/intcrvcntion-bv-india-scizure-of-gcncric-drug-consignments-at-cc-ports.pdf 
x3<) Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 o f 22 July 2003 concerning customs action against goods 
suspected o f infringing certain intellectual property’ rights and the measures to be taken against goods 
found to have infringed such rights [2003] OJ L 196/7 at http://cur- 
lex.europa.eu/ LexU riServ/site/en/oi/2003/1 196/1 19620030802en00070014.pdf
x31 Earlier in 1994, the Council of European Union had adopted its first regulation on the border measures 
concerning pirated and counterfeited goods Council Regulation (EC) No 3295/94 o f 22 December 1994
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subsequently replaced with a more comprehensive regime which provides Customs’ 
seizure of goods infringing intellectual property rights such as trademarks, copyrights, 
patents, geographical indications, designs, plant variety rights, and supplementary 
protection certificates. 532 Rights-holders, exclusive licensees and their representatives 
are entitled to invoke the processes of confiscation. In addition, Customs authorities 
may ex officio suspend the release of the goods even before a formal request is made by 
the right-holder. 533
Customs authorities are entrusted with extensive powers to suspend and detain the 
goods in transit which are not primarily destined for any member state of the European 
Union. These powers are even applicable when goods are bound for Customs free 
zones/ 34 These powers were used by the Dutch and German Customs authorities when 
consignments of generic drugs were detained. It is pertinent to note that over the last 
few years, the scope and implementation of practices related to these regulations have 
gradually evolved in the European Union. Relying upon the considerable body of 
European case law on the detention of goods in transit, I will argue that the detention of 
generic medicines was unjustified under the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice.
laying down measures to prohibit the release for free circulation, export, re-export or entry fo r  a 
suspensive procedure o f counterfeit and pirated goods [December 30, 1994] OJ L 341 , at http://eur- 
lex.curona.eu/LcxUriScrv/LcxUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994R3295:EN:llTML
532 Article 2 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 o f  22 July 2003 concerning customs action 
against goods suspected o f infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be taken 
against goods found to have infringed such rights [2003] OJ L 196/7 at http:/7eur- 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oi/2003/1 196/1 19620030802en00070014.pdf
533 Ibid. Article 4.
x34 Ibid. See Article 1 for subject matter and scope.
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In Commission v. France5?\  a case was filed by the European Commission alleging an 
infringement action against France on the basis that a domestic law enabled French 
Custom authorities to intervene when a product was transported through France which 
could infringe a design right in France. This was notwithstanding the fact that no such 
right was infringed both in the country of origin and the country of destination. The ECJ 
held that the French Republic had violated Article 28 (formerly Article 30) of the EC 
Treaty by providing a right for the Customs authorities to retain goods in transit via 
France which had been legally manufactured in Spain and were destined for another 
member state where they could equally be legally offered for sale. The court rejected 
the plea that those goods would infringe a right-holder’s design rights under French law 
and declared that it was immaterial in the facts of the case.
In the second case, in Administration des douanes v. Riog/ass SA, the issue was 
regarding a shipment from a member state (Spain) to a non-member state (Poland-was 
not a part of EU at that time) through another member state (France). The goods were 
seized by the French Customs authorities for infringement of domestic trademarks and 
the case was referred to the European Court of Justice with the following question:
Is Article 30 of the Treaty, now Article 28 EC, to be interpreted as meaning that it 
precludes the implementation ... of procedures for detention by the customs 
authorities of goods lawfully manufactured in a Member State of the European 
Community which are intended, following their transit through French territory, to 
be placed on the market in a non-member country, in the present case, Poland?’36
’ ’ Commission v France Case C-23/99 (26 September 2000)
636 Administration des douanes et droits indirects v Rioglass SA, Transremar SL Case C-l 15/02 (23 
October 2003).
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The court held that: ‘a measure of detention under customs control, such as that in issue
in the main proceedings, cannot be justified on the ground of protection of industrial 
and commercial property within the meaning of Article 30 EC’.537
The final case which is important for our analysis here is Montex v. Diesel which was 
decided in 2006. The European Court of Justice held that trademark ownership in the 
country of transit did not allow any interference with the transit procedure unless the 
‘goods are subject to the act of a third party while they are placed under the external 
transit procedure which necessarily entails their being put on the market in the Member 
State of transit’.538 The court also clarified that the risk of diversion to the transit market 
must be established and the risk that ‘they could theoretically be marketed 
fraudulently” 34 is insufficient to support the trademark owner’s application under the 
border control regulations. Therefore, ‘every external transit of goods bearing the 
(protected) sign’540 should not be automatically considered as a relevant infringement 
under the border control regulation. The burden of proof that there is a sufficient risk of 
fraudulent diversion to the transit market lies on the part of the right-holder, ‘by 
establishing either the existence of a release for free circulation in a Member State in 
which the (right) is protected, or of another act necessarily entailing their being put on 
the market in such a Member State’.541 The court concluded ‘that Article 5( 1) and (3) of 
Directive 89/104 is to be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a trade mark can 
prohibit the transit through a Member State in which that mark is protected (the Federal
537 Administration des douanes et droits indirects v Rioglass SA, Transremar SL Case C -1 15/02 (23 
October 2003).
538 Ibid. Paragraph 23.
5' 9 Ibid. Paragraph 24.
540 Ibid. Paragraph 25.
541 Ibid. Paragraph 26.
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Republic o f Germany in the present case) o f goods bearing the trade mark and placed 
under the external transit procedure, whose destination is another Member State where 
the mark is not so protected (Ireland in the present case), only i f  those goods are subject 
to the act o f a third party while they are placed under the external transit procedure 
which necessarily entails their being put on the market in that Member State o f 
transit’ . ' '42
The outcome o f the case is very clear that transit goods do not constitute infringement 
when there is no risk o f diversion and the Customs authorities’ powers to detain such 
goods are extremely limited.
The losartan potassium case, and the legality o f Customs authorities’ detention, can be 
evaluated in light o f such precedents. As mentioned earlier, the medicine is not patented 
in either India or Brazil. A review o f the case law suggests that the powers o f Customs 
authorities are limited and exceptional regarding the detention o f transit goods. The first 
two cases suggest that the detention o f transit goods on the basis o f border regulations 
cannot be even justified when goods are destined for internal markets. Subsequent cases 
provide the criteria suggesting when border regulations can be used to detain goods 
which are destined for non-member states. The only valid reason for the intervention o f 
Customs authorities is the risk o f diversion and even that risk is required to be fu lly 
established by the right-holder. In the losartan potassium case, no evidence was 
provided which could reveal the apprehension o f diversion to the European market. In 
the absence o f any evidence, the detention o f the shipment is an act o f transgression 
against the powers provided by the European Union directive, and the case law o f the 
European Court o f Justice.
542 Ibid.
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Although the cases mentioned earlier mainly deal with trademark and design 
infringements, they can be fully contextualized in the cases of patent infringements. The 
European Court of Justice has adopted specific subject matter approach in this regard to 
determine whether an act of importation, direct or transit, would affect the entitlements 
of the right-holder or not. A survey of European Union border control measures and its 
analysis in the light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice clearly 
establishes that the seizure of generic drugs by the Dutch and German authorities does 
not fit within the framework of the Community’s legal and regulatory framework. 
Though the European Union’s border control regulation provides for the right of 
detention of goods in transit in case of infringement of intellectual property rights, these 
provisions were very narrowly interpreted by the highest court of the European Union. 
Customs authorities are repeatedly informed to refrain from such seizure unless there 
are valid apprehensions of diversion in the Community’s internal market. Such 
apprehensions have never been communicated with regard to consignments of generic 
medicines, and their seizure therefore lacks any valid legal ground.
C. EC Border Control Measures and TRIPS Agreement 1994
Regulation No. (EC) 1383/2003 o f 22 July 2003 (European Union) can also be analysed 
from the perspective of international trade law to determine the validity of detention 
actions by the Customs authorities. The TRIPS Agreement 1994 provides a 
comprehensive framework of intellectual property norms and related enforcement 
measures. In its statement at the World Trade Organization Council on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (The TRIPS Council) on June 2009, India 
categorically stated that the European Union’s border control law was against the spirit 
of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. It was stated that:
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EC has sought to justify the action of customs authorities to control goods in 
transit suspected of infringing IPRs as a means to stop “traffic of potentially 
dangerous products, such as fake medicines, even when the shipments were 
destined for any country”. ... We wish to remind the EC that the concept of 
“territoriality” is a key stone in the edifice of the TRIPS Agreement and a widely 
understood and accepted principle. In our view, sovereign functions of the country 
of destination should be exercised by the country itself and other countries may 
assist in enforcement of their law, if requested. The seizures run counter to the 
spirit of the TRIPS Agreement and the resolution 2002/31 of the Commission on 
Human Rights on the right to enjoy the highest standards of physical and mental 
health ... It is ironical that while on the one hand WTO has taken steps to promote 
access to affordable medicines and remove obstacles to proper use of TRIPS 
flexibilities, on the other hand some Members seek to negate the same by seizing 
drug consignments in transit and creating barriers to legitimate trade.54'
A comparison of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and Regulation No. (EC) 1383/2003 o f 22 
July 2003 (European Union) reveals that the European Union has adopted a so-called 
‘TRIPS plus’ approach.
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 specifically deals with the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. It is pertinent to note that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 is the 
first multilateral agreement which contains detailed enforcement provisions ranging 
from border measures to infringement remedies. Additionally, Part III contains 
provisions on provisional measures, administrative proceedings and criminal sanctions
>4’ World Trade Organization Council on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (The 
TRIPS Council) (8 June 2009) at http://vvww.ip-watch,oru/weblou/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/intervention-bv-india-se izure-of-generic-drug-consignmcnts-at-ec-ports.pdf
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for certain severe infringement matters. For the purpose of the issue currently under 
discussion, Section 4 of Part III is directly relevant which deals with special 
requirements related to border measures.'44 The general obligation regarding certain 
subject matters of intellectual property rights is stated as follows:
Members shall, in conformity with the provisions set out below, adopt 
procedures to enable a right holder, who has valid grounds for suspecting that the 
importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods may take place, to 
lodge an application in writing with competent authorities, administrative or 
judicial, for the suspension by the customs authorities of the release into free 
circulation of such goods.'4'
With regards to other forms of intellectual property rights such as patents, Article 51 of 
the TRIPS Agreement 1994 permits member states to extend border measures to such an 
area provided that the requirements of Section 4 are adequately met. This is what the 
European Union has precisely done in its Regulation No. (EC) 1383/2003 o f 22 July 
2003 (European Union) which provides the application of border measures in the case 
of almost all forms of intellectual property rights. These obligations would therefore be 
non-compliant with the Treaty obligations.
Article 52 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 obliges member states to require from the 
right-holder adequate evidence to the satisfaction of competent authorities under the law 
of the country of importation, and establish that there is a prima facie infringement case 
of relevant intellectual property rights. Thus, in the case of Regulation No. (EC) 
1383/2003 o f 22 July 2003 (European Union), it should be an obligation on the part of
' 44 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property> Rights (The TRIPS Agreement 1994) at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e. trips e/t a»m4 e.htm#Footnotel 3 
545 Ibid. Article 51, First Paragraph.
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the right-holder to demonstrate a prima facie case of infringement based upon the law of 
the country of importation. In the context of the losartan potassium case, the crucial 
question is about the identification of the country of importation. There are two possible 
interpretations. First, the country of importation is Brazil as the shipment was destined 
for it and Brazilian law should be applied to determine the issue of infringement. 
However, an alternative interpretation may suggest that the country of importation in 
this case is the country of transit i.e. the Netherlands, and the patent holder should 
establish a prima facie case on the basis of Dutch law. There is nothing in the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 and the jurisprudence of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body which can 
directly help us in this regard. The Oxford English Dictionary defines importation as 
The bringing in of goods or merchandise from a foreign country’.546 This literal meaning 
is perhaps not very useful in the context of the current dispute.
There are additional problems of compliance in the Regulation No. (EC) 1383/2003 of 
22 July 2003 (European Union). Article 53 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 provides 
that the relevant authorities shall have powers to demand security from the right-holder 
when acting on his request. This is an important safeguard which helps the defendant. 
However, the European Union’s border regulation fails to incorporate this mandatory 
requirement of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and merely requires a written undertaking 
from the right-holder.547 Likewise Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 requires that
M<’ Oxford English Dictionary Online Version at
http:/7dictionarv.oed.com/cgi/entry/50113213?singlc= 1 &qucry jypc=word&query word==importation&firs 
t=l&max to show -10.
M Article 6 (1) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003 concerning customs action 
against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be taken 
against goods found to have infringed such rights, Official Journal o f the European Union, L 196/7 
(August 2, 2003) at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu LexU riServ/site/en/oi/2003/1 196/1 19620030802en00070014.pdf
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the destruction of infringing goods must be in accordance with the details mentioned in 
Article 46 of TRIPS Agreement 1994. Thus, before any destruction is mandated, a 
positive finding should be established based upon the evidence before the judicial 
authorities. The border control regulation of the European Union once again fails on this 
account and a direct and simplified destruction procedure is provided in Regulation No. 
(EC) 1383/2003 o f 22 July 2003 (European Union).548 Based upon this provision, Dr 
Reddy’s Laboratories had been served a notice by the lawyers of the patent holder to 
extend consent for the destruction of generic drugs.
Beyond the substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, there are additional 
arguments which suggest that several aspects of the Regulation No. (EC) 1383/2003 o f 
22 July 2003 (European Union) do not comply with the letter and spirit of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994. The seizure of generic medicine in transit is apparently against the 
objectives of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha 
Declaration 2001) as it was stated in the Declaration that WTO members:
[Ajgree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members 
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ 
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all.549
Any attempt to apply border measures in a way which discourages the supply of generic 
medicines to the developing countries clearly violates the spirit of the Doha Declaration
548 Ibid. Article 11.
549 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc WT/M1N(01 )/DEC/2 (14 
November 2001) at http://\vww. wto.org/ermlish/thewto e/minist e/min01 e/mindecl trips e.htrn
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on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration 2001). India has 
assumed a correct position at different multilateral forums to agitate for the detention of 
its generic exports and in this regard it can rely upon the existing legal and regulatory 
framework. There are apparently good prospects for India to contest this matter in the 
World Trade Organization on the basis of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and the relevant 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice.
IV. Conclusion
The enforcement of intellectual property rights is prominent on the agenda of 
industrialised countries and a strong push for the adoption of higher enforcement norms 
is evident from different multilateral and bilateral initiatives. Developing countries such 
as India have a range of policy options to address intellectual property enforcement 
within the framework of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. The crucial aspect is the 
implementation and practical utilisation of the safeguards which are permitted under the 
existing laws. Most of the enforcement issues are domestic policy matters and countries 
can adopt innovative measures to ensure that intellectual property enforcement should 
not affect public access to essential medicines. The Tarceva case discussed in this 
chapter demonstrates how the legal system can be equipped with the public policy 
objectives within the limits of country’s international obligations. The matter of 
remedies and injunctive relief largely depends upon the factual matrix of a case and 
courts should be empowered to interpret the law in the best public interest.
The position of India has been reinforced by emerging trends in other forums. Article 45 
of the World Intellectual Property Organization Development Agenda has emphasised 
the need To approach intellectual property enforcement in the context of broader 
societal interests and especially development-oriented concerns, with a view that The 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
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promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations’, in accordance with Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement’. Such a 
statement would allow nation states considerable flexibility in devising enforcement 
regimes, which are appropriate to a nation’s level of development. Cross-border 
intellectual property enforcement, however, offers complex challenges as many 
countries have adopted laws and regulations which go beyond the standards of the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994.
It is also important to note that consistency in Indian policy is an important pre-requisite 
for resisting the onslaught of a new enforcement offensive. India is currently negotiating 
a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union.”0 Article 2 (1) of the draft 
FTA indicates that This chapter shall complement and further specify the rights and 
obligations between the Parties beyond those under the TRIPS Agreement and other 
international treaties in the field of intellectual property to which they are parties’.’51 
The European Union has proposed many TRIPS-plus provisions in the draft text which 
is still under negotiations between the two countries. On the issue of enforcement and 
border measures, Professor Carlos Correa insightfully observes that Customs authorities 
lack the technical capacity to determine complex matters such as the scope of patent 
claims, and infringement:
The proposed expansion of border measures much beyond what is required under
the TRIPS Agreement would make such measures applicable not only to the
Directorate General of Trade-European Commission, ‘EU-India FTA Negotiations: Latest Text on 
Goods, SPS and IPR’ (February 24, 2009) Trade C3/AG/pg-D (2009) 1855 at 
http://bilaterals.org/1MG/pdf/EU-lndia-Texts Goods SPS 1 PR teb2009.pdf 
551 Ibid.
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importation but also to the exportation of goods and to goods in transit. The 
seizure by European custom authorities of generic medicines in transit through 
European territory illustrates about the possible implications on legitimate trade of 
the broad application of border measures. This case not only shows the problems 
posed by the application of IPRs to goods merely in transit (which may constitute 
a violation of article V of GATT) but also the inadequateness of applying, as 
proposed by the EU, border measures to patent infringements. 552
Though these proposals have not yet been endorsed by India, it is expected that 
substantial amendments will be forwarded by the Indian government in this regard 
although a cautious approach should be advocated at the very outset.
^ Carlos M. Correa, Negotiation o f a Free Trade Agreement European Union-lndia: Will India Accept
TRIPS-Plus Protection? (Berlin, Germany: Oxfam Germany, June 2009) 12 at 
http://www.oxlam.de/download/correa eu india fta.pdf
227
Chapter 6
Equitable Licensing and Publicly Funded Research
I. Introduction
On the 24th June 1994, the antiretroviral drug stavudine -  which has the brand name 
Zerit -  was approved by the U.S. Food and Drag Administration (FDA)/ "' Despite the 
fact that the drug was highly useful, and recommended for HIV/AIDS patients in South 
Africa, Yale University only agreed that stavudine would not be patented in South 
Africa, after extensive lobbying and public controversy.
The story of the development of stavudine dates back to 1964 when Dr Jerome Horwitz 
of the Michigan Cancer Foundation synthesised a group of compounds called 
dideoxythymidines which included AZT, ddc, ddl and d4T.554 Though these compounds 
could not be successfully tested for the treatment of cancer, their discovery laid the 
foundation for HIV/AIDS treatment.'''’" In the late 1980s, Dr Tai-Shun Lin and Dr 
William Prusoff of Yale University developed the drug stavudine, based upon the d4T 
compound and this drug was licensed to Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS).556 This research 
was jointly funded by the NIH and Bristol-Myers Squibb secured an exclusive license 
for the product on January 12, 1988.""7 Yale University secured an initial patent in 1990.
Susa Coffey, ‘Stavudine (Zerit)’, (October 31,2006) HIVInSite at 
http://vvwvv.hivinsite.org/InSitc?page=ar-01-04
554 Steven Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics o f Knowledge (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996).
555 Ibid. 192.
x"6 Yale University, ‘Yale Innovators: Faculty Innovators’ (accessed on June 28, 2009) at 
http://innovators.vale.edu/facultv-prusoff.asp
""7 Ashley J. Stevens, ‘Valuation and Licensing in Global Health’ in Anatole Krattiger et al (eds),
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Acquiring rights to file further patents under a licensing agreement, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb elected to file patents of stavudine in a number of countries including South 
Africa, Mexico and Egypt.
In 2000, Toby Kasper, a volunteer working with the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) 
started compiling a list of essential medicines needed for the treatment of F1IV/AIDS 
patients in South Africa. Given the exorbitant prices of drugs such as stavudine, MSF 
started campaigning for the availability of generic versions of antiretroviral drugs. In 
2001, the Indian drug manufacturer Cipla, offered to supply generic versions of several 
antiretroviral drugs including stavudine at a considerably lower price but its request to 
receive a voluntary manufacturing license was rejected by the patent holders.558
In Yale University a first year law student, Amy Kapczynski, led a campaign for the 
inventor and initial patent holder of stavudine, Yale University, to play its role in 
allowing generic competition in South Africa. MSF also wrote to Yale University 
asking if it:
would consider the importation of generic versions of stavudine for use in 
providing treatment free of charge to people with HIV/AIDS unable to afford 
treatment an infringement of your intellectual property rights ... issue a voluntary 
license to allow the importation and use of generic stavudine in South Africa.554
Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook o f  Best Practices 
Volume 1 (Oxford: Centre for the Management of Intellectual Property in Health Research and 
Development, Oxford Centre for Innovation, 2007), 93 at
http;/Vvvw vv.iphandbook.org/handbook/resourccs/Publications/links/ipHandbook%20Volumc%201 .pdf 
558 Ibid.
554 Letter from Eric Goemaere, Representative of Medecins Sans Frontieres-South Africa, to Jon 
Söderström, Managing Director, Office of Cooperative Research, Yale University (Mar. 9, 2001).
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After Yale University responded negatively to this request, Amy Kapczynski and her 
colleagues mobilised the students and faculty by gathering more than 600 signatures 
asking for a decisive university action. After massive media attention and public 
comments, Bristol-Myers Squibb finally announced on the 14th March 2001 that it 
would not enforce its stavudine patent in South Africa. Bristoi-Myers Squibb further 
announced the reduction of the price of its treatment in South Africa and eventually 
signed a non-suit agreement with Aspen Pharmaceuticals, South Africa’s generic 
manufacturer.560
The Zerit (stavudine) controversy highlighted the largely neglected problem of 
university patenting and related practices in the United States. Initial research and 
development in the pharmaceutical sector is quite often conducted with the funding and 
support of public sector grants.561 These research outputs are then licensed to private 
companies which develop them further before a commercial product is launched. In the 
life cycle of invention, the role of public sector entities such as universities, hospitals, 
and research institutes is very crucial. Like stavudine, several drugs were initially 
developed -  wholly or partially -  with public sector funding, but ended up in private 
ownership by commercial pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies.562 Many studies
560 Amy Kapczynski et al, ‘Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for 
University Innovation’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1031-1114.
561 lain M. Cockburn and Rebecca M. Henderson, ‘Publicly Funded Science and the Productivity of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry’ in A. Jaffe, J. Lemer and S. Stern (Eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).
562 For further details and examples: Dave A. C'hokshi, ‘Improving Access to Medicines in Poor 
Countries: The Role of Universities’ (June 2006) 3(6) PLoS Medicine 0723-0726 at 
http://www.plosmedicine.oru/article/info%3Adoi%2F 10.1371 %2Fiournal.pmed.0030136. Also see: Dave 
A. Chokshi and Rahul Rajkumar, ‘Leveraging University Research to Advance Global Health’ (October 
2007) 298(16) The Journal o f the American Medical Association 1934-1936 at http://jama.ama-
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have been recently conducted examining the role of universities amidst the global crisis 
of access to medicines.
The dispute over Zerit (stavudine) is not the only case where publicly funded research 
has been the subject of larger political debate. Commentators have cited several other 
examples where crucial medicines and other health technologies were developed with 
public sector funding but subsequently transferred to private companies through 
exclusive licenses.563 The use of licenses for technology transfer and commercialisation 
of academic research is a widely recognised and popular phenomenon. However, the 
terms of licenses are critical to determine the scope of exclusivity and products’ 
accessibility. The licensing regime developed in the United States after the enactment of 
the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act (the LBayh-Dole Act) 1980 
(US) has led to a range of problems. In the pharmaceutical sector, exclusive licenses 
concluded between academic and research institutions and drug companies created 
access barriers beyond the shores of the United States.564 After securing licences from 
universities in United States, drug companies secured patents in many developing 
countries for medicines which were badly needed there.
Against this backdrop, the role of academic patents and licences of publicly funded 
research has come under scrutiny and questions have been raised about the ramifications 
of universities’ licensing policies. Commentators have raised some basic questions 
about the nature of academic research and its direction."'65 This debate is informed by
assn.org/cgi/rcprint/298/16/1934
663 Amy Kapczynski et al, ‘Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for 
University Innovation’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1031-1114.
Ml4 University and Smalt Business Patent Procedures Act (the ‘Bayh-Dole Act) 1980 (US) 35 
U.S.C. § 200-212.
Mo Amy Kapczynski et al, ‘Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for
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some key themes which are used to reflect upon the limitations of the existing licensing 
regime. These themes revolve around the concepts of ‘public goods’, the ‘commons’ 
and ‘social production’ and they help in shaping the alternative ideas of licensing best 
practices and appropriate models. It is presumed that effective intellectual property 
management through publicly-minded licensing can help in addressing the problem of 
access to medicines. Licensing tools can be innovatively reshaped in the form of 
socially responsible licences, equitable access licences, patent pools and a wide array of 
open source techniques. I have explored these themes in this chapter with the aim to see 
how existing licensing practices can be transformed to achieve the objective of equitable 
access.
Professor Amartya Sen’s conception of poverty and capability deprivation helps us in 
contextualising the constraints of conveying the benefits of publicly funded research to 
poor patients. He argues that poverty and capability deprivation may lead to social 
exclusion. In the case of health care, he writes that:
The exclusion of large sections of the population from public health services 
provided by the State has been a matter of considerable discussion in recent years, 
since it is an extensive problem in many Asian countries. To this some authors 
have proposed adding the international exclusion involved in the unavailability of 
modem health care in the poorer regions, often because of high medicinal cost 
(for example, for the medical care of AIDS patients) . 566
University Innovation’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Technology> Law Journal 1031-1114.
566 Amartya Sen, Soeial exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny (Asian Development Bank Social 
Development Papers No. 1: June 2000) 43 at
http://vvwvv.adb.org/documents/books/social exclusion/social exclusion.pdf
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The intellectual property policies of research organisations and universities play an 
important role in widening the gap of social exclusion. Equitable licensing schemes can 
provide a satisfactory solution to this problem to reduce the incidence of social 
exclusion.
Part II of this chapter deals with academic innovations and open licensing strategies. 
After explaining the current licensing practices of academic institutions, I have explored 
alternative approaches which are mainly focused on adopting carefully crafted 
safeguard measures. The proposed Indian law dealing with patents on publicly funded 
research is also discussed in this part. Part III specifically deals with the Open source 
drug discovery model. Various theoretical perspectives and practical nuances of open 
source are discussed in this section before exploring the prospects for this model for 
India. Part IV considers the patent pools proposal and the initiatives of UNITAID and 
GlaxoSmithKline are analysed to determine their relevance in the Indian context.
After surveying various licensing regimes and the experience of academic licences in 
the United States, it is concluded here that the access to medicines problem in 
developing countries can be partially dealt with through public minded licensing 
practices. Universities and academic institutions can proactively perform their role 
through innovative means and the existing regulatory framework can also be used in 
this regard. The chapter further concludes that a one-size-fit-for-all approach picked up 
by the Indian government would not help in achieving the stated objectives of 
accessibility and technology transfer. A comparison of different models shows that 
India can benefit substantially from an open source regime instead of following a patent 
based framework.
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II. Academic Innovations and Open Licensing Strategies
A. The Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (U S fbl
In the United States, the role of universities in respect of innovation has been shaped by 
a series of policy interventions and transformations in the marketplace. 568 Historically, 
universities in the United States were seen as institutions deeply rooted in the traditions 
of social values and public interest. Grounded in the tradition of academic freedom, the 
creative and academic atmosphere in universities was always aimed at optimising the 
public benefit. It was widely believed that universities had their social responsibility 
towards the community and the academy should play that role to enhance the social 
well-being of the masses. This public mission of universities was defined in terms of 
promoting the common good through academic policies and practices. 569 The initial 
scientific research was heavily influenced by the notion of ‘communalism’, in which 
scientific innovation was treated as a common good, and intellectual property rights 
were waived. ' '70 The knowledge so created should be then freely communicated and 
distributed.
567 University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act (the 'Bayh-Dole Act) 1980 (US) 35 
U.S.C. § 200-212 codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211,301-307 (1994).
568 David C. Mowery et al, Ivory’ Tower and Industrial Innovation: University-Industry Technology 
Transfer Before and After the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States (California: Stanford University Press, 
2004).
569 American Association of University Professors ‘1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom 
and Tenure’ (1940) at http://vvww.aaup.org/NR rdonlyres/EBB 1B330-33D3-4A51-B534- 
CEE0C7A90DAB. 0/1940StatcmcntofPrinciplcsonAcademicFrcedomandTenurc.pdf. The statement 
maintains that: ‘Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the 
interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the 
free search for truth and its free exposition.’
" 0 Robert Merton identified four norms underpinning the operation of the scientific community:
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Throughout this period, public funding played a pivotal role in determining the scope 
and direction of universities research priorities. According to Professor Rebecca 
Eisenberg of the University of Michigan Law School, universities in this era were not 
directed to adopt a uniform and strict ownership regime in the form of a coherent patent 
policy, and campuses were given freedom to determine the best mode of dissemination 
and transfer of technology. She notes that:
Congress did not follow the suggestion of the Attorney General to adopt a 
uniform policy vesting ownership of all federally sponsored research discoveries 
in the government, although over the years it did enact such a policy on a more 
limited basis in a number of statutes applicable to particular programs or agencies. 
Agencies not bound by such explicit statutes had considerable discretion to 
choose whatever patent policy best suited their missions. Not surprisingly, there 
was considerable variation in the policies adopted by the different agencies. 5 1 
(Footnotes omitted)
However, this policy was fundamentally changed with the promulgation of two laws in 
the United States aimed at streamlining the intellectual property management of
Communalism, Univcrsalism, Disinterestedness, and Organized Scepticism. Robert K. Merton, The 
Sociology o f Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1979). Sec also Piotr Sztompka, ‘Trust in Science: Robert K. Merton’s Inspirations’ (2007) 7 (2) 
Journal o f Classical Sociology 211 -220 at http://ics.sattepub.eom/cui/content/abstract/7/2/211. Professor 
Arti Rai and Professor Eisenberg later applied these norms while critiquing on Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 
(US). For details: Katherine J. Strandurg, ‘Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology 
Transfer’ in Gary D. Libccap (ed.), Advances in the Study o f Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic 
Growth: University Entrepreneurship and Technology Transfer Volume 16 (Bingley, UK: Emerald 
Group Publishing, 2005) 103.
1 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in 
Government-Sponsored Research’ (1996) 82 Virginia Law Review 1663-1727 at 1676.
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publicly funded innovations and transfer of technology. The statutes include the 
Stevenson- Wydler Technology Innovation Act o f 1980 (US)572 and the Bayh-Dole Act o f 
1980 {US).573
Birch Bayh, one of the sponsors of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (US) has reflected upon 
the significance of the legislation: This legislation combined the ingenuity and 
innovation from our university laboratories with the entrepreneurial skills of America’s 
small businesses.’574 He contends that ‘this combination created the incentive necessary 
for private investment to invest in bringing new ideas to the marketplace’.77''
A wealth of literature is now available on the implications of Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 
(US) covering issues from technology transfer to the effect of this law on universities 
patents profile and income generation.576 Researchers have also analysed the actual 
implications of this law in terms of patenting activity in the pre- and post-legislation era, 
and how the law has changed the dynamics of learning, innovation and research in 
United States universities. An analysis along these lines does not lie within the scope of 
this section and I refrain from engaging in this discussion.
5?" Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act o f 1980 codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 
(1994).
573 University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act (the ‘Bayh-Dole Act) 1980 (US) 35 
U.S.C. § 200-212 codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211,301-307 (1994).
574 Birch Bayh, ‘Statement to the National Institutes of Health’, The National Institutes of Health, 25 May 
2004 at www.oipc.unh.edu/Bayhstatement.pdf
575 Ibid.
576 David C. Mowery et al, ‘The Growth of Patenting and Licensing By U.S. Universities: An Assessment 
of The Effects of The Bayh-Dole Act Of 1980' (January 2001) 30( 1) Research Policy 99-1 19. Also see: 
Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine’ 
(Winter/Spring 2003) 66 Law and Contemporary> Problems 289-314.
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Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the Bayh-Dole Act o f  1980 (US) changed 
the presumption of ownership of government funded inventions. This shift in the 
presumption is in favour of the recipient of the funding unless a contrary intention 
arises. Since its enactment, the Bayh-Dole Act o f  1980 (US) has drastically changed the 
patenting practices of universities. Shortly after the implementation of the law, a 
manifold increase was reported in the number of patents secured by the universities. In 
1979, before the adoption of the law, universities secured merely 264 patents. This 
number grew almost ten times with 2,436 patents filed in 1997. A more than 12% 
increase was witnessed in the year 2000 when universities filed 8,534 patents. Likewise, 
massive patenting activity was noticed related to the National Institutes of Health 
funded inventions.'77
This increase in university patents on publicly funded inventions is not static and some 
recent studies show that the trend is now downward within the United States. The 
statistics about the large number of university patents are often misleading, as they tend 
to overstate the potential benefits of the Bayh-Dole Act o f  1980 (US). Despite this 
caveat, a significant impact of the Bayh-Dole Act o f  1980 (US) on university patents is 
undeniable. The Bayh-Dole factor coupled with the advent of biotechnology and several 
advancements in the area of chemistry contributed towards new modes of wealth 
creation and resource generation in United States universities.'7X Several new drugs were
' For different set of data and related analysis see: Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Bayh-Dole 
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine’ (2003) 66 (1) Law and Contemporary Problems 1-38 at 5 at 
http://papcrs.ssrn.com/sol3/papcrs.cfm7abstract id=348343 and Sheldon Krimsky ‘The Profit of 
Scientific Discovery and its Normative Implications’ (1999) 45 Chicago-Kent Law Review 15-30 at 
http://vvwvv.tufts.edu/~skrimsky/PDF/kent law.PDF
' s Nicola Baldini, ‘Implementing Bayh-Dole-Like Laws: Faculty Problems and Their Impact on 
University Patenting Activity, (2008) 38(8) Public Policy 1217-124 at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id -1 395680
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developed and successfully licensed to private companies which encouraged the 
adoption of royalty based licensing strategies. Technology transfer offices of 
universities had been established to facilitate licensing arrangements between 
universities and their private commercial partners/74
The Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) contains a march-in provision which allows the 
funding agency, on its own initiative or at the request of a third party, to effectively 
ignore the exclusivity of a patent awarded under the act and grant additional licenses to 
others. This right is limited and can only be exercised if the agency determines, after an 
investigation, that one of four criteria is met. The most important of these are a failure 
by the licensee to take ‘effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject 
invention’ or a failure to satisfy ‘health and safety needs’ of consumers.''*0
Though it looks a promising safeguard, in practice this right has never been successfully 
used581 in the history of the legislation. Indeed, all attempts to invoke the march-in right 
clause for public health purposes thus far, have failed. Three unsuccessful petitions have 
so far been filed with the NIH requesting the exercise of march-in rights on the ground
579 For the role of Technology transfer offices see: Terry A. Young, ‘Establishing a Technology Transfer 
Office’ in Anatole Krattiger et al (eds), Intellectual Property> Management in Health and Agricultural 
Innovation: A Handbook o f Best Practices Volume 1 (Oxford: Centre for the Management of Intellectual 
Property in Health Research and Development, Oxford Centre for Innovation, 2007), 93 at 
http://wwvv.iphandbook.org/handbook/resources/Publications/links/ipHandbook%20Voliimc%201 .pdf
580 Section 203 of Act of Dec. 12, 1980 (Commonly Known as Bayh-Dole Act o f  1980) codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211, 301-307 (1994).
’8I The negotiation history of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) reveals that march-in rights were once 
exercised by a government department prior to enactment of this law. David Halperin reports that march- 
in rights were exercised in respect of one of two patents held by MIT, which were not being effectively 
utilised. For details see: David Halperin, ‘The Bayh-Dole Act and March-ln Rights’, Essentia! Inventions, 
(May 2001) at http://www.essentialinventions.oru/leual/norvir/halpeiinmarchin2001 .pdf
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that the licensee had failed to achieve practical application of the subject invention. 
There is also a new petition under consideration in 2010.
In the first case, In Petition of Cell Pro, Inc, the NIH denied the petition of Cell Pro that 
The Johns Hopkins University should be directed to license the petitioner the patent 
necessary to continue its business.3*2 The petitioner argued that The Johns Hopkins 
University and Baxter Healthcare failed to take reasonable steps to commercialise 
certain patented stem cell technologies. NIH declared that The Johns Hopkins 
University had adequately licensed its technology which was sufficiently practiced by 
the licensee and that the exercise of the march-in right would have adverse effects on 
commercialisation of federally funded research.5X3
In the second case, In the Case o f Norvir, the NIH again rejected a petition of Essential 
Inventions to exercise march-in rights for patents owned by Abbott Laboratories related 
to the drug ritonavir, marketed under the trade name Norvir. This drug was used as an 
important antiretroviral and Abbott was marketing it at a considerably high price. 
Essential Inventions’ petition was also supported by the members of United States 
Congress. In dismissing the petition the NIH observed that:
Ritonavir has been on the market and available to patients with HIV/AIDS since 
1996, when it was introduced and sold under the trade name Norvir® as both a
3X2 National Institutes of Health-Office of the Director, 'Determination in the case of In Petition of 
Cel/Pro, Inc’ (1 August 1997) at
hnp://vveb.archivc.org/vveb/20070418135645/littp://vvwvv.nih.gov/icd/od/foia/cellpro/pdfs/foia cellpro39. 
pdf'.
3fv' National Institutes of Health-Office of the Director, 'Determination in the case of In Petition o f 
Cel I Pro, Inc' (1 August 1997) at
http:/7web.archive.org/vveb/20070418135645/http://www.nih.gov/icd/od/foia/cellpro/pdfs/foia cellpro39. 
pdf.
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standalone protease inhibitor and a booster to increase the effectiveness of 
protease inhibitors marketed by other companies. Thus, the invention has reached 
practical application because it is being utilized and has been made widely 
available for use by patients with HIV/AIDS for at least eight years ... 
Accordingly, this drug has reached practical application and met health or safety 
needs as required by the Bayh-Dole Act.'*4
On the question of the high price and consumers’ inability to afford this medicine, the 
NIH referred this matter to Congress and other government agencies empowered to 
consider these arguments.
For the third time, In the Case o f Xalatan, the NIH was petitioned to exercise a march- 
in right related to Pfizer’s glaucoma drug. The petitioner, Essential Inventions, asked 
that the NIH should adopt a policy of granting march-in licenses to patents when the 
patent owner charged significantly higher prices in the United States than they did in 
other high income countries. Citing its determinations in the earlier two cases, the NIH 
once again denied an exercise march-in right under the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) 
maintaining that price cannot be regulated through the extraordinary remedy of march- 
in.
In August 2010, Joseph M. Carik, Anita Hochendoner, and Anita Bova requested the 
Secretary of DHH to exercise Bayh-Dole march-in rights and grant an open license to 
use patents related to the manufacture of Fabrazyme® (agalsidase beta). The grounds 
for the request are that the patent owner and its exclusive licensee have harmed the
>><4 National Institutes of Health-Office of the Director, ‘In the Case of Norvir® Manufactured by Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc. (July 29, 2005) 5-6 at http://vvww.ott.nih.uov/policy/Mareh-in-norvir.pdf 
^  National Institutes of Health-Office of the Director, ‘In the case of Xalatan® Manufactured by Pfizer, 
Inc. (September 17, 2004) at http://ott.od.nih.gov/policy7March-in-xalatan.pdf
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public health by severely rationing the supply of agalsidase beta, the only approved 
therapeutic treatment for Fabry disease. Fabry disease (also known as Fabry’s disease, 
Anderson-Fabry disease, angiokeratoma corporis diffusum, and alpha-galactosidase A 
deficiency) is an X-linked recessive (inherited) lysosomal storage disease, which can 
cause a wide range of systemic symptoms. The petition states that:
The initial production of Fabrazyme® was sufficient to meet the needs of all 
patients in the United States. Flowever, in mid-2009, Genzyme decreased 
production as a result of a viral infection of their Allston, MA manufacturing 
plant. Further, in November 2009, Fabrazyme® was produced which contained 
contaminants. The FDA initiated action against Genzyme which resulted in a 
consent decree including $175 million dollars fines as profit disgorgement and 
oversight of the manufacture of Fabrazyme® for at least 7 years. Genzyme is only 
producing 30% of Fabrazyme estimated to meet the needs of patients. Current 
patients cannot have dosage increases, and no new patients being diagnosed are 
eligible to receive therapy. Although the most recent communication from 
Genzyme indicates that it expects to increase production by late 2011, there is no 
substantial guarantee that the projected date will be met.586
These cases demonstrate that safeguard provisions can face several practical limitations 
and their mere incorporation in the law or licensing document is not sufficient. NIH had 
construed the march-in provision very narrowly by giving much consideration to the 
commercialisation objective of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US). The fact that march-in 
rights have never been practised in the United States should, however, have been
Petition To Use Authority Under The Bayh-Dole Act To Promote Access To Fabryzymc® (Agalsidase 
Beta), An Invention Supported By And Licensed By The National Institutes Of Health Under Grant No. 
Dk-34045 at http://patentlawversite.com/files/Download/Fabrazvme Petition 5 O.doc
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construed in right context. The pharmaceutical market in the United States is very 
different from markets such as India and other developing countries. There might have 
not been very pressing cases of inaccessibility in the United States which can build up 
an appropriate case for march-in type interventions. The point is simple: that practical 
failure of the march-in clause should not become an argument to avoid the incorporation 
of this right in the statutes of other countries. A march-in right can achieve desirable 
policy goals with institutional support and political will.
Birch Bayh, one of the sponsors of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) has defended the 
refusal by the NIH to exercise march-in rights, arguing:
It would be the ultimate folly to march in and alleviate the problem addressed by 
the petition, availability of a drug to treat AIDS today, and in so doing dampen the 
ingenuity, entrepreneurial skills and incentives necessary to develop a permanent 
cure for AIDS, or for that matter the cure for other diseases that plague all too 
many American mothers, fathers, children and seniors today.587
However, in my view, these failed attempts to exercise march-in rights show the 
inherent limitations of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US). Despite the safeguard 
provisions and related flexibilities, the licensing practices could not be modified to 
protect public interest. It is troubling that one of the sponsors of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 
1980 (US) should be so hostile to the use of march-in rights.
There have been some unsuccessful attempts to ameliorate the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 
(US). In the United States, Senator Patrick J. Leahy introduced the Public Research in 
the Public Interest Act o f 2006 (US) on September 29, 2006 to ensure that inventions
587 Birch Bayh, ‘Statement to the National Institutes of Health’, the National Institutes of Health, 25 May 
2004, 6 vvww.orpc.unh.edu/ Bayhstatement. pdf
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developed at federally-funded institutions are available in certain developing countries 
at the lowest possible cost.588 Although this Bill never became law, the Bill is viewed as 
symbolic ot dissatisfaction with the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US), the workings of the 
National Institutes of Health, and limitations to access to publicly funded research. 
While introducing this Bill in the House, Senator Leahy observed that:
If passed, my bill would greatly lessen the cost burden of generic drugs in the 
developing world. It would achieve this by requiring federally funded research 
institutions to permit their inventions, such as drugs, vaccines, and innovative 
medical devises, to be provided inexpensively by generic companies distributing 
medical supplies to the developing world. Federally funded labs and research 
institutions have a vital role to play in meeting this goal ... It is time to ensure that 
public funds truly serve public purposes -  in this instance, delivering essential 
health care needs at minimal costs to American taxpayers, universities, and 
pharmaceutical companies.589
This Bill specifically would have required that universities adopt such licensing 
provisions to allow generic competition in developing countries to reduce prices.590 
Given the lack of bipartisan support and strong industry lobbying, this Bill will not be
588 The Senate of the United States, ‘Public Research in the Public Interest Act of2006-S4040 ’ ( 109,h 
Congress, 2d Session) at http://frwebgate. access, gpo. go v/c gi- 
bin/getdoc.cgi7dbname=T09 eong bills&dockUfsdOTOis.txt.pdf
589 Statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy: Public Research in the Public Interest Act Of 2006, (September 29, 
2006) at http://leahv.senate.gov/prcss/200609/092906c.html
59(1 The Senate of the United States, ‘'Public Research in the Public Interest Act of2006-S4040 ’ ( 109th
Congress, 2d Session) Section 5 at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.go vvegi - 
bin/getdoc.egi?dbname-109 eong bills&docid-f:s4040is.txt.pdf
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adopted in the foreseeable future and university licensing practices will continue to be 
governed by the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US).
In this context, universities and academic institutions are left with one option and that 
involves changing their own licensing practices. Professor Arti Rai and others have 
provided a list of safeguards which can serve the public interest and which universities 
should adhere to while entering into technology licensing agreements.591 They are of the 
view that licences negotiated within the framework of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) 
can also ensure that public interests are served. Under the notion of social responsibility 
and public interest, universities and academic institutions are considering options 
regarding humanitarian licensing.
B. Licensing University Technology
Since the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (US), universities have developed 
several breakthrough drugs for the treatment of emerging diseases and epidemics which 
were then licensed to pharmaceutical companies for commercial exploitation of 
technologies. In addition to stavudine discussed earlier, several key treatments were 
developed as a direct outcome of public funding which universities then licensed 
exclusively to private companies. The University of Minnesota licensed its patented 
drug, carbovir, to GlaxoSmithKline which was used to develop the antiretroviral drug, 
Ziagen."92 This drug was developed with NIH funding and its annual sales went up to 
US $800 million. The University of Minnesota secured 5 to 10% of sales revenue as
"9I Anthony D. So et al, i s  Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the US 
Experience’ (October 2008) 6 (10) Public Library o f Science Biology 2078-2084 at 2081.
592 Evelyn Cottle Raedler, ‘Chemical Cures’ University of Minnesota Alumni Association (November 13, 
2003) at http://vvww.alumni.umn.edu/Chemical__Cures.html
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royalty payments. Other examples include Duke University’s patent on enfuvirtide and 
Emory University’s patent on lamivudine.
A recent study shows that academic institutions in the United States still have a 
substantial share of total drug patents granted during the period of 1988 to 2005. During 
the research period, out of 1,947 patents on new drug applications, 96 were academic 
patents. Though lesser in number, most of these patents belong to the upstream category 
which is very crucial for further research and development. The study further shows that 
12 of 72 drugs with academic patents belong to HIV/AIDS drugs and the ratio of 
academic patents in the HIV/AIDS category is unusually high. The study concludes 
that:
The overall share of drugs approved between 1988 and 2005 on which universities 
own patents was relatively low -  7.7% -  and the share for new molecules was 
only slightly higher -  10.3%. However, universities own patents for nearly 1 in 5 
(19.2%) of the drugs that are arguably the most innovative -  new molecular 
entities that received “priority” approval by the FDA; this share has been basically 
stable since the late 1980s. In addition, universities own key patents on over one 
quarter of the HIV/AIDS drugs approved since 1988, which is particularly 
important given the potentially catastrophic impact of this disease in the 
developing world.''93
These findings are critical for two reasons. First, this study presents the most updated 
picture of academic patents and confirms the relevance of these patents to the access to 
medicine debate. Second, the study clearly establishes that academic patents can be 
leveraged to ensure accessibility of drugs in developing countries. Though the problem
y)' Bhaven N. Sampat, ‘Academic Patents and Access to Medicines in Developing Countries’ (2009) 99 
(1) American Journal o f Public Health 9-17 at 15 at http://www.aiph.onz/cgi/reprint/99/1/9
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of the research gap, according to this study, cannot be effectively dealt with university- 
level intervention, these institutions can definitely play a crucial role in improving 
access conditions.
Exclusive licensing and restricted access clause are common features of university 
license agreements. The ownership of these crucial patents by the universities has 
further aggravated the dismal state of access to essential medicines in developing 
countries. These technologies are quite often licensed to pharmaceutical companies, 
giving them full rights to determine the countries where they intend to file subsequent 
patents. The companies generally file strategic patents in many developing countries to 
minimise the risk of generic competition.
Over the years, a strong resentment and frustration has emerged regarding university 
licensing and patent policies. Commentators have started raising questions about the 
role which universities actually play through their licensees who restrict the access to 
essential products in the developing world.'",J The controversy about the role of Yale 
University regarding the Zerit (stavudine) patent triggered a thorough debate among 
academics and students and strong voices emerged calling for revisiting universities’ 
licensing policies and practices.
Indeed, the case of stavudine was merely a point of culmination as the debate had 
already started yielding some positive outcome in some American universities. The 
concept of socially responsible licensing first emerged in 2002 when Eva Harris, an 
Associate Professor at the School of Public Health, started negotiating a license related 
to dengue fever’s diagnosis technology with the University of California, Berkeley. This
Richard R. Nelson ‘Linkages Between the Market Economy and the Scientific Common’ in Keith E. 
Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman (eds) International Public Goods and Transfer o f Technology Under a 
Globalized Intellectual Property’ Regime (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 136.
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technology known as ImmunoSensor was believed to help greatly in reducing the 
burden of dengue fever, a leading cause of death in many developing countries. Acumen 
Fund, a non-profit global venture fund, agreed to invest in the development of this 
technology and they proposed a licence to the university which would allow them to use 
this technology free, or at cost, in developing countries. According to the arrangements, 
the university was allowed to earn future royalties from this technology by marketing it 
in developed countries. 595
This served as a starting point and many agreements were then concluded between the 
University of California, Berkeley and its partners, opening the door for free access for 
patients in developing countries. Josefma Coloma observes that:
SSI helped set the stage for this concept by developing an agreement with the UC 
Berkeley Office of Technology Licensing to obtain the right to market one of UC 
Berkeley’s patents “at cost” in the developing world. This was swiftly followed 
by several widely publicized agreements involving royalty-free licenses for 
developing countries’ use of products-including the Gates-funded project for 
artemisinin synthesis in Escherichia coli being conducted at UC Berkeley, the 
Institute for OneWorld Health, and Amyris Biotechnologies, and an agreement 
between UC Berkeley and Samoa for development of plant-derived 
pharmaceuticals. Importantly, a new movement for “socially responsible 
licensing” has been bom, led by UC Berkeley, Harvard University, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Yale University, University of Minnesota, and Columbia
Malceha Mohiuddin and Omer Imtiazuddin, ‘Socially Responsible Licensing: Models Partnerships for 
Underserved Markets’ (March 2007) Acumen Fund Concepts at 
http://www.acumenfund.oni/uploads/assets/documents/Acumen%20Fiind°/o20- 
%20Sociallv0/o20Responsible%20Licensing%20-%20Julv%202008 kYAIb8kF.pdf
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University, to share ideas on bringing access to technology and medical 
treatments to the developing world."'6
The concept of socially responsible licensing worked in certain cases but there is no 
evidence that it was practically adopted by the academic institutions as a norm and 
standard licensing practice."97
In 2007, top US universities and the Association of American Medical Colleges issued 
guidelines for responsible licensing policy guidelines. These guidelines, entitled ‘In the 
Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology’"9*, 
consider various aspects of technology licensing and its social impacts. The points 
include universities’ right to retain the power to practice licensed technology; the 
appropriate scope of exclusive licensing; attempts to minimise the risk of licensing 
future improvements; avoiding conflict of interest, access to research tools; careful
Josefina Coloma and Eva Harris, ‘Open-Access Science: A Necessity for Global Public Health’ 
(October 2005) 1 (2) Public Library o f Science Pathogens at 0099-0101 at 
http://wvvw.plospathogens.or£/article/info:doi/l 0.1371 /journal.ppat.0010021.
"97 Some universities have taken serious initiatives towards adopting policies and guidelines on socially 
responsible licensing but most of the universities have yet to respond. For University of California, 
Berkeley see: Office of Intellectual Property and Industry Research Alliances, ‘Socially Responsible 
Licensing at U.C. Berkeley: An Intellectual Property Management Strategy to Stimulate Research 
Support and Maximize Social Impact’ (accessed on June 22, 2009) at 
http://ipira.berkelev.edu/docs/sociallvresponsiblel l-07.pdf
"ys Participating institutions include: California Institute of Technology, Cornell University, Harvard 
University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, University of California, 
University of Illinois, Chicago, University of lllinois-Urbana-Champaign, University of Washington, 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, Yale University and Association of American Medical Colleges 
(AAMC). For the full text and details: http://news- 
serviee.stanford.edu/news/2007/march7/gifsAvhitepaper.pdf
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enforcement actions and the unmet needs of patients in developing countries. It is 
pertinent to note that these guidelines do not specifically address the problem of 
academic patents in developing countries. The focus of these guidelines is limited to 
licensing practices and the role of patents in developing markets is conspicuously 
missing in this document. The last point acknowledges some of the access barriers in 
the developing world but do not categorically place a social responsibility on academic 
institutions to ensure that their licensing agreements must stipulate that licensee would 
not expand market exclusivity to developing and least developing countries.
Amidst the controversy of the Yale-stavudine patent in 2001, the Universities Allied For 
Essential Medicines (UAEM) was established as a private non-profit organisation and it 
includes more than 46 campus chapters in leading universities of the United States, 
Canada and United Kingdom.'’99 UAEM aims to promote access to medicines for people 
in developing countries by changing norms and practices around university patenting 
and licensing. It further aims to ensure that university medical research meets the needs 
of the majority of the world’s population and empower students to respond to the access 
and innovation crisis.600 The UAEM has also adopted the ‘Philadelphia Consensus 
Statement on Universities Policies for Health Related Innovations’.601 The statement 
highlights the problem of access to essential medicines in developing countries and 
builds up a case for university action. Universities can play their role in three distinct 
ways by promoting equal access to university research, undertaking research for
For details sec: the Universities Allied For Essential Medicines (accessed on June 23, 2009) at 
http://www.esscntialmedicinc.org/7page id=40
600 Ibid.
601 Universities Allied For Essential Medicines, ‘Philadelphia Consensus Statement on Universities 
Policies for Health Related Innovations' (accessed on June 23, 2009) at 
http://www.essentialmedicine.org/es/
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neglected diseases and measuring research success according to the impact on human 
welfare.602
To materialise the objectives of this statement, the UAEM has developed and advocated 
a case for universities’ action in addressing global health inequities and calls for the 
adoption of open licensing approach. The group supports the Equitable Access License 
(EAL) and campaigns that major universities and academic institutions should adopt 
this license to demonstrate their commitment to social responsibility. The details of the 
Equitable Access License are discussed in Part III of this Chapter. The UAEM follow a 
simple and straightforward approach by proposing that universities’ technology licenses 
should encourage generic competition in developing countries.
C. The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill 2008 
(India)
The Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) represents an influential model of public sector 
licensing and over the last decade many countries attempted to adopt this model for 
their academic and research institutions. A report of the Organization o f Economic- 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) claims that the treatment of government funded 
research as a public good may not be sufficient for economic growth. The report 
suggests that academic institutions and researchers should be provided opportunities to 
commercialise their inventions by creating spin-off companies and joint ventures with 
the commercial sector.603 Though the report does not specify a particular model which 
countries can adopt to achieve the goal of intellectual property commercialisation, it 
categorically refers to some of the benefits which US institutions have reaped after the
603 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Turning Science into Business: Patenting 
and Licensing at Public Research Organizations (Paris: OECD Publications, 2003).
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enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US). With regard to the practices of OECD 
countries, the report states that:
Across OECD countries, laws and policies governing the ownership of IP 
generated with public research funds are being re-examined with a view to 
encourage ownership of inventions by the institution performing the research ... 
Austria, Denmark, Germany and Norway have recently introduced new legislation 
to grant universities title to IP resulting from publicly funded research ... In Japan 
and Korea, recent reforms in funding regulations have given universities more 
control over the IP generated by their researchers. These policy trends echo the 
landmark US Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.604
This trend is not only confined to economically developed countries and recently many 
developing countries have also shown their interest in this direction.
In 2008, Indian government introduced the Protection and Utilisation o f Public Funded 
Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (India) in the parliament to provide for the protection 
and utilisation of intellectual property originating from public funded research.6<b 
According to the statement of objects and reasons:
To compete in a global environment, it is necessary for India to innovate and 
promote creativity. For promoting creativity and innovation, India needs to protect 
and utilise the intellectual property created out of public funded research and 
development. Over the years, the Government has invested large funds in research 
and development. To provide incentives for creativity and innovation, it is 
604 Ibid. 11.
6(b For the full text see:
http://vvw\v.prsindia.org/docs/bills/l229425658/1229425658 The Protection and Utilisation of Public 
funded Intellectual Property Bill 2008.pdf
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necessary to develop a framework in which the protection and utilisation of 
intellectual property is put in place. The ultimate objective, however, is to ensure 
access to such innovation by all stakeholders for public good ... Such innovations 
can be utilised for raising financial resources of these establishments, through 
royalties or income.606
This Bill has been largely criticised in India and it was lamented as the Indian Bayh- 
Dole which would restrict access to publicly funded research.607
Before turning to the substantive provisions of the Protection and Utilisation o f Public 
Funded Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (India), it is pertinent to analyse some broader 
policy issues underlying the legislative proposal in India. Three basic questions can be 
raised about this proposed law and their answers will determine the appropriateness of 
this proposition. First, is the Indian science and technology environment fully prepared 
to respond to the so-called opportunities which this law will create? Second, given the 
level of development and technological advancement, what is the best model which 
India can follow to promote the culture of innovation? To what extent would a law 
modelled on the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) help achieve policy objectives? Third, 
what are the main concerns regarding the provisions of the proposed law and how can 
India learn from best practices used elsewhere?
The adoption of a law on the lines of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) clearly presumes 
the existence of requisite innovative capacity on the part of Indian universities. 
However, it is arguable that the current state of science and technology in Indian
606 Ibid. 8.
607 For a detailed analysis of this Bill see: Shamnad Basheer, ‘India Unveils National Innovation Act’ 
Spicy IP Blog (1 October 2008) at http://spicvipindia.blogspot.eom/2008/10/breakiim-ne\vs-india-unveils- 
national.html
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universities is not very promising. There is no doubt that India is ‘shining’,608 
particularly in the information and technology sector, and has achieved a tremendous 
growth rate during last few years but the educational institutions in India are still 
lagging behind. The public sector investment in research and education is marginal and 
Indian universities produce very little research. Most of the existing innovative 
capabilities are located in government agencies, particularly in the Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR)609, the Department of Science and Technology (DST)610, 
the Department of Biotechnology (DBT)6", the Ministry of Science and Technology612, 
the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR)613, and the National Research and 
Development Council (NRDC).614 Although these institutions have produced great 
scientists and academics, the innovative capacity of the institutions has been relatively 
weak. In terms of patent filing, India’s ratio of resident to foreign is just 0.58% which is 
less than Russia, South Africa, China and Poland.615 This is notwithstanding that India is
608 The slogan ‘shining India' became popular in 2003-04 during information technology boom. However, 
commentators have challenged this notion by raising questions about malnutrition, poverty, illiteracy and 
poor governance. See: H. S. Virk, ‘Does India Shine in Scientific Research?’ (July 2004) 87 (1) Current 
Science 7 at http://www.ias.ae.in/currsci/jul 102004/7.pdf
609 The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research at http://www.csir.res.in/
610 The Department of Science and Technology at www.dst.tiov.in
611 The Department of Biotechnology at http://dbtindia.nic.in/indcx.asp
612 The Ministry of Science and Technology at http:/7www.dst.tzov.in/
613 The Indian Council of Medical Research at http://icmr.nic.in/
614 The National Research and Development Council at http:/7www.nrdcindia.com/
615 Gregory D. Graff, ‘Echoes of Bayh-Dole? A Survey of IP and Technology Transfer Policies in 
Emerging and Developing Economies’ in Anatole Krattiger et al (eds), Intellectual Property Management 
in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices (Oxford: Centre for the 
Management of Intellectual Property in Health Research and Development, Oxford Centre for Innovation, 
2007), 188 at
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also emerging as a key destination of global R&D outsourcing; the pharmaceutical 
sector is prominent in this regard.
As a matter of comparative law, the suitability and relevance of transplanting the legal 
model of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) to India in the 21st century is another crucial 
question. The Protection and Utilisation o f Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill 
2008 (India) suggests that Indian policy makers are fully satisfied with the United States 
model and they have simply replicated the same provisions in the proposed law. 
Arguably, this is an instance of what Australian pundits would call ‘a cultural cringe’.616 
The sponsors of this Bill have failed to address the fundamental question of the 
relevance of the United States model to India and its possible implications on the 
innovation culture and public domain. The proponents of a Bayh-Dole type model argue 
that universities in the United States hugely benefited from this law and universities 
secured better licensing royalties as a result of the new regulation. However such claims 
are not necessarily supported by empirical evidence. Professor Eisenberg analysed the 
data in this regard and held that the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) was 
marginal.617
In fact, the latest data shows that academic patents are in decline domestically in the 
United States and with the emergence of new criteria for the ranking of universities, 
patents are increasingly losing their importance for universities. Relying on data from 
1990 to 2008, Loet Leydesdorff and Martin Meyer suggest that there is a decline in 
university patenting in United States and European Union:
http://vvwvv.iphandbook.org/handbook/resources/Publications/links/ipHandbook%20Voliime%201.pdf
616 Robert Hughes, Culture o f Complaint: The Fraying o f America, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993,91.
617 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer In 
Government-Sponsored Research’ (1996) 82 Virginia Law Review 1663-1727.
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At the global level university patenting is still gaining momentum, but in the most 
advanced economies the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 seem to have faded 
away since the turn of the millennium. In our opinion, the reason for this is 
structural. More universities are nowadays increasingly ranked in terms of their 
knowledge output, and patents or spin-offs are usually not part of this ranking ... 
The nature of the competition among universities is changing, and the incentive to 
patent has thus withered. International collaborations and co-authorships, for 
example, have become more important in research assessment exercises than 
university-industry relations.618
Given that there are few university patents in India, the legislation may result in the 
same chilling effects which are now reported in other countries. It is a simplistic 
approach to expect that the introduction of a new Bill would have purely positive effects 
on innovative culture. The Indian Government should engage with the empirical 
evidence garnered from the experiment of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US).
One of the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) was to mobilise additional 
revenues and financial resources for academic institutions. Indeed, the Protection and 
Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (India) also envisages 
similar objectives. The failure of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) is well established in 
this regard. Anthony D. So observes that the commercial benefits of patenting to 
universities have been overstated:
In 2006, US universities, hospitals, and research institutions derived US$1.85 
billion from technology licensing compared to US$43.58 billion from federal,
618 Loet Lcydcsdorff and Martin Meyer, ‘The Decline of University Patenting and the End of the Bayh- 
Dole Effect’ (2009) 83(2) Scientometrics 355-362, 355 at http://users.fmg.uva.nl/lleydesdorff/Bavh- 
Do le B a v h - Do 1 e%2 0 Effect. pd f
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state, and industry funders that same year, which accounts for less than 5% of 
total academic research dollars. Moreover, revenues were highly concentrated at a 
few successful universities that patented “blockbuster” inventions. A recent 
econometric analysis using data on academic licensing revenues from 1998 to 
2002 suggests that, after subtracting the costs of patent management, net revenues 
earned by US universities from patent licensing were “on average, quite modest” 
nearly three decades after [Bayh-Dole] took effect.619
Lita Nelson, former president of the Association of University Technology Managers 
goes one step ahead and states that: ‘The direct economic impact of technology 
licensing on the universities themselves has been relatively small (a surprise to many 
who believed that royalties could compensate for declining federal support of 
research).’620 In light of such research, the Indian government should conduct a cost- 
benefit analysis on these lines to determine how much the proposed Bill would 
contribute towards revenue generation.
There are several additional points which establish that the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) 
is not an ideal model and it has many negative implications on public science. To 
promote innovation and technological development, the Indian government should itself 
adopt an innovative policy approach. So far we have seen that India’s innovative 
capacity is still at its nascent stage, it needs more creative space rather than exclusivity 
based property rights, to flourish. Furthermore, the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) does 
not represent an ideal model which India can readily adopt for its domestic purposes.
619 Anthony D. So et al, ‘Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the US 
Experience’ (October 2008) 6(10) Public Libraty o f Science Biology 2078-2084 at 2079 at 
http://www.plosbiolouv.Org/article/info:doi/10.1371 /journal.pbio.0060262
620 Lita Nelson, ‘The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in The American University’ (6 March 
1998) 279 (5356) Science 1460-1461 at http://www.sciencemag.oru/cgi/content/full/279.5356/1460
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The Bill fails to address one of its stated objectives as no mechanism is envisaged to 
protect the public interest. According to ex-Indian science minister, Kapil Sibal, ‘the 
benefits of publicly funded research are not reaching the public’.621 But the policy 
response to this situation in the form of Protection and Utilisation o f Public Funded 
Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (India) is less likely to improve this situation. It rather 
goes to introduce measures which will narrow the public domain by creating new 
intellectual property rights. According to its proposed scheme:
The bill is modelled on the 1980 US Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed US 
universities to patent discoveries derived from federally funded work. According 
to the Indian bill, scientists would be allowed to retain 30% of the net income 
earned from patents and licences. The scientist’s institute would retain 40%, with 
the rest going into a fund maintained by the institute for managing intellectual 
property. Researchers in publicly funded institutes or universities would also be 
allowed, for the first time, to set up and work in private companies without having 
to leave their academic jobs.622
There is no effective public use mechanism envisaged in the Protection and Utilisation 
o f Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (India). The drafters even failed to 
incorporate a march-in right provision which was discussed earlier in the preceding 
section. It is ironical that the law is drafted along the lines of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 
(US), but it does not contain a march-in right provision. There is only one similar 
provision in the Bill with quite restricted language. According to this provision 
government has a right to refuse the title of a research institution within ninety days of
621 K.S. Jayaraman, ‘Patent Pledge to Indian Universities’ (December 2008) 456 (11) Nature 685 at 
littp://ww\v.nature.com/news/2008/081210/pdf/456685a.pdf
622 Ibid.
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learning of the research institutions’ intention to retain a patent.623 This brief period of 
ninety days is a big limitation and beyond that period, government would not be able to 
exercise this right. In pharmaceuticals, the decisions about retaining patent rights are 
made at very early stages and they would be accordingly communicated to the 
government. How the government can react within ninety days of such communication 
when the application of a patented invention is not yet known for the treatment of an 
epidemic? This time bound access clause is indeed narrower than the march-in right 
provided in Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US).
Another problematic aspect of the Protection and Utilisation o f Public Funded 
Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (India) is its scheme which is designed to ensure that 
universities and publicly funded institutions must apply for patent protection. 
Universities will have to follow strict timelines throughout their research processes to 
ensure compliance. A researcher must disclose the invention immediately after learning 
of the patent right.624 Thereafter, the research institute has sixty days to notify the 
government about the invention and the institution has ninety more days to show its 
intention to retain patent rights over the disclosed intention.625 These compressed 
timelines are unprecedented as the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) merely demands such 
notifications within a reasonable time. It is anticipated that when universities will not 
been given appropriate time to make their decisions, it may lead to excessive strategic 
patents notification at an early stage to secure future interests.
623 Section 5 of Protection and Utilisation o f Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (India) at 
http://vvwvv.prsindia.org/docs/bills/1229425658/1229425658 The Protection and Utilisation of Public 
Funded Intellectual Property Bill 2008.pdf
624 Ibid. Section 9.
623 Ibid. Section 4 and Section 5(1).
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This analysis show that the Indian attempt to adopt a licensing regime for publicly 
funded research and development suffers from serious deficiencies. In my view, the 
Indian government should withdraw the proposal, and initiate a new process to 
formulate a coherent and consistent policy regarding public sector licensing. The Indian 
National Knowledge Commission declared in 2007 that intellectual property 
infrastructure and assets should be used in the best public interest and for the overall 
benefit of society.626 The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual 
Property Bill 2008 (India) is an antithesis of this approach as it restricts the public 
domain by encouraging private rights over public benefit.
III. Open Source Drug Discovery
Richard Stallman introduced the concept of free software amidst the strong wave of 
commercialisation in the field of computer programs and software.627 As a member of 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Stallman 
laid the foundation of the free software movement by advocating that software users 
should be able to run a program for any purpose. Software is free if a user can analyse 
and improve it for further distribution and its source code is disclosed and copyright 
restrictions are removed though a typical copyleft licence. The free software movement 
was later institutionalised thorough the Free Software Foundation628 which adopted the
626 Letter from Sam Pitroda, Chairman, The National Knowledge Commission to Manmohan Singh, 
Prime Minister of India, (Oct. 15, 2007) at
http://wwvv.knowledgeconiinission.gov.in/downloads/recommendatioiis/iPRPM.pdf
('" Sam Williams, Free as in Freedom: Richard Stallman ’s Crusade for Free Software (Sebastopol, CA.:
O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2002).
628 For an overview and introduction, see the Free Software Foundation: http://www.fsf.ore/
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General Public Licence629 (GPL) approach to facilitate software distribution in a non­
proprietary fashion.
In 1998, Bruce Perens and Eric S. Raymond established the Open Source Initiative 
which prompted the beginning of the open source software movement. Perens and 
Raymond did not share Stallman’s position on proprietary software and their initiative 
was basically the establishment of a certification body for open source licences.630
The non-proprietary software movement and open source initiative rapidly attracted 
considerable attention and contributed in the development of several important 
computer programs which were later expanded by successive generations of 
programmers. Despite the peculiarity of the term ‘open source’ with regard to computer 
programs, the term is now widely used in other disciplines, too, as denoting the notion 
of unrestricted and free access. Open source techniques are now suggested in certain 
unconventional areas such as biotechnology, ecology and medicines and open source 
ideology propagates lesser or no use of intellectual property protection in the form of 
copyright and patents.
Open source drug discovery is a relatively new phenomenon which is proposed to off­
set the problems which are typically associated with patented medicines and 
pharmaceuticals. The existing patent system provides incentives for pharmaceutical 
research and development for the treatment of certain disease categories which 
generally affect the affluent group of patients. This system has shown established failure 
in the area of neglected and tropical diseases.631 The open source drug discovery
<’"v For details see, the GNU Operating System: http :/7 w\vvv,gnu.oru/
6,0 For the objectives and products of the Open Source Initiative: http://w\v\v.opensource.org;
631 Bernard Pecoul et al., ‘Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries: A Lost Battle?’ (1999) 281 The 
Journal o f the American Medical Association 361-367 at http://iama.ama-
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proposal is aimed at addressing this problem by locating the incentives for new drug 
discovery away from traditional intellectual property methods.
A. Philosophy of Open Source Drug Discovery
A number of commentators have provided detailed theoretical justifications for the 
remarkable success of the open source movement in the area of computer programs and 
software/"2 The nature of information technologies, incentives associated with the open 
programming, the probability of low cost production and the assimilation of a critical 
mass of technically skilled people are some reasons which are commonly attributed to 
the success of the open source movement. Lately, some commentators have started 
exploring more generic explanations of the open source initiative with the aim to 
explore a feasible open source model for technologies other than computer programs.
The most comprehensive account of open source development -  both as a theory and 
technique -  is provided by Yochai Benkler, a professor of law at Harvard Law School. 
In his seminal article633 for the Yale Law Journal in 2002, Benkler used a ‘Coasean’634 
rationale to explain commons-based approaches to managing resources in networked 
environments. This work was later expanded through The Wealth o f Networks: How
assn.org/cm/contcnt/abstract/281 4.361
6~'“ Josh Lerncr and Jean Tirole, ‘The Open Source Movement: Key Research Questions’ (May 2001) 45 
(4-6) European Economic Review 819-826 and Eric von Hippel and Georg von Krogh, ‘Open Source 
Software and the “Private-Collective” Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science’ (March-April 
2003) 14(2) Organization Science 209-223.
633 Yochai Benkler, ‘Coasc’s Penguin, Or Linux and the Nature of the Firm’ (2002) 112 Yale Law Journal 
369-446 at http://valelawiournal.Org/l 12/3/369 vochai bcnklcr.html
'"4 Refers to the theory presented by Ronald Coase about the efficiency of firms’ decisions and 
transaction cost. For details see: Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (October 1960) 3 The 
Journal o f Law and Economics 1-44.
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Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom635 where Benkler explains his view 
of networks, social production and open source methods. The book contains several 
intriguing ideas and in this section, I will confine myself to the extent of a brief 
explanation of the theoretical foundation of Benkler’s thesis.
At least three elements of Benkler’s thesis are directly related to the discussion of open 
source drug discovery and its objectives. The notion of social production and 
appropriate changes in existing intellectual property norms are key factors which can 
play a pivotal role in the transformation of the existing production process. Benkler 
advocates that social production will lead to the transformation of society by eradicating 
poverty and empowering masses living in developing countries.
Benkler asserts that most of the wealth accumulated in society is generated through non­
proprietary motivations. In the realm of production methods, Benkler identifies at least 
six types of social production where half of them are inspired by propriety motives. He 
places ‘Scholarly Lawyers’636, ‘Know-How’ 637 strategies and ‘Learning Networks’ 638 in 
the category of non-exclusive markets because they make money from information 
production but not by the exercise of exclusive rights. Benkler offers a list of another 
three non-exclusive non-market social production approaches. The first is dubbed ‘Joe 
Einstein’, where information is given away free of cost in return for status and the 
benefits for reputation. The second non-exclusive non-market social production
635 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth o f Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006).
636 Lawyers writing blogs in public domain offering great insight of legal knowledge with a motive to 
attract and inspire new clients.
637 Firms that offer better or cheaper production process because of their research.
638 Making money through early access to information by sharing information with similar networks such 
as news wire services.
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approach is labelled ‘Los Alamos’, where in-house information is shared with the 
government departments to obtain additional funding and status. Benkler’s third 
category is ‘Limited Sharing Networks’ where academicians share their papers with 
peers tor comments and improvements before publication and instances of information­
sharing on the condition of reciprocity such as ‘copyleft’ conditions.631' Benkler favours 
the adoption and expansion of non-exclusive non-market approaches and compares 
them with rights based on the exclusion approach where money is made by exercising 
intellectual property rights such as patents and copyright.
Benkler argues that social production is often a better method of creating wealth as 
compared to market based production which depends upon traditional incentives such as 
monetary payments and intellectual property rights. Before turning to the point of 
intellectual property, it is crucial to go through the theoretical basis of Benkler’s claim 
about the superiority of social production. While elaborating his choice of production 
regimes, Benkler relies upon Ronald Coase’s theorem in respect of transaction costs. 640 
His well-known theorem suggests that the transaction cost is a decisive factor when 
firms choose to adopt a particular transaction model. If the transaction cost of 
outsourcing is high then a firm will be inclined to undertake in-house production.
Instead of engaging with the diversity of data and its policy implications, Benkler 
declares that intellectual property rights are not useful regulatory tools. He describes 
that:
639 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth o f Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 43. Benkler provides this comparison in the 
tabular format and subsequently discuses some of these approaches at length.
640 This term is first used by Lior Strahilevitz while analyzing the work of Benkler. Lior Strahilevitz, 
'Wealth without Markets?’ (2007) 116 The Yale Law Journal 1472-1516 at 
http:/7\vw\v.valelawiournal.oruy,,l 16/7/strahi levitz.html
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When one cuts through the rent-seeking politics of intellectual property lobbies 
like the pharmaceutical companies or Hollywood and the recording industry; 
when one overcomes the honestly erroneous, but nonetheless conscience-soothing 
beliefs of lawyers who defend the copyright and patent-dependent industries and 
the judges they later become, the reality of both theory and empirics in the 
economics of intellectual property is that both in theory and as far as empirical 
evidence shows, there is remarkably little support in economics for regulating 
information, knowledge, and cultural production through the tools of intellectual 
property law.641
Open source is a manifestation of social production and Benkler describes some 
promising features of open source which I will elaborate in the next section. Social 
production and open source methods are not merely alternative modes of production. To 
Benkler both means and ends are critical and he advocates that social production will 
ultimately transform the lives of the people and that ‘information policy has become a 
critical element of development policy’.642
In the beginning of Chapter 9, ‘Justice and Development’, Benkler raises a key 
question: how non-exclusive production in the information economy will affect 
questions of distribution and human wellbeing? The answer is not simple and Benkler 
recognises the multiplicity of factors responsible for global inequality, poverty, hunger 
and injustice. After realising the pessimistic response to this question, Benkler pleads 
his case by maintaining that information, knowledge and culture are core inputs in 
human welfare and social production can provide a normative basis to resolve some of
641 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth o f Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 39.
642 Ibid. 302.
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these sufferings.643 Benkler provides a detailed account of relevant elements through the 
survey of liberal theories of justice and the network information economy and then 
builds a case for concrete and asserted action in the realm of human welfare and 
development, industrial organisation, access to medicines, food security and biomedical 
research. He observes that social production ‘offers a new path, alongside those of the 
market and formal governmental investment in public welfare, for achieving definable 
and significant improvements in human development throughout the world’ .644
B. A Practical Model of Open Source Drug Discovery
The application of the open source model to the discovery of new drugs requires a 
considerable adaptation of conventional open source techniques. Against the backdrop 
of Benkler’s theoretical approach towards social production and commons-based peer 
production, it is now widely agreed that open source methods can be effectively used 
for the production of resources and products beyond traditional computer programs and 
software. The open source movement in bioinformatics has come to an age where the 
bulk of the information and databases in this new filed are available as non-proprietary 
resources. The convergence of biology and computing has given rise to a phenomenal 
expansion of open source software such as Biojava645, BioPython646, Bio-SPICE647, 
BioRuby648, Simple Molecular Mechanics for Proteins649, and Generic Software 
Components for Model Organism Databases (GMOD) . 650
643 Ibid. 301-302.
644 Ibid. 355.
64 ’ Biojava: http:/7bioiava.org/wiki/Main Page
646 BioPython: http://biQpython.org/wiki/MainPage
647 BioSpice: http://biospice.sourceforge.net/
648 BioRuby: http://bioruby.oitz/
649 Simple Molecular Mechanics for Proteins: http://w\vvv.smmp05.net/
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In addition to these computing technologies in the area of bioinformatics, some basic 
science projects were also launched with open source modalities in the areas of biology, 
chemistry, and disease mapping. The SNP Consortium of the Wellcome Trust aimed to 
discover the genome data and place it in the public domain. An element of copyleft was 
introduced in the SNP Consortium's public domain model with the HapMap 
Consortium’s funding which is aimed at comparing multiple human genomes to find 
disease causing variations.651
Why is an open source drug discovery model important at all? Benkler has a clear 
answer to this question and he relates open source drug discovery to his desirable 
outcomes of social production. Benkler particularly states that:
One of the lessons we learn as we look at the networked information economy is 
that the work of governments through international treaties is not the final word 
on innovation and its diffusion across boundaries of wealth. The emergence of 
social sharing as a substantial mode of production in the networked environment 
offers an alternative route for individuals and non-profit entities to take a much 
more substantial role in delivering actual desired outcomes independent of the 
formal system. Commons-based and peer production efforts may not be a cure-all. 
However, as we have seen in the software world, these strategies can make a big
650 Generic Software Components for Model Organism Databases: http://gmod.org/vviki/Main Pane
651 For HapMap Consortium see: http:/7w vvw, hap map. or g/. For a description and analysis of SNP 
Consortium database see: Gudmundur A. Thorisson and Lincoln D. Stein, 'The SNP Consortium 
Website: Past, Present and Future’ (2003) 31(1) Nucleic Acids Research 124-127 at 
http://nar.oxfordiournals.Org/cgi/content/full/31 / l / 124
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contribution to quite fundamental aspects of human welfare and development. 
And this is where freedom and justice coincide.652
But how will this transformation occur through open source drug innovation? Benkler 
recognises that there are practical bottlenecks and he offers a three pronged strategy 
which can be used to facilitate access to medicines through commons-based biomedical 
research. His model heavily relies upon academic institutions and universities and 
Benkler strongly advocates a major shift in the attitude of these institutions towards 
their existing patenting and licensing practices.
Universities can play a key role in improving the dismal state of access to medicines in 
the developing world by revisiting their intellectual property policies. Empirical 
evidence also shows that universities in the United States can actually afford forgoing 
some of their patent rights by entering into licensing arrangements which allow generic 
competition in certain jurisdictions. Benkler argues that the revenue of top United States 
universities generated through patent licensing is only a minor portion of their gross 
income.'0' These universities would not loose substantial revenues if they adopted an 
Equitable Access License, a legal device engineered by Yochai Benkler and Samantha 
Chaifetz.654
The centrality of the Equitable Access License in Benkler’s model is evident both from 
his book and subsequent writings. An Equitable Access License is aimed at achieving
Yochai Benkler, The Wealth o f Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 355.
653 Ibid. 340.
654 Samantha Chaifetz et al, ‘Closing the Access Gap for Health Innovations: An Open Licensing 
Proposal for Universities’ (2007) 3 (1) Globalization and Health at 
http://www.Uobalizationandhealth.cx)m/content/pdf' 1744-8603-3-1 .pdf
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the goal of marginal cost pricing for health related products in low and middle income 
countries. The details of this licence are important as it contains some critical features to 
ensure access through generic production. By adopting an Equitable Access License, 
university technology transfer agreements will allow generic competition by providing 
open licences which will guarantee third party manufacturers the right to compete in 
low and middle income countries. The inclusion of middle income countries along with 
low income is important to ensure the practical feasibility of this proposal as generic 
competition can come only from some middle income countries. An Equitable Access 
License does not deliberately adopt the ‘so-called’ fair pricing approach where 
universities can stipulate appropriate pricing caps on manufacturers. Such an obligation 
will increase the risk of litigation and involves the establishment of detailed and 
elaborated monitoring mechanism which universities may not like to do. Thus, a simple 
market-based mechanism is proposed to facilitate generic competition.655
The scope of an Equitable Access License is less restrictive and it covers a wide range 
of health technologies and products. It categorically rejects the notion that developing 
countries only need some medicines for the treatment of infectious diseases. An 
Equitable Access License is thus designed to cover chronic non-communicable diseases 
too which constitute a major portion of the burden of disease in the developing world.
An Equitable Access License works in three steps. In the first step, a licence of 
innovation is exchanged between the university and the licensee. University grants 
rights which enable the licensee to practice the technology in designated jurisdictions. 
At this stage, the licensee will grant back certain rights to the university which include 
all the exclusive rights which the licensee has that could prevent a third party from 
using the end product. This is a critical aspect of an Equitable Access License as the
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granting back of these rights is crucial for a third party manufacturer in a low or middle 
income country. However, a licensee is not supposed to grant back its own material 
property rights such as cell lines. The second stage involves the notification procedure 
from an intended third party which wants to exploit licenced technology in low and 
middle income countries. The grant of this right to a third party will be almost 
automatic after notification because of the licensee’s grant back. A third party can be a 
generic manufacturer, a government body or even a non-governmental organisation and 
the Equitable Access License envisages a probability of multiple notifications to ensure 
a true competition to achieve the objective of marginal cost pricing.656 To comply with 
the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US), third parties will be asked to pay a 
small amount of royalties both to the university and the licensee. As a last step, an 
Equitable Access License requires that all improvements made by the third party 
manufacturers should be granted back to the university for the purpose of sub­
licensing.6''7
In addition to this public-minded licensing proposal, Benkler offers another practical 
model for open source drug discovery. His second proposal is a peer to peer production 
model for research and development. It is useful to see Benkler’s definition of open 
source paraphrased by Stephen M. Maurer as follows:
We will define open source as
(a) a method of producing complex economic products;
(b) capable of supporting medium-large-scale collaborations, potentially 
includes thousands of people; and
656 Ibid.
65' For model provisions of Equitable Access License, see: http://www.essentialmedicine.org/EAL.pdf
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(c) organized according to signals that are neither hierarchical commands (as in 
firms or academic laboratories) not prices (as in markets) but voluntary or 
social.658
The convergence of computing and drug discovery methods has opened new and 
innovative ways and science is no more considered to be too expansive to be done in 
this way. Along the pipeline of the drug discovery process, Benkler clearly sees the 
relevance of open source methods at more than one place. The task can start with the 
identification of the critical mass of young scientists who are ready to volunteer their 
time and energies for computer modelling of disease patterns and candidate substances.
Modularity and granularity are typical conditions for the successful implementation of 
any social production initiative and in the context of drug discovery it is not always 
possible to adopt this pattem. However, Benkler thinks that:
Increasing portions of biomedical research are done today through modeling, 
computer simulation, and data analysis of the large and growing databases, 
including a wide range of genetic, chemical, and biological information. As more 
of the process of drug discovery of potential leads can be done by modeling and 
computational analysis, more can be organized for peer production. The relevant 
model here is open bioinformatics. Bioinformatics generally is the practice of 
pursuing solutions to biological questions using mathematics and information 
technology . . . . 659
loS Stephen M. Maurer, ‘Open Source Drug Discovery: Finding A Niche (Or Maybe Several)’ (2007) 76:2 
University o f Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 1-31 at 3 at 
http://crosstalks.vub.ac.be/past events/2006 futmed/Maurer UM KC2008.pdf.
659 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth o f  Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom
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Once computer modeling is completed and candidate compounds are identified then the 
real challenge to commons-based peer production emerges in the form of wet-lab 
experiments.
A relatively more clear account of these options comes from a 2007 article by Stephen 
M. Maurer/'60 Maurer discusses various practical options which can be used to 
undertake open source drug discovery throughout the life cycle of pharmaceutical 
innovation ranging from in silico discovery to clinic trails.
A slightly different model of open source drug discovery is presented by Professor Arti 
Rai in the form of the Tropical Disease Initiative.661 This approach is less focused on 
licensing formats and instead focused upon developing a web portal where feasible open 
source projects can be launched. The idea is explained as follows:
What would open-source drug discovery look like? As with current software 
collaborations, we propose a Web site where volunteers use a variety of computer 
programs, databases, and computing hardware ... Individual pages would host 
tasks like searching for new protein targets, finding chemicals to attack known 
targets, and posting data from related chemistry and biology experiments. 
Volunteers could use chat rooms and bulletin boards to announce discoveries and 
debate future research directions. Over time, the most dedicated and proficient 
volunteers would become leaders.662
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 351-352.
660 Stephen M. Maurer, ‘Open Source Drug Discovery: Finding A Niche (Or Maybe Several)’ (2007) 76 
(2) University> o f  Missouri-Kansas City’ Law' Review’ 1-31 at 3 at 
http://crosstalks.vub.ac.be/past events/2006 futmed/Maurer UMK.C2008.pdf
661 For details see: www.tropicaldisease.oru
662 Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai and Andrej Sali, ‘Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source
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Professor Rai and her colleagues do not worry much about intellectual property 
constraints in the way of open source drug discovery and think that big pharmaceutical 
companies pay less attention to revenues generated in developing markets. They suggest 
that any open source licence can be adopted to facilitate the process of social production 
which does not have far-reaching virai implications.663 This position is understandable in 
the context of an initiative which is solely reserved for tropical diseases. However, a 
project with much broader and ambitious objectives will need a comprehensive 
licensing regime such as the Equitable Access License.664
C. Open Source Drug Discovery and India
The application of the open source model for the development of medicines offers both 
challenges and opportunities for India. The Indian local pharmaceutical industry is 
uniquely placed to benefit from open source drug discovery initiatives which can 
ultimately narrow the access gap within and outside India. However, India’s position as 
a major emerging economy has already started precipitating key shifts in a range of 
public policies including the national industrial and innovation framework. The
an Answer?’ (December 2004) 1 (3) Public Library o f Science Medicine 183-186 atl 84 at 
http://www.pIosmedicine.Org/artiele/info:doi/10.1371 /iournal.pmcd.QO 10056
6<” Professor Rai discussed various options of adopting different licenses depending upon nature of a 
project. Possible licenses for the Tropical Disease Initiative include a public domain license, license 
similar to Creative Commons Attribution License, or the General Public License.
664 For a general discussion of the use of licences for open source innovation and its relevance to drug 
discovery see: Severine Dusollier, ‘Sharing Access to Intellectual Property through Private Ordering’ 
(2007) 82 (3) Chicago-Kent Law Review 1391-1435 at
http://lawreview.kentlaw.edu/articlcs/823/Dusollicr%2QAuthor%20Approvcd%20Edits(H)(Pi.pdf and 
Arti Rai, “ Open Source’ and Private Ordering: A Commentary on Dusollier’ (2007) 82 (3) Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 1439-1442 at http://lawreview.kentlaw.edu/articles/82- 
3/Rai0/o20Author0/o20Approved%20Hdits(H)(P).pdf
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relevance of the open source model is less promising in this context when the Indian 
government is fully on track to introduce changes in its patent laws and providing 
incentives to local researchers who apply for domestic and foreign patents.
There are several positive signals for a successful implementation of open source drug 
discovery projects in India. The most optimistic is that none of the alternative research 
and development models discussed in this chapter other than open source methods 
could actually start building their roots in India. The Indian Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research has taken a pioneering lead in this regard by launching the Open 
Source Drug Discovery Foundation.6'1" The Government has earmarked over US$120 
million in its 11th Five Year Plan for open source drug discovery projects and this 
money will be gradually increased with the implementation of the project.666
This project is currently focused on tuberculosis but in the future it will also target other 
neglected tropical diseases. The selection of tuberculosis at the start is understandable 
given its share in India's burden of diseases. The rationale of this project is stated as 
follows:
OSDD is a CSIR Team India Consortium with Global Partnership with a vision to 
provide affordable healthcare to the developing world by providing a global 
platform where the best minds can collaborate and collectively endeavor to solve 
the complex problems associated with discovering novel therapies for neglected 
tropical diseases like Malaria, Tuberculosis, Leshmaniasis, etc. It is a concept to
665 For Details see: http://www.oscId.org/
666 Samir K. Brahmachari, ‘Remarks by the Chair’ (Proceedings of the China-India-US Workshop on 
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy, Bangalore, India, July 7-9, 2008) at
http://www.law.gmu.cdit/nctl/stpp/us china pubs/ehina india us workshop/sec7 session5/sec7 iteml c 
over chair remarks.pdf
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collaboratively aggregate the biological and genetic information available to 
scientists in order to use it to hasten the discovery of drugs. This will provide a 
unique opportunity for scientists, doctors, technocrats, students and others with 
diverse expertise to work for a common cause.667
The project started with the creation of a database which includes virtually everything 
about tuberculosis. This huge information base known as SysBorgTB serves as an open 
source community portal to attract participants across the world.668 The project is still in 
its infancy and it will take some time before any substantial breakthrough is achieved. 
Almost 27 targets are so far identified and in 11 of them people are already working on 
proteins.669 The Government has separately established the Centre for Genomic 
Application6711 with facilities such as testing, screening, sequencing and proteomics 
analysis. This Centre, along with massive infrastructure of other public sector 
laboratories and academic institutions, can provide important information and technical 
input to the open source initiative.
Beyond project infrastructure and funding commitments, open source drug discovery 
needs a foundation of pre-existing research which participants can improve through 
their individual efforts. In the area of tropical diseases such background work is 
essentially missing or is under proprietary control and not available for open source 
buildup. This barrier was even faced by the Tropical Disease Initiative and to overcome
66 Open Source Drug Discovery at http://wwvv.osdd.net/what__is__osdd.htm
668 For details about SysBorgTB: http://svsborgtb.osdd.net/bia/view/Main/WcbHoroe
669 Samir K. Brahmachari, ‘Remarks by the Chair’ (Proceedings of the China-India-US Workshop on 
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy, Bangalore, India, July 7-9, 2008) at
http://wwvv.law.mnu.edu/nctl/stpp/us_ehina_pubs/china_india_us_\vorkshop/sec7 session5/scc7 item 1 c 
over chair remarks.pdf
670 For details see: http: Hw ww .tc gare sea re h, ore/
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this problem, a team of experts developed a kernel671 for open source drug discovery in 
tropical diseases. The practical coordination among the two projects is not really known 
but one thing is clear, that this new kernel can be a useful starting point for Indian open 
source project.
It is worth mentioning that the Indian open source drug discovery is indeed a hybrid 
model as it incorporates an element of direct incentives in the form of credit and prizes. 
The project is envisaged with a view that small prizes will be awarded to those who 
contribute in finding solutions. The TnnoCentive’ 672 model is readily available for this 
purpose. Professor Samir K. Brahmachari explains this reward mechanism as follows:
Credit sharing, through a micro-credit system and eventually, the dream is that if 
you are contributing to the cause of tuberculosis, you carry a credit-card-like thing 
with you which gives you special favours in hospitals and insurance and so on, 
and there are sponsors to give awards. So there is no more IPR. Everything that 
you use, you have to pay it back. It is all click-wrap -  not hard IPR as you wanted. 
But what is interesting here is that you still get credit as prizes and awards, and 
are not forgotten. 673
6 1 Leticia Orti ct al, ‘A Kernel for Open Source Drug Discovery in Tropical Diseases’ (April 2009) 3 (4) 
Public Library o f Science Neglected Tropica! Diseases at 
http://vv\vvv.plosntds.org/article/info:doi/l 0.137 l/journal.pntd.0000418
6 2 InnoCcntive: http://www.innocentivc.coni/. It is interesting to note that the ‘innoCcntive’ model has 
already started rewarding an Indian InnoCcntive solver for his achievement to find a new methods to 
cost-effectively manufacture tuberculosis drug candidates. See: http://blog.innocentive.com/tag/india/
6 ' Samir K. Brahmachari. 'Remarks by the Chair’ (Proceedings of the China-India-US Workshop on 
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy, Bangalore, India, July 7-9, 2008) at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/nctl/stpp/us china pubs/china india us workshop/sec7 session5/sec7 iteml c 
over chair remarks.pdf
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The Indian scientific and technological landscape is another positive consideration 
which can help in successful implementation of a domestic open source drug discovery 
project. India has a large cadre of skilled scientists who can take the open source model 
as a thrilling opportunity to produce new and innovative solutions. Indian scientists do 
not have much exposure to patent lead research and development and a new model can 
become a popular and mainstream approach if implemented carefully. 674
The Indian open source model is largely dependent upon its public sector academic and 
research institutions because advanced drug discovery is not possible without the heavy 
involvement of sophisticated scientific establishments. Institutional dynamics will be 
changed with the introduction of an intellectual property based system in the public 
sector research and development institutions.
Another practical bottleneck relates to the scarcity of open source expertise. We have 
seen earlier that open source methods are unique and this system works optimally if 
requisite conditions are met. In the absence of an open source culture in India, the 
success of open source drug discovery is subject to several factors including the 
appreciation of the concept by the critical mass, identification of the right projects, 
organisation of innovative activity and its final culmination. Merely one government 
sponsored project may not lead to the wider acceptability of open source methods unless 
it is to become a standard in the public institutions.
674 For a detailed overview of India’s scientific capabilities please see: Kristen Bound. India: The Uneven 
Innovator in The Atlas o f Ideas: Mapping the Geography o f Science Series (London: The Good News 
Press, 2007) at http://mt.educarchile.cl/MT/Hbrunner/archivesdibros/DHMQS/lndia Final.pdf
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IV. Patent Pools
In 2006, the World Health Organization’s Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation and Public Health observed that:
Patent pools, therefore, could be most useful for technologies particularly relevant 
to developing countries, because the lack of strong market incentives may enable 
agreements that would otherwise be more difficult to engineer. Low-margin 
research directed towards problems of poor people might be promoted.675
This proposition was reinforced by the World Health Organization's Global Strategy 
and Plan o f Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property which 
categorically recommends the member states to explore the potential role of patent 
pools in promoting innovation in upstream and downstream technologies.676
In 2008, UNITAID’s Executive Board approved a proposal to establish a patent pool for 
medicines.67 UNITAID's move attracted substantial attention from almost all 
stakeholders and this initiative is now at an advanced stage and is discussed at length in 
subsequent sections. India is a major supplier of HIV/AIDS medicines to many African
6 ’ WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, Public Health 
Innovation and Intellectual Property> Rights (Geneva: WHO Press, 2006) 53 at 
http://vvwvv.who.int/intellectualpropertv/documents/thcreport/ENPublieHealthReport.pdf.
6 World Health Organization, ‘Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property’ (May 24, 2008) WHA61.21 at 
http://apps.vvho.int/gb/ebwha/pdrfilcs/A61/A61 R21 -cn.pdf 
677 UNITAID, ‘Draft Resolution EB8 /
Patent Pool’ (2008) at
http://vvwvv.msfaccess.org/fileadmin/user upload/medinnov accesspatents/Draft%20Resolution%20EB8. 
pdf
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countries and it can potentially play a key role in the implementation of the UNITAID 
patent pool.
On 13th February 2009, Andrew Witty, Chief Executive Officer of GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) announced some unusual steps to deal with the challenges of improving global 
public health.678 While addressing the Harvard Medical School, Andrew unleashed his 
company’s four point strategy to accomplish the huge task to lowering the burden of 
diseases in the developing world. His speech delivered under the title of ‘Big Pharma as 
a Catalyst for Change’ set out an ambitious plan of action and gave a strong signal of 
possible policy shifts which the pharmaceutical industry may elect to pursue following 
GSK’s lead. One of the points presented was about GSK’s willingness to participate in a 
patent pool for the development of medicines for neglected tropical diseases.
A. The * Tragedy of the Anticommons ’
The law and economics movement has taken a keen interest in patent pools. In 1962, 
Kenneth Arrow explained the crucial role that intellectual property rights play in the 
disclosure of information.679 Contrary to the conventional approach, Arrow assigned an 
independent market to intellectual property rights separable from the assets associated 
with them. Thus, the patent plays a vital role in facilitating information exchange in the 
markets. However, this facilitating role becomes somewhat problematic when several 
layers of property rights are created. The transaction cost then escalates to the extent 
that information bargain becomes a futile exercise for players operating in a market.
67s Andrew Witty, ‘Big Pharma as a Catalyst for Change’ (13 February, 2009) Speech to Harvard Medical 
School at http://vvww.gsk.coin/media/dovvnloads/Wittv-Harvard-Speech-Suinmarv.pdf 
679 Kenneth J. Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and Allocation of Resources for Innovation’ in ‘ The rate and 
Direction o f Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors' (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), 609-626 at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2144.pdf
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This situation typically exists in the form of patent thickets680 creating ‘a dense web of 
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in 
order to actually commercialize new technology’.681
In an influential article in 1998, Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg682 used a 
property law metaphor of the ‘commons’ to explain the problem of the dense web of 
overlapping patents. Employing the terminology of Garrett Hardin, Heller and 
Eisenberg explained how too much property rights in the form of excessive patents can 
create the ‘tragedy of anticommons’.
In 1968, Garrett Hardin coined the term ‘tragedy of commons’ in his paper published in 
the same journal, Science,683 The tragedy of commons is its excessive use and ultimate 
relinquishment given the lack of private ownership.
The ‘tragedy of anticommons’ refers to the under-utilisation of an asset because of 
multiple proprietary claims over it. Heller introduced this term in his article for the 
Harvard Law Review in 1997-98 as following:
In an anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with 
right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective 
privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the
The term is used first time in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 507 F.2d 358 (2d. Cir. 1974)
681 Carl Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting’ in 
Adam B. Jaffe et al (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy (Volume 1), (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 
2001) 119-150, 121 at http://facultv.haas.berkelev.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdt'
682 Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research’ (1 May 1998) 280 (5364) Science 698 -701 at 
http://vvwvv.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698
683 Garrett Hardin, ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243-1248.
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resource is prone to underuse -  a tragedy o f the anticommons. Legal and 
economics scholars have most overlooked this tragedy, but it can appear 
whenever governments create new property rights.6*4
Here, Heller in fact provides an expansive definition of tragedy for which one can 
expect arguably strong empirical evidence in support of this assertion. The whole theory 
is indeed construed in the context of biotechnology patents, an area from which Heller 
cites many existing and potential examples of tragedy. However, the beneficial aspects 
of the tragedy of anticommons such as wealth creation need further systematic analysis 
from Heller.
In their article in 1998, Heller and Eisenberg applied the concept of anticommons in the 
field of biomedical research to elaborate the problem associated with excessive 
patenting in this area. Thus the ‘tragedy of anticommons’ in biomedical and 
pharmaceutical research is indeed a tragedy of millions of poor patients living without 
access to secure life saving drugs. The authors note that:
The tragedy of the anticommons refers to the more complex obstacles that arise 
when a user needs access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful 
product. Each upstream patent allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the 
road to product development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of 
downstream biomedical innovation ... Current examples in biomedical research 
demonstrate two mechanisms by which a government might inadvertently create 
an anticommons: either by creating too many concurrent fragments of intellectual 
property rights in potential future products or by permitting too many upstream
684 Michael A. Heller, ‘Tragedy of Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets’ (1997- 
98) 111 Ila n ’ardLaw Review 621-688 at 622.
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patent owners to stack licenses on top of the future discoveries of downstream
users.685
The main concern is about the entry barrier which an existing or future user may face 
because of already granted patents. These patents usually have very broad claims and 
their upstream location give them an advantage in seeking high rents and licence 
royalties from downstream users. Up to an optimal point users may find it worth 
pursuing and they can continue operating within the system but beyond that point, exit 
strategies are followed which leave the innovation underutilised.
In 2008, Heller published his book, The Gridlock Economy686, where he discussed the 
economic implications of his anticommons thesis. The basic idea is that too many 
stakeholders can virtually kill the optimal usefulness of a property and Heller provides 
the justification of his conclusion through examples. Heller maintains that the 
anticommons can be found in places like medical research, and this is where the book 
gets excited. He narrates the story of Compound X, a treatment for Alzheimer’s that 
remains undeveloped because there are too many owners of relevant patents, each of 
whom can demand a substantive share in the form of royalties.687
Heller warns that the potential threat of gridlock in biomedical research does not come 
mainly from litigation or uncertainty about patent claims. He notes that:
685 Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research’ (1 May 1998) 280 (5364) Science 698 -701 at 699 at 
http://vvwvv.scicnccmag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698
686 Michael A. Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stop 
Innovation, and Costs Lives (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
687 Ibid.4-5.
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A firm might be confident that it will win a particular patent suit but not that it 
will prevail against every single one of a hundred weak claims. Fragmented 
ownership can be enough, by itself, to deter innovation. For example, consider the 
potential gridlock effect of patents related to brain receptors (proteins in the brain 
that respond to particular molecules and stimulate brain-cell responses). Bennett 
Shapiro, Merck’s vice president for worldwide basic research, explains that 
people who take “compounds for schizophrenia often develop other disorders 
some of which resemble Parkinson’s disease, another disease involving the 
dopamine system. A rational approach to discovery of improved schizophrenia 
drugs would be to target specific dopamine receptors. But if different companies 
hold patents on different receptors, the first step on the path to an important and 
much needed therapeutic advance can be blocked. ” 688
The question of whether the tragedy of anticommons is a feature of pharmaceutical 
research and development has generated conflicting opinions. Commentators generally 
agree that the patent thickets and associated tragedy of anticommons is evidently 
prevailing in the area of information technology and related fields where standard­
setting is a key issue. “ 4
Empirical research has not yet provided conclusive evidence of the existence of this 
problem in the area of pharmaceutical research. 690 Nevertheless, leading commentators
688 Ibid. 53.
689 Economists do not have a uniform position on this and some studies still maintain that enough 
empirical data is not yet available to construe the existence of patent thickets. For details sec: Birgit 
Verbeure, Esther van Zimmeren, Gert Mtthijs and Geertrui Van Overwalle, ‘Patent Pools and Diagnostic 
Testing’ (March 2006) 24 (3) TRENDS in Biotechnology 115-120 at 
http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip02/lectures/Verbeureetal-2006-TIB-Publication.pdf
690 It is generally believed that low patenting standards encourage patent thickets. For details and survey
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in this field have discussed various situations where overlapping patent rights create 
entry barriers for follow-on research and development. According to the ‘Preliminary 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report' of the European Commission: ‘individual 
blockbuster medicines are protected by up to 1,300 patents and/or pending patent 
applications EU-wide and that, as mentioned above, certain patent filings occur very 
late in the life cycle of a medicine’.691
Heller raises a number of remedial measures which can offset the tragedy of 
anticommons. His list includes market-driven solutions, property-preventing 
investments, patent pools and cooperative solutions and a wide array of regulatory 
solutions.692 Heller starts with a positive note on patent pools and considers it a 
workable solution in a particular technological sphere. He is specifically appreciative of 
a history of patent pools which have worked largely well in aircraft and sewing machine 
cases.69' However, Heller acknowledges the complexity of the law and economics of
literature see: Nancy T. Gallini, ‘The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform’ 
(2002) 16 (2) Journal o f Economic Perspectives 131-154. However, Industry does not agree with these 
findings. For Industry’s perspective see: Ann Mills and Patti Tereskerz, ‘Proposed Patent Reform 
Legislation: Limitations of Empirical Data Used to Inform the Public Policy Debate’ (January 30, 2008)
A Report Prepared for the Biotechnology Industry Organization’ at 
http://www.fr.coin/ncws/2008/Feb/UVA Limitations of Empirical Data.pdf
691 Director General Competition European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary 
Report, (28 November 2008), 9 at
hupV/ec.curopa.eu/compclition/scctors/pharmaccuticaLs/inquiry/prcliminarv report.pdf
69~ Michael A. Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stop
Innovation, and Costs Lives (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 69-75.
69 ' For the history and background of early patent pools: Ryan Lampe and Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools 
Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century Sewing Machine Industry (Stanford, CA.: 
Working Paper Scries, June 1,2009) at http://papers.ssrn.eom/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id—1308997
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patent pools and wams that patent pools may not work in all cases as "their internal 
dynamics are fraught with peril for bargaining failure’ . 694
Heller is not alone in his prescription of patent pools as a plausible solution to the 
problem of anticommons. Many commentators have recently considered this option and 
concluded that patent pools can effectively address the problems associated to patent 
thickets and anticommons.695 However, certain qualifications are attached to this 
proposal and most of the studies conclude that patent pools work well only in certain 
areas of technology and their universal application and relevance is not clear. This 
scepticism is even reflected in Heller’s approach as follows: ‘Patent pools may be a 
good solution to gridlock in some circumstances -  for example, in telecommunications, 
semiconductors, or nanotechnology, where standard-setting is important -  but it is 
doubtful they will do the same for biomedical research. ’ 696 There have been concerns 
raised by competition regulators that patent pools may have anti-competitive effects for 
biomedical and pharmaceutical research.697
694 Michael A. Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stop 
Innovation, and Costs Lives (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 73.
695 For a survey of literature on this see: Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property’ 
Transactions: The Case o f Patent Pools (Berkeley: University of California, Boalt Hall School of Law 
Working Paper, 1999) at http://vvwvv.law.berkelev.edu/iiistitutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools.pdf: Carl 
Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting’ in Adam B. 
Jaffe et al (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy (Volume 1), (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2001) 
119-150, 121 at http://facultv.haas.berkelev.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf and Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, 
Efficient Patent Pools (Cambridge, MA.: NBER Working Paper Series, 2002) at 
http://papers.ssrn.coni/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=330314.
696 Michael A. Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stop 
Innovation, and Costs Lives (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 74.
697 In 2003, United Sates Federal Trade Commission analyzed the scope and application of patent pools in
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B. VIS IT AID 's Proposed Patent Pool: A Search for Workable Model
According to Professor Amartya Sen, justice is served when equal opportunities are 
granted to individuals and their capabilities are strengthened. 698 Globally, developing 
countries’ capabilities are significantly lower and they face added disadvantages due to 
poor health conditions and the burden of diseases. The vast divide between developed 
and developing countries illustrates the need for developing countries to be supported so 
as to catch up to the more prosperous and healthy nations. Amartya Sen’s focus on 
cosmopolitanism and global justice illustrates the role developed nations can play in 
improving global health rights and access to medicines. 699
What is the best mode of assembling the patent rights7011 to facilitate the research and 
development of new drugs for the treatment of neglected and tropical diseases? Among 
the several options stated in this regard, patent pools have some obvious merits. As an 
arrangement among patent holders to license one or more of their patents, patent pools 
can substantially help in remedying the tragedy of anticommons created in biomedical
various fields of technologies and concluded that patent pools may not help in the biotechnology industry. 
See for details: Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance o f Competition 
and Patent Law and Policy, (2003) at http://www.fte.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
698 Amartya Sen, ‘Justice Across Borders' in Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronic (Eds)
Global Justice and Transnational Politics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002) 37-51.
699 Amartya Sen, The Idea o f Justice (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009).
700 Patent rights can be assembled in a variety of ways which include: information clearinghouses, royalty 
collection agencies, and technology clearinghouses. For a comparative perspective and analysis: Anatole 
Krattigcr and Stanley P. Kowalski, ‘Facilitating Assembly of and Access to Intellectual Property: Focus 
on Patent Pools and a Review of Other Mechanisms’ in Anatole Krattiger et al (eds), Intellectual Property 
Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook o f Best Practices (Oxford: Centre for 
the Management of Intellectual Property in Health Research and Development, Oxford Centre for 
Innovation, 2007), 131 at
http://vvww.iphandbook.oru/handbook/resources/Publications/links/ipHandbook%20Volume%201.pdf
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and pharmaceutical research and development. This role of patent pools is well 
recognised and the idea of pooling patent rights for the development of new and 
effective drugs is very well reflected in many studies and declarations.701
On June 6, 2006, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) submitted its proposal to the 
Government of France and UNITAID suggesting the creating of a patent pool initially 
as a test case for a limited number of diseases. Over the years working in many 
countries in the world as a humanitarian organisation, MSF faced the problem of access 
to medicines and high costs. Other non-governmental organisations also started 
lobbying on the same lines and asked for the implementation of a patent pools proposal. 
A study in 2006 observed that: ‘This commitment to back up the Doha Declaration with 
purchasing power should signal to global holders of HIV, tuberculosis and malaria drug 
patents that the time has come to open their products to competition in developing 
countries, for example by voluntarily creating a patent pool.’702 This call was clearly for 
a patent pool which could cater to the need for essential medicines to tackle HIV, 
tuberculosis and malaria. However, UNITAID has an inherent limitation of its mandate 
and it was not possible for the organisation to launch an initiative covering the broader 
areas stated in the study.
701 Some of these instances are mentioned earlier in the form of WHO Global Strategy and WHO’s 
Commissions Report. The relevance of patent pools for pharmaceutical research and development is also 
recognized in the OECD Noordwijk Medicines Agenda. See for details: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Noordwijk Medicines Agenda: Changing the Face o f  Innovation 
for Neglected and Emerging Infectious Diseases (Paris: OECD, 2007) at 
http://vvwvv.oecd.Org/dataoecd/30/5/39671218.pdf
702 Jeremiah Norris, UNITAID/IDPF: An Analysis o f the International Drug Purchase Facility 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Science in Public Policy- Hudson Institute, November 2006), 5 at 
https://vvvvvv.policvarehive.oru/handle/10207/7658
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In 2008, the Board of UNITAID adopted a resolution which principally agreed on the 
creation of a patent pool. The significant move was applauded throughout the world as 
an important concrete step towards patent assembly for public health purpose.70' The 
UNITAID Board resolved that: ‘The Board further acknowledges the potential 
described in the update on a patent pool presented by the Secretariat EB8/2008/11 and 
supports the principle of establishing a Patent Pool.’704 In the light of this mandate, 
UNITAID is still working on the modalities of the proposed patent pool and the process 
involves extensive consultation and negotiations with relevant stakeholders. Though the 
UNITAID's model is not fully known at this stage705, it can be anticipated that it will be 
largely based upon the initial proposal of MSF in terms of its scope and diseases 
coverage. At least two studies can be cited in this regard which attempt to chalk out an 
appropriate model of a patent pool for neglected diseases.
The Innovation Partnership (TIP) conducted a preliminary legal review of the MSF 
proposal in 2007.706 This review provides a comprehensive survey of issues which may
03 For general comments and reactions to UNITAD resolution: Medecins Sans Frontieres ‘MSF 
welcomes UNITAID patent pool endorsement’ (Press Release, 9 July 2008) at
http://wvvw.msraccess.org/niedia-room/press-rcleases/msf-welcomes-unitaid-patent-pool-endorsement/; 
and Knowledge Ecology International, ‘Statement of KE1 on UNITAID announcement of the creation of 
a patent pool for medicines’ (Press Release, 8 July 2008) at http://www-.keionlinc.Org/contcnt/vicw/l 92/ 
704 UNITAID, ‘Draft Resolution EB8 / Patent Pool’ at (2008)
http://www.msfacccss.oru/iileadmin/user upload/medinnov accesspatent.s/Draft%20Resolution%20EB8. 
pdf
7U> In April 2009, UNITAID shared its patent pool idea with European Parliament and the statement on 
that occasion shows the nature of ongoing work in this regard. Action for Global Flcalth, ‘UNITAID 
Presents Patent Pool in European Parliament’ (Press Release, 16 April 2009) at 
http://wvvw.actionforulobalhealth.eu/news/unitaid presents patent pool in european parliament.
706 E. Richard Gold et al, Preliminary Legal Review o f Proposed Medicines Patent Pool (Montreal, 
Quebec: The Innovation Partnership, July 26, 2007) at
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be involved in the creation of a medicines patent pool. It also gives a practical snapshot 
of how a patent pool can be initiated and what measures are important for the successful 
implementation of such pool. The UNITAID patent pool will start with a limited scope 
and it is mainly aimed at putting ‘fixed-dose antiretroviral combination medicines 
(FDCs) and new formulations of existing medicines adapted to developing countries’ . 707 
The focus on new antiretroviral combinations is obvious for two reasons. First, this 
problem is increasingly confronted by international humanitarian organisations such as 
MSF when they outreach in far-flung areas to distribute HIV/AIDS medicines. Second, 
the organisational mandate of UNITAID warrants that the organization can channel its 
resources to meet the particular needs of the developing world.
Seven drugs and combinations are identified as targeted medicines which include: 
Efavirenz; heat-stable Ritonavir; Tenofovir; Lamivudine; Abacavir; a combination of 
Lopinavir with heat-stable Ritonavir; and a combination of Atazanavir with Ritonavir. 
All of these drugs are critical for a treatment program in developing countries but some 
of them have no generic substitute. Some of them are more important in certain 
countries given the patients’ profiles and resistance patterns/"* Evidence also shows that 
most of these drugs are patented in major developing countries which have 
manufacturing capacity in this field. 709 A patent pool can simplify the licensing process 
and help in reducing the costs and overhead expenditures. As Richard Gold and his 
colleagues note: ‘Without a patent pool, coordination of the right to manufacture and
http://vvww.thcinnovationpartnersliip.org/data/documents/00000003-l .pdf
Ibid. 1.
708 Ibid.5.
709 Ibid. 2. Limivudine and Heat stable Ritonavir are not patented in India. There is no patent on 
Limivudine in Brazil too. Tenofovir is also not patented in Brazil. All of these drugs are patented in South 
Africa.
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sell combinations and new formulations of antiretroviral medicines for developing 
countries is costly and time consuming.’710
A patent pool can be established both through voluntary and compulsory measures but a 
UNITAID pool will adopt a voluntary licensing scheme. " The selection of participants 
will be a crucial aspect of a patent pool and in addition to patent holders, the 
identification of licensees is highly critical. Given the fact that very few developing 
countries have sophisticated medicines’ manufacturing capacity, a pool should be 
created with a good mix of licensees both from developed and developing countries. 
Indian companies are in a unique position to lead this process and a detailed analysis is 
provided in the next section.
James Love conducted a cost-benefit analysis for the UNITAID patent pool in 2008 and 
he presented different scenarios in which a patent pool could efficiently work.717 This 
analysis also presumes that a patent pool will be initially focused on fixed-dose 
combinations of antiretroviral drugs and James Love provides a cost analysis of first 
and second line treatments for AIDS. The main objective is to establish a point at which 
a patent pool can contribute in lowering the prices of concerned antiretroviral drugs. 
The role of patent pools in price reduction and enhancing affordability is a crucial issue. 
Love estimates that a UNITAID patent pool will approximately cost US$1.5 million per 
year. This figure is based upon the calculations which he has worked out in three
11 Though some non governmental organization consistently argue a case for the creation of non­
voluntary patent pool but industry is adamant to this demand. For GSK position: GlaxoSmithKline, 
“Voluntary Licensing of ARVs, Global Public Policy Issues: GlaxoSmithKline’s Position’ (November
2007) at http://www.gsk.com/policies/GSK-on-voluntarv-licensing-of-ARVs.pdf
712 James Love, Cost Benefit Analysis for UNITAID Patent Pool (UN1TAID/EB8/2008/11/1,20 June
2008) at http://wwvv.keionlinc.0 rg/misc-does/T/cost benefit UN IT AID patent pool.pdf
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different scenarios by comparing and varying innovators' prices, generic savings, 
patients’ estimated population and other related factors.7" Love contends that patent 
pooling will be one factor among several in determining outcomes in respect of access 
to essential medicines.714
This analysis shows that establishment and implementation of a patent pool is quite 
possible if relevant factors are considered carefully. Two factors play a crucial role in 
this regard. One, the scope and disease coverage which will determine not only costs 
but also the identification of the source of supply is possible when the nature of the 
patent pool is clear. Second, the overall cost of implementation of a proposal such as 
UNITAID’s patent pool is understandably very high and resources should be mobilised 
accordingly to operationalise such an initiative.
The UNITAID’s patent pool received a boost in September 2010 when the United 
States National Institute of Health announced the first patent to share in the patent 
pool.715 Dr Charles Clift, Chair of the Medicines Patent Pool Board, welcomed this 
development and said: ‘We are delighted that with this first license, the NIH is 
demonstrating its support for the Medicines Patent Pool and its commitment to making 
the fruits of its research globally available.’716 This is an important development as the
713 James Love, Cost Benefit Analysis for UNITAID Patent Poo! (UNITAID/EB8/2008/11/1, 20 June 
2008) at http://www.keionline.oiU'misc-docs/l/cost benefit UNITAID patent pool.pelf
714 Ibid.
^  For the full text of License Agreement: Public Health Service: Non Exclusive Patent Agreement 
(September 20, 2010) at
hitp://www.medicinespatentpool.org/pdt/MPPF Patent License Full Executed Sent 2010 NS.pdf.
I(’ UNITAID, ‘US National Institutes of Health (NIH) First to Share Patents with Medicines Patent Pool’ 
(Press Release, 30 September 2010) at http://www.unitaid.eu/en/20100922290/News/US-National- 
Jnstitiites-of-Health-NIH-First-to-Share-Patents-with-Medicines-Patent-Pool.htm!
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National Institute of Health holds several key patents and it can set an example for other 
public sector organisations and universities to participate voluntarily in this process.
C. Patent Pool and India
In the context of India, patent pools as an alternative research and development strategy 
for the discovery of new and improved drugs raise various questions. First, the very 
notion of patent pools within a domestic policy framework presumes the existence of 
certain key patents in a particular field of technology which have the potential to restrict 
future research and development. To overcome this barrier, a patent pool solution is 
considered. This situation is unlikely to exist in India at least for the time being when 
substantial patenting is yet to be recorded in the area of pharmaceuticals and biomedical 
research. Nevertheless, an international patent pool proposal such as initiatives launched 
by UNITAID and GSK has many promising implications both for Indian local 
manufacturers and poor patients.
UNITAID's patent pool offers many opportunities for Indian pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. The creation of a patent pool for HIV/AIDS medicines would not 
automatically mean that pooled patented innovations will be licensed to Indian 
manufacturers giving them unprecedented business opportunities throughout the world. 
Patent holders involved in a patent pool may decide that manufacturing will take place 
in a particular developing country such as South Africa and indeed there are some 
indications in this regard. However, both market dynamics and technological superiority 
favour Indian manufactures and it can be anticipated that if not exclusively but 
substantially, Indian companies will capture the opportunities arising out of a patent 
pool.
India's track record in the supply of HIV/AIDS medicines to international humanitarian 
organisations supports this assertion. In Chapter 4, we discussed the importance and
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volume of Indian pharmaceuticals for procurement programs of many international 
organisations such as MSF, UNITAID, and WHO. The proposed patent pool of 
UN1TAID will probably start with these drugs: Efavirenz; heat-stable Ritonavir; 
Tenofovir; Lamivudine; Abacavir; a combination of Lopinavir with heat-stable 
Ritonavir; and a combination of Atazanavir with Ritonavir. This pool will be aimed at 
achieving the objective of fixed-dose combinations. The Indian position is very 
advantageous to be involved in this arrangement. Indian manufacturers are already 
producing most of the first and second lines of antiretroviral drugs and even in the 
market of adult fixed-dose combinations, Indian generic manufactures are at the 
forefront.
Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 show the comparative advantage which Indian manufacturers 
are enjoying at the moment. This data reveals interesting insights of HIV/AIDS drugs 
and their manufacturers. It is evident that Indian generic manufacturers play a vital role 
in producing affordable generic versions of medicines and they have over the period 
developed a sophisticated technological base which is required to undertake this task. 
The share of Indian companies is almost 85% of the total generic volume purchased in 
Sub-Saharan Africa which equates with 53% of the total volume.717
With the implementation of the UNITAID patent pool for HIV/AIDS medicines, Indian 
firms will simply increase their manufacturing base by assuming a strong position as 
potential licensees. Both for economic and technological reasons, developing new 
manufacturing facilities through patent pools will not be a viable option. It is also 
important to note that this vast scale generic activity in the area of HIV/AIDS medicines 
is not merely because of limited patent portfolios of brand name companies. It is not
717 Colleen V. Chien, ‘HIV/AIDS Drugs for Sub-Saharan Africa: How Do Brand and Generic Supply 
Compare?’ (March 2007) 2 (3) Public Library o f Science ONE e278. doi:l 0.1371/journal.pone.0000278 
at http://www.plosone.Org/article/info:doi/l0.137l/iournal.pone.0000278
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even the case that brand name companies are finding it hard to enforce their patent 
rights and Indian manufacturers are thus producing these drugs. The reality lies 
somewhere in between the two situations. Many Indian generic manufacturers entered 
into the HIV/AIDS medicines’ business only after the announcement of the United 
States President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief Initiative (PEPFAR) in 2004, 
and they are already in licensing arrangements with brand name companies. IX Other 
companies are getting the benefit of automatic licensing provisions incorporated in 
Indian patent law as they started manufacturing these drugs before the enactment of the 
new law and were given a blanket immunity from infringement prosecution.7'1'
A patent pool on these lines can be highly useful for Indian patients too. There is a huge 
domestic market in India for the consumption of HIV/AIDS medicines. As philanthropy 
starts from home, Indian companies can initially address the needs of the local segment 
and while doing so they can build a strong case to become a partner in the proposed 
patent pool. India has the second highest number of patients in the world living with 
HIV/AIDS7211 and most of these patients desperately need affordable drugs. The 
UNITAID patent pool can become a great hope for them.
/IX Ibid.40.
|l' Janice M. Mueller, ‘Taking TRIPS to India-Novartis, Patent Law, and Access to Medicines’ (February 
8, 2007) 356 (6) The New England Journal o f Medicine 541-543 at 542 at 
http://contcnl.ncjm.Org/cgi/rcprint/356/6/541 .pdf
720 HIV/AIDS data from India has created some unease during recent years. UN AIDS estimated in 2006 
that there were 5.6 million people living with HIV in India, which indicated that there were more people 
with HIV in India than in any other country in the world. However, National AIDS Control Organization 
(NACO) did not agree with this estimate, and claimed that the actual figure was lower. In 2007, UNAIDS 
and NACO agreed on a new estimate -  between 2 million and 3.6 million people living with HIV. The 
figure was confirmed to be 2.4 million in 2008. For details: UNAIDS, ‘2.5 million people in India living 
with HIV, according to new Estimates’ (Press Release, 6 July 2007) at
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However, a careful consideration of additional facts can reveal that Indian companies 
will not be the absolute beneficiaries of a patent pool windfall. The GSK patent pool is 
aimed at facilitating the development of new drugs for the treatment of neglected 
tropical diseases. GSK has provided a list 16 diseases in this regard which includes: 
tuberculosis, malaria, blinding trachoma, buruli ulcer, cholera, dengue/dengue 
haemorrhagic fever, racunculiasis, fascioliasis, human African trypanosomiasis, 
leishmaniasis, leprosy, lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis, soil 
transmitted helminthiasis and yaws.721 GSK’s patent pool is exclusively for the 
development of products for least developed countries and domestic use in India is thus 
automatically out of the question. This is regardless of the fact that some of the 
designated diseases have a very high incidence in India.
The remaining question is about the commercial prospects which Indian generic 
manufactures may have under GSK’s arrangements. Theoretically, there should be fair 
and equal chances for Indian manufacturers to compete for licences of pooled patents. 
GSK’s position is clear on this point as follows:
GSK will offer licences to third parties on available technologies on favourable 
terms that will include geographical and therapeutic area restrictions and other 
terms relevant to the transaction. For pool licensees looking to sell outside the 
LDCs, GSK may be willing to discuss two options in appropriate circumstances. 
We may either allow a third party to sell into developing countries on a royalty­
bearing basis or we might agree to take a licence (for which we pay a one-off fee
http://data.unaids.org/pub/PressRelease/2007/070706 indiaprcssrcleasc on.pdf. Also sec: UNAIDS, 
Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (Geneva: UN AIDS, 2008) at
http://vvw\v.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HlVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008 Global report .asp 
21 GlaxoSmithKline, ‘An Intellectual Property Pool for Neglected Tropical Diseases in Least Developing 
Countries’ (Press Release, 27 March, 2009) at http:/Avw\v.gsk.com/research/patent-pool.htm
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or royalties) which would allow us to sell the products into non-LDCs countries 
ourselves. The preferred option would be chosen on mutually agreed terms, on a 
case by case basis.722
So for domestic purposes, Indian companies would have to negotiate a royalty fee with 
GSK or in turn will need to sell their follow-on inventions back to GSK. It is important 
to note that GSK has categorically excluded HIV/AIDS patents 23 from this patent pool 
and given the patents data on antiretroviral drugs mentioned above and GSK’s share in 
that, a large segment of the patient population will not benefit from this pool. The 
incidence of tuberculosis is very high in India and the Indian government is keen to 
invest in the development of tuberculosis treatment. GSK’s tuberculosis related patents 
will be available in the patent pool but again it would have less significance for Indian 
patients given that India is not a least developing country. Indian companies can, 
however, seek licences from the proposed pool to improve their technology base in this 
area with very little effects on affordability and accessibility of these drugs in India.
There is additional evidence that most of Indian companies will obtain little benefit 
from GSK’s patent pool. In May 2009, GSK acquired 16% of the shares in South 
Africa’s largest pharmaceutical firm, Aspen Pharma.724 It is noteworthy that GSK is
722 GlaxoSmithKline, ‘An Intellectual Property Pool for Neglected Tropical Diseases in Least Developing 
Countries’ (Press Release, 27 March, 2009) at http://wwvv.gsk.com/researeh/patcnt-pool.htm
723 It is interesting to note that GSK has a defined position on voluntary licensing of HIV/AIDS drugs and 
want to pursue this option independently from its patent pool proposal. In September 2001, GSK granted 
South Africa’s Aspen Pharmacare a voluntary licence for the manufacture and sale of their own versions 
of C’ombivir, Epivir and Retrovir in the public sectors of South Africa and Zimbabwe. For details: 
GlaxoSmithKline, ‘Voluntary Licensing of ARVs, Global Public Policy Issues: GlaxoSmithKline’s 
Position' (November 2007) at http://www.gsk.com/policies/GSK-on-voluntarv-licensintz-of-ARVs.pdf
Roshni Gajjar, ‘Aspen and GSK Agree on Strategic Deals’ (Press Release, 12 May 2009) at
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engaged in several patent disputes in India with generic manufacturers and India is seen 
as a troubled jurisdiction by pharmaceutical multinational companies for its 
enforcement policies.72' The likelihood of a partnership is thus rare in the Indian case 
and GSK will probably prefer to operate in the most favourable business circumstances.
This analysis shows the potential application of a patent pool in an Indian context. The 
relevance of a patent pool within India largely depends upon the nature and 
arrangements of such a pool. It is argued here that an international patent pool initiative 
such as UNITAID will be extremely relevant to India and both patients and industry 
will benefit from such scheme. It is further argued here that a purely industry based 
initiative such as GSK’s patent pool may not be useful for practical reasons. The Indian 
industry’s strategic positioning, and the dynamics of ongoing competition in the 
pharmaceutical market, will dictate the terms and conditions of the patent pool alliances.
V. Conclusion
Academic institutions have a great potential to transform the existing state of patent 
policies and practices by revisiting their role amidst the global access to medicines 
crisis. There are indications that universities in the United States are increasingly 
showing their interest in new forms of socially responsible licences and in certain cases 
equitable licensing terms are indeed incorporated in recently concluded technology
http://www.aspenpharma.com/,dcfault.aspx?pid=7<&stepid=2565&oid=7&ctl00 ContentPlaccl loldcrl ctr 
lMainPortletContainer==itemid* 1161Sstcpid*2565Siddcf*828Sidlangvcr*827$idIayout*827$idmode*247 
lSlanguageid*lSpreviousitcmid* 1 161SignoreloadcdcontroIs*True&parentid=0 
725 CNBC-TV Report, ‘Cipla fdes case against GSK on Tykerb patent’ (24 February 2009) at 
http:/7vvww.monevcontrol.com/india/iiews/business/eipla-files-case-against-gsktvkerb-patent 38661 i .
Also see: Nalin Grover Ranbaxy, GSK Settles ‘Imbrex’ Patent Dispute’ (22 January 2008) at 
littp://www.stockwatch.in/ranbaxy-gsk-settlcs-imitrex-patent-dispute-2173.
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commercialisation agreements. However, in the sphere of government policy, the case 
for an equitable licensing regime is not high on the agenda and the existing rules would 
more likely remain in the foreseeable future. The options are then considerably limited 
for the introduction of a cogent and public minded licensing regime.
The most promising opportunities lie in the transformation of institutional principles 
which can allow unique experiments in the area of intellectual property licensing. 
Relying upon the notion of equitable licensing, three distinct options are discussed in 
this chapter with the objective to predict their relevance in the Indian context. Existing 
practices attached to the licensing of publicly funded research and development are 
shaped under the influence of the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980 (US) which poses serious 
challenges to developing economies. India’s proposed legislation also fails to consider 
the level of its own economic and scientific development.
Open source licensing offers numerous opportunities for India with almost no risks 
associated with it. The Indian government can also enhance its developmental policy 
goals through open source initiatives. A policy framework which encourages open 
source methods will strengthen India’s support and push for the Development Agenda 
at the platform of World Intellectual Property Organization. Alternatively, a patent 
based incentive system to stimulate publicly funded research will hamper India’s 
position at different multilateral forums. An offshoot of intellectual property 
management through collective licensing can be developed in the form of patent pools. 
The patent pools option is equally promising for India but practically India cannot get 
outstanding benefits from this mechanism. The Indian domestic patent base is weak and 
sporadic and patent barriers have not yet started playing their role in the Indian 
innovation system. The objectives which are generally targeted through patent pools can 
be easily managed with the help of safeguard provisions of Indian patent law. India, 
however, can become the largest beneficiary of an international patent pool.
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In the light of this analysis, it can be concluded that open source drug discovery is the 
best option which India can use to build a strong scientific base with equitable access 
norms. Such a socially responsible licensing regime can create a mutually beneficial 
relationship for universities and funding agencies by allowing patients to benefit from 
India’s innovative capabilities.
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Table 6.1: First-Line Antiretrovirals
Stavudine (d4T) Bristol Myers Squibb Cipla, Hetero, Matrix, Duopharma
Zerit Ranbaxy, Aurobindo, (Malaysia),
Strides Aspen Pharmacarc
Acrolabs, Emcure (South Africa),
Ranbaxy
(Malaysia)
Zidovudine ( ZDV) GlaxoSmithKline (UK) Ranbaxy, Cipla Ltd, Aspen Pharmacarc
Retrovir Hetero,
Strides Acrolabs, 
Aurobindo, 
Emcure, Matrix
(South Africa)
Zidovudine (AZT) GlaxoSmithKline (UK) Matrix, Strides Acrolabs, Aspen Pharmacarc
Retrovir Hetero, Aurobindo, Cipla, (South Africa),
Ranbaxy, Micro Labs Apotex Inc 
(Canada)
Lamivudine ( 3TC) GlaxoSmithKline (UK) Cipla Ltd, Aurobindo, Aspen Pharmacarc
Epivir Micro
Labs, Ranbaxy, Matrix, 
Strides
Acrolabs, Hetero, Emcure
(South Africa)
Nevirapine ( NVP) Boehringer Ingelheim Ranbaxy, Cipla Ltd, Aspen Pharmacarc
Viramune (USA) Aurobindo, Hetero, (South Africa),
Strides Huahai
Acrolabs, Emcure, Pharmaceutical
Matrix, (China),
Micro Labs Duopharma
(Malaysia)
Efavirenz (EFV) Merck Ranbaxy, Aurobindo,
(200 mg) Stocrin Strides Acrolabs, Hetero,
200 Micro Labs, Cipla Ltd.
Efavirenz (EFZ) Bristol Myers Squibb Cipla, Hetero, Matrix,
(600 mg) Stocrin (Puerto Rico), Merck Aurobindo, Strides
600 Sharp and Dohme Acrolabs,
(Australia) Ranbaxy, Emcure, Micro 
Labs,
Emcure
Emtricitabine (FTC) Gilead Sciences but Aurobindo, Matrix, Cipla
Emt rival Merck owns the rights 
for Canada and
Australia
Didanosine (DDI) Bristol Myers Squibb Aurobindo, Micro Labs,
( 200 mg) Videx Cipla
Ltd.
Didanosine (DDI) Bristol Myers Squibb Aurobindo, Ranbaxy,
(400 mg) Videx EC Micro Labs
Source: Padmashree Gehl Sampath726
_<> Padmashree Gehl Sampath, India 's Pharmaceutical Sector in 2008: Emerging Strategies and Global 
and Local Implications for Access to Medicines (United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (DFID), 2008), 41-45 at
http://vvw\v.genomicsnetwork.ac.uk/media/lndia,s%20Pharmaceutical%20Sector0/o20in%202008.pdf
299
Table 6.2: Second-Line Antiretrovirals
Tcnofovir Gilead Sciences
disoproxil
fumarate
(TDF) Viread
Indinavir (IVD) Merck
Crixivan
Lopinavir (
LPV/r)
Kaletra
Abbott
Nelfinavir ( NFV) Pfizer, but Roche has
Viracept the distribution rights
Abacavir (ABC) 
Ziagen
GlaxoSmithKline
Atazanavir (ATV) 
Riyataz
Bristol Myers Squibb
Saquinavir (SQV) 
Fortovase or 
Invirase
Roche
Ritonavir Nonnr, Abbott
Cipla Ltd, Aurobindo,
Hetero,
Strides Acrolabs, Matrix,
Ranbaxy 
Ranbaxy, Strides 
Acrolabs,
Emcure, Micro Labs,
Hetero,
Cipla Ltd, Cadila 
Pharmaceuticals 
Aurobindo, Hetero,
Emcure,
Matrix, Ranbaxy, Cipla 
Ltd.
Cipla Ltd, Aurobindo,
Hetero,
Emcure
Ranbaxy, Cipla Ltd,
Aurobindo,
Hetero, Strides Acrolabs,
Emcure, Matrix
Hetero, Emcure, Matrix, Aspen
Aurobindo Pharmacare
(SA)
Aurobindo, Matrix, 
Ranbaxy,
Cipla Ltd_____
Source: Padmashree Gchl Sampath 2
727 Padmashree Gehl Sampath, India ’s Pharmaceutical Sector in 2008: Emerging Strategies and Global 
and Local Implications for Access to Medicines (United Kingdom Department for International
Development (DFID), 2008), 41-45 at
http://www.genoniicsnetwork.ac.uk/niedia/lndia V//o20Pharmaccutical%2ftSector%20in%202008.pdr.
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Table 6.3: Adult Fixed-Dose Combinations
Abacavir + 
Lamivudine 
600 mg + 300 mg 
(ABC + 3TC 
Abacavir + 
Lamivudine + 
Zidovudine 
300mg + I 50 mg + 
300mg
(ABC + 3TC + 
AZT)
Didanosine + 
Efavirenz + 
Lamivudine 
(ddl + EFV + 3TC) 
400mg + 600mg + 
300mg 
Efavirenz + 
Emtricitabine + 
Tenofovir 
600mg + 200mg + 
300mg
(EFV + FTC +
TDF)
Efavirenz + 
Lamivudine + 
Stavudine 
600mg + 150 mg + 
30mg/
40 mg
(EFV + 3TC + d4T) 
Efavirenz + 
Lamivudine + 
Zidovudine 
600mg + 150mg + 
300mg
(EFV + 3TC + 
AZT)
Emtricitabine + 
Tenofovir 
200mg + 300 mg 
(FTC + TDF) 
Lamivudine + 
Zidovudine 
150mg + 300mg 
(3TC + AZT)
GlaxoSmithKline (UK)
GlaxoSmithKline (UK)
Merck Sharp and Dohme 
(Canada; the 
Netherlands), Bristol 
Myers Squibb and 
Gilead Sciences Int. 
(Canada)
Gilead Sciences
GlaxoSmithKline (UK), 
Pharmacare Ltd. (
South Africa)
Lamivudine +
Nevirapine 
+ Zidovudine 
150 mg + 200mg +
300 mg 
(3TC + NVP +
AZT)
Lamivudine +
Stavudine
1 50 mg + 30 mg/ 40 
mg
(3TC + d4T__________________
Source: Padmashree Gehl Sampath7“
Aurobindo, Cipla Ltd., 
Hetero Drugs
Matrix Laboratories, 
Ranbaxy, Aurobindo, 
Hetero Drugs
Cipla Ltd.
Matrix Laboratories, 
Cipla Ltd
Strides Acrolabs, 
Emcure, Ranbaxy
Ranbaxy, Strides 
Acrolabs, Aurobindo, 
Cipla Ltd., Emcure
Hetero Drugs, Strides 
Acrolabs
Cipla Ltd., Hetero 
Drugs, Cadila 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Ranbaxy, Matrix 
Laboratories,
Aurobindo, Strides 
Acrolabs, Emcure 
Strides Acrolabs, Hetero 
Drugs Ltd.
Cipla Ltd., Ranbaxy, 
Strides Acrolabs, 
Aurobindo, Matrix 
Laboratories, Hetero 
Drugs, Emcure____
Aspen Pharmacare 
(South Africa)
7 s Padmashree Gehl Sampath, India ’s Pharmaceutical Sector in 2008: Emerging Strategies and Global 
and Local Implications for Access to Medicines (United Kingdom Department for International
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Chapter 7
India’s Slumdog Millions:
New Models of Medical Innovation
I. Introduction
During his historic visit to India in November 2010, the United States President, Barack 
Obama, declared that ‘the United States does not just believe, as some people say, that 
India is a rising power; we believe that India has already risen’.724 These comments, 
which clearly acknowledge India’s marvellous political and economic achievements 
during the last decades, were further elaborated by the President in his remarks to the 
joint session of the Indian Parliament. While appreciating India’s overall economic 
development, President Obama also highlighted key challenges which are continuously 
haunting the country’s economic development because of India’s widespread disease 
burden and poor health infrastructure. He noted that:
Because the wealth of a nation also depends on the health of its people, we’ll 
continue to support India’s effort against diseases like tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS, and as global partners, we'll work to improve global health by 
preventing the spread of pandemic flu.730
Development (DFID), 2008), 41-45 at
http://www.gcnomicsnctwork.ac.uk/media/hidia’s%20Pharrnacculical%20Scctor%20in%202008.pdf.
724 The White House, Office of the State Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President and the First Lady in Town 
Hall with Students in Mumbai, India at St. Xavier College Mumbai, India (November 7, 2010) at 
http://vvww. whitehouse. gov/thc-press-office/2010/11/07/rcmarks-presidcnt-and-first-ladv-town-hall-with- 
students-mumbai-india
730 The White House, Office of the State Secretary, Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the 
Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India Parliament House, New Delhi, India (8 November, 2010) at
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Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS are just two illustrative cases. Several other diseases 
coupled with acute poverty and malnutrition have further aggravated the situation for 
India’s ‘Slumdog Millions’ . 731 The country’s Burden of Disease statistics shows that 
widespread problem of communicable and non-communicable diseases is undermining 
India’s performance as an emerging economic power. 732 Indian patients need curative 
treatments for these epidemics. The Indian epidemic landscape is rapidly becoming 
complex with the emergence of new strains of tuberculosis and malaria which are 
offering resistance to existing medicines. 733 HIV/AIDS has increased the tuberculosis 
incidence all around the world and in the case of India it is estimated that HIV would
lilip:7w vvw. vvhiiehousc.gov/the-press-orficc/2010/11/08/rcmarks-prcsident-ioint-session-indian- 
parliament-ncw-delhi-india
1 The term ‘Slumdog Millions’ is adapted in a doeumentary sponsored by UK’s Department for 
International Development after the success of Academy Awards winner Slumdog Millionaire. The 
documentary shows that over 42 million Indians live in slums, 18 million of them in cities. For details 
see: Department for International Development, ‘India’s Slumdog Millions’ (20 February 2009) at 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/News-Storics/2008/lndias-Slumdou-Millions/
/'° Indian economic growth and country’s accumulation of wealth during last few years is an 
unprecedented phenomenon. Several studies focused on the issues of equity and social justice in the 
context of new opportunities of wealth generation. Department for International Deve/opment-VK's 2008 
Annual Plan for India characterizes India as multilayered entity with three distinct faces: Global India, 
Developing India and Poorest India. India’s policy dilemma is how to improve its largest but somehow 
neglected face. Sec for details: Department for International Development, Three Faces of India: DFID 
India Country Plan 2008-2015 (New Delhi, India, 2008) at 
http://www.dfid.uov.uk/Doeuments/publications/india-cap%3Bl%5D.pdf
" World Health Organization, ‘Drugs Resistance Threatens India’s Battle against TB’ (Press Release, 23 
March 2007) at http://www.searo.who.int/EN/Section 10/Section2097/Section2103 13155.htm.
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increase tuberculosis prevalence (by 1%), incidence (by 12%), and mortality rates (by 
33%) between 1990 and 2015.734
The solution lies in the adoption of an integrated policy encompassing an increased 
health care budget, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation and the provision of 
drugs. In pharmaceuticals, Indians consumers are not yet facing the typical problem of 
inaccessibility because of patent protection. However, they are the victim of a much- 
talked about 10/90 gap.735 It is a paradox that India provides generic medicines for 
millions of patients around the globe, but is nonetheless still dependent upon 
multinational pharmaceutical companies for the development of new drugs. The 
research based pharmaceutical companies clearly lack the incentives to invest in the 
development of drugs for neglected and tropical diseases.736
4 B. G. Williams et.al., ‘The Impact of HIV-A1DS on the Control of Tuberculosis in India’ (July 5, 
2005) 102 (27) PNAS: Proceedings o f the National Academy o f  Sciences o f  United States o f  America 
9619-9624 at http://ww\v.pnas.oni/eontent/102/27/9619.full.pdf+html
735 The term ‘ 10/90 gap’ is coined by Global Forum for Health Research to demonstrate their statistical 
finding that only 10% of worldwide expenditure on health research and development is devoted to the 
problems that primarily affect the poorest 90% of the world's population. For details: Global Forum for 
Health Research, The 10/90 Report on Health Research 1999 (Geneva: Global Forum for Health, WHO,
1999) at http://www.globalforuinhealth.org/en/Media-Publications/Publications/l0-90-Repoil-on-Health- 
Research-1999
736 Considerable literature is now produced which provides analysis about the research and development 
policies and priorities of pharmaceutical industry. For general discussions see: James Love and Tim 
Hubbard, ‘The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines’ (2007) 82 (3) Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 1519-1554 at 1528 at http://lawrevievv.kentlaw.edu/articles/82-
3■ Love%20Author%20Approved%20Fdits(H)(P).pdf and William W. Fisher and Talha Syed, ‘Global 
Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World’ (2007) 40 UC Davis Law Review 
581 -678 at http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Vol40/lssue3/DavisVol40No3_Fisher.pdf
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The role of alternative research and development models is crucial to address this 
problem and recently these models have been discussed quite extensively both in the 
academic literature and in policy circles. 7 These models are generally categorised 
under the broader streams of pull and push mechanisms which include: prizes, patent 
pools, open source drug discovery, health impact funding, compulsory licensing, 
advance market commitments, priority review vouchers and competitive tender treaty. 
In this chapter, 1 have considered two alternative research and development models: 
prizes, and the Health Impact Fund. The original contribution of this chapter is to 
evaluate whether such models would be appropriate for the Indian government to adopt. 
Given the importance of the Indian pharmaceutical industry and India’s health profile, it 
is important to predict how new policy proposals would be perceived within India. Part 
II of this article deals with prizes and explores the theoretical foundations and practical 
details of this model followed by its application in India. Part III considers the proposal 
of the Health Impact Fund and relates it to the Indian situation. The chapter concludes 
that, while India’s commitment to the global economic order is intact, there is a strong 
case for the adoption of alternative research and development models for both domestic 
and international reasons. Rather than relying upon one model of innovation, it is 
argued that a hybrid mix of models should be adopted to harness innovation in public 
health sector.
For general discussion and analysis of these models: Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge, The Health 
Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All (Yale University: Incentive for Global Health, 1st 
ed, 2008) 31 at http://www.yalc.edu/maemillan/igh/hif book.pdfand Thomas Alured Faunceand Hitoshi 
Nasu, ‘Three Proposals for Rewarding Novel Health Technologies Benefiting People Living in Poverty.
A Comparative Analysis of Prize Funds, Health Impact Funds and a Cost-Effectiveness/Competitive 
Tender Treaty' (2008) 1 (2) Public Health Ethics 146-153 at 
hnp://phe.oxfordiourna ls.org/cgi/reprint/1/2/146
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II. Prizes and Pharmaceutical Research
In a 2006 editorial for the British Medical Journal, the famous economist and Nobel 
laureate, Professor Joseph E Stiglitz lamented the failure of intellectual property rights 
to provide a sufficient stimulus for research and development into pharmaceutical drugs 
designed to meet the needs of the poorest population of the world.738 Referring to the 
character of Scrooge from Charles Dickens’ 1843 novel, A Christmas Carol, Professor 
Stiglitz criticises the existing state of patent monopolies and pharmaceutical innovation 
and argues that often these restrictions outweigh the benefits which are generally 
anticipated by the policy makers. He proposes a medical prize fund to supplement the 
existing patent system to improve the financing of drug innovation.
The idea of the use of prizes to stimulate research and development is not a new 
proposal. Economists have dedicated considerable attention to this idea in the past and a 
wealth of literature can be found on this topic.7'9 However, the idea has been resurrected
738 Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Medical Prize Fund Could Improve the 
Financing of Drug Innovation’ (23-30 December 2006) 333 British Medical Journal, 1279-1280 at 
http://vvww.bmi.eoni/cui/eontent/fu 11/333/7582/1279. Also see: Claude Henry and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
‘Intellectual Property, Dissemination of Innovation and Sustainable Development’ (October 2010) 1(3) 
Global Policy 237-251 at http://onlinelibrarv.wiley.coin/doi/10.1 111/i. 1758-5899,2010.00048.x/full and 
Joseph E Stiglitz and Arjun Jayadev, ‘Medicine for Tomorrow: Some Alternative Proposals to Promote 
Socially Beneficial Research and Development in Pharmaceuticals’ (2010) 1 Journal o f  Generic 
Medicines 217-226 http://\vw vv.palurave-iournals.com/iuni;iournal/v7/n3/abs/ium201021 a.html
739 For a comprehensive overview of literature and relate documents on prizes see: Know ledge Ecology 
International, ‘An Annotated Bibliography of Scholarly and Technical Articles and Books on Innovation
Prizes’, KEI Research Note 2008:2, January 17, 2008 at 
hnp://\vvv\v.keionline.oru/index.php?option=^coin content&task^view&id^:82
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over the last decade in the field of patent law and access to medicine issues, and it is 
now widely discussed in policy circles and academic research. 740
The limitation of the existing patent regime in spurring an equitable innovation model is 
a major issue. Professor Amartya Sen comments that:
The counterproductive patent regimes that exist -  and rule -  at the moment also 
provide very inadequate incentives for medical research aimed at developing new 
medicines ... that would be particularly useful for the poor people of the world 
whose ability to offer a high price for such medicines is quite limited. The reach 
of incentives in producing medical innovations of specific benefit to low-income 
people can be puny indeed. This is well reflected in the heavy bias of 
pharmaceutical research in the direction of catering to those with more income to 
spend. Given the nature of the market economy and the role that the profit 
calculations inescapably play in its operation, the concentration has to be made on 
departures that can change the incentive patterns radically. They can vary from 
altered legal arrangements for intellectual property rights (including different tax 
treatment of profits from different types of innovation) to providing public 
incentives through specially devised programs of support. 741
This statement signifies the need to develop alternative strategies to address the need of 
poor patients. These strategies may include revised intellectual property norms because 
existing models have failed to deliver to the objectives of global justice.
411 James Love and Tim Hubbard have given an account of recent debates about prizes within industry 
and academic circles. Lately the prizes appeared continuously on the agenda of several civil society 
organizations and international bodies such as MSF and WHO.
41 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006) 140-141.
307
A. Theoretical Underpinnings
The prize model for medical innovation has many different variants. 742 This section will 
focus upon the work of James Love, the executive director of the Knowledge Ecology 
International, and Tim Hubbard, a genetics and bioinformatics researcher with the 
Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute.
Numerous incentive models exist to boost research and development activities in the 
scientific sphere. The grant of patent protection is generally presumed to be the most 
effective and efficient model in this regard and its widespread adoption all over the 
world is generally presented as supporting evidence. However, there is an equally 
strong discontent as well which highlights the shortcomings and failure of the patent 
system in crucial areas of public goods, such as drug innovation and access to 
medicines. James Love and Tim Hubbard provide a summary of such limitations:
The current system of financing research and development (“R&D”) for new 
medicines is deeply flawed by the impact of high prices on access to medicine, the 
wasteful spending on marketing and R&D for medically unimportant products, 
and the lack of investment in areas of greatest public interest and need. It can and 
should be replaced with something better. The system for financing new drug 
development can be radically improved -  spending less overall, aligning 
investment incentives more efficiently -  while making drugs available to 
everyone at cheap generic prices. Reforming the way we pay for R&D on new
42 In addition to the proposal of Knowledge Ecology International, see: Ron Marchant, ‘Managing Prize 
System: Some Thoughts on the Options’ (2008) 2 Knowledge Ecology Studies at 
http://kestudies.org/ois/index.php/kes/article/viewFile/31/42. Also see: Aidan Hollis, ‘Prize, Advanced 
Market Commitments, and Pharmaceuticals for Developing Countries’, New ICTSD Series on New 
Opportunities through Innovation Fostering R & D  and Promoting Access to Medicines, 22-26 October 
2007, Italy at http://www.iprsonline.ora/ictsd/Dialomies/2007-10-22/7%20ThinkPiece Hollis.pdf
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medicines involves a simple but powerful idea. Rather than give drug developers 
the exclusive rights to sell products, the government would award innovators 
money: large monetary “prizes” tied to the actual impact of the invention on 
improvements in health care outcomes that successful products actually deliver. 743
Love and Hubbard recommend the use of monetary prizes as an alternative model to 
stimulate investment in research and development. Considering prizes as ‘an appalling 
answer to a thorny dilemma’, they suggest that a patent right should be de-linked from 
the market exclusivity and generic competition should be encouraged in the market to 
affordable and stable prices. 744 A patent owner in return should be compensated in the 
form of prize money according to a set criterion. They also assert that ‘prizes can extend 
the community of actors working to solve innovation challenge beyond those who 
would be supported by grant programs’ . 745 Furthermore, access problems can be readily 
addressed through prizes once patent monopolies are waived under the new innovation 
model. 746
Love and Hubbard present a case for a compulsory replacement of prizes for marketing 
monopolies and they are sceptical about the success of any voluntary scheme. 747 Some
43 James Love and Tim Hubbard, ‘The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R & D for New Medicines’ Volume 
82 (3) 2007, 1519-1554, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 1520 at http://lawrcview.kentlaw.edu/articlcs/82- 
3 Lovc%20Author%20Approved%20Edits(H)(P).pdf 
744 Ibid.
4’ Knowledge Ecology International, ‘Selected Innovation Prizes and Reward Programs’ (2008) 1 KEI 
Research Note 6 at http://www.kcionlinc.org/misc-docs/researeh notes/kei rn 2008 l.pdf 
46 James Love and Tim Hubbard, ‘The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R & D for New Medicines’ Volume 
82 (3) 2007, 1519-1554, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 1528 at http://lawreview.kcntlaw.edu/articles/82-
3 / Lo ve%20 A ul ho r°/o20 Appro ved%2 OEd its( H)(P). pd f
4 James Love, ‘Submission of CPTech to IGWG’ (Nov. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.who.int/phi/public hearings/first/15Nov06JamesLoveCPTech.pdf. Also see: James Love and
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commentators think that a non-volunteer and compulsory mechanism is less likely to be 
adopted anywhere in the world and they suggest a slightly different variant of volunteer 
prize model. 48 Love and Hubbard argue that a volunteer prize system would be the most 
expensive and the companies would always opt for a larger sum after weighing their 
options carefully. 749 They are, however, ready to consider the possibility of a volunteer 
mechanism too if an appropriate model can emerge.
The patent system heavily relies on marketing and exclusivity rewards to the patent 
owner. A prize system is different with the possibility of having many players in the 
market manufacturing the same product. Love and Hubbard have proposed a fixed prize 
fund with payments divided among innovators based upon the merits of each product. 50 
Unlike Hollis and Pogge, they have not strictly linked their prize fund with the Quality- 
Adjusted Life Year (QALY). 1 A QALY based system has the potential to over-reward 
certain products on the cost of others which are otherwise important for a group of 
patients. They have cited the example of Gleevec in this regard and observed that:
Tim Hubbard, ‘The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R & D for New Medicines’ (2007) 82 (3) Chicago-Kent 
Law Review’ 1519 at 1535 at http://lavvreview.kentlaw.edu/articles/82- 
3/Love%20Author%20Approved%20Edits( H)( P).pdf
48 Aidan Hollis, A Comprehensive Advanced Market Commitment. Submission to World Health. 
Organization Public Hearing on Public Health Innovation and Intellectual Property, 2007, available at 
http://vvvvw.vvho.int/phi/public hearings/second/contributions section2/Section2 Aidan Hollis 
FullContribution.pdf
49 James Love and Tim Hubbard, ‘The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R & D for New Medicines’ Volume 
82 (3) 2007, 1519-1554, Chicago-Kent Law' Review, 1535 at http://lavvrcvicw.kcntlaw.edu/articlcs/82- 
3/Lovc%20Author%20Approved%20Edits(H)(P ).pdf
750 Ibid. 1536.
751 A quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) takes into account both quantity and the quality of life generated 
by healthcare interventions. It is the arithmetic product of life expectancy and a measure of the quality of 
the remaining life-years.
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We prefer a system where the administrators of a prize fund have the flexibility to 
consider different approaches, rather than only one that is strictly proportional to 
QALYs. Larger QALYs are associated with both the efficacy of the products and 
the number of patients who use them. Diseases like breast cancer, heart disease, 
diabetes, and asthma have very large patient populations. Some diseases or 
conditions have very few patients. In the current market, governments and private 
insurers are willing to pay higher prices for products that have relatively small 
client populations, such as the high prices paid for Gleevec (STI571) or Ceredase 
(Alglucerase), medicines used to treat diseases classified as “orphans” by the 
United States FDA.752
It is also proposed that the prize amount will be paid over the period of time when more 
is known about the efficacy, utilisation and safety of the product and a ten year time 
period can be one option. Love and Hubbard have left the issue of prize size open and 
subject to several other factors. This should be resolved in the light of the overall 
objectives of a prize system and the broader context should help in determining the 
prize size.752
How would a prize system would co-exist with the patent laws? Love and Hubbard 
comment:
Prize mechanisms can be implemented in ways that are consistent with a robust 
patent system, but are best implemented in systems where the patent system is 
used to establish ownership of inventions and thus claims on the prize rewards,
' James Love and Tim Hubbard, ‘The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R & D for New Medicines’ Volume 
82 (3) 2007, 1519-1554, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 1535 at http://lawreview;. kentlaw.edu/articles/82- 
3.T..ovc%20Author°/o20Approved%20Edits( H)(Pj.pdf 
753 Ibid. 1540.
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rather than through exclusive rights to market products. It is important that those 
incentives are linked to broad research priorities, and not be overly prescriptive in 
terms of diseases, mechanisms or technologies. By eliminating marketing 
monopolies on products, there is an opportunity for much greater efficiency 
through unrestricted competition to manufacture the resulting medical products. 754
There are other suggestions as well where prizes can co-exist with strong patent 
monopolies.7'''' James Love and Tim Hubbard clearly favour a system where marketing 
rights are detached from patent monopoly and a weaker patent system operates to 
establish ownership rights and priority claims.
Despite the endorsement of Professor Joseph Stiglitz and the subsequent elaboration by 
James Love and Tim Hubbard, the practical relevance of a prize model is still to be 
established. During the last few years, several initiatives -such as open source drug 
discovery patent pools, advanced market commitments etc. -  have been launched to 
boost the global access to medicines situation but developed countries, international 
organizations and major donors have avoided experimenting with the prize model. High 
administrative cost, commercial uncertainty and the scarcity of resources are major 
reasons behind this reluctance. 756 The proponents of the prize model have failed to
754 Ibid. 1554.
755 Aidan Hollis, "Prize, Advanced Market Commitments, and Pharmaceuticals for Developing 
Countries’, New ICTSD Series on New Opportunities through Innovation Fostering R & D and 
Promoting Access to Medicines, 22-26 October 2007, Italy at 
http://www.iprsonline.oru/ictsd/Dialogues/2007-10-22/7%2QThinkPiece Hollis.pdf
756 For a critical evaluation of prize model and its resistance see: James Love, Why is There Resistance 
to Prize Funds?’ (23 May 2010) Knowledge Ecology International at http://keiordine.oru/node/848 and 
Aidan Hollis, "The Health Impact Fund and Price Determination’ (April 23, 2009) IGH Discussion Paper 
No. 1 at http://www.yale.edu/macmi 1 lan/'igh/files/papers/DP 1 Hol 1 is.pdf
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realise the potential of this idea in the context of developing economies and the so 
called BRIC alliance. These economically affluent developing countries have a strong 
interest in the development and production of new drugs but the prize model could not 
be developed according to needs and requirements of these economies.
B. US Medical Innovation Prize Bill 2007 (The Sanders Bill)
The Medical Innovation Prize Bill of 2007 (US), or S.2210757 introduced by 
Congressman Bernie Sanders, uses a prize mechanism as a non-voluntary substitute for 
patent monopoly. This bill creates a shift away from relying on high drug prices as the 
incentive for R&D and towards directly rewarding innovators on the basis of the 
incremental therapeutic benefit to consumers through a new Medical Innovation Prize 
Fund. The purpose of the Bill is stated as following:
It is the purpose of this Act to provide incentives to encourage entities to invest in 
research and development of new medicines through the establishment of a 
Medical Innovation Prize Fund and to enhance access to such medicines by 
allowing any person in compliance with Food and Drug Administration 
requirements to manufacture, distribute, or sell an approved medicine.758
Section 5 of the Bill prohibits any person from having the right to exclusively 
manufacture, distribute, sell, or use a drug, a biological product, or a manufacturing 
process for a drug or biological product in interstate commerce, notwithstanding current 
Federal laws providing otherwise, including laws governing patent rights or exclusive 
marketing periods. A Fund for Medical Innovation Prizes would be established under
The Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007 (US) at http://www.opcncongress.ortz/bill/110-s2210/show. 
The Bill was earlier introduced in 2005 as H.R. 417 and details are available on: 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd7bill-hl09-417 
N Ibid. Section 3.
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Section 6. The Bill mandates the Board of Trustees for the Fund to award prize 
payments for medical innovations relating to a drug, biological product, or 
manufacturing process for a drug or biological product. An eligible award recipient can 
be either the first person to receive market clearance or the holder of the patent. Section 
9 elaborates the eligibility criteria to receive a prize payment and directs the Board to 
consider: (1) the number of patients who benefited from the drug, including non-U.S. 
patients; (2) the incremental therapeutic benefit of the drug to treat the same disease or 
condition; (3) the degree to which the drug addresses priority health care needs, such as 
global infectious diseases and neglected diseases that primarily afflict the poor in 
developing countries; and (4) the improved efficiency of manufacturing processes for 
drugs or biological processes.
This Section further mandates the Board to award prize payments for no more than ten 
years. It also allocates certain minimum payments from the Fund for priority research 
and development and requires the Comptroller General to conduct an audit to determine 
the Board’s effectiveness in bringing to market new drugs, vaccines, biological 
products, and manufacturing processes in a cost-effective manner and addressing 
society's global medical needs.759
The legislation attracted considerable support from a number of consumer groups, civil 
society organisations and educational institutions but the requisite level of political 
backing did not emerge to get the legislation through the legislative process.760
760 For the list of organisations and individuals supporting this initiative see: Consumer Project on 
Technology, ‘Letter to ask World Health Organization to Evaluate New Treaty Framework for Medical 
Research and Development’, 24 February 2005, 
http:// www.cpteeh.org/workingdrafts/rndsiunonletter.html
314
However, some commentators have also criticised the legislation and its ambitious 
objectives. Professor Henry Grabowksi observes:
While little evidence of broad political support exists for such radical change as 
prizes as alternatives to patents, this could be an important long-term issue for the 
biopharmaceutical industries. Though some foundations and prominent academics 
appear enamored by prize funds as a substitute for patents in the medical area to 
improve access and result in lower prices for new medicines, the cost of 
compulsory elimination of the patent system would likely be a significant stall in 
innovation and medical advancement.761
The introduction of Medical Innovation Prize Bill of 2007 (US) has a symbolic value 
and there is no evidence that such legislation will be formally adopted by the United 
States. Given the political landscape of the United States and strong bipartisan support 
for patents on pharmaceuticals, an expectation of a major shift in the United States 
domestic policy will be unrealistic.762 In fact the United States is not a good starting 
point to test and apply the ideas of prize model and the focus should be diverted towards 
developing countries such as India and China to launch targeted prize funds.
761 Henry G. Grabowski and Jeffrey L. Moe, ‘Impact of Economic, Regulatory and Patent Policies on 
Innovation in Cancer Chcmoprevention’, Duke University’ Working Paper Series at
http://vv\v vv.econ.duke.edu/Papers/PPFvBarrierWorkingPaper.pdf.
762 For a critical evaluation of legislation see: Marlynn Wei, ‘Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique 
of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005’ (2007) 13(1) Boston University Journal o f  Science and 
Technology Law> at
http://\v\vw.bu.edu/la\v/central/jd/organizations/iournals/scitech/volume 131/documents/Wei WEB.pdf
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C. Medical Research and Development Treaty
Knowledge Ecology International has a multi-tier strategy to advance the notion of 
prizes as a suitable substitute to the existing patent system. At a domestic level in the 
United States, the organisation is lobbying for the adoption of the Medical Innovation 
Prize Bill of 2007 (US) to develop a model for the successful implementation of a prize 
system. At the international level, Knowledge Ecology International has drafted a 
Medical Research and Development Treaty which also reflects the same objectives of 
prize incentives in the area of drug innovation.763
The proposed treaty is aimed at increasing the sharing of the high costs of research and 
development, providing flexibility to countries on ways to finance Research and 
Development (R&D), and create obligations and incentives to invest in priority R&D 
projects.
The proposal would set minimum obligations to finance R&D based on internationally 
agreed-upon proportions of member states’ Gross Domestic Product. Countries could 
count all qualifying R&D spending, which would promote local research and the 
targeting of local health priorities. In this regard member states may use a variety of 
mechanisms such as public sector funding, tax credit, and purchases of patented 
medicines. The treaty also proposes a system of tradable ‘credits’ for investments in 
priority R&D, traditional medical knowledge, open public goods (such as free and open 
source public databases), and technology transfer.
The proposed draft specifically addresses the issue of patent law and suggests 
mechanisms to restrict patents on inventions which are derived from open public goods 
databases. It further provides exceptions in copyright laws. The objective is to change 
the trend toward stronger intellectual property protection and new rights on data. The 
763 For the full text and related documents: http://www.cptech.org/workinudrarts/rndtreatv.htrnl.
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shift would supposedly introduce more innovation and competition into the current 
business methods.
This model of a Medical Research and Development Treaty was first publicised on the 
24lh February 2005 when the draft treaty was submitted to the World Health 
Organization for consideration, accompanied by an open letter signed by 162 scientists, 
lawyers, public health experts, government officials and parliamentarians. A plea for a 
multilateral Research and Development Treaty is explicitly endorsed in this letter and a 
case was made that:
A trade framework that only relies upon high prices to bolster medical R&D 
investments anticipates and accepts the rationing of new medical innovations, 
does nothing to address the global need for public sector R&D investments, is 
ineffective at driving investments into important priority research projects, and 
when taken to extremes, is subject to a number of well-known anti-competitive 
practices and abuses. Policy makers need a new framework that has the flexibility 
to promote both innovation and access, and which is consistent with efforts to 
protect consumers and control costs. To this end, a number of experts and 
stakeholders have proposed a new global treaty to support medical R&D. This 
effort has produced a working draft that illustrates a particular approach for such a 
treaty -  one that seeks to provide the flexibility to reconcile different policy 
objectives, including the promotion of both innovation and access, consistent with 
human rights and the promotion of science in the public interest.764
64 Knowledge Ecology International, ‘Letter to ask World Health Organization to Evaluate New Treaty
Framework for Medical Research and Development’, 24 February 2005 at 
http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/rndsignonletter.html
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The joint communication showed that pressure on the international community was 
rising to precipitate efforts to implement a public health strategy for neglected diseases.
In April 2008, just before the annual meeting of the World Health Assembly, Barbados 
and Bolivia made six different proposals for the possible use of new incentive 
mechanisms for pharmaceutical innovation. Barbados and Bolivia made proposals to the 
WHO’s Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property (IGWG) for prizes to reward innovation. They suggested exploring 
multiple prizes: for the development of a low-cost rapid diagnostic test for tuberculosis; 
for new treatments for Chagas disease; for priority medicines and vaccines prize fund to 
reward mechanisms for new cancer treatments in developing countries; for clinical trials 
on medicines as global public goods and for a licensed products prize fund for donors.765 
After the adoption of WHO’s Global Strategy and Plan of Action in 2008766, the 
negotiations started to work out the details of an appropriate R&D model which could 
address the needs of poor and developing nations. In March 2010, the Secretariat of the 
World Health Organization tabled its report, Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual 
Property: Global Strategy; and Plan o f  Action767, before the Sixty-Third World Health 
Assembly highlighting key developments and the state of implementation of the Global
765 For details and full texts:
http://www.keionline.or&/indcx.php?option=coin eontent&task=view&id=:3&ltemid=l#KE[0/o20Doeume 
nts
766 World Health Organization, ‘Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property’ (May 24, 2008) WHA61.21 at 
http://apps.who.int/ub/ebwha/pdf files/A61/A61 R21 -en.pdf
76' World Health Organization, ‘Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property: Global Strategy and 
Plan of Action: Report by the Secretariat’ (25 March, 2010) A63/6 at 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA63/A63 6-en.pdf
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Strategy. A new consultative working group was established in this meeting to further 
review and evolve the modalities of the Global Strategy.768
D. Prize Incentives and Indian Pharmaceutical Sector
Like most of the alternative R&D models, the prize fund proposal was intended to 
stimulate research and drug discovery in the area of neglected diseases. The prize model 
proposed by James Love and Tim Hubbard was intended to address the acute problem 
of access to new medicines in the developing world. The Indian situation is pivotal in 
this regard being a major generic medicine supplier and expanding pharmaceutical 
market. Given the diverse structural details of the prize model, it is worthwhile 
considering the prize mechanism in the Indian context in two different scenarios.
In the first scenario, 1 am pessimistic about the introduction of any kind of prize model 
within India’s domestic context. There are several independent reasons for this ranging 
from policy considerations to structural impediments in the industry. It is thus quite 
unlikely that India will show a positive inclination towards the adoption of any policy or 
law similar to the Medical Innovation Prize Bill of 2007 (US). The cost associated with 
the prize initiative is prohibitive in India where almost 80% of health care expenses are 
paid out-of-pocket by patients in the absence of adequate health insurance systems.769 
The government does not have current budgetary allocations in this area which can be 
redirected towards prize financing.
6X World Health Organization, ‘Sixty-Third World Health Assembly Closes after Passing Multiple 
Resolutions’ (21 May 2010) at
http://vv\vvv. who.int/mcdiacentre/ncws/rclcascs/2010/wha closes 20100521/en/indcx.html
769 Sai Ma and Neeraj Sood, ‘A Comparison of the Health Systems in China and India’, Centre for Asia
Pacific Studies, International Program at RAND, 2008, 20 at
http:/Avw\v,rand.org/pubs/occasional papers/2008/RAND OP212.pdf
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The potential for private sector financing is relatively more promising but the current 
level of Indian firms’ R&D investments does not provide a convincing case. The latest 
statistics show that major Indian pharmaceutical firms have invested almost 10% of 
their total sales into R&D since 2000.770 After 2005 when Indian patent law became 
TRIPS compliant, leading Indian firms increased their R&D spending by 47% totalling 
US$192.3 million. However, it is important to understand the nature of these low cost 
R&D operations which are largely dedicated to the development of novel delivery 
systems, non-infringing processes and similar activities. Given the interest in the 
secondary level of R&D ventures, the combined R&D expenditures of the top five 
Indian firms is less than 3% of Pfizer. 1 A somehow shocking aspect of existing 
investments is related to priorities. According to a survey conducted in 2008:
The surveyed firms were also asked to quantify the amount of their total research 
that is focused on local disease conditions ... Only 6% of the 49 firms that 
participated in the survey conducted all of their research on local disease 
conditions, 18% of the firms admitted to conducting up to half of their R&D on 
local conditions, and a large majority of the firms (75%) conducted only 25% or 
less of their R&D on local disease conditions.772
Against this backdrop, the relevance of a prize mechanism and its domestic application 
in India is questionable. The private sector’s investment decisions are clearly linked 
with the potential incentives in the regulated markets where these firms can recover
770 Padmashree Gehl Sampath, ‘India’s Pharmaceutical Sector in 2008: Emerging Strategies and Global 
and Local Implications for Access to Medicines’, Department for International Development (DFID), 
2008, 22 at http://www.dfid.izov.uk/pubs/files/indiapatentreport.pdf
771 Ibid.24.
772 Ibid.20.
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their R&D costs through licensing or patenting devices. So a case for the introduction of 
a domestic prize mechanism lacks a sound economic basis in India.
A second international scenario presents a relatively more plausible case for the 
involvement of India in a multilateral framework about prizes. A multilateral treaty also 
involves enormous costs and initial proposals linking member states’ contribution with 
their gross domestic product or gross national product, have major disincentives for 
countries such as India to subscribe them. Nevertheless, there are promising aspects too 
for Indian pharmaceuticals for a multilateral research and development treaty 
membership. Any attempt to delink patent rights from exclusive marketing rights should 
be welcomed in India as it will open substantial manufacturing opportunities for Indian 
generic companies. However, recognising the nature of multilateral negotiations and the 
existence of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, the chances of an outright substitution of 
patent monopolies with a workable prize system are not very high.
III. Health Impact Fund
In the field of applied philosophy, there has been an interest in questions of justice and 
equity underlying development issues -  such as access to essential medicines. In his 
recent book, The Idea o f Justice, Amartya Sen raised the issue of transcendental 
institutionalism773 and global neglect while discussing the problem of overemphasis on 
the relevance of global structures and institutions. He criticises currently dominated 
theories of justice which attempt to overcome the problem of injustices through global
773 In The Idea o f Justice, Amartya Sen discusses two different approaches towards the question of justice. 
The first approach, which he calls transcendental institutionalism, is advocated by Kant, Lock and Rawls. 
The second approach, which is preferred by Amartya Sen, is manifested in the works of Smith,
Condorcet, Bcntham, and John Stuart Mill.
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institutions and regulatory structures. Amartya Sen specifically mentioned the problem 
of patents and access to justice and notes that:
Consider any of the great many changes that can be proposed for reforming the 
institutional structure of the world today to make it less unfair and unjust (in terms 
of widely accepted criteria). Take, for example, the reforms of patent laws to 
make well-established and cheaply producible drugs more easily available to 
needy but poor patients (for example, those who are suffering from AIDS)-an 
issue clearly of some importance for global justice. The question that we have to 
ask here is: what international reforms do we need to make the world a bit less 
unjust? 774
This is an important observation highlighting the inherent limitation of different 
proposals which are developed to address the problem of patents and access to 
medicines. Amartya Sen’s conception of justice rejects an overwhelming reliance on 
global institutions and instead provides a detailed critique of the Rawlsian approach of 
justice.
William Fisher and Talha Syed provide a comprehensive survey of work undertaken by 
leading philosophers in the area of patent law and access to essential medicines. 775 Their 
work demonstrates that significant interest has emerged among the scholars of 
philosophy and theoretical economics suggesting distinct proposals and suggestions to 
address the problem of access to medicines. The authors themselves have advanced 
several moral and ethical justifications for establishing a mechanism which can address
774 Amartya Sen, The Idea o f Justice (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009) 24-25.
77’ William W. Fisher and Talha Syed, ‘Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the 
Developing World’ (2007) 40 UC Davis Law Review 581 at 
http://lawreview.law.Licdavis.edu/issues/Vol40/lssue3/DavisVol40No3 Fisher.pdf
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the problem of R&D gaps in the area of neglected diseases. The most recent initiative in 
this regard came from Professor Thomas Pogge. Thomas Pogge along with Aidan Hollis 
has taken a step further by proposing the idea of the Health Impact Fund to stimulate the 
process of pharmaceutical innovation in the area of neglected diseases. 776 The Health 
Impact Fund is an optional advance market commitment system offering financial 
incentives to patentees of new drugs, which are globally marketed at a low price.
A. Theoretical Justifications of the Health Impact Fund
A student of Rawls'77, and a philosopher of justice and development778, Thomas Pogge 
approaches the problem of the pharmaceutical research gap and access to medicines in 
the broader context of poverty and human rights. He offers a two tiered justification for 
his solution: The Health Impact Fund. First, Pogge engages with the arguments of 
libertarians and vehemently dismisses the approval of patent exclusivity as a natural 
right. Second, he questions the efficiency and optimality of the existing framework of 
pharmaceutical innovation which relies largely on patent protection.
Pogge questions the conventional philosophical justifications provided for patent rights. 
The libertarian theorists assert that patent rights are part of a natural rights stream and 
they enjoy the same status of inviolability and protection. Thus, any attempt to 
appropriate these rights on the basis of a social needs argument such as a public health 
crisis, lacks theoretical validity. Pogge questions this approach by rejecting some of the 
fundamental premises of a leading libertarian philosopher, Robert Nozick. He writes:
776 Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible fo r All 
(Yale University: Incentive for Global Health, 1st ed, 2008) at 
Intp:/7vvww.vale.edu/macmillan/iuh/hif book.pdf
Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989).
78 Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Wiley-Blackwell, 2001).
323
[L]et me here focus on the more fundamental difficulty of justifying any natural 
right of inventors to control the use of their inventions at all. Even the most 
property-friendly accounts of rights -  those of right-wing libertarians -  have 
trouble explaining how the innovative creation of a physical object should earn 
the innovator property rights not merely in this object token but in all objects of its 
type. 119
Pogge then concludes that Nozick’s construction of a Lockean argument to support his 
position fails to the extent that:
Far from supporting intellectual property in particular types of medicine, 
libertarian and deontological accounts such as Nozick’s actually refute such 
property rights: specific quantities of medicine (token) can be owned exclusively 
only because and insofar as such ownership leaves undisturbed the freedom of 
others to produce (if they can) medicine of the same type. 780
He then discusses other sets of theories which rationalise the importance of intellectual 
property rights on the basis of beneficial consequences. While approving part of these 
theories that intellectual property rights do encourage some kind of research and 
development in the pharmaceutical sector, Pogge draws our attention to certain specific 
groups which have varying attitudes towards the patent regime. Pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies and their shareholders can be categorised as a happy group for 
obvious reasons. Affluent populations of the world could see this situation with mixed 
feelings. They pay more for drugs and miss opportunities to buy cheaper generics.
79 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity, 2IK| ed, 2008) 
227-228.
780 Ibid. 229.
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However, the overall pattem of pharmaceutical innovation suits them as there is a clear 
R&D bias in their favour.
Pogge contends that patent monopolies are a setback for generic pharmaceutical drug 
manufacturers in the developing world because they are rapidly losing opportunities to 
sell their medicines both to the affluent and poor patients around the world. Pogge notes 
that poor patients are disadvantaged in this scenario:
The newly globalized patent regime effectively cuts them off from advanced 
essential medicines by rendering such medicines unaffordable to them and by 
massively diluting the capacity of national health systems, international 
development agencies, and non-governmental organizations to buy these 
medicines for them. Millions of deaths from AIDS and other treatable or curable 
diseases are due to the suppression of manufacture and trading of generic drugs.7X1
A consequentialist approach towards patent law should also be informed from these 
facts to fix the shortcomings of patent monopolies.
Beside this theoretical critique of global intellectual property rules and their negative 
implications for public health and access to medicines, Pogge offers additional points in 
support of his alternative model. Pogge enumerates at least seven main drawbacks of 
the globalised patent regime.7X2 First, the problem of high prices is essentially linked 
with patented medicines because of market exclusivity. The mark ups in excess of 
1,000% on patented medicines are not exceptional and this leads to a massive 
accessibility problem. Second, the existing patent system is instrumental in neglecting 
781 Ibid. 232.
/X2 Thomas Pogge, 'Medicines for the world: Boosting Innovation without Obstructing Free Access’ 
(2008) 8 SUR International Journal on Human Rights 117-140 at 
http://www.suriournal.oni/eng/conteudos/pdf/8/contesse.pdf
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the diseases concentrated among the poor because this population group is not a 
lucrative target for pharmaceutical R&D. This problem is also identified as the 10/90 
problem alluding to only 10% of all pharmaceutical research being focused on diseases 
that account for 90% of the global burden of diseases. Third, the existing patent regime 
provides optimal returns and profits for symptom-relieving medicines. So the most 
attractive group of patients is the one who are not cured and who do not die either. 
Vaccines and other preventive solutions are far less lucrative options for R&D 
priorities. Fourth, the system lacks efficiency and is ridden with wastefulness. Patent 
rights are territorial in nature and patentees are supposed to secure patents in multiple 
jurisdictions of their choice. Huge amounts are spent on this followed by litigation 
which discourages generic companies from challenging the patents of dubious quality. 
Fifth, huge mark ups and optimal profits, and the associated problem of accessibility, 
encourage the illegal manufacturing and counterfeiting of medicines. Sixth, excessive 
marketing is another problem linked with the attempts to reap maximum profits within 
the exclusivity period. This problem is exacerbated in the case of competition among 
‘me-too’ brands which share the same market despite their respective patents.
The final drawback which Pogge highlights is the last mile problem.7* He observes that:
While the present regime provides strong incentives to expose affluent people to 
patented medicines they do not need, it provides no incentives to ensure that poor 
people benefit from medicines they do need. Even in affluent countries, 
pharmaceutical companies have incentives only to sell products, not to ensure that 
they are actually taken, properly, by patients whom they can benefit. This issue is 
compounded in poor ones, where the infrastructure is severely lacking to
7X3 For a detailed accoiint of these problems and for additional arguments: Aidan Hollis and Thomas 
Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Making New' Medicines Accessible fo r AH (Yale University: Incentive 
for Global Health, 1st ed, 2008) at http://wwvv.yale.edu/macmillan/iglvhif book .pdf
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distribute, prescribe, and supervise the proper consumption of medicine. In fact, 
the present regime gives pharmaceutical companies the opposite incentives. To 
profit under this regime, a company needs not merely to develop and patent a 
medicine that is effective in protecting paying patients from a disease and/or its 
detrimental symptoms. It also needs this target disease to thrive and spread 
because, as a disease waxes or wanes, so does market demand for the remedy. 784
The central theme of the Health Impact Fund model is the creation of a substantial fund 
which can be used to allocate incentives for medicines with considerable health impact. 
This fund will be contributed by the members of the Health Impact Fund on the basis of 
their gross national income. It essentially involves a much larger contribution from 
economically developed and rich countries and in consequence, the tax-payers in these 
countries will share this additional burden. What is the moral justification for placing 
the responsibility of financing pharmaceutical R&D for neglected diseases on the 
affluent population of developed countries?
B. Structure of the Health Impact Fund
The Health Impact Fund is aimed at resolving the problems of the innovation gap in 
pharmaceutical research which badly affect the poor masses of the world. The 
proponents of this model designate it as a ‘full pull program' for the provision of
s4 Thomas Pogge, ‘Medicines for the World: Boosting Innovation without Obstructing Free Access’ 
(2008) 8 SUR International Journal on Human Rights 117-140, 123 at 
hnp://w\v vv.suriounial.org/eng/conteudos/pdt78/contesse.pdf
v Thomas Pogge himself used this term in his book World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Polity, 2nd ed, 2008) Later others also used the same term in regard to Health Impact 
Fund. For example: Michael J. Selgelid, ‘A Full-Pull Program for the Provision of Pharmaceuticals: 
Practical Issues’, (2008) 1(1), Public Health Ethics 134-145 at 
hltp://nhe.oxfordiournals.or»/cui/reprint/l/2/134
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medicine, because it overcomes the shortcomings of other existing pull and push 
mechanisms. 786 As noted earlier, the general idea of the Health Impact Fund is that 
governments and other donors will establish a pool of funds, which will be used for 
annual payments to firms with patented pharmaceutical products, which they agree to 
sell at a negotiated low price. The amount payable to the patentee will be measured on 
the basis of health impact of the product. This health impact will be calculated against a 
baseline of previous state of the art. Aiden Hollis and Thomas Pogge provide a 
comprehensive account of the Health Impact Fund structure and its operational details. 
Some of these details are discussed in the following.
The Health Impact Fund is an ambitious model by all means. Unlike some other 
alternative R&D models, it is not a disease focused proposition and as a matter of 
general principle it is there to accommodate all medicines which have the potential to 
demonstrate substantial health impact. The health impact of a given medicine will be 
measured in terms of the increase in Quality-Adjusted Health Years (QALYs) and 
obviously the medicines produced for diseases responsible for a greater number of 
deaths will have better chances to enter in the system for the reward. This includes type 
II and type III diseases according to the criteria of the World Health Organization. 787
86 Such mechanisms include: patents, research grants, prizes, advance market commitments, and patent 
pools. For a comparison of various models: William W. Fisher and Talha Syed, ‘A Prize System as a 
Partial Solution to the Health Crisis in the Developing World' in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmcr and 
Kim Rubenstein (eds) Incentives for Global Public Health: Patent Law and Access to Essential 
Medicines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2010), 181.
78' Word Health Organization, ‘Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights: Report of the 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health’, 2006, 12-13 at 
http://vvwvv.vvho.int/intellectualpropertv/documents/thereport/FNPublicHealthReport.pdf
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HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases still constitute a major 
part of burden of diseases in low income and middle income countries.7X8
The Health Impact Fund will be a major attraction for pharmaceutical firms which have 
invested in medicines having larger potential consumption in low income and middle 
income countries. Traditionally, consumers in these countries cannot afford to pay 
higher drug prices and manufacturers were reluctant to target these markets. With the 
Health Impact Fund an incentive now exists and the firms can use this option to address 
the needs of a huge but poor market. However, there is a problem associated with this 
aspect of the Health Impact Fund. The problem of rare diseases and orphan drugs will 
continue to exist even after the introduction of this proposal. This model essentially 
links the incentive with the health impact and the firms have no incentive to engage in 
R&D for rare diseases. On this account, this proposal shares the drawback of the 
existing patent regime. Hollis accepts that the problem of rare diseases may not be 
resolved through their proposal and he suggests that some alternative solution may be 
considered in this regard.7!W
The whole idea of the Health Impact Fund revolves around the payment of incentives 
from the pot of money which will be collected from members’ contributions. This 
money will be allocated on the basis of the health impact of a product; the higher the 
health impact, the higher the amount paid to a patentee. A precise and accurate 
calculation of the health impact which a drug can achieve is a challenging task. Hollis 
and Pogge propose the creation of an Independent Assessment Committee (IAC) which 
will be authorised to calculate the incremental health impact of a particular medicine.
7X8 World Health Organization, The 10 leading eauses of death by broad income group (2004) at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/index.html
84 Aidan Hollis, ‘The Health Impact Fund: A useful Supplement to the Patent System?’ (2008) 1(2) 
Public Health Ethics 124-133, 130 at http://phe.oxfordiournals.oru/cgi/reprint/1/2/124
329
The committee may consider the data provided by the patentee and independent 
sources, and it can also generate its own information to reach certain conclusions. w
The Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) metric will be used to calculate the health 
impact of a product and a final formula can be further refined for practical application. 
The authors have also considered other options available but they consider that QALYs 
best fits the given situation. It is noted that:
... We do not prescribe any particular metric; however, the [Health Impact Fund] 
will need to choose one, and for the present we assume that it is QALYs. The 
[Health Impact Fund] then needs to make an estimate of the number of 
incremental QALYs achieved because of the use of a given medicine globally 
rather than the baseline technology. This is properly the field of 
pharmacoepidemiology. Developing such an estimate is obviously challenging 
and this section examines a number of approaches which can be used. 791
Given the extensive nature of measurements involved, the controversy about the use of 
the QALYs metric is not unusual and different commentators have proposed some 
alternatives or adjustments in this approach. Some have simply suggested that a 
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) based approach should be adopted because a 
reduction in the burden of a disease could be measured in this term. 792 Others think that
911 Hollis, Aidan and Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for AH 
(Yale University: Incentive for Global Health, 1st ed, 2008) 27 at 
http://vvww.vale.edu/maemillan/igli/hif_book.pdf
791 Ibid. 29.
792 Michael J. Selgelid, ‘A Full-Pull Program for the Provision of Pharmaceuticals: Practical Issues’ 
(2008) 1(1) Public Health Ethics 134-145 at http://phe.oxfordiournals.org/cui/reprint/1 ,-2/134
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a QALYs metric provides an appropriate starting point but to reflect more complex 
situations, the formula would need to be adjusted in mathematical terms.793
It is still not clear how the Health Impact Fund will calculate the health impact of 
products such as vaccines which may not have a demonstrable health impact in 
immediate terms. Other problems include the refinement of the formula to avoid the 
inclusion of the improved health impact of a situation which can be attributed to other 
factors such as improved sanitation conditions, and better nutrition. Such a situation 
may lead to an unjust enrichment of drug companies.794
The Health Impact Fund is indeed an off-shoot of the prize model with considerable 
distinct characteristics and variations. Like prizes, it needs the creation of a large 
funding pool which can be used to finance the alternative incentive scheme. There are 
two clear issues which the fund will confront in immediate term. First, what investment 
is needed to start this program on a sustainable basis? Second, what funding sources and 
on what basis will the investment funds be generated from member countries. Hollis 
and Pogge project that the Health Impact Fund needs an annual budget of US$6 billion 
with about $600 million expenditures on administration and assessment.9:> The total
79'' Fisher, William W. and Talha Syed, ‘A Prize System as a Partial Solution to the Health Crisis in the 
Developing World’ in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer and Kim Rubenstein (eds) Incentives for Global 
Public Health: Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
2010), 181.
94 For general comments on this point and other related issues: Kathleen Liddell, ‘The Health Impact 
Fund: A Critique’ in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer and Kim Rubenstein (eds) Incentives for Global 
Public Health: Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
2010), 155. Also see: Michael J. Selgelid, ‘A Full-Pull Program for the Provision of Pharmaceuticals: 
Practical Issues’ (2008) 1(1) Public Health Ethics 134-145 at 
littp:/7phe.oxfordiournals.org/cgi/reprint/1 /2/134
 ^Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All
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budget required for this initiative cannot be left undetermined as it will induce an 
element of uncertainty and ambiguity. An alternative suggestion was to fix the price per 
incremental QALY and leave the total budget undermined. However, this was dropped 
in favour of a fixed predetermined annual budget.™1
Once the fund is established, its allocation among the candidate drugs is another crucial 
step. There can be more than the required number of drugs with excellent health impact 
profiles and in this case the allocation of money may become difficult to effect. Hollis 
notes in this regard:
In the absence of breakthrough drugs such as completely effective vaccines, the 
risks in this mechanism are considerably reduced by the fact that there is the 
possibility of substitution from the HIF mechanism to and from exploitation of 
patent exclusivity. If the payments fall too low, the HIF will not attract other drug 
products, which will instead be sold at monopoly prices. This will allow the 
payments on products remaining in the HIF to be higher. In effect, because of the 
possibility of substitution, the riskiness of the HIF payments is considerably 
reduced.797
Membership of the Health Impact Fund is open to all governments and the members 
will be required to contribute annually to the fund. Though not binding the Incentives 
for Global Health suggests a contribution of 0.03% of members’ Gross National Income 
(GNI) to reach the target of US$6 billion. This ratio can be changed subject to the
(Yale University: Incentive for Global Health, 1st ed, 2008) 31 at 
ht t p ://•ww vv .vale, ed u /mac mill an/i gh/hi fb o o k , pd f
79(1 Aidan Hollis, ‘The Health Impact Fund: A useful Supplement to the Patent System?’ (2008) 1(2)
Public Health Ethics 124-133, 127 at http://phe.oxfordiournals.org/cui/reprint/1 Hi 124 
797 Ibid. 128.
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number of countries initially willing to participate in the system and the total amount is 
indeed a humble sum keeping in view annual global spending on pharmaceuticals. This 
amount is roughly equivalent to 0.01% of global income.798
The latest report of the Global Funding of Innovation for Neglected diseases (G- 
F INDER) shows that ‘just over US$2.5 billion was invested into R&D of new neglected 
disease products in 2007 V" The Health Impact Fund funding projections presumes that 
all major OECD countries and the European Union (EU) will be fully involved with 
their proportional contributions, and the funding target achieved. The projected budget 
of the Health Impact Fund, therefore, looks an ambitious target and difficult to be 
matched by the participating members.
Unlike the prize model, patent exclusivity will not be compromised if a drug company 
elects to enter in the Health Impact Fund system. The system does not require any kind 
of automatic licensing to the generic companies and the patentee can exclude others 
from manufacturing and marketing. However, after the lapse of the reward period (10 
years), a patentee shall have contractual liability to waive their exclusive rights and 
share the relevant technical know-how with competitors. It is expected that with these 
arrangements, this proposal will attract a positive response from the pharmaceutical 
industry and in the long run it will be beneficial for generic competitors as well.800
,s Aidan Hollis and Thomas Poggc, The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All 
(Yale University: Incentive for Global Health, 1st ed, 2008) 31 at 
http: 7 vvw vv .vale.edu / mac mill an/ i gh/h ifbook.pdf
99 Mary Moran Javier Guzman et al, ‘Neglected Disease Research and Development: How Much Are We 
Really Spcnding?’(February 2009) 6(2) Public Library> o f Science (PLoS) Medicine el 000030 at 
http://medicine.plosiournals.Org/archive/1549-1676/6/2/pdf/10.1371 journal, pmed. 1000030-L.pdf 
800 Aidan Hollis, ‘The Health Impact Fund: A Useful Supplement to the Patent System?’ (2008) 1(2) 
Public Health Ethics 124-133, 131 at http://phe.oxfordiournals.oru/cm/reprint/1 2/124
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Hollis observes: The HIF would determine a price at approximately the variable cost of 
manufacturing, so that the patentee would earn profits chiefly from the payments made 
by the HIF, rather than from high prices charged to consumers’.801 Pogge and Hollis do 
not necessarily advocate substantive reforms to the patent regime. William Fisher and 
Talha Syed also favour this cautious approach and they persuasively argue that a model 
suggesting changes in the patent regime is less likely to be implemented. They note that 
a non-exclusive prize system will be a potential infringement of Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement I994.m2
Dr Kathy Liddell has also raised several points to show that the patent-Health Impact 
Fund nexus is a complex issue and it has not been fully explored by the authors of the 
concept. She argues that the quality of patents granted by national patent offices is not 
always the same and many trivial inventions are patented. A heavy reliance of the 
Health Impact Fund on the patent status of a medicine may not work in a real situation 
realising the limitations of patent system and significant litigation among rival 
pharmaceutical companies. Furthermore, patents are territorial in nature and the 
application of a patent based incentive mechanism such as the Health Impact Fund will 
be undermined in countries where patents are granted. The criteria of patentability are 
another challenging aspect which needs to be addressed by the proponents of the Health 
Impact Fund. A medicine patentable in one jurisdiction may be refused a patent in
801 Ibid. 127.
8112 Fisher, William W. and Talha Syed, ‘A Prize System as a Partial Solution to the Health Crisis in the 
Developing World’ in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer and Kim Rubenstein (eds) Incentives for Global 
Public Health: Patent Law> and Access to Essential Medicines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
2010), 181.
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another jurisdiction on the basis of different guidelines and practices. All these aspects 
are currently ignored in the design of an effective Health Impact System.x,,!
C. India and the Health Impact Fund
As an alternative incentive model for research and development into neglected diseases, 
the Health Impact Fund can offer some promising outputs for India. The main objective 
of the fund is to accelerate the process of pharmaceutical innovation for the benefit of 
poor consumers. India is categorised a middle income developing country with a huge 
population living below the poverty line. A successful implementation of the Health 
Impact Fund model could benefit millions of patients in India living with the diseases of 
poverty. In an overall public health perspective, India can be the beneficiary of a Health 
Impact Fund facilitated innovation regime.
The implementation of the Health Impact Fund proposal may create several 
opportunities for Indian pharmaceutical firms. Contrary to the general belief, the 
relationship of Indian firms with multinational pharmaceutical companies is not always 
antagonistic. In recent years, research cooperation and business alliances between the 
firms from both sides have increased and this can produce tremendous business and 
expansion opportunities for Indian firms if the Health Impact Fund proposal 
materialises. Admittedly, the Health Impact Fund scheme allows patentees to retain 
their patent exclusivity and there is no compulsion for automatic licensing to generic
X(b Liddell, Kathleen, ‘The Health Impact Fund: A Critique’ in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer and 
Kim Rubcnstcin (eds) Incentives for Global Public Health: Patent Law and Access to Essential 
Medicines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2010), 155. Talha Syed also argues that the patent 
requirement of the Health Impact Fund should be dispensed with to make it a more inclusive and 
balanced incentive mechanism. See: Talha Syed, Should a Prize System for Pharmaceuticals Require 
Patent Protection for Eligibility? (IGH Discussion Paper No. 2, June 10, 2009) at 
http://wwvv.yale.edu inaentillan/ieh/files/DP2 Sved.pdf
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companies. However, the patentees will practically find it feasible to outsource their 
manufacturing and marketing operations to maximise the health impact of their 
products. Indian firms are best placed in this regard and their R&D and manufacturing 
facilities can play a major role in a widespread dissemination of new technology and 
products.
Many factors establish India pharmaceutical firms’ credentials to assume this role. With 
100 approved plants, India has the largest number of FDA approved pharmaceutical 
manufacturing units outside the United States/04 Indian firms have demonstrated 
capabilities in various stages of the drug discovery and development process and 
conduct contract research and manufacturing for foreign firms. Local companies now 
have agreements with multinational companies for advanced stage drug trials in the 
laboratory facilities of multinationals. Some recent, interesting forms of contract 
research include basic molecular research, gene mapping, drug discovery and managing 
clinical trials, discovery chemistry for domestic and global pharmaceutical 
companies/1''
Such a robust industry will positively construe the Health Impact Fund proposal as an 
opportunity and a new business model may emerge in India with the help of the Health 
Impact Fund rules. Indian firms may not have to wait for the lapse of the 10 year 
exclusivity and may be the beneficiary of early harvesting options. The application of 
the Health Impact Fund model in the Indian context may become less relevant in view 
of certain negative considerations such as the cost of participation, the disease profile,
Ml4 Sampath, Padmashree Gehl, India ’s Pharmaceutical Sector in 2008: Emerging Strategies and Global 
and Local Implications fo r Access to Medicines (United Kingdom Department for International 
Development: 2008), 21 at
http://www.genomicsnetwork.ac.Uk/mcdia/l ndia,s%20Phannaceutical%20Sector%20in%2Q2U08.pdf 
805 Ibid. 27.
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the response of the generic industry and the rules of patentability. India is a huge market 
with diverse policy considerations and corporate interests interacting at the same time to 
make the fate of a scheme such as the Health Impact Fund, vulnerable to several factors.
The Indian Government may blanch at the cost of membership of the scheme. Like all 
other funding partners, India is supposed to contribute at least 0.03% of its GNI on an 
annual basis. According to World Bank’s statistics, India’s GNI per capita for the year 
2007 was US$950. The total GNI for the same year was around US$1,069.4 billion.806 
On the expenditure side with a GDP of US$1,171.0 billion, the Indian Union 
government spends less than 1% of its GDP on health and in recent years this ratio 
further declined to 0.9% of the GDP.80' To fill the gap, out-of-pocket expenditures on 
healthcare are on rise: ‘in 2001-02, households accounted for 72% of total health 
expenditure (3.5% of GDP), followed by state (13%), central (6%), private insurance 
(5%) and external aid (2%)’.80N Pharmaceutical related expenditure constitutes a small 
proportion of public budgets. In the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare’s budgets, it 
accounts for 1.4% (US$8 million) out of US$598 million. At the state level it accounts 
for 1.7%, US$59 million out of US$3.5 billion.809
Another factor which further complicates the prospects of Indian willingness is related 
to India’s transforming burden of disease landscape. As seen in Table 7.1, I have 
discussed India’s burden of disease data and the projected changes which are anticipated
806 The World Bank, ‘India at a Glance’, 2008 at http://dcvdata.worldbank.org/AAG/indaae.pdf
807 Chandrakant Lahariya, ‘Budget India 2008: What is New for Health Sector?’ (May 17, 2008) 45 
Indian Pediatrics 399-400 at http://indianpediatrics.net/mav2008/399.pdf
808 Divya Srivastava, ‘A Country Level Report on the Pharmaceutical Sector in India Part One:
Institutions Involved in Pharmaceutical Regulation’ Report commissioned by DFID, UK, April 2008, 10 
http://ww\v.dfid. eov.uk/pubs/files/indiapharmaceuticalreport.pdf
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in the near future. The most prevailing diseases responsible for the loss of maximum 
DALYs are not typical poverty related diseases. The data shows that a substantial 
proportion of India’s burden of disease belongs to type I and type II categories, and the 
prevalence of type III diseases in India is not major public health concern. What has this 
to do with the Health Impact Fund application in India? The answer is simple. Though 
the Health Impact Fund proposal is not a disease specific solution, this fund will at least 
initially attract products targeted towards type III diseases. Hollis makes this point clear:
Poor people in low-income countries are just as much in need of drugs for Type 1 
diseases (those with a common global distribution), such as cancer, diabetes and 
hypertension, as of drugs for the infectious diseases which particularly plague 
them. However, a reward fund with annual payments of a few billion dollars 
would have relatively little effect on incentives for innovation into global diseases, 
but could be very important in stimulating research into Type III diseases.810
Pogge and Hollis persuasively elaborate that the system will expand gradually and at 
some later stage, it could even address the broader problem of innovation in the 
healthcare sector beyond the medicines, but this initial focus can become a barrier for 
India. Unlike many affluent countries, India cannot afford to support a long term 
process which is not immediately focused on its domestic problems. Selling such a 
mechanism is a hard task on the domestic political front as well.
The third criticism that could be made of the Health Impact Fund is that it favours 
brand-name pharmaceutical drug companies. The implication of the Health Impact Fund 
on generics has been a much debated topic and views are divergent in this regard. The
810 Aidan Hollis ‘The Health Impact Fund: A useful Supplement to the Patent System?’ (2008) 1(2) 
Public Health Ethics 124-133, 129 at http://phe.oxfordiournaIs.oru/cui/reprint/1 Hi 124
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proponents of the Health Impact Fund, however, disagree with this observation and they 
simply do not find negative consequences. Hollis replies that:
We expect the [Health Impact Fund] to have approximately zero impact on the 
generic drug industry. It would reduce barriers to competition at the end of the 
reward period of ten years, by requiring open licensing of all outstanding patents 
required for the manufacture and sale of the registered product at that time. This 
would of course reduce litigation costs in those markets where litigation occurs, 
which would benefit generic manufacturers. The [Health Impact Fund] could 
result in decreased sales of some generic medicines if there were cheaper and 
better [Health Impact Fund]-registered drugs available at low prices, which could 
harm generic manufacturers. (Of course, in the latter case, consumers would 
benefit.) Generic firms might also benefit from increased opportunities for 
contract manufacturing of [Health Impact Fund]-registered drugs.8"
The objection has a solid basis from the public health perspective. Though the Indian 
generic firms will not lose substantial business opportunities if a Health Impact Fund 
type mechanism is implemented because most of their export revenues are already 
coming from regulated US and EU markets. But the continuous presence of a resilient 
and efficient generic sector is important for the production of medicines which may not 
be an optimal financial option for the firms. If an alternative research and development 
model threatens the growth and viability of generic firms per se then the long terms 
implications would be quite negative.
Additional problems can also be highlighted in the implementation of the Health Impact 
Fund within Indian context. Building upon the argument of Dr Kathy Liddell, the 
interaction between the Health Impact Fund and Indian patent law reveals a potentially
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problematic situation. With a new patent regime in the country, the Indian Patent Office 
had already rejected many patent applications by drug companies which were issued 
patents elsewhere in the world. With Section 3(d) of the patent law playing a major role 
in the scrutiny of pharmaceutical patent applications, this trend will probably continue 
to boost the quality of patenting in the country. How wili this situation be tackled if 
India chooses to become the member of this fund? A drug which is not patented in India 
but with patents elsewhere (such as Gleevec) may have a tremendous health impact but 
the attribution of this impact to a particular producer will not be possible because of 
generic competition in the market. Another associated issue is the substantial problem 
of irrational use of medications in India. With almost all kinds of drugs available over- 
the-counter and irrational prescription practices, the measurement of the health impact 
will be next to impossible in many cases.
This analysis shows the diverse nature of opportunities and risks which are associated 
with the introduction of the Health Impact Fund in India. The objectives of the Health 
Impact Fund corresponds with the future needs of the Indian public health sector and 
the growing segment of the generic pharmaceutical industry, but the cost of 
participation may be prohibitive for a developing country like India. The dynamic 
changes which the Indian economy has witnessed during the past decade have helped in 
lifting the quality of life and thus transformed the domestic patterns of disease burden. 
This makes India a difficult case for the implementation of the Health Impact Fund 
reform strategy which is mainly designed to address the problems of poor populations 
suffering from neglected diseases around the globe. The Health Impact Fund proposal 
therefore seems a less attractive proposition for Indian policy circles.
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IV. Conclusion
Alternative research and development incentives for drug discovery have attracted 
considerable academic attention during the past few years and several proposals were 
floated to address the problems of access to medicines and existing research gaps. None 
of these models were conceived specifically to cater to the needs of developing 
countries and proposals made in this regard are generally applicable across all fields of 
technologies. However, the special needs of developing countries came in the context of 
policy debates about neglected and tropical diseases, and commentators started 
contextualising the general themes in particular situations. This adaptation has given 
rise to an array of alternative research and development models which are exclusively 
designed to address the problem of access to essential medicines.
On the basis of the analysis in this chapter, it is clear that each model has the potential 
to facilitate the task of new drug discovery. While applying these models in the Indian 
situation, we further noticed that there are considerable challenges which these 
alternative models can face during the implementation phase. This analysis also shows 
that no single model can fully substitute for the existing system of patent monopolies 
and a viable alternative model will operate parallel to patent system. This is particularly 
true at least in the transition period. It is suggested that India can adopt a hybrid model 
of alternative research and development mechanisms.
As a starting point Indian policy can incorporate a mix of three alternative models 
discussed in this thesis namely prizes, open source and patent pools. The Health Impact 
Fund is left out of this equation for two reasons. First, the Health Impact Fund with its 
current form and details is primarily directed towards developed countries to generate 
sufficient resources and institutional support. The moral arguments advanced by 
Thomas Pogge suggest that developed countries and the world’s affluent populations
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should act to resolve the global health crisis. The outcome of such an initiative will be 
beneficial for developing countries like India but these countries cannot play any pivotal 
role at this formative stage of the Health Impact Fund. On the contrary, India can play 
an immediate positive role in boosting the ideas of open source drug discovery, prizes 
and patent pools. Second, the details of the Health Impact Fund and its operational 
aspects are still under review and the associated high cost of implementation does not 
allow us to group it with other relatively low cost methods. This critique partly applies 
to the prize model as well which needs substantial financing for its implementation. 
There is, however, an important distinction between prizes and the Health Impact Fund 
on this point. The idea of floating miniature prizes targeted at tropical diseases is very 
attractive for economically emerging developing countries and, with relatively less cost, 
India can demonstrate a successful implementation of the prize system.
Prizes also share some commonalities with open source and patent pools which are 
discussed in Chapter 6. They can co-exist in a carefully crafted policy instrument. We 
have already seen that the Indian open source drug delivery initiative which is focused 
on tuberculosis is indeed a hybrid model because it provides a prize incentive. In case of 
prizes, market actors are key stakeholders and this model can be implemented with a 
lesser involvement of regulatory bodies through contractual mechanisms. A prize 
incentive will be mainly relevant for new and pipe-line products and it has less 
relevance for existing products in the market. In India small prizes can be announced for 
innovative projects to bargain with future patent holders as an alternative incentive. The 
open source model ideally suits non-market actors. In the Indian context, state funded 
research and academic institutions can be directed to this track. Patent pools again 
involve market actors but they differ from prizes because pools are created mainly for 
existing patents to create future products. A mix of these instruments will enable the
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Indian government to use a specific tool or a combination thereof according to the needs 
of a particular situation.
Table 7.1: India-Burden of Diseases
Disease / Health Condition DALYs Lost 
(xlOOO)
Share in Total 
Burden of 
Disease (%)
C om m unicable diseases, m aternal and
perin a ta l conditions
Tuberculosis 7,577 2.8
HIV/AIDS 5,611 2.1
Diarrhoeal diseases 22,005 8.2
Malaria and other vector-borne conditions 4,200 1.6
Leprosy 208 0.1
Childhood diseases 14,463 5.4
Otitis media 475 0.1
Maternal and perinatal conditions 31,207 11.6
Others 49,517 18.4
N on-com m unicable conditions
Cancers 8,992 3.4
Diabetes 1,981 0.7
Mental illness 22,944 8.5
Blindness 3,699 1.4
Cardiovascular diseases 26,932 10.0
COPD and asthma 4,061 1.5
Oral diseases 1,247 0.5
Others 18,801 7.0
Injuries 45,032 16.7
A ll listed  conditions 200,634 74.6
Others 68,319 25.4
Source: National Commission on Microeconomics and Health*12
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  M i c r o e c o n o m i c s  a n d  H e a l t h ,  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a ,  B u rd e n  o f  D ise a s e  in
In d ia  ( N e w  D e l h i :  M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a l t h  a n d  F a m i l y  W e l f a r e ,  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 5 ) ,  2 a t
h t t p : / / w w w . v v h o . i n t / m a e r o h e a l t h / a e t i o n / N C M H  B u r d e n % 2 0 o f )/ o 2 0 d i s e a s e  ( 2 9 % 2 0 S e p % 2 0 2 0 0 5  i . p d f
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Chapter 8
India, TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements 
and the Future of Access to Essential Medicines
I. Introduction
In 2010, the Delhi Network of Positive People wrote a letter to members of the Indian 
Parliament, expressing its concerns about the impact of free trade agreements upon 
access to medicines. The group exclaimed:
We are alarmed that the Indian government is trading away our lives and right to 
health, in the name of a free trade agreement ... As patients relying on life long 
treatment, we are intimately familiar with provisions on intellectual property in 
such trade agreements and their impact on access to treatment. Our new HIV 
medicines have been patented in India and cannot be domestically produced 
because India signed the WTO TRIPS Agreement.813
The Delhi Network of Positive People emphasised: ‘It is not only our lives that are at 
stake but those of millions around the developing world in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America that rely on India as a source of affordable generic medicines.’814 The letter 
underscores the concerns about the impact of TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements with 
the United States and the European Union upon the capacity of India to develop and 
disseminate pharmaceutical drugs.
813 Delhi Network of Positive People, ‘Letter of Indian Members of Parliament Re: Indian Government 
Trading Away Our Lives in Secret Negotiations India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA)’ (10 March 
2010) at http://www.msfaccess.oru/fileadmin/user upload/medinnov access patent s DN P L1 TT L R - F i n a 1 - 
lndia.pdf
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Economists have divergent views about the welfare impacts of bilateral and plurilateral 
trade agreements. Lawrence H. Summers815 and Paul R. Krugman816 argue that regional 
trade agreements are likely to have trade creation effects with welfare enhancing 
consequences. However, this view is contested by Professor Bhagwati and other 
scholars who think that free trade and preferential trade agreements generally cause 
trade diversion.817 Bhagwati contends that the United States policy shift to regionalism 
is a main reason behind the proliferation of free trade agreements which are negatively 
impacting the multilateral trading system."18 A strong push to bilateral trade agreements 
is weakening the position of developing countries in multilateral trade negotiations and 
in this process developed countries are often successful in including aggressive trade 
liberalisation clauses.819
Instead of assisting developing countries in the process of implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994, the United States launched a new strategy to achieve higher standards 
of intellectual property rights. In 2002, the United States Trade Representative, Robert
818 Lawrence H. Summers, 'Regionalism and the World Trading System’ (1991) Journal Proceedings o f 
Federal Reserve Bank o f Kansas City 295-301.
819 Paul R. Krugman, ‘Is Bilateralism Bad?’ in Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin (Eds), International 
Trade and Trade Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press: June 1991) 9.
81 Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas’ in Jagdish Bhagwati 
and Anne O. Krueger (Eds) The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (Washington, D.C., 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: 1995).
818 Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’ in Jaime De Melo, Arvind 
Panagariya (Eds) New Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
1996) 22.
819 Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, 'Bilateral Trade Treaties Are a Sham’ Financial Times, July 
13, 2003 at http://www.cfr.org/publication/6118/bilateral trade treaties are a sham.html?id-6118
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B. Zoellick, highlighted the dynamics of President Bush’s administration’s policy on 
bilateral and free trade agreements. He wrote that
As our FTA negotiation with Singapore showed, our agreements can also serve as 
models by breaking new ground and setting higher standards. The United States- 
Singapore FTA will help advance areas such as e-commerce, intellectual property, 
labor and environmental standards, and the burgeoning services trade. As we 
work more intensively with nations on FTAs, the United States is learning about 
the perspectives of good trading partners. Our FTA partners are the vanguard of a 
new global coalition for open markets/20
Central to this new strategy was the instrument of free trade agreements which imposed 
intellectual property standards stricter than those agreed in the TRIPS Agreement 1994.
Susan Sell comments:
It should come as no surprise that the US and the EU aggressively have been 
pursuing efforts to ratchet up TRIPS standards, to eliminate TRIPS flexibilities 
and close TRIPS loopholes. Playing a multi-level, multi-forum governance game, 
countries like the United States have been able to extract a high price from 
economically more vulnerable parties eager to gain access to large, affluent 
markets. Bilateral Investment Treaties, Bilateral Intellectual Property Agreements, 
and regional FTAs concluded between the US and developing countries, and 
between the European Union and developing countries invariably have been 
TRIPS-Plus. According to Dylan Williams, “a recent US Congressional Research 
Service report states that the United States main purpose for pursuing bilateral
x2° Robert B. Zoellick, ‘Unleashing the Trade Winds: A Building-Block Approach’ (December 7-13, 
2002) The Economist 19 at https://wwwxiaonet.oriz/oli/fpa/fpa auu()3 zoellick.pdf
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FTAs is to advance US intellectual property protection rather than promoting 
more free trade”. TRIPS permits countries to exceed TRIPs standards and the US 
has been pressuring them to do so. It has offered countries WTOPlus market 
access in exchange for TRIPs-Plus policies.821
This new wave of free trade agreements, coupled with United States Trade 
Representative’s Special 301 mechanism, has played a key role in shaping the world of 
TRIPS-plus intellectual property standards.822 As at December 2010, the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) has concluded twenty free trade agreements with its 
trading partners and some active negotiations are still in the process of negotiation.
The typical format of a free trade agreement which is negotiated between United States 
and its trading partners contains a stand-alone chapter on intellectual property rights. 
The mandate of the United States Trade Representative under the Trade Act 2002 
(United States) is very clear in this regard. It states that:
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related 
intellectual property are ... ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ... 
particularly with respect to meeting enforcement obligations under that 
Agreement; and ensuring that provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade
821 Susan K. Sell, ‘TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines’ (2007) 28 Liverpool 
Law Review 41 at 59.
s2‘ Special 301 (Section 182 of the Trade Act o f 1974 (United States)). Also see: Robert J. Pechman, 
‘Seeking Multilateral Protection for Intellectual Property: The United States “TRIPs” over Special 301 ’ 
(1998) 7 Minnesota Journal o f Global Trade 179-210 and Susan K. Sell, ‘Post-TRIPS Developments: 
Tension between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property’ (2001-2002) 14 
Florida Journal o f International Law 193-216.
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agreement governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United 
States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law. 823
In the light of this mandate, the United States Trade Representative has attempted to 
impose United States-style intellectual property protection on other countries resulting 
in TRIPS-plus standards across a range of fields of intellectual property law.
The issue of TRIPS-plus intellectual property standards is not confined only to the 
countries which are signatory to a free trade agreement with the United States. There is 
now a proliferation of such bilateral and multilateral regional trade agreements which 
effectively hinder the policy space of developing countries. A prominent example is the 
European Union’s Economic Partnership Agreements which, like the United Sates free 
trade agreement, also contain provisions on intellectual property rights. 824
The issue of TRIPS-plus standards and its implications for access to essential medicines 
are discussed in this chapter in the Indian context. As a leading manufacturer and 
supplier of generic drugs, the Indian case is crucial to be considered from the 
perspective of the TRIPS-plus regime and its negative consequences. Given the absence 
of a free trade agreement between the United States and India, this chapter analyses the 
potential implications of such an agreement in the future. The argument extended in this 
chapter relates to the existing norms of TRIPS-plus standards in the United States trade 
negotiations. It is argued that both for public health and trade policy reasons, India
82' Section 2101 (B) (4) (A) (i) of The Trade Act o f2002 (Public Law 107-210, 116 Stat. 933, enacted 
August 6, 2002; 19 U.S.C. § 3803-3805; U.S. Trade Promotion Authority Act) 
http://www.gpQ.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ210/pdfyPLAW-107publ210.pdf 
824 Dalindyebo Shabalala, ‘Intellectual Property in European Union Economic Partnership Agreements 
with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries: What way Forward after the Cariforum EPA and the 
interim EPAs?’ (Geneva, Centre for International Environmental Law, April 2008) at 
http://•w ww, c i e 1. o rg/ P u b 1 icat i o n s/Qx fam Tec h n i ca 1B r i ef 5 M a vO 8. pd f
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should not engage in any TRIPS-plus trade agreement with the United States as it would 
harm its interests on domestic and foreign fronts. India has recently adopted a new 
patent policy and a reasonable time should be given to relevant institutions to build an 
operational framework and capacity before further changes are made. This task will be 
challenging as there is very little evidence about any positive change in the position of 
the United States as it would continue imposing TRIPS-plus standards through variety 
of trade instruments. It is further argued in this chapter that the best mitigating strategy 
for developing countries such as India lies in the combination of multilateralism and 
networking across under a rights based approach.
Part II deals with a situational analysis of the pharmaceutical trade between India and 
the United States. The prospects of an India-United States free trade agreement are also 
discussed in this part. Part III provides a detailed account of elements of TRIPS-plus 
standards and the possible implications of such rules for India. TRIPS-plus standards 
are analysed in this part in the light of the domestic practices of the United States. Part 
IV deals with ongoing negotiations on the EU-India free trade agreement. Part V 
considers the ramifications of the development of plurilateral agreements, such as the 
mooted Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (ACTA).82"
II. The Proposal for an India-United States Free Trade Agreement 
and Pharmaceuticals
A. United States-India Free Trade Agreement?
Currently, there is no free trade agreement between India and United States despite 
growing trade ties and close co-operation.
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, [2011] ATN1F 22, not yet in force.
349
Historically, India has maintained a protectionist trade regime and its international trade 
policy revolved around multilateralism. After 1990, marked trade reforms were 
introduced in India especially with respect to the trade in pharmaceuticals. Until 
recently Indian trade policy was characterised by two key reform strategies: unilateral 
trade liberalisation and active participation in multilateral trade agreements. Bilateral 
trade agreements such as free trade agreements with the United States were not a top 
priority agenda in India for political and economic reasons. However, a recent shift can 
be seen in the Indian stance and India is now gradually moving towards bilateral trade 
negotiation and has signed some regional trade agreements. India is now in a process of 
active negotiations with the European Union to conclude a free trade agreement and it is 
expected that this agreement will be signed by the end of 2010.826 The United States is 
India’s second largest trading partner after the European Union with a total annual 
turnover of US$30 billion. India enjoys a US$19 billion surplus in exports as compared 
to US $11 billion in imports.827
Despite some key economic and political problems, the likelihood of a free trade 
agreement between India and United States cannot be totally dismissed. There is at least 
some evidence that different stakeholders are actively engaged with the question of 
signing a free trade agreement between the two countries and three distinct levels of 
efforts and evaluation can be identified in this regard. First, the most conservative 
assessment of an India-United States Free Trade Agreement is made in different
826 European Parliament, ‘EU-India: Free Trade Agreement to be signed by the end of 2010 say MEPs’ 
(Press Release March 26, 2009)
http://www.europarl.curopa.eu/sidcs/gclDoc.do?language=EN&tvpc=lM- 
PRESS&re ference=200903 2 51PR5 2 62 8
827 Sandra Polaski, A Ganesh-Kumar, Scott McDonald, Manoj Panda and Sherman Robinson, India's 
Trade Policy Choices: Managing Diverse Challenges (Carnegie Endowment: Washington: 2008) 4 at 
httpV/www.carnegieendowment.org/files/india's trade policy choices final.pdf
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technical and economic studies. The majority of the economic experts think that in the 
light of empirical data and economic analysis, an India-United States Free Trade 
Agreement is not a likely option in near future. After analysing the existing nature of 
trade between India and United States, Sandra Polaski and her colleagues conclude that 
The prospects of a free trade agreement between India and the United States are not 
strong in the foreseeable future’.828 They state that: The most striking overall result of 
the simulations in this study is that the gains for the Indian economy from both 
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements are surprisingly modest’.829 The study 
considers a number of possible scenarios:
The three potential bilateral agreements simulated in this study result in smaller 
gains for the Indian economy than a Doha agreement and losses for Indian 
households. This suggests that the Indian government should proceed cautiously 
with bilateral agreements. It appears that such agreements would unambiguously 
increase investment in the Indian economy, a welcome development, but by 
extremely modest amounts. However there would be a trade-off to achieve these 
investments, with reductions in household welfare under free trade with the EU 
and United States, at least in the short term. Given the low incomes of most Indian 
households and the country’s high poverty rate, inflicting even short-term welfare 
losses on these households is not to be taken lightly.830
The chemical sector in United Sates will be a winner under a free trade agreement with 
exports of US$230 million. Indian pharmaceutical companies will gain very little under 
a bilateral trade liberalisation regime as the current level of entry barriers in the United
Ibid 
Ibid. 65
830 Ibid. 66.
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States pharmaceutical market are not insurmountable for Indian manufacturers and they 
are independent of any FTA conditions.
Some commentators think that India should sign a free trade agreement with the United 
States despite it making less economic sense at this stage because it can help in 
introducing broader reforms in Indian economy. Robert Z. Lawrence and Rajesh 
Chadha argue that:
India also has positive reasons to enter into an FTA, namely, the role the FTA can 
play in stimulating Indian liberalization and reform. The agreement could be used 
to propel change in a host of areas including trade policy, tax reform, services, 
industrial policy, foreign direct investment, regulatory policy, competition policy, 
customs administration, public sector enterprises, agricultural policy, public 
procurement, governmental transparency, and technical and sanitary standards. 831
This report fails to address the social implications of such reforms in a country where 
issues of poverty and inequality are profound. An industrial policy reform which 
automatically includes the modernisation of patent law through a TRIPS-plus model 
will create huge barriers for access to essential medicine regimes. There is a need to 
account for any welfare losses associated with the impact of a free trade agreement upon 
the Indian pharmaceutical market. Any such analysis should not be confined within 
India as Indian drugs are critically important for millions of patients all over the world.
The second tier of analysis to assess the potential of an India-United States Free Trade
agreement can be made on the political front. Interestingly, there is more activity in the
831 Robert Z. Lawrence and Rajesh Chadha, ‘Should a U.S.-India FTA Be Part of India’s Trade Strategy?’ 
in Arvind Panagariya, Barry P. Bosworth and Suman Bery (eds), The India Policy Forum 2004 Volume I 
(Brookings Institution Press and National Council Of Applied Economic Research India: 2005) 45 at 
http://www. hks.harvard.edu/fs/rlawTence/-l.aw rence.pdf
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United States in this regard and Indian politicians seldom express their views on this 
issue. In January 2008, Republication Congressman, David Dreier, introduced a 
Resolution in the Congress to express the sentiment of the House of Representatives 
with respect to trade relationship between India and the United States.8"2 This 
Resolution was co-sponsored by Joseph Crowley, a Democratic Congressman from 
New York. This Resolution categorically demanded that ‘the United States should 
initiate negotiations to enter into a free trade agreement with India’.8" This Resolution 
could not be adopted by the House and it was referred to the House Committee on Ways 
and Means.
David Dreier highlighted the importance of trade relations with India and said that:
In an increasingly inter-connected world, our relationship with India is especially 
critical. From a national security perspective, we should do all we can to engage 
with allies like India. From an economic perspective, India represents a huge 
economic opportunity for American farmers, workers and businesses, particularly 
in California. From a humanitarian perspective, increasing trade with India could 
help lift millions of people out of poverty. Increased trade with India would be a 
win-win-win. Maintaining a strong U.S.-India relationship is strategically, 
politically, and economically important to both of our nations.834
8 ,2 House Resolution 928 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to the trade 
relationship between the United States and India (January 17, 2008) at 
http://www.govtraek.us/congrcss/bill.xpd?bill=hrl 10-928 
833 Ibid.
Sl4 Dreier, Crowley Urge U.S.-India Free Trade Agreement (News Release January 17, 2008) at 
http://dreier.house.gov/archives.htm
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The trade policy agenda of Barack Obama in 2010 also demonstrates that the conclusion 
of a free trade agreement between India and the United States is not possible in the near 
future. Most of the focus in the President’s 2010 Trade Policy Agenda was on trade 
talks through the US-India Trade Policy Forum which was established in 2005. 
According to this new policy:
In 2010, as part of the Trade Policy Forum, we intend to address key trade 
irritants and develop cooperative initiatives -  especially on issues related to 
innovation, services, agriculture, market access, and investment. Our plans also 
include work on a commercial space launch agreement and continued negotiation 
of a Bilateral Investment Treaty.835
Perhaps the most candid view about a free trade agreement with India was expressed by 
the former Bush administration United States Trade Representative, Susan Schwab, 
who categorically excluded the possibility of signing a free trade agreement with India 
in the near future.836
The absence of a focus on free trade agreement with India does not mean that the United 
States is not interested in the implementation of TRIPS-plus standards in India. 
Realising the limitations of a bilateral trade agreement and its possible constraints on 
the agriculture and services sector, the United States is using its diplomatic and trade 
sanction regimes to impose a TRIPS-plus regime on India. The recent initiative of 
technical collaboration with the Indian Patent office for modernisation and training 
purposes clearly establishes the emergence of the United States’ subtle influence in the
835 Office of the United States Trade Representative, The President’s 2010 Trade Policy Agenda (March 
2010) 7 at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm send/1673
8,6 ‘No FTA with India for Now, says US’, Express India (February 21,2008) at 
http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/No-FTA-with-lndia-for-now-savs-US/275510/
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area of policy implementation and statutory interpretation/' Yet the aggressive push for 
TRIPS-plus standards comes through the United States Trade Representative’s Special 
301 mechanism. In its Annual Report 2009, USTR observed that:
India will remain on the Priority Watch List in 2009 ... the United States remains 
concerned about weak IPR protection and enforcement in India. The United States 
continues to urge India to improve its IPR regime by providing stronger protection 
for copyrights and patents, as well as effective protection against unfair 
commercial use of undisclosed test and other data generated to obtain marketing 
approval for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products ... Piracy and 
counterfeiting, including of pharmaceuticals, remain a serious problem in India. 
India’s criminal IPR enforcement regime remains weak.838
83 Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Cooperation between the Office of the Controller General 
of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry of the Republican of India and the United States Patents and Trademark Office, 
U.S. Department of Commerce (23 November 2009) at 
http://dipp.nic.imacts/MOU of bilateral cooperation with usa.pdf
8,8 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2009 Special 301 Report (April 30, 2009) 18 at 
http://www.ustr. uov/sites/default/fi les/Full%20Version%20of%20the%202009%20SPECl A L%20301%2 
0RfcPQRT.pdf
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There is a clear demand for TRIPS-plus measures in this statement as India already has 
a functional system for the protection of undisclosed data/"' This system is obviously 
different from the one which is practised in the United States and as such there is no 
obligation in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 calling for a particular form of protection in 
this regard. However, the United States is consistently pushing its own slanted 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and demanding 
that India adopt TRIPS-plus measures.
A third tier of evaluation of a free trade agreement between India and the United States 
comes from the business and commercial sector. On this front, several Indian 
companies are active, seeing a great potential in terms of market access. The advocacy 
efforts of the US-India Business Council are prominent in this regard. The Council 
supports a ‘U.S.-India Free Trade Initiative: The initiative seeks to reduce bilateral 
trade and investment barriers in a socially sustainable manner, and ultimately lead the 
way to a U.S.-India Free Trade Agreement -  potentially the largest ever negotiated’.840
v'4 For a general overview of Indian test data protection regime see: Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Test Data 
Protection, Data Exclusivity and TRIPS: What Options for India (September 10, 2006) at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.ctm7abstrdct id=935847&http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract i 
d=935847. However, there is an ongoing debate in India about the effectiveness of it existing system but there 
is wide consensus that India should not adopt a TRIPS-plus data exclusivity regime. Other options discussed in 
this regard include possibility of amending the Dnig and Cosmetics Act 1940 (India). Also see: Shamnad 
Basheer, Protection o f Regulatory Data under Article 39.9 o f TRIPS: The Indian Context (Intellectual Property 
Institute: 2006) at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papcrs.cfm7abstract_kU934269
840 US-lndia Business Council, U.S.-India Business Council Supports Successful Conclusion to Doha 
Development Agenda Negotiations (Press Release September 4, 2007) at
http://wAvw.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlvres/ecp4747ptm73bocdm3xkwehdohbdvd67n2uf5htpniltna7w6vit 
hpni2yk<tmomdvz5pvkpl34mpipptalwaa3hke7mg/USlBCSupportsSuccessfulConclusiontoDohaDevelop 
merit AttendaNegotiations.pdf
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In June 2009, the US-India Business Council released a report criticising India’s 
existing approach towards pharmaceutical innovation. The Report specifically 
questioned the rationale of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) and proposed an 
alternative regime which can encourage incremental innovation in healthcare and the 
pharmaceutical sector. The Report recommended that;
[RJemoval of Section 3(d) from the Patents Act will not lead to an increase in 
drug prices or a decrease in access to medicine in India ... Providing the right 
incentives for incremental pharmaceutical innovation can move India forward on 
this path and encourage the development of drug products that meet the needs of 
Indian patients. Reforming Section 3(d) to encourage and protect incremental 
pharmaceutical innovation would create such incentives and help India become a 
true powerhouse of innovation.841
Realising that there is no obligation under the TRIPS Agreement 1994 which requires 
the removal of Section 3(d), the demand on the part of a leading business organisation is 
an attempt to impose TRIPS-plus measures. This TRIPS-plus agenda further intensified 
in the light of the fact that PhRMA had also expressed the same view about Section 3(d) 
in its latest submission to USTR.842
841 US-India Business Council and Coalition for Healthy India, The Value of Incremental Pharmaceutical 
Innovation: Benefits for Indian Patients and Indian Business: A Report Prepared for the US-India 
Business Council (June 2009) 18 at
http://vvwvv.ahealthvindia.org/NR/rdoiilvres/edq7axi5zukil311137sv7ulswpiz4r7xt6ktixqqiianixt3xummbg 
6xcq4ffgvc25iirgu53scgs7v4fbistcxvob/USlBClncrcmentalInnovationRcportFinal.pdf 
84~ Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Special 301 Submission 2009 (February 17, 
2009) 57 at
http://wvvvv.phrma.org/news_room/press releases/phrma 301 submission supports global intellectual 
property priorities
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The dynamics of pharmaceutical trade between India and the United States is another 
important factor which needs appropriate analysis. Indian drug manufacturers have 
significant trade opportunities in the United States which is the world’s largest 
pharmaceutical market. However, at present, Indian pharmaceutical imports are 
currently marginal. India’s share in the pharmaceutical imports of the United States is 
less than 2%.843 On the contrary, the United States market is extremely important for 
Indian manufacturers as it is the largest export destination for Indian companies.*44 The 
future role of Indian drug manufactures in the United States generic market is bound to 
change as Indian companies are aggressively filing Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
(ANDA). Initially very few Indian companies could obtain ANDA approvals but the 
rate of success has improved to 701 ANDAs filed by 17 companies in 2007.84:s However, 
the Indian manufacturer may face significant challenges in the United States generic 
market, including competition from Chinese generic manufacturers. Indian companies 
have demonstrated reliable technical skills in the area of small molecular chemistry and 
formulations, but it has significant constraints in the area of biotech products.846
India’s domestic pharmaceutical market is less attractive from the perspective of the 
United States pharmaceutical companies. Despite its huge population, India is a high 
volume and low profit country and there is a little interest in the Indian domestic
84-1 Deepak Kumar Jena et al, "Presence of Indian Pharmaceutical Industries in US Market: An Empirical 
Analysis’ (2009) 6 Journal o f Generic Medicines 333-344, 334.
844 Ibid.
845 Reji K Joseph, India’s Trade in Drugs and Pharmaceuticals: Emerging Trends, Opportunities and 
Challenges (Research and Information System for Developing Countries Discussion Paper No # 159: 
Delhi, November 2009) 20.
846 For a general review of Indian pharmaceutical Industry in the United States market sec: William 
Greene, The Emergence o f India ’s Pharmaceutical Industry and Implications fo r the U.S. Generic Drug 
Market (Office of Economics Working Paper, U.S. International Trade Commission: Washington, 2007).
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market. However, the United States pharmaceutical firms are keenly interested in Indian 
drug and pharmaceutical regulations for two different reasons. First, drug manufacturing 
in India is commercially an attractive proposition and multinational pharmaceutical 
companies can shift some of their high cost operations to India. Second, the ability of 
Indian pharmaceutical companies to export generic medicines is a disturbing feature for 
multinational Finns and they want to curb this comparative advantage through stricter 
patent standards.
This is the context in which the whole debate of TRIPS-plus norms should be analysed 
from the Indian perspective. There are threats and opportunities for different segments 
of the Indian industrial sector and no balanced approach has yet evolved which can 
address this crucial policy challenge.
Despite widespread rhetoric about the economic and commercial significance of free 
trade agreements, it is crucial to measure a potential and actual impact of such 
agreements on developing countries. Most of the feasibility studies conducted on the 
United States-India and EU-India free trade agreements rely upon mainstream economic 
modeling which is indeed inadequate both in terms of its content and process. Professor 
Joseph Stiglitz, Professor Amartya Sen and Professor Jean-Paul Fitoussi have discussed 
the limitations and inadequacies of measurement techniques which are generally used to 
study economic performance and social progress. s47 They analyse the limits of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) as an indicator of economic performance and social progress 
and assess alternative measurements of performance. The long term impact of free trade 
agreements should also be calculated on the basis of such inclusive measurement 
methods which also consider the well-being of the citizens. Amartya Sen's capability
847 Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, ‘Report by the Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress’ (France: 2009) at http:/7www.stiulitz-sen- 
fitoussi.fr/doeuments/rapport_aimlais.pdf
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approach can further enrich such an analysis which goes beyond pure economic gains 
and trade benefits.
B. Bayer Corporation v. Union of India
Should India follow the United States’ approach on the issue of patent-regulatory 
approval linkage or it should adopt a distinct model allowing operational space to 
generic manufacturers?
In a recent case of Bayer Corporation v. Union o f India*4*, the question of patent-drug 
registration linkage was considered by the High Court of Delhi and Bayer’s stance was 
dismissed both by the Single Bench and Appellate Court.
This controversy was basically between Bayer Corporation and Cipla Limited. In March 
2008, Bayer Corporation secured a patent for the drug, sorafenib tosylate (Nexavar) 
which is used to treat renal cell carcinoma. In the United States, sorafenib was approved 
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in December 2005 and the Orange 
Book lists two relevant patents with the expiry date of January 12, 2020.<S4V A 
corresponding Indian patent was granted in March 2008. In the meanwhile, Bayer 
Corporation also secured a license under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 (India) to
S4S Bayer Corporation v Union o f India (High Court of Delhi: February 9, 2010) LPA 443/2009 at 
http://lobis.nic.in/dhe/
N49 Riedl, Bernd et al (2007), ‘Omega-carboxyaryl substituted diphenyl ureas as raf kinase inhibitors’ US 
Patent No: 7,235,576 at http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parscr?Sectl=PTQl&Sect2=HlTOFF&d=PALL&p=l&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=l 
&f=G&l=5Q&sl=7235576.PN.&OS=PN/7235576&RS=PN/7235576 and Riedl, Bernd et al (2008), 
‘Omega.-Carboxyaryl substituted diphenyl ureas as raf kinase inhibitors’ US Patent No: 7,351,834 at 
http://patft.uspto.izov/netacgi/nph-
Parser7Sectl=PT01&Sect2-HrrQFF&d=PALL&p=l&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTQ%2Fsrchnum.htm&r-1 
&f=G& K50&S 1 -7351834.PN.&OS PN 7351834&RS=PN/735 1834
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import sorafenib tosylate into India.*50 In July 2008, Cipla, a leading Indian generic 
manufacturer, announced the launch of its generic version of sorafenib tosylate under 
the brand name of Soranib. Bayer Corporation approached the office of the Drug 
Controller General of India and requested that marketing approval should not be granted 
to Cipla’s generic product. Bayer Corporation also wrote a similar letter to Cipla asking 
it to confirm the launch of Soranib but no reply was received in this regard.
Finally, Bayer Corporation filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court on October 31, 
2008 to seek a restraining order against the Drug Controller General of India from 
granting license to Cipla ‘to manufacture and market, to imitate/substitute sorafenib 
tosylate protected under subject patent number 215758’.S5i Cipla was also made a party 
in the case and an undertaking was demanded from Cipla to certify that its drug did not 
infringe Bayer Corporation’s patent. This matter was heard by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat 
and initially an interim ex-parte restraining order was passed in favour of the petitioner. 
Cipla then applied for vacation of the order and in the final order, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat 
dismissed the plea of Bayer Corporation with ‘costs quantified at Rs. 6,75,000/- payable in 
equal shares to the Union of India, and Cipla’.852 The Bayer Corporation subsequently 
appealed this order before the Divisional Bench of Delhi High Court which announced its 
judgment on February 9, 2010. The Bayer Corporation v. Union o f India & Others is the 
first case in India in which the question of patent-regulatory approval linkage has been 
decided by the court. In support of its position, Bayer Corporation presented the 
following three arguments.
851 Ibid. 4.
s " Bayer Corporation v Union o f India & Others (High Court of Delhi: August 8, 2009) WP(C)
No.7833/2008 at http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SRB/iudiiement/18-08-2009/SRB18082009MATC78332008.pdf
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First, Section 48 of the Patents Act 1970 (India) states that a patent holder has exclusive 
right to restrain anyone from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing the 
patented drug. This provision should be read with Section 2 of the Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act 1940 (India) which states that the provisions of this law are not in derogation of any 
other law. Bayer Corporation also relied upon statutory interpretations given by the 
Supreme Court of India in Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceutical Ltd7" 
Second, the concept of patent-regulatory approval linkage is not a new phenomenon in 
India and relevant forms developed by the health authorities do require the mention of 
patent status. Form 44 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 (India) is specifically 
referred in this regard. Third, Bayer Corporation also maintained that Cipla’s generic 
version of sorafenib tosylate would be a spurious drug within the meaning of the Drugs 
and Cosmetics Act 1940 (India).8"4
In response to the contentions of Bayer Corporation, Cipla argued that Indian law did 
not acknowledge the notion of Patent-regulatory approval linkage and the Parliament 
had cautiously avoided the introduction of such a regime in India. The scheme and 
objectives of patent law and drug regulations are totally different and any linkage would 
result in delays and inefficiencies. It was further argued that any mention of patent 
status in Form 44 was mainly to indicate bio-availability and bio-equivalence. The grant 
of patent can be challenged and if such proceedings are pending then the linkage would 
create unnecessary delay in the introduction of generic drugs.
The Union of India through the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI), the Cancer 
Patient Association and the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance also supported the position
853 Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v Cadila Pharmaceutical Ltd {200 \ )5 SCC 73.
8:4 Bayer Corporation v Union o f India & Others (High Court of Delhi: February 9, 2010) LPA 443/2009, 
7-9 at http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SMD/iucUement/09-02-2010/SMD090220101.PA4932009.pdf
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of Cipla and argued against the creation of the linkage system.855 In their judgment, 
Honourable the Chief Justice and Justice S. Muralidhar thoroughly reviewed the 
arguments extended by the parties and rejected the case of Bayer Corporation. On the 
question of a relationship between patent law and drugs regulation, the judgment states 
that:
In the considered view of this court, the purport of Section 156 is not that the 
DCGI, who is no doubt an officer of the central government, is prevented from 
granting marketing approval to a non-patentee in respect of a patented drug. No 
such obligation flows from Section 156 Patents Act as such. This submission also 
misses the point that the right conferred under Section 48 is essentially a private 
right and negative right as is and does not confer a right to market the product 
even on the patent holder.856
Thus, the court did not read any link between patent law and marketing approval of 
pharmaceutical products and the matter was therefore left to the policy makers. The 
issue of Form 44 is also elaborately discussed in the judgment and it was concluded that 
an entry in a statutory form requiring the mention of patent status should be read against 
the overall scheme of legislation. Such an approach clearly suggests that no linkage was 
ever conceived within the framework of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 (India).8"'
The outcome of Bayer Corporation v. Union o f India & Others is definitely 
disappointing for Bayer Corporation and other multinational pharmaceutical companies 
operating in India. However, from a public health perspective, it is a welcoming 
development which would have a positive impact on the introduction of generic
855 Ibid. 11-13.
856 Ibid. 15-16.
857 Ibid. 19-20.
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medicines in Indian market. The timing of this decision is also crucial as Indian patent 
law is gradually settling down and its future largely depends upon administrative and 
judicial interpretations.
Beside the outcome of this case, India should consider adopting a clear policy about 
patent-regulatory approval linkage and this is precisely indicated by the learned judges 
as following:
Whether patent linkage should be introduced is an issue that requires a policy 
decision to be taken by the government. It is not for the court to determine if the 
government should bring in a system of patent linkage. There is considerable 
literature on the topic with many a developing country resisting it in the interests 
of public health care that is both affordable and accessible. The court cannot and 
ought not to dictate that policy shift ... There is also merit in the contention that 
patent linkage is a TRIPS Plus concept and India has only signed on to TRIPS. 
Worldwide there is a raging debate on whether patent linkage should be 
permitted. There is no uniformity in the policy of different countries. 8"8
An expansive interpretation giving effect to TRIPS-plus standards would have long 
term adverse consequences which Indian generic manufacturers and patients cannot 
afford at this point. Yet the situation is fragile as the matter has been again appealed by 
the Bayer Corporation in the Supreme Court.
C. Syngenta India v. Union of India
The issue of protection of undisclosed data came under judicial scrutiny in the case of 
Syngenta India Ltd. V. Union of India.^ Syngenta India Ltd. filed this writ petition to
858 Ibid.23-24.
859 Syngenta India Ltd. v Union o f India (High Court of Delhi: July 1, 2009) W.P. (C) 8123/2008 at
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challenge the decision of the Registration Committee established under the Insecticides 
Act 1968 (India) granting the approval of an agrochemical product, Emamectin Benzoate 
5% SG to one of the respondents in this case, Jaishree. In the process of product 
registration, Jaishree submitted bio-efficacy data mainly referring to data already submitted 
by Syngenta India Ltd. The proprietor of the data, Syngenta India Ltd, objected on this 
practice and argued that:
[T]he value in data protection is that it is the basis for the application (for 
registration) about the source, the raw materials, the nature of production of the 
insecticide, etc. Unless some measure of protection is afforded, the “data 
originator” would do all the toil and the “me too” applicant would reap the 
rewards ... The petitioner argues that Article 39.3 of TRIPS, clearly recommends 
that protection be accorded to the data submitted by an Originator, against unfair 
commercial use and disclosure, meaning thereby that a Statutory Authority (in this 
case the Committee) cannot rely on the data submitted by the Originator for 
approving the second and subsequent applications for the same insecticide. This 
protection and data exclusivity, however, would be for a limited period and not in 
perpetuity.860
The assertion that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 provides for a data exclusivity regime is 
misleading. A reference is also made to the recommendations of the Reddy 
Committee’s Report but it was ignored by the petitioner that the data exclusivity regime 
was deliberately avoided by the Committee in its final recommendation. This case is not 
related to a pharmaceutical product and the rules recommended by the Committee with 
regard to agrochemical products are somewhat different. However, those
http:/7delhicotirts.nic.in/Jul()()/SYNGENTA%201NDlA%2()VS.%20UQl.pdf
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recommendations cannot be equated to supporting a TRIPS-plus data exclusivity 
regime.
In his judgment, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat rejected the plea of Syngenta India Ltd. on the 
basis of fact that its product was not subject to data exclusivity rules at the time of 
registration of competing product. He concluded that:
In view of the above discussion and findings, the petition has to fail. The court is 
of the opinion that this litigation was speculative, as the attempt was clearly to 
invite the court to make a policy declaration, which could not have been made 
under any circumstances. The pendency of this proceeding has also resulted in 
prejudice to the third respondent, who was constrained to give an undertaking not 
to give effect to its registration; that has subsisted all this while.861
D. The Reddy Report
India is increasingly facing pressure from the United States to implement a TRIPS-plus 
data exclusivity regime.862
India has conventionally maintained that its existing regime, based upon a combination 
of common law protection of trade secrets law86’ and the provisions of the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act 1940 (India), is sufficient to fulfil the obligation of the TRIPS Agreement
861 Ibid. 27.
862 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2009 Special 301 Report (April 30, 2009) 18 at 
http:/7ww vv.ustr.gov/sitcs/dcfault/filcs/Full%20Version%20ot%20the%202009%20SPHCIAL%20301 %2 
0REPQRT.pdf
863 There arc precedents in India when trade secret protection was recognized by the Indian Courts. For 
details see: Shamnad Basheer, Protection o f Regulatory Data under Article 39.9 o f  TRIPS: The Indian 
Context (Intellectual Property Institute: 2006) 35-36 at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract 10=934269
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1994. Realising the inadequacies of its current system, the Indian government had 
constituted an inter-ministerial committee in February 2004 to recommend an 
appropriate framework for the implementation of the obligations of Article 39.3 of the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994. This Committee took considerable time in its deliberations and 
finally submitted its report on May 31, 2007.864 The Committee, which is commonly 
known as the Reddy Committee, recommended separate protection regimes for 
agrochemical products, traditional medicines and pharmaceuticals. To protect 
undisclosed information submitted to the drug regulatory authority, the Report 
recommends that:
There is an established system of marketing approval and evaluation of test data 
generated for drugs in India. While there is need to improve the system and make 
necessary legal changes and explicitly provide for the minimum requirements 
under Article 39.3 of TRIPS, any higher standards of data protection should be 
done after a careful study of its impact on the sector and public to avoid any
adverse repercussions in the long run. India has adopted product patent regime
st
with effect from 1 January, 2005, the impact of which is yet to be seen. 
Therefore, a somewhat cautious approach may be in the interest of the country. 
Any misgivings in the public mind about the need or the justification for the new 
system need to be addressed over a period of time. A calibrated approach with a 
transitional period, therefore, appears to be best suited for India. During the 
transitional period, the minimum requirements under Article 39.3 of TRIPS can 
be implemented. Also, this period can be utilized to educate the public and 
industry so as to allay their apprehensions on the issue. The capacity and the
864 Satwant Reddy and Gurdial Singh Sandhu, Report on Steps to be taken by Government o f India in the 
context o f Data Protection Provisions o f Article 39.3 o f TRIPS Agreement (Delhi: May 31,2007) at 
http: He he m i cals. n i e. i n/ D P B ook 1 et. pd 1'
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physical infrastructure available with the Regulatory Authority would need to be 
suitably strengthened and upgraded. 865
The Report clearly rejected the option of adopting a TRIPS-plus data exclusivity regime 
and instead proposed an alternative model with transition arrangements. The 
compromise reached in the Report has some negative implications as well. Ideally, 
India should adopt a more enabling data protection regime which can allow generic 
companies to use proprietary data subject to the payment of royalties. A complete 
restriction on the use of data, though for a limited period of time, would inevitably 
affect the functioning of generic companies. There are apprehensions that such a system 
would gradually move to a full-fledged data exclusivity regime. This Report contains 
several important recommendations which are yet to be adopted by the government. The 
initial response of the Ministry of Health was not welcoming on certain aspects of 
Committee’s recommendation but it is recently reported that the Ministry has now 
requested the World Health Organization to commission a ‘study on the impact of 
Satwant Reddy Committee Recommendations on the Indian Pharmaceutical 
Industry’ . 866
III. Anatomy of a TRIPS-plus Regime and its Implications for India
In a variety of forums, the United States government has been pressing for TRIPS-Plus 
Agreements. TRIPS-plus standards in free trade agreements are mainly informed and 
influenced by the domestic laws and regulations of the United States. The TRIPS-plus
865 Ibid. 39.
866 Ramesh Shankar, ‘Health Ministry’s nod to WHO for a study on data exclusivity raises concern’ 
PharmaBlz.com (Delhi: December 16, 2009) at
http://\vwvv. tmaipr.com/Articles/Health%20Ministrv%3C’s0/o20nod%20to%20WH00/()20fbr0'o20a0/o20stu 
dv%2()on%20data%20exclusivitv%20raises°/o20coneern.pdf
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Standards which deal with patent law and pharmaceuticals are designed to maximise the 
advantage of patent holders and multinational pharmaceutical companies. The most 
prominent TRIPS-plus provisions relate to patent term extension, data exclusivity and 
patent-regulatory approval linkage. The model for such treaty obligations is the 
legislative template of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act o f  
1984 (US), often referred to as Hatch-Waxman Act , 867 It is worthwhile analysing such 
measures in detail.
A. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (US)
The Hatch-Waxman Act contains provisions covering drug price competition, the 
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process for generics and patent term 
restoration.
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act o f  1984 (US) was co­
sponsored by Democratic Congressman Henry A. Waxman and Republican Senator 
Orrin Hatch and reflected trade-offs between the interests of brand-name drug 
manufacturers, generic suppliers, and consumer interests.868 The enactment has created a 
balance between the interests of research-based pharmaceutical industry and generic 
companies by providing patent term extension and a path for filing ANDAs. Title I of 
the law deals with a drug price competition component limiting the authority of the 
Food and Drug Administration to demand the results of extensive clinic trails before 
generic medicines are registered. The drug registration authority can only demand bio-
867 Public Law No. 98-417 Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 
360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
868 For a historical background of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Gerald J. Mossinghoff, ‘Overview of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and its Impact on the Drug Development Process’ (1999) 54(2) Food and Drug Law' 
Journal 187-194 at http://www.fdli.org/pubs/Journal%20Qnline/54 2Zart2.pdf
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availability studies from generic applicants. This part also provides five years 
exclusivity for new molecular entities and this additional protection runs independent of 
patents. The Act also provides for the so called Paragraph IV Certification process 
which is essentially a drug patent challenge notification. The first generic manufacturer 
who satisfies the requirements of the Act is entitled to a 180-Day exclusivity period 
which gives enormous incentive to generic companies. A complex regime of patent 
term extension is envisaged in the Act which addresses a range of situations.*69
A brief snapshot of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act o f 
1984 depicts the nature of a complex regulatory regime which governs pharmaceuticals 
and the patent law. TRIPS-plus standards which are used by the United States cannot be 
understood in isolation and it is extremely important to properly contextualise the 
emergence of such a regime. Some of the TRIPS-plus provisions dealing with the patent 
law and medicines are discussed in the following with an aim to see their relevance and 
implications for India.
B. Patent Term Extension
In the 2003 case of Eldred v. Ashcroft, dealing with the constitutionality of copyright 
term extensions, Justice Stevens of the Supreme Court of the United States wrote in his 
dissenting opinion:
The issuance of a patent is appropriately regarded as a quid pro quo -  the grant of
a limited right for the inventor’s disclosure and subsequent contribution to the
public domain ... Neither the purpose of encouraging new inventions nor the
overriding interest in advancing progress by adding knowledge to the public
domain is served by retroactively increasing the inventor's compensation for a
869 For an overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to 
Patent Expiration: An ETC Study (Federal Trade Commission: July 2002) 3.
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completed invention and frustrating the legitimate expectations of members of the 
public who want to make use of it in a free market/ 70
Although E/dred v. Ashcroft concerned the constitutionality of copyright term 
extensions, Justice Stevens drew parallels between patents and copyright in rejecting 
arguments in favour of statutory term extensions.
For years, the pharmaceutical industry lobbied the United States Congress, protesting 
that the term of patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs was unduly compromised by 
delays associated with new drug approval processes. Without a substantial patent term 
after the approval of a drug from the Food and Drug Administration, pharmaceutical 
companies cannot recoup the high cost incurred in the drug discovery cycle. In the light 
of reforms introduced under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Patent Act (United States) now 
provides for the extension of patent term with respect to drugs that undergo the rigorous 
regulatory approval process of the Food and Drug Administration. The regime 
governing the extension procedure is complex and subject to several conditions which 
are summarised as follows:
According to the statute, a patent which claims a product, method of using a 
product, or a method of manufacturing a product covered by the statute shall be 
extended if (i) the patent has not expired before an application for extension is 
submitted, (ii) the patent has not been previously extended under the Hatch- 
Waxman Act, (iii) a complete application for extension is submitted, (iv) the 
product has been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial
870 Eldred v. Ashcroft (01-618) 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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marketing or use, and (v) this will be the first permitted commercial marketing or 
use of the product.871
The determination of period of extension is sophistically elaborated in the law and no 
extension can exceed a maximum period of 5 years. It is crucial to note that no such 
limit is mentioned in the text of the free trade agreement between Bahrain and the 
United States.
Patent term extensions are a standard feature of United States bilateral trade agreements. 
With the exception of the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, all major bilateral 
trade agreements contain a patent term extension provision on the lines of the scheme 
originally envisaged under the Hatch-Waxmcm Act.*12 For example, Article 16.8.4 of the 
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement states that:
With respect to any pharmaceutical product that is subject to a patent:
(b) the Party shall provide that the patent owner shall be notified of the identity 
of any third party requesting marketing approval effective during the term of the 
patent.873
871 Jeffrey S. Boone, ‘Patent Term Extension for Human Drugs Under the US Hatch-Waxman Act’ (2009) 
4(9) Journal o f Intellectual Property Law and Practice 658-664, 658.
872 For details and comparison see: Hitoshi Nasu, ‘Public Law Challenges to the Regulation of 
Pharmaceutical Patents in the US Bilateral Free Trade Agreement’ in Thomas Poggc. Matthew Rimmer 
and Kim Rubenstein (eds), Incentives For Global Public Health: Patent Law and Access to Essentia! 
Medicines (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 77.
873 United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, signed 6 May 2003 (entered into force 1 January 
2004) at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/a^eements/fta/singapore/asset upload file708 4036.pdf
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This extension is independent of the general provision of patent term extension which is 
provided in Article 16.7.7 of the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement that 
provides:
Each Party, at the request of the patent owner, shall extend the term of a patent 
to compensate for unreasonable delays that occur in granting the patent. For the 
purposes of this paragraph, an unreasonable delay shall at least include a delay 
in the issuance of the patent of more than four years from the date of filing of the 
application with the Party, or two years after a request for examination of the 
application has been made, whichever is later, provided that periods attributable 
to actions of the patent applicant need not be included in the determination of 
such delays.874
In the case of pharmaceutical drugs, there is no mention of a total period of patent term 
extension which occurs in case of delays in the drug approval process. However, 
according to Article 16.7.7, a 2-4 year extension is stipulated in case delay occurs 
during the course of patent registration. In some free trade agreements, an extended 
period is mentioned to compensate delays in patent registration and drug approval 
procedures.*7"
Given that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 does not mandate any scheme of patent term 
extension, these provisions in the bilateral trade agreement are clearly TRIPS-plus 
obligations. However, almost all developing countries lack experience and expertise to
N " For example see: Article 16.9(6) of the United States-Columbia Free Trade Agreement, signed 22 
November 2006 at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text, 
and Article 15.9(6) of the United States-Panama Free Trade Agreement, signed 18 June 2007 at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa/final-text
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implement such a complex system of patent term extension. Even within the United 
States, there are conflicting opinions and varying interpretations about the details of 
relevant provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.x76 It would be unjust to expect 
developing countries to apply the same standards without appropriate regulatory and 
institutional arrangements. The safeguards and flexibilities which have developed over a 
period of time in the United States through litigation and jurisprudence cannot be easily 
transplanted elsewhere. A TRIPS-plus patent term extension regime would have adverse 
effects on the Indian pharmaceutical sector and it would ultimately jeopardise the 
interests of poor patients across the world.
Pragmatically, considering the existing political and business environment, India is well 
placed to resist bilateral pressures for revising its laws to provide patent term 
extension."77 The situation in this regard is even changing in the United States and in 
2007, the requirement for patent term extension was removed from then-pending free
876 Ibid. 660-661.
877 For an overview of India’s emerging economic power and it impact on politics and international diplomacy
see: Stephen P Cohen, India: Emerging Power {Washington DC, Brookings Institution: 2001). Also see: Diana 
Tussie & Marcelo Saguier, The Sweep o f Asymmetric Trade Negotiations: Overview (Buenos Aires, Latin 
American Trade Network: 2011) at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011 08165.pdf. The ongoing 
negotiations on EU-India free trade agreement also prove that India can effectively resist TRIPS-plus demands. 
The latest updates show that the EU is withdrawing from its data exclusivity and patent term extension 
demands. There are some sign that the EU may extend further relaxation in the area of intellectual property 
enforcement. This establishes India’s ability to negotiate a free trade agreement without substantial TRIPS-plus 
measures. See: Ramesh Shankar, ‘Health groups welcome exclusion of data exclusivity from India-EU free 
trade pact’ PharmaBiz.com (Bombay: June 24, 2011) at
http://w\vw.gnaipr.conVAtticlcs/Hcalth%20groups%20welcome0/o2Qexclusion%20of%20data%20exclusivity 
%20from%20India-EU%20frcc%20tradc%20pact.pdf
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trade agreements. The Waxman Report also observed that such 'provisions can work to 
delay access to low-cost generic drugs in developing nations’.878
C. Patent-Regulatory Approval Linkage
In the United States, a linkage mechanism has been established under the Hatch- 
Waxman Act 1984 (United States), where the process of approval of generic drugs is 
linked with the status of patents.879 If a case does not fall within the purview of 
Paragraph IV certification mentioned earlier, then one of the following three 
certifications should be made by a generic manufacturer along with an ANDA filing: (i) 
the drug has not been patented; (ii) the patent has already expired; or (iii) the generic 
drug will not be marketed until the patent expires.880 The patent holder is notified about 
the intention of the generic manufacturer and the United States domestic system allows 
him to initiate litigation. This is followed by an automatic stay of 30 months. The 
sophisticated, complex system also requires the patent holders to list their patents on the 
Orange Book to provide a clear picture of relevant interests.881
8,8 As quoted in: Submission of Global Health Organizations, ‘In the Matter of 2010 Special 301 Review: 
Identification of Countries under Section 182 of the Trade Act 1974’ (February 16, 2010) 23 at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/2010spceial301 ngoSubmission.pdf
879 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (United States) 21 U.S.C. Section 505(j)(3). 
88(1 Robin J. Strongin, Hatch-Waxman, Generics, and Patents: Balancing Prescription Drug Innovation, 
Competition, and Affordability (National Health Policy Forum Background Paper, The George 
Washington University, Washington DC: June 21,2002) 10 at http://www.nhpf.org/library/backuround- 
pa pc rs B I’ H at eh Wax ma n 6-02. pd f
881 For background and details see: Brook K. Baker, ‘Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data 
Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage' (2008) 34 American Journal o f Law and Medicine 303-344.
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In 2002, the United States Federal Trade Commission reported that generic companies 
were facing legal challenges by the brand name companies in attempts to introduce new 
drug applications under the Hatch-Waxman Act 1984 (United States). It states that:
Beyond any doubt, Hatch-Waxman has increased generic drug entry. Generic 
drugs now comprise more than 47 percent of the prescriptions fdled for 
pharmaceutical products -  up from 19 percent in 1984, when Hatch-Waxman was 
enacted. In spite of this record of success, two of the provisions governing generic 
drug approval prior to patent expiration (the 180-day exclusivity and the 30- 
month stay provisions) are susceptible to strategies that, in some cases, may have 
prevented the availability of more generic drugs. These provisions continue to 
have the potential for abuse.882
The patent linkage provisions delay the entry of generic drugs and often encourage the 
evergreening of patents. The Federal Trade Commission recommended that only one 
injunction against a generic manufacturer should be allowed under the legislation to 
discourage the evergreening trend.883 It is important to note that the United States 
legislative response to the problem of evergreening is complex and largely 
unsuccessful.
Notwithstanding such policy problems, the United States has frequently incoiporated 
provisions on TRIPS-plus linkage mechanisms in several free trade agreements with 
developing countries. The United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement states that:
882 Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study (July 2002) 
at http://w\vw.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/gcncricdrugstudv.pdf
883 Thomas A Faunce and Joel Lexchin, “ Linkage’ pharmaceutical evergreening in Canada and Australia’ 
(2007) 4(8) Australia and New Zealand Health Policy at 
http://archive.biomedcentral.com/coiitent/pdf/1743-8462-4-8.pdf
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With respect to any pharmaceutical product that is subject to a patent, and where a 
Party permits authorizations to be granted or applications to be made to market a 
pharmaceutical product based on information previously submitted concerning the 
safety and efficacy of a product, including evidence of prior marketing approval 
by persons other than the person that previously submitted such information, that 
Party:
(a) shall implement measures in its marketing approval process to prevent such 
other persons from marketing a product covered by a patent during the term of 
that patent, unless by consent or with the acquiescence of the patent owner, and
(b) if it allows applications to be made to market a product during the term of a 
patent covering that product, shall provide that the patent owner shall be notified 
of the identity of any such other person who requests marketing approval to enter 
the market during the term of a patent notified to or identified by the approving 
authority as covering that product. 884
If such a linkage is created then generic manufacturers will be exposed to lengthy and 
expensive litigation with resourceful multinational companies. Frederick M. Abbott 
notes that:
Designing a system which prevents the effective marketing approval of a 
medicine during the term of a patent without significantly impairing the ability of
sS4 Article 15.10(4) of the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, signed 15 June 15 2004 
(entered into force 1 January 2006) at
http://vvvvvv.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset upload file797 3849.pdf
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generic producers to place drugs on the market at the end of the patent term has 
proven exceedingly difficult.885
There is some evidence that the United States is easing its pressure on developing 
countries to adopt such TRIPS-plus standards but the efficacy of new measures is under 
serious apprehension. In May 2007, new trade policy mandated by the Congress 
removed the condition of linkage provisions from pending free trade agreements.886
Robert Chalmers notes in the context of the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement 2004 that:
The “pro-evergreening” elements of the AUSFTA extend protection by creating 
peripheral mechanisms rather than making fundamental changes to patent laws. 
Specifically, the mechanisms introduce regulatory “data exclusivity” and impose 
tightened controls over advertising by generics companies. The core obligation 
imposed by these changes is to require those seeking to market pharmaceuticals to 
certify their products as “patent-friendly”, under threat of significant penalty.887
The implications of evergreening are more dangerous for developing countries which 
lack legislative and administrative capacities to overcome the problem associated with 
this trend.
885 Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Provisions o f Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements in 
Light o f U.S. Federal Law (UNCTAD-ICTSD Issue Paper No.12, Geneva: February 2006)10 at 
http://vvwvv.unctad.org/cn/docs/iteipc20Q64 en.pdf
886 Submission of Global Health Organizations, ‘In the Matter of 2010 Special 301 Review: Identification 
of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade Act 1974’ (February 16, 2010) 22 at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/2010special301 ngoSubmission.pdf
887 Robert Chalmers, ‘Evergreen or Deciduous? Australian Trends in Relation to ‘evergreening’ of 
Patents’ (2006) 30( 1) Melbourne University Law Review 29.
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D. Data Exclusivity
The third TRIPS-plus standard which stems from the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act is related to the highly controversial issue of data exclusivity. The protection of 
undisclosed information is an obligation under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement 
1994 but there is no consensus on the interpretation of this provision. Most of the 
developing countries do not agree with the interpretation of this clause which has been 
adopted by the United States since 1994. This position is manifested in many USTR 
Special 301 Reports which suggest that a US styled data exclusivity regime will be a 
satisfactory implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. India and several other 
developing countries do not subscribe to this understanding of Article 39.9 and argue 
that the negotiation history of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 categorically proves that US 
styled data exclusivity regime was not the intended outcome.
The heart of the dispute is not about the protection of undisclosed information per se. 
The controversy is about the nature and structure of a regime which will protect 
undisclosed information including the data submitted to drug regulatory authorities. 
Multinational pharmaceutical companies allege that their data is misused by generic 
manufacturers and they apply for the registration of their products on the basis of
xsx For details and the analysis of different versions of Article 39.9 discussed during the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations see: Shamnad Basheer, Protection of Regulatory Data under Article 39.9 o f TRIPS: The 
Indian Context (Intellectual Property Institute: 2006) at 
http://papcrs.ssrn.com/sol3/papcrs.cfm7abstract id=934269.
Carlos Correa, Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration o f Pharmaceuticals: Implementing 
the Standards o f the TRIPS Agreement (Geneva: South Centre, 2002) at 
http: apps.who.int/medicincdocs/pdf h3009ac/h3009ae.pdf. Also sec: Smith Kline & French 
Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v. Secretary, Department o f Community Services and Health (1990) 23 FCR 
73 and Roger Magnusson, ‘Data Linkage, Health Research and Privacy: Regulating Data Flows in 
Australia’s Health Information System’ (2002) 24(5) Sydney Law Review 5-55.
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proprietary data. Thus, a data exclusivity regime should be implemented to protect them 
from the fraudulent use of regulatory data. On the contrary, generic manufacturers 
believe that a data exclusivity regime pushed by the United States would create another 
entry barrier. This concern has merit as the data exclusivity system works independently 
of patent status and this protection can be used to block the entry of generic 
competition.
Most of the free trade agreements of the United States contain data exclusivity clauses 
posing serious threat to generic competition.890 Brook K. Baker notes that:
Data exclusivity ... in their most absolute form can prevent registration of follow- 
on generic products even when those products are needed to respond to 
compelling public health needs like HIV/AIDS ... Despite its inability to win 
clear language on data exclusivity and its setback at Doha, the USTR persisted in 
twisting the language of minimalist data protection to maximalist data 
exclusivity.891
Some of these problems are now recognised within the United States after extensive 
lobbying and advocacy of civil society organisations.
In 2003, Congressman Henry A. Waxman expressed his concerns about the way in 
which the data exclusivity regime is imposed on developing countries. He said that:
890 Generally a period of 5 years exclusivity is stipulated along with 3 years of protection for new clinical 
information. Also see: Carsten Fink and Patrick Reichenmiller, ‘Tightening TRIPS: Intellectual Property 
Provisions of U.S. Free Trade Agreements in Richard Newfarmer (cds) Trade Doha, and Development: A 
Window into the Issues (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2006) 289.
891 Brook K. Baker, ‘Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and 
Patent/Registration Linkage’ (2008) 34 American Journal of Law and Medicine 303-344, 310-313.
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[The Hatch/Waxman period of data exclusivity] works in this country because 
most people in the U.S. have health insurance that pays for essential drugs and 
because we have a health care safety net to assure that the poorest in our society 
are not left without medical care and treatment. But to impose such a system on a 
country without a safety net, depriving millions of people of life-saving drugs, is 
irresponsible and even unethical. In developing countries, we must do everything 
in our power to make affordable drugs for life-threatening diseases available now 
... Whether in Central America, Latin America, Morocco, or Southern Africa, 
there is a long slate of USTR negotiations where the Hatch-Waxman could have 
devastating results.892
After facing immense pressure, the United States partially revised its data exclusivity 
approach under the New Trade Policy for America 2007. Some technical details relating 
to the data exclusivity provisions of free trade agreements were changed to limit its 
scope.893
Protection of pharmaceutical regulatory data is a hotly debated issue in India and 
despite several attempts; the Indian government could not adopt a clear policy on this 
issue. The conflicting interests of generic manufacturers and the multinational 
pharmaceutical industry have largely shaped this debate in terms of national interest and 
public policy issues.
892 Henry Waxman, Statement of Representative Henry Waxman (June 10, 2003) at
http://\vww.cptech.org/ip/health/dataexcl/
89'' Brook K. Baker, ‘Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and 
Patent/Registration Linkage’ (2008) 34 American Journal o f  Law and Medicine 303-344, 336.
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E. Restrictions on Compulsory Licences and Parallel Importations
Putting additional restrictions on the issuance of compulsory licensing is another 
TRIPS-plus measure which is often used by the United States in free trade agreements. 
An aggressive strategy of USTR can also be identified in this regard which essentially 
demands that developing countries avoid the grant of compulsory licences even if they 
are badly required to meet public health needs. The United States-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement 2003 provides for one of the most restrictive compulsory licensing 
provisions allowing the use of this instrument only to remedy anti-competitive 
behaviour.894 Some other free trade agreements such as Australia-United States Free 
Trade Agreement895 also contain similar provisions restricting the scope and operation 
of compulsory licensing beyond the mandate of the TRIPS Agreement 1994.
This policy has, however, been lately shifted after it was severely criticised by public 
interest groups and non-governmental organisations. Compulsory licensing provisions 
of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 are considered to be the most important safeguard 
measures and in the post Doha Declaration 2001 scenario, its importance has 
tremendously increased.8'"’ In its new strategy, the United States is no longer pushing its 
harsh conditions through free trade agreements and the focus is now on the Special 301 
mechanism. In 2009, Thailand was placed on a Priority Watch List after it engaged in 
the compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical drugs.897
894 Article 16.7.6 of the United States -Singapore Free Trade Agreement, signed 6 May 2003 (entered into 
force 1 January 2004).
898 Article 17.9.7 of the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, signed 18 May 2004 (entered into 
force 1 January 2005).
896 Relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and the subsequent developments in WTO and 
elsewhere are discussed in Chapter 4.
897 Jonathan Burton-MacLeod, ‘Tipping point: Thai Compulsory Licences Redefine Essential Medicines
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It is ironic that the United States felt encouraged by a policy limiting the application of 
compulsory licensing and a reference is made to the Doha Declaration 2001 to express 
this view. In its submission to USTR, Global Health Organizations demanded that the 
United States should refrain from listing countries on its Special 301 Watch List for use 
of flexibilities such as compulsory licensing.898
Another disturbing aspect of TRIPS-plus standards is related to conditions which 
restrict or prevent parallel imports. For instance, the United States-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement 2004 gives an exclusive right to the patent holder to prevent the importation 
of patented product without his consent.899 In the absence of obligation of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994, preventing parallel imports compulsorily will reduce the ability of 
developing countries to import cheaper drugs. Such a sweeping application of these 
standards becomes more disturbing in the light of internal United States rules governing 
parallel importation, which are not consistent and uniform and lately, in some cases, 
parallel imports have been allowed subject to some conditions.900
Debate’ in Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer and Kim Rubenstein (eds), Incentives For Global Public 
Health: Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines (Cambridge University Press: 2010) 77. Also see: 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2009 Special 301 Report (April 30, 2009) 21 at 
http://www.ustr.uov/sitcs/dcfault/files/Full%20Vcrsion%20of%20the%202009%20SPEClAL%20301%2 
QREPORT.pdf
898 Submission of Global Health Organizations, Tn the Matter of 2010 Special 301 Review: Identification 
of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade Act 1974’ (February 16, 2010) 23 at 
http://keioiiline.org/sites/default/files/2010special301 ngoSubmission.pdf
899 Article 17.9.4 of the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, signed 18 May 2004 (entered into 
force 1 January 2005).
900 For details see: Pedro Roffe, Bilateral agreements and a TRIPS-plus world: The Chile-US Free Trade 
Agreement (Ottawa, Canada: Quaker International Affairs Programme, TRIPS issue Papers 4, 2004) 28 at 
http://vvww.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/lssues/Bilateral-Agreements-and-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf
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The TRIPS-plus compulsory licensing regime will reduce the powers of the Indian 
government to issue a compulsory licence in the case of domestic public health needs. 
India’s public health problems and the relevance of a compulsory licensing mechanism 
have already been discussed in Chapter 4. TRIPS-plus regimes adopted elsewhere in the 
world, especially in developing countries, will also have a direct taxing effect on Indian 
generic manufacturers. Indian generic manufactures have a great interest in the drug 
markets of African and other developing countries which are increasingly facing 
pressures from the United States to reform their patent laws. Thus, resisting TRIPS-plus 
standards is not only a domestic policy issue for India. India should assume a leading 
and active role in the global campaign to resist the TRIPS-plus movement.
F. Side Letters
A number of developments could be cited in support of a proposition that a positive 
shift has occurred in the stance of the United States towards the imposition of TRIPS- 
Plus standards. The best evidence in this regard are the side letters which were issued by 
the United States Trade Representative after facing severe criticism about its policies of 
restricting the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and Doha Declaration 2001. 
The most common language of the side letters is as following:
The obligations of Chapter Fifteen [intellectual property rights] do not affect a 
Party’s ability to take necessary measures to protect public health by promoting 
access to medicines for all, in particular concerning cases such as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme 
urgency or national emergency. In recognition of the commitment to access to 
medicines that are supplied in accordance with the Decision of the General 
Council of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph Six of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health (WT/L/540) and the WTO
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General Council Chairman’s statement accompanying the Decision (JOB(03)/177, 
WT/GC/M/82) (collectively the “TRIPS/health solution”), Chapter Fifteen does 
not prevent the effective utilization of the TRIPS/health solution.401
Such side letters were later issued with regard to different free trade agreements to 
address concerns about the impact of TRIPS-plus provisions on the access to medicines 
regime.902 The actual impact of side letters is unclear as these letters do not override the 
obligations established under the original text of free trade agreements.903
Moreover the terms of side letters are considerably restrictive and they hardly provide a 
practical leeway which can be used consistently with the TRIPS Agreement 1994. This 
problem was also recognised by a group of Congressmen including Representative 
Henry Waxman who wrote a letter to the United States Trade Representative on March 
12, 2007. The group specifically mentioned that:
USTR has also refused to reference the right to compulsory licensing -  or other 
public health exceptions -  in the text of FTAs. Instead, USTR has relied upon the 
use of vaguely worded “side letters” that are subordinate to the agreements and 
non-binding on the parties. The letters also fail to provide clear and specific
901 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health 
Measures (August 5, 2004) at
http://vvww.ustr.gov/sites/default/tilcs/uploads/agrccments/cafla/asset upload filc697 3975.pdf.
902 For details sec: Brook K. Baker, ‘Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and 
Patent/Registration Linkage’ (2008) 34 American Journal o f Law and Medicine 303-344.
,0’ Lance Gable et al, Legal Aspects o f HIV/AIDS: A Guide for Policy and Reform (Washington DC, The 
World Bank, 2007) 199.
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assurances affirming the ability of governments to take various measures to 
address public health needs.904
Part of these concerns was addressed by the US Congress in 2007 when it supported a 
Senate Resolution urging the United States to reaffirm its commitments to the Doha 
Declaration 2001. Brook K. Baker notes that the requirement of patent term extensions 
was removed from several treaties:
The clearest evidence, however, of cracks in the armor of registration-related 
rights can be found in the New Trade policy adopted by a new Democrat-led 
Congress and incorporated in U.S.-Peru, U.S.-Panama, and U.S.-Columbia FTAs, 
and to a lesser extent in the U.S.-Korea FTA.905
The changes introduced through the New Trade Policy were also appreciated by the 
Global Health Organizations in their latest submission to USTR.906 The actual impact of 
developments is yet to be seen beyond the fact that some of the most restrictive TRIPS- 
plus clauses were removed from the new generation of FTAs.
However, since the adoption of New Trade Policy and subsequent reforms introduced 
by Congress, the executive arm of the United States government has not shown any 
change in its traditional approach. The United States Trade Representative has been
904 Joint Letter of Henry A. Waxman, Jim McDermott, Tom Allen and Lloyd Doggett addressed to Susan 
Schwab, United States Trade Representative (March 12, 2007) at 
http://www.cpath.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/ipeongresstoustr3-07.pdf 
9<b Brook K. Baker, ‘Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and 
Patent/Registration Linkage’ (2008) 34 American Journal o f  Law and Medicine 303-344, 336.
906 Submission of Global Health Organizations, 7/7 the Matter o f  2010 Special 301 Review: Identification 
o f  Countries Under Section 182 o f the Trade Act 1974' (February 16, 2010) 23 at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/2010special3() 1 ngoSubmission.pdf
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using the mechanism in the same old-fashioned way and countries were listed on the 
basis of failure to comply TRIPS-plus measures.
G. The Special 301 Report Consultation Process
Recently, the Obama Administration announced an open and consultative process of 
public hearings in respect of the Special 301 Report process which is undoubtedly an 
important development.907 The whole process of determination of the annual Special 301 
Report was heavily influenced by different industry groups and this new consultation 
process will open an opportunity both for non-governmental organisations and 
developing countries. However, the real question is about the change in policy rather 
than the process and operational strategy of the USTR. Beyond the use of side-letters 
and the promise of consultation, there has been a lack of substantive change in the 
approach of the Obama Administration to patent law and access to essential medicines.
IV. European Union-India Free Trade Agreement
On October 7, 2010, Medecins Sans Frontieres launched a global campaign, Europe! 
Hands O ff Our Medicine, to stop the European Union’s multiple attempts to restrict 
access to generic drugs in developing countries.908 Though the focus of the campaign is 
on the European Union’s trade and intellectual property policies, it particularly
90 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Review: Identification of 
Countries under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974: Request for Public Comment and Announcement 
of Public Hearing (January 12,2010) at
http://www.rcgulations.gov7search/Rcgs/homc.html#docketDctail'?R=USTR-2010-0003
908 Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), ‘MSF Launches Global Campaign: “Europe! HANDS OFF Our
Medicine” As European Negotiators Arrive in New Delhi’ (Press Release October 7, 2010) at
http://www.msfaccess.org/media-room/press-releases/press-release-
detail/'index.html%3ftx ttnews%?Btt news%5D= 1642&cHash^b89a7cd00d
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addresses concerns about ongoing negotiations between India and the European Union 
to conclude a free trade agreement. This agreement which was initially expected to be 
entered into before the end of 2010 contains provisions on patents and intellectual 
property enforcement.404 In its Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontieres noted that:
The India-EU agreement is just one of many attacks on generic medicines 
currently being undertaken by the EC. Through other bilateral trade agreements 
around the world, Europe is threatening the production of safe, effective and 
affordable medicines by demanding tougher intellectual property provisions than 
anything required under international law. Europe is also a driving force in the 
secret negotiations for an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, where it is 
leading the push for measures that would put limits on the generic production of 
medicines.910
Unlike the United States, the bilateral trade agreements of the European Union did not 
come under much academic scrutiny despite Europe’s long-standing interest in 
intellectual property enforcement (Table 8.2). It is generally presumed that the 
European Union’s approach towards TRIPS-plus standards is relatively mild, and its 
different trade agreements9" usually do not contain substantive provisions on key areas
909 European Parliament, ‘EU-India: Free Trade Agreement to be signed by the end of 2010 say MEPs’ 
(Press Release March 26, 2009) at
http://wwvv.curoparl.curopa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?lanuuagc=EN&type:=IM-
PRESS&refcrencc=200903251PR52628
910 Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), ‘MSF Launches Global Campaign: “Europe! HANDS OFF Our 
Medicine” As European Negotiators Arrive in New Delhi’ (Press Release October 7, 2010) at 
http://vvvvvv.nisfaccess.oru/inedia-room/press-releases/press-release-
detai 1/index■html%3ftx ttnevvs%5Btt news%5D=l 642&cFlash-b89a7cd00d
911 The European Union employs a complex strategy to engage in wide range of bilateral trade
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of intellectual property rights. The focus in these agreements is on enforcement issues to 
curb piracy and anti-counterfeiting. Nevertheless, the problem of TRIPS-plus standards 
is still there and almost every trade agreement dealing with intellectual property 
protection negotiated after the TRIPS Agreement 1994 incorporates TRIPS-plus 
standards.412 As mentioned earlier, the European free trade agreement model is more 
inclined towards enforcement details of intellectual property rights and certain non- 
traditional areas of intellectual property such as geographical indications have been 
pushed through these agreements. A study of the Centre for International Environmental 
Law finds that: "The inclusion of TRIPS-Plus intellectual property provisions in the 
[Economic Partnership Agreements] will alter, in a single action, the entire landscape of 
international intellectual property negotiations.’91'
relationships through different instruments. The framework of its bilateral agreements include Sector Free 
Trade Agreements (with Switzerland) Customs Union (Turkey), Stabilization and Association 
Agreements (Croatia, Macedonia etc.), Enhanced Cooperation Agreements (Ukraine and Russia), 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (Moldova), Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel etc.), Free Trade Agreements (Gulf Cooperation Council, CAFTA etc.) and Economic Partnership 
Agreements (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States Region). For details see: Stephen Woolcock, 
‘European Union policy towards Free Trade Agreements’ (Belgium: EC1PE Working Paper No. 03/2007, 
European Centre for International Political Economy, 2007) at http://www.acp-eu- 
trade.org/library/filesAVooleock EN 010307 ECIPE EU-poliev-towards-frce-trade-agrccments.pdf 
912 Maximiliano Santa Cruz S., ‘Intellectual Property Provisions in European Union Trade Agreements: 
Implications for Developing Countries’ (Geneva, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development Issue Paper No. 20: June 2007) at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Santa- 
Cruz%20B 1 uc2(). pd f
41' Dalindyebo Shabalala, ‘Intellectual Property in European Union Economic Partnership Agreements 
with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries: What way Forward after the Cariforum EPA and the 
interim EPAs?’ (Geneva, Centre for International Environmental Law, April 2008) 13 at 
http://www.ciel.oru/Publications/Oxfam Technical Brief 5MayQ8.pdf
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The significance of a bilateral trade agreement between India and the European Union is 
often expressed in economic terms. During the last few years, bilateral trade between 
the two countries have significantly increased and the European Union is the largest 
trading partner of India, representing more than 20% of Indian exports and imports.914 It 
is anticipated that a free trade agreement may provide improved market access to India 
by easing existing quota pressures and market competition.9" This view is, however, 
contested in view of the rapid market transformation and multilateral trade integration. 
A study conducted by LEI Wageningen UR concludes that:
The results suggest that India's interests in a regional trade agreement with the EU 
are downplayed by the fact that India’s economy is not well integrated in global 
markets. Impacts on the EU are minor and further reduced if a Doha agreement is 
in place when the FT A is implemented. Results indicate the rationale for a 
strongly asymmetric arrangement: it would be in the interest of both partners if 
the EU provides large concessions to India for market access, while India 
maintains the bulk of current border protection. An EU-India FTA delivers little 
scope for achieving efficiency gains via adjustments to the pattem of international 
specialization. An EU-India agreement on merchandise trade is unlikely to 
embody substantial preferential treatment with regard to market access. Probably, 
India can find more suitable FTA partners.916
914 Sateesh Gulkarni ‘Comparisons between Indo-US Relations and India-EU Relations: Political and 
Economic Ramifications’ in Shazia Aziz Wulbers (ed) EU India Relations: A Critique (New Delhi: 
Academic Foundation, 2009) 49.
915 Yvan Decreux and Cristina Mitaritonna, ‘Economic Impact of A Potential Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) Between the European Union and India’ (CEPII-CIREM Final Report: 2007) at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/may/tradoc 134682.pdf
916 Thom Achterbosch, Marijke Kuiper and Pirn Roza, EU-India Free Trade Agreement: A Quantitative
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Can India really benefit from a bilateral trade deal with the European Union? The 
answer of this question is complex and subject to various interpretations.
Trade agreements are tools for economic liberalisation and market access. According to 
Professor Amartya Sen, economic growth and wealth generation are not self-serving 
objectives of international trade agreements. The litmus test to measure a satisfactory 
outcome of trade flows is equity, poverty eradication and resource allocation. Professor 
Amartya Sen notes that:
Indeed, we cannot reverse the economic predicament of the poor across the world 
by withholding from them the great advantages of contemporary technology, the 
well-established efficiency of international trade and exchange, and the social as 
well as economic merits of living in an open society. Rather, the main issue is 
how to make good use of the remarkable benefits of economic intercourse and 
technological progress in a way that pays adequate attention to the interests of the 
deprived and the underdog. That is, I would argue, the constructive question that 
emerges from the so-called anti-globalization movements ... A crucial question 
concerns the sharing of the potential gains from globalization -  between rich and 
poor countries and among different groups within a country. It is not sufficient to 
understand that the poor of the world need globalization as much as the rich do; it 
is also important to make sure that they actually get what they need. This may 
require extensive institutional reform, even as globalization is defended?1
Assessment (The Hague: LEI Wageningen UR, October 2008) 3 at 
http: /library.wur.nl/way/bcstanden/clc/1890532.pdf
1,1 Amartya Sen, ‘How to Judge Globalism: Global Links Have Spread Knowledge and Raised Average 
Living Standards. But The Present Version of Globalism Needlessly Harms the World’s Poorest’ 
(January 1,2002) 13 The American Prospect at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/-dludden/SenGlobalism.htm
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Thus, the relevance of a free trade agreement between India and the European Union 
should be judged in this context instead of simplistic economic appraisals.
In Development as Freedom, Professor Amartya Sen further states that:
As the fast economic progress of East Asian and Southeast Asian economies gets 
more fully analyzed, it is becoming increasingly clear that it is not only the 
openness of the economies-and greater reliance on domestic and international 
trade-that led to such rapid economic transition in these economies. The 
groundwork was laid also by positive social changes, such as land reforms, the 
spread of education and literacy and better health care. What we are looking at 
here is not so much the social consequences of economic reforms, but the 
economic consequences of social reforms.1,118
This is indeed an important reminder for Indian policy makers to rethink their existing 
approach towards bilateral trade agreements. These agreements will limit the ability of 
Indian generic manufacturers to produce affordable drugs. It will be indeed a reversal of 
the positive social change which India has achieved over the last few decades.
The negotiations for the EU-India free trade agreement started in 2006 as a part of the 
European Union’s Global Europe strategy.919 The tenth round of negotiations will be 
held from 6-8 March, 2011 in New Delhi to resolve outstanding issues between the 
parties.920 Despite considerable lobbying and public outcry, the parties did not formally 
release any text which is currently being negotiated. In February 2009, a working draft 
was leaked by Wikileaks showing the possibility of inclusion of several TRIPS-Plus
918 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1999), 259.
919 European Trade Commissioner, India (accessed on 22 November 2010) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countrics/india/
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provisions in the final agreement.421 It is, however, difficult to predict safely the actual 
scope of any agreement given India’s long-term resistance to stringent patent rights. 
Furthermore, recent controversy between India and the European Union on the 
detention of Indian generic drugs also suggests that India will resist a demand for many 
TRIPS-plus measures.
Unlike United States free trade agreements, the European Union bilateral trade 
agreements are diverse and it is difficult to identify typical TRIPS-plus elements of 
these agreements affecting access to essential medicines. One feature which is widely 
reported as an important negotiation issue between India and the European Union will 
have significant potential impact on Indian access to medicine regime. The European 
Union is reportedly pushing India to adopt a data exclusivity regime to provide 
additional protection to pharmaceutical products.422 Data exclusivity provisions will 
apply to all drugs by creating a new patent-like monopoly, which will delay the 
registration of generic medicines. Even drugs without patents will be entitled to enjoy 
data exclusivity protection. For example, a patent on Gleevec was rejected by the Indian 
patent office, allowing generic producers to begin manufacturing. If data exclusivity had 
been in place, generic firms would have had to wait up to ten years to be able to start 
producing this drug, even though it could not secure a patent. Realising the 
apprehensions about the impact of free trade agreement on generic drugs, the European 
Parliament called ‘on the European Union and India to ensure that commitments under
421 EU-India Free Trade Agreement Draft, 24 Feb 2009 (accessed on November 22, 2010) at 
http://nnrror.wikilcaks.inib/wiki/ElJ-lndia Free Trade Agreement draft, 24 Feb 2009/
422 Carlos M. Correa, Negotiation o f a Free Trade Agreement European Union-lndia: Will India Accept 
TRIPS-Plus Protection? (Berlin, Germany: Oxfam Germany, June 2009) at 
http://ww\v.oxfam.de/download/correa eu india fta.pdf.
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the FTA do not preclude access to essential medicines whilst India is developing its 
capacity from a generic to a research-based industry’.923
It is pertinent to note that in 2007, the European Parliament specifically resolved against 
the European Commission’s attempts to negotiate TRIPS-plus standards through 
bilateral trade negotiations. The Resolution calls on the European Commission:
[T]o meet its commitments to the Doha Declaration and to restrict the 
Commission’s mandate so as to prevent it from negotiating pharmaceutical- 
related TRIPS-plus provisions affecting public health and access to medicines, 
such as data exclusivity, patent extensions and limitation of grounds of 
compulsory licences, within the framework of the EPA negotiations with the ACP 
countries and other future bilateral and regional agreements with developing 
countries.924
The final outcome of the EU-India free trade agreement will eventually determine the 
long-term direction of India’s patent policy and its impacts on the access to medicine 
regime. India should continue resisting TRIPS-plus standards. Any change in the Indian 
stance will lead towards further compromises.
923 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on an EU-India Free Trade Agreement 
(2008/2135(INI)) at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ :C’:2010:117E:0166:0175:EN:PDF
924 European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the TRIPS Agreement and Access to Medicines at 
http:/7ww\v.curoparl.europa.eu/sides/getI.X)c.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-
0353 • 0 • DOC • XML VO EN
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V. The Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement
The proliferation of TRIPS-plus standards and their negative consequences are not just 
limited to countries which signed free trade agreements with the United States and the 
European Union. Other developing countries are also increasingly facing bilateral 
pressures to adopt stricter intellectual property standards following the lead of group of 
countries signed FTAs.
By signing these free trade agreements, the United States and the European Union are 
successfully creating a framework of intellectual property norms which would become 
default agenda of future multilateral talks. Peter Drahos calls it a global intellectual 
property ratchet which is dependent upon three factors.42" First, the forum shifting is an 
essential technique which is used by the United States to achieve its policy objectives. 
The historical shift of the United States from World Intellectual Property Organization 
to GATT and subsequent shift to bilateralism clearly indicate that different forums have 
been smartly used to attain policy objectives. Second, the global intellectual property 
ratchet works through coordinated bilateral and multilateral strategies which helps in 
early compliance of higher standards while putting pressures on the rest of the world.926 
Third, ‘in order for the ratchet to take hold there must be a re-setting of minimum 
standards through multilateral entrenchment’ .927
92" Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property ’s Empire: The Role o f FT As (November 2003)
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University at
http://ietsd.org/downloads/2008/08/drahos-fta-2003-cn.pdf. Also see: Peter Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property 
and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach' (2004) 77 Temple Law Review 401-424 at 
http://w\vw.tcmple.edu/lawschool/iilpp/Docs/Drahos,%20Final%20to%20Publisher,%20060605.pdf 
926 Ibid.
92 Bryan Christopher Mcrcurio, ‘TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends' in Lorand Bartels, 
Federico Ortino (eds). Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO legal System (Oxford: Oxford
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There has been much debate as to whether the negotiations over the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) will have an impact upon access to medicines. The earlier 
negotiations on ACTA started in 2006-07 among the United States, European Union, 
Canada, Switzerland and Japan (see Table 8.2). The first formal public announcement 
was made in 2007 when these countries simultaneously announced their participation in 
ACTA negotiations.92* Since then seven rounds of negotiations have been completed 
and two rounds were scheduled in April and June 2010. ACTA is conceived as a 
plurilateral agreement with the aim to introduce new intellectual property enforcement 
norms beyond the threshold set in the TRIPS Agreement 1994A2'1 The negotiation 
process of ACTA has been marred by extreme secrecy and very little information has 
been so far released through official channels.
The apprehensions about the potential implications of this agreement on developing 
countries and access to essential medicines are intensified as doubts are rising amidst 
the secretive process of talks behind closed doors. Developing countries like India are 
not participating in ACTA negotiations but there are concerns that this agreement may 
reduce policy space for non-member countries. Eddan Katz and Gwen Hinze write that:
Although not participating in negotiations, developing country governments will
nevertheless find their domestic policy space reduced by ACTA ... ACTA
University Press, 2006) 223.
92x Eddan Katz and Gwen Hinze, ‘The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade on the Knowledge
Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP
Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade Agreements’ (2009) 35 (24) Yale Journal o f  International
Law Online 24-35, 26 at http://www.yiil.org/images/pdfs/katz hinze 432.pdf
929 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘ACTA: Summary of Key Elements under
Discussion’ (Last updated: November 13, 2009) at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/prcss-otficc/Tact-
sheets/2009/novembei7acta-summary-kev-elements-under-discussion
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Standards likely will be a requirement of future bilateral agreements and 
evaluation criteria in the annual Special 301 report. In addition to the international 
trade framework, ACTA may have its own enforcement mechanism overseen by 
an ACTA Oversight Council.930
The lack of transparency is another point of concern and participating governments are 
releasing very patchy information about the scope and coverage of this new agreement. 
Some commentators have seen it as a coordinated move of ‘nodal actors’931 where 
networks of states and private actors are engaged in a process of creating higher 
intellectual property norms.932
The adverse implications of this approach on developing countries have already been 
witnessed during the Uruguay Round Negotiations when higher intellectual property 
standards were eventually imposed on developing countries, ignoring their
; Eddan Katz and Gwen Hinze, ‘The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade on the Knowledge 
Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP 
Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade Agreements’ (2009) 35 (24) Yale Journal o f International 
Law Online 24-35, 26-27 at http://www.yiil.org/images/pdfs/katz hinzc__ 432.pdf
Peter Drahos has applied the theory of nodal governance to analyse the intellectual property 
negotiation strategy of the United States. For details see: Peter Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and 
Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 Temple Law Review 401-424 at 
http://www.tcmple.cdu/lawschool/iilpp/Docs/Drahos,%20Final%20to%20Publisher,%20060605.pdf 
9j~ Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: 
The State Of Play (Geneva: IQsensato Occasional Papers No. 1, June 9, 2008) 6 at 
http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-content/uploads/Sell IP Enforcement State of Plav- 
OPs 1 June 2008.pdf
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developmental status and regulatory capacity.933 Charles McManis summarises the key 
procedural problems in relation to ACTA:
From the outset, however, the negotiations have been embroiled in controversy, 
for at least four reasons. First, while the negotiations are being carried out behind 
closed doors, industry representatives are apparently being supplied with 
information that is not being disseminated to the public. Second, the “plurilateral” 
nature of the negotiations has aroused suspicions that the ACTA negotiations are 
but the latest example of “forum-shifting”, a well-documented tactic that is 
apparently being deployed as a part of a nodally coordinated effort on the part of 
intellectual property owners to ratchet up international standards for the protection 
of private intellectual property rights.934
The negotiating parties to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement released an official 
draft text in April 20 lO.93' Thereafter, an updated draft of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement was formally released on November 15, 2010.936 This draft, which is still 
subject to legal review, shows that participating countries had successfully resolved 
most of their differences which were shown in heavily bracketed language of earlier
9"  IQsensato, ‘The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Global Policy Implications’ 
(June 2, 2008) 2(8) In Focus, 3 at http://wvvw.iqsensato.org/vvp-content/uploads/InFocus%20-ACTA%20- 
%20 Vo l°/o202%20-Issuc%208.pd f
9,4 Charles R. McManis, ‘The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a 
Treaty’ (2009) 46 (4) Houston Law Review 1235-1256, 1236-1237 at 
http://vvwvv.houstonlawrevicw.org/archive/dovvnloads/46-4 pdt/6 McManis.pdf
9'° Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft: April 21,2010, P1J1P 
IP Enforcement Database, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta See also Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement 2011, [2011] ATNIF 22, not yet in force.
936 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, [2011] ATNIF 22, not yet in force.
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texts. To address concerns about patent enforcement issues and stringent border 
measures, the latest text provides that for the purpose of this Agreement, Parties may 
exclude patents and protection of undisclosed information from the scope of civil 
enforcement section.937 It is nevertheless important to note that this language was 
different in an earlier draft where the United States suggested that for the purpose of this 
Agreement, parties agree that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section.938 The 
latest text apparently provides more flexibility to parties which are interested in 
adopting a strong border protection and seizure procedure. From an access to medicines 
perspective, the final outcome of ACTA is still unsatisfactory as it allows member 
countries to adopt TRIPS-plus enforcement measures inhibiting the smooth trade of 
generic drugs.
VI. Conclusion
Since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, the proliferation of TRIPS-plus 
standards since then has largely shaped the agenda of global intellectual property 
debates. There is an emerging agreement among developing countries and academia that 
stricter intellectual property standards, which are often enforced through a free trade 
agreement, restrict the policy space for developing countries and adequate mitigating 
strategies should be evolved to off-set the negative consequences of such agreements. A 
TRIPS-Plus regime is especially problematic for access to medicine programs and 
patent-related TRIPS-plus measures have been particularly criticised by public health 
advocates and policy commentators. India should resist adopting TRIPS-plus standards
93 Ibid. Footnote 2 to Section 2: Civil Enforcement.
938 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft: April 21,2010, PIJ1P
IP Enforcement Database, http://sites.aoogle.com/site/iipenforcement/acta See also: Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement 2011, [2011] ATNIF 22, not yet in force.
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in its patent regime because of the potential severe negative impact both on domestic 
consumers and poor patients elsewhere in the world.
There is a growing realisation in India that reforms in patent law should be aligned with 
its public health needs. Several members of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha have raised 
concerns regarding TRIPS-plus standards during Parliamentary debate on the Patents 
(Amendment) Bill 2005 (India).934 It was resolved that India should not introduce 
TRIPS-plus standards as any move in this regard would jeopardise the interests of the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry and consumers. Subsequent developments in Indian 
courts also show a positive trend towards discouraging reliance on TRIPS-plus 
measures. Although Indian courts have consistently responded against an expansive 
reading of relevant provisions of patent law and drug regulations, a proactive policy is 
conspicuously missing. It is perhaps the right time for the Indian government to adopt 
clear policy on issues related to data exclusivity and the patent-marketing approval 
nexus. These matters cannot be left to interpretations for a longer period of time, and 
even courts need policy guidelines from government.
Moreover, this chapter suggests that India should be wary of developments such as the 
plurilateral ACTA, which are further efforts by the USTR to raise the minimum 
standards of intellectual property protection at an international level.
939 See: India, Parliamentary’ Debates-Combined discussion on the Statutory Resolution regarding
disapproval o f  Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No.7 o f2004) and the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 
2005, March 22, 2005 at http://164,100,47.132/LssNew/psearch/result 14.aspx?dbsl-1S66
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Table 8.1: Free Trade Agreements of the United States
No Country Year
1 Australia January 2005
2 Bahrain August 2006
3 Canada January 1994
4 Chile January 2004
5 Costa Rica August 2004
6 Dominican Republic August 2004
7 El Salvador August 2004
8 Guatemala August 2004
9 Honduras August 2004
10 Israel April 1985
11 Jordan December 2001
12 Mexico January 1994
13 Morocco January 2006
14 Nicaragua January 2004
15 Oman January 2009
16 Peru April 2006
17 Singapore January 2004
18 Colombia* November 2006
19 Korea* June 2007
20 Panama* June 2007
Source: Office of the United States Trade Representative940 
* These agreements are yet to be implemented through enactment of Congress.
Table 8.2: Participants in the Negotiations of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
No Parties
1 Australia
2 Canada
3 The European Union (EU) and its Member States, represented by the 
European Commission and the EU Presidency
4 Japan
5 Korea
6 Mexico
7 Morocco
8 New Zealand
9 Singapore
10 Switzerland
11 United States o f America
Source: Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade94
940 Office of the United States Trade Representative (Last Updated 2 June 2009) at 
http: / vvww.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements
041 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade at http://vvww.dfat.izov.au/trade/acta/
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion
I. Introduction
In his book, The Idea o f Justice, Amartya Sen comments that the question of access to 
essential medicines raises fundamental questions about global justice:
Take, for example, the reform of the patent laws to make well-established and 
cheaply producible drugs more easily available to needy but poor patients (for 
example, those who are suffering from AIDS) -  an issue clearly of some 
importance for global justice. The question that we have to ask here is: what 
international reforms do we need to make the world a bit less unjust?942
Taking this fundamental, philosophical question as its cue, this thesis has engaged in an 
analysis of Indian patent law, with a view to providing recommendations not only for 
domestic reform, but also for a rearticulation of the international framework of treaties 
and declarations governing access to essential medicines.
In a cri de Coeur in June 2010, an Indian delegate to the World Trade Organization 
expressed his concerns about the impact of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and new 
initiatives upon public health, development, and access to knowledge:
My delegation also wishes to draw Members’ attention to some systemic 
implications of the multitude of initiatives launched by a group of largely 
developed country Members to enforce TRIPS Agreement in a manner that is 
considerably more extensive than the level enshrined in TRIPS Agreement. India
94' Amartya Sen, The Idea o f Justice, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 2009) 24-25.
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has had to expend significant resources and make legislative changes to protect 
and enforce IPRs in line with TRIPS within the ten year transition period which 
ended in 2005. Among the developing countries, the least developed are still in 
the transition period till 2013-16.
Our concerns arise from the surge of TRIPS plus initiatives in multilateral fora, 
RTAs and plurilateral initiatives like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA). Texts of such RTAs, and more recently the negotiating text of ACTA, 
have appeared in public domain. Such higher levels of protection are likely to 
disturb the balance of rights and obligations in the Agreement enshrined, inter 
alia, in the Preamble, the Objectives and Principles (Art 7-8) and have the 
potential to constrain the flexibilities and policy space provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement to developing country Members like India particularly in areas such as 
public health, [Technology Transfer], socio-economic development, promotion of 
innovation and access to knowledge. They could also potentially negate decisions 
taken multilaterally such as the Doha Declaration on Public Health in WTO and 
the Development Agenda in WIPO.943
The Indian delegate highlighted a stark division between progressive initiatives such as 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001, the WTO 
Waiver Decision 2003, and the WIPO Development Agenda; and the threats represented 
by the push for greater enforcement of patent rights both within the World Trade 
Organization and from new outside initiatives -  such as TRIPS-Plus Free Trade 
Agreements, and the menacing new proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.
943 India’s Intervention to the WTO TRIPS Council: TRIPS plus Enforcement Trends (June 9, 2010) at 
http://keionline.org/node/864
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In light of such developments, it is imperative to evaluate the impact of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 on public health and access to essential medicines with the aim to draw 
key lessons and appropriate policy response for developing countries. This thesis 
explores the role of the Indian pharmaceutical sector and generic manufacturers in the 
supply of affordable and safe drugs to developing countries. The question of India’s 
continuing role as the pharmacy of the developing world is the central theme of this 
thesis. Placing the question of access to medicines in the Indian context, this thesis 
provides an analysis of India’s future as a leading generic manufacturer with the help of 
case studies portraying a broader picture of access to essential medicines in developing 
countries. Highlighting the significance of Indian generic supplies for the most 
vulnerable populations of world, the Indian case studies are used to show some inherent 
inadequacies and shortcomings of the global patent law architecture.
This concluding chapter is divided into several main sections. Part II provides a 
summary of preceding chapters highlighting the main arguments and conclusions 
presented in each chapter. Part III deals with recommendations which I have made in 
the light of case studies and analyses conducted in core chapters. Four distinct sets of 
recommendations have beenprovided for India, the World Trade Organization, the 
World Health Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization. Part IV 
suggests that future research should consider a number of outstanding issues -  including 
the emergence of new international agreements, such as the proposed Anti- 
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement; the advent of new scientific disciplines, such as 
nanotechnology, stem cell research, and synthetic biology; and the appearance of new 
infectious diseases, such as the SARS virus, avian influenza, and porcine influenza.
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II. Summary of Key Arguments
After providing a literature review of the debate over Indian patent law and access to 
medicines, Chapter 1 contends that Amartya Sen’s theory of development as freedom 
can help explain the interactions between patent law, access to essential medicines, 
innovation policy, and human rights. It suggests that Amartya Sen’s capability approach 
has a great potential to explain several contemporary developments such as the global 
access to medicines campaign, alternative innovation models and the WIPO 
Development Agenda. The chapter concludes that the global crisis of access to 
medicines can be approached as a state of un-freedom which severely limits the abilities 
of poor individuals in many developing countries. Sen’s capability model offers certain 
promising insights that can help in identifying and building appropriate solutions and 
alternative paradigms.
Chapter 2 charts the historical evolution of Indian patent law and highlights a number of 
transformations -  notably the debate over the Patents Act 1970 (India), the Patents 
(Amendment) Act 2002 (India), and the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India). Chapter 
2 maintains that, notwithstanding the consensus of major political forces on key aspects 
of patent law, the Indian Parliament has failed to address broader policy issues of access 
to medicines and pharmaceutical innovation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
certain features of patent law discussed in the Parliament provide important safeguard 
provisions from a public health perspective. The impact of advocacy networks and 
lobbying of non-governmental organisations -  such as the Indian Cancer Patients 
Association, Medecins Sans Frontieres, and the Lawyers Collective -  also played a 
crucial role in the law-making process.
Chapter 3 looks at the domestic implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 through 
the case study of the Gleevec patent application in India. The rejection of this patent on
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the basis ot Section 3(d) ot the Patents Act 1970 (India) has raised a wide range of 
questions associated with patent law, international law and the Constitution of India. 
The judgment ot Chennai High Court in Novartis AG v. Union o f India944 provides 
crucial insights about the domestic implementation of international law and the 
flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. It is argued that the judgment of the Chennai 
High Court has rightly upheld the legality of Section 3(d) on the basis of patentability 
criteria and the constitutional right of equality before the law and the right to health. The 
chapter further deals with the question of the legality of Section 3(d) in purview of the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994 and argues that the Chennai High Court should have considered 
this question instead of declining its jurisdiction on TRIPS related matters. The chapter 
concludes with this observation that Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India) is fully 
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and India should aggressively defend this 
provision as an important safeguard measure.
Moreover, it is submitted that other developing countries -  both in the neighbouring 
regions ot Southeast Asia and elsewhere -  should also incorporate similar provisions in 
their patent laws to avoid the problem of evergreening. Section 3(d) is gradually 
developing into an effective tool to counter evergreening practices in patent filing. 
Recently some countries have shown interest in implementing a similar provision in 
their patent laws to ensure that only quality patents are granted in the filed of 
pharmaceuticals.94" The Philippines approved and signed in the changes to its patent law 
in June 2008 to incoporporate a Section 3(d) type amendment.946 The amended Act
,44 Novartis AG v Union o f India and others, (2007) 4 Madras Law Journal 1153 at: 
http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp’/tfnmM 1121
Tahir Amin, ‘India’s Patent Act on Trial’ (February-March 2007) Bridges 15-16 at 
http://www. iprsonlinc.org/ictsd/news/bridgesl 1-1 .pal 5-16.pdf
946 Section 5 of Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act o f2008 (The Philippines)
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provides that:
The following shall be excluded from patent protection:
"22.1. Discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods, and in the case of drugs and 
medicines, the mere discovery of a new form or new property of a known substance which docs 
not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance, or the mere discovery of 
any new property or new use for a known substance, or the mere use of a known process unless 
such known process results in a new product that employs at least one new reactant.
"For the purpose of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle 
size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations, and other derivatives of a known 
substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in 
properties with regard to efficacy.
This provision is essentially similar to India’s Section 3 (d) but it has not been fully 
applied to achieve those objectives for which it was actually enacted. An overview of 
patents through the database of Medicines Patent Pool shows that not a single patent on 
antiretroviral drugs was opposed and rejected in Philippines through the application of 
this provision. Whereas several such patents had been successfully opposed and rejected 
in India on the basis of Section 3(d).947 Despite its limited practical impact, the United 
States Trade Representative placed Philippines on 2011 Watch List observing that “the 
United States remains concerned about amendments to the Patent Law that limit the 
patentability of certain chemical forms unless the applicant demonstrates increased 
efficacy. The United States urges the Philippines to make progress in the short term to
amending Section 22 of the Intellectual Property Code o f the Philippines at 
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repaets/ra2008/ra 9502 2008.html.
947 See Medicines Patent Pool 'The Patent Status Database for Selected HIV Medicines’ at 
http://ww-w. medicinespatentpool.org/LICENSING/Patent-Status-of-AR Vs
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address these and other matters.”948
Chapter 4 examines the issue of pharmaceutical exports and compulsory licensing 
provisions of Indian patent law in the light of the Pfizer-Natco controversy.449 In the 
Natco compulsory licensing controversy, two applications were made for the grant of 
compulsory licences to export drugs to a least developing country, Nepal. Although the 
relevant provisions of Indian patent law are more flexible than the Waiver Decision 
2003, the applicant ultimately withdrew its application because of frustration with the 
process of compulsory licensing. Despite the technical capability of Indian firms to 
manufacture quality generic drugs, poor citizens in many developing countries lack the 
freedom to access them. The solutions imposed to address these concerns further 
aggravate this problem instead of facilitating the smooth flow of generic drugs across 
different countries. The chapter concludes that WTO’s Waiver Decision 2003 and the 
proposed Article 3 Ibis of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 should be completely revised. The 
ambiguities in Indian law should also be resolved with a strong political will. Within the 
current scheme, Indian pharmaceutical exports will be undermined and sabotaged, 
leaving millions of poor patients’ needs unattended.
Chapter 5 focuses on patent enforcement mechanisms and border measures which have 
recently attracted considerable attention. The first part of the chapter mainly considers 
the challenges which Indian generic manufacturers are now experiencing and I have 
used the case study of Roche v. Cipla to explain some of the contentious issues in this
United States Trade Representative, 2011 Special 301 Report, (2011) [39],
949 Delhi Patent Office, Government of India, No. POD/HK/2008-09012942 Dated July 4, 2008 at 
https: 124.124.220.66/patentdecisionsearch/displav uploaded.asp?application numbei-IN-PCT-2002- 
00 7 85-DEL-167
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regard.4"0 This controversy involved an alleged non-authorised manufacturing of 
Roche’s patented drug, Tarceva, which were made and marketed by Cipla under a 
different brand name. After elaborating key arguments of the parties, I specifically deal 
with the issues of injunctive relief in the light of public health and access to drug 
considerations. The main argument in this regard deals with the institutional capabilities 
of considering public interest as a key driver of the patent enforcement agenda. This 
occurred when the Delhi High Court refused to grant an injunctive relief on grounds 
related to the public health implications of any such order.
This chapter finally develops an argument that recent instances of the seizure of Indian 
generic exports are against the letter and spirit of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. In the 
light of relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, Doha Declaration 2001 and 
the jurisprudence of European courts, detention of generic drugs destined for 
humanitarian programs in developing countries are absolutely unwanted. A TRIPS-plus 
patent enforcement agenda employed by the European Union disadvantages the poor 
countries who heavily rely upon Indian exports. Several intellectual property 
enforcement initiatives have been recently launched and India should resist an upward 
harmonisation of the patent enforcement agenda to protect the policy space afforded in 
the TRIPS Agreement 1994.
Chapter 6 establishes an argument in favour of equitable licensing and the open source 
drug discovery regime in India and in this regard evaluates different applicable models. 
It starts with a critical analysis of the Bayh-Dole Act 1980 (US) and concludes that 
limitations of these models are now well known and there is an increasing 
dissatisfaction with the way in which publicly funded research and development 
projects are commercialised. The Indian policy response to regulate publicly funded
950 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Del v Cipla (I.A 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008).
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research is manifested in the form of the Protection and Utilisation o f Public Funded 
Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (India). This Bill is modelled on the United States 
approach and restricts avenues of equitable licensing. It is argued that the Indian 
government should abandon this legislation in its current form and some innovative 
thinking is required before a law is proposed on this subject.
The chapter then discusses two alternative paradigms of equitable licensing mechanisms 
in the form of open source drug discovery and patent pools. Based on the notion of 
Yochai Benkler’s peer production and commons-based social production techniques, 
open source drug discovery projects contain some promising prospects for poor patients 
in developing countries. A case for open source drug discovery in India is argued in this 
chapter to help overcome the problems associated with the conventional model of 
innovation. Instead of focusing on proprietary drug research and collaborative schemes 
with multinational pharmaceutical companies, it is argued that the Indian government 
should encourage open source projects in drug discovery.
The last part of the chapter deals with patent pools, to argue a case for India’s active 
participation in an international patent pool aimed at solving the crisis of HIV/AIDS and 
other epidemics. The UNITAID’s patent pool is discussed in this context in the light of 
the Heller and Eisenberg theory of the tragedy of anticommons in biomedical and 
pharmaceutical research.1'"1 Patent pools may have greater significance for India as 
Indian generic manufacturers will cease new production and partnership opportunities 
under an international institutional arrangement. It is, however, important to note that 
the technological capability of Indian companies will only be an advantage if India 
continues exploiting its own safeguard provisions of patent law. The chapter concludes
',M Michael A Heller, and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research’ (1 May 1998) 280 (5364) Science 698-701 at 
http:/7\v\vvv.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698
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with a note that a delicate mix of open source and compulsory licensing policies at a 
domestic level will help in boosting the national agenda of access to medicine. Patent 
pooling will be a useful tool to build technological capabilities and to ensure the 
availability of drugs for rest of the world.
Chapter 7 specifically considers the issue of the gap in research and development in the 
area of tropical and neglected diseases. While India can adopt several policies and 
legislative frameworks to continue its existing role of the pharmacy of the developing 
world, the challenge of access to medicines is far more complex amidst the emergence 
of new disease patterns and massive drug resistance tendencies. It is argued that India 
could benefit from a prize-based incentive mechanism which delinks patents from 
products, and realising its existing technological and industrial base, India would be a 
major beneficiary of this system. The chapter then evaluates the proposal of Professor 
Thomas Pogge for a Health Impact Fund.952 The work of Professor Pogge, suggesting 
the moral responsibility of affirmative action in favour of poor patients, is briefly 
discussed in the context of a patent law framework and its limitations.9-" The chapter 
provides a critical overview of the Health Impact Fund and its key components and 
concludes that this model may have limited utility in the Indian context. The chapter 
concludes with a note that India should explore its niche in the prize model which is 
now getting some institutional support from the World Health Organization. This model 
is relatively flexible and adequately addresses the problem of patents on pharmaceutical
952 Thomas Pogge, ‘A Global Resources Dividend’ in David A. Crocker and Toby Linden (Eds), Ethics o f 
Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship (United Kingdom: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1998), 501.
9x' Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge, 'The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for 
A ll' Incentive for Global Health (1st ed, 2008) at http://wwvv.vale.edu/macmillan/iub/bif_.book.pdf
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products. This strategy is in accord with the proposal made in earlier chapters dealing 
with open source, patent pools and compulsory licensing.
The final substantive chapter of this thesis looks at the future direction of India’s access 
to medicine regime in the light of TRIPS-plus free trade agreements. Analysing two 
recent Indian cases, Syngenta India v. Union of India1''4 and Bayer Corporation v. Union 
o f India4-5, it is contended that a TRIPS-plus patent regime will have severe adverse 
impacts on the access to medicines regime. It is further argued in this chapter that India 
has very little to gain from a proposed United States-India free trade agreement. On the 
contrary, it would compromise substantially on regulatory freedom provided under the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994. For the pressures of the free trade agreement, India should not 
adopt TRIPS-plus measures because it will disturb the balance of patent law which has 
the potential to facilitate global access to medicine regimes. In particular, it should resist 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement which is aimed at accelerating the 
standardisation of TRIPS-plus norms.
III. Recommendations
In the light of this comprehensive analysis, it can be concluded that India's traditional 
role as the pharmacy of the developing world is in jeopardy, as a result of its adoption 
of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. Without structural and institutional changes, India will 
lose its pre-eminent role as the key provider of generic drugs and medicines. Although 
India has adopted flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 -  such as Section 3(d) and 
its compulsory licensing regime -  there are increasing pressures within India to change
4r'4 Syngenta India Ltd. v Union o f India (High Court of Delhi: July 1, 2009) W.P. (C) 8123/2008 at 
http://dcIhicourts.nic.in/JulQ9/SYNGENTA%201NDlA%20VS.%20UQl.pdf
Bayer Corporation v Union o f India & Others (High Court of Delhi: February 9, 2010) LPA 443/2009 
at http:/7lobis.nic.in/dhc/
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its domestic policies. Any change in this regard (such as patent based innovative 
strategies) will not only harm Indian consumers but it will seriously affect the plight of 
poor patients around the world. A number of recent international trends, including the 
seizure of generic drugs in transit, TRIPS-plus free trade agreements, and the 
negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement have the potential to further 
threaten India’s access to medicines regime. However, India could nonetheless 
safeguard its role as the pharmacy of the developing world through the adoption of 
several alternative schemes -  including open source drug discovery, prizes, and the 
fostering of rights-based advocacy networks.
To improve and safeguard India's role as a key provider of safe and affordable generic 
medicines, a number of key recommendations are made in this thesis.
A. Domestic Indian Patent Law
The debate about patent law development and possible reforms is intense and has 
attracted considerable academic focus. In the United States, several commentators have 
considered this question from a policy perspective and suggested various substantive 
and procedural patent law reforms to overhaul the existing framework. 956 The situation 
in India is, however, quite different where the policy debate about the operation of 
patent law is largely absent. India is amending its old laws, implementing new statutes 
and creating regulatory bodies but a serious and informed dialogue about the objectives
956 Adam B. Jaffe and Joshua Lcmer, Innovation and its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System is 
Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to do about it (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2004). Also see: James Bessen and Michael James Meurer, Patent Failure: How 
Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2008) and Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
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and scope of this exercise is non-existent. The need for such a dialogue is immensely 
felt at this critical juncture of Indian legal history.
At a domestic level, India should introduce a wide range of policy and legislative 
measures to improve the access to medicine regimes by setting a leading example. 
Currently, there is no comprehensive patent policy in the country which frequently leads 
towards confusing policy signals generated by different stakeholders and government 
departments. Though India has adopted a fairly balanced patent regime, it still requires a 
long term policy vision to crystallise thinking on patents and access to medicines. This 
gap was clearly reflected during Parliamentary debates on patent law amendments 
where only a few issues dominated the whole debate and major policy matters had never 
been considered and discussed. It is recommended that the Indian government should 
articulate a long term policy vision on issues of patent law and pharmaceutical drugs -  
dealing with the role of the generic industry, the use of safeguard measures, and the 
enhancement of local capabilities to continue producing cheaper versions of patented 
drugs.
The ongoing debate on the Protection and Utilisation o f Public Funded Intellectual 
Property Bill 2008 (India) shows the state of confusion which prevails among different 
government departments and ministries due to the lack of an overarching innovation 
policy and its implications for access to medicines. The most notable absence in the 
policy-setting arena is the Ministry of Health which has virtually left the whole debate 
in the hands of intellectual property and trade professionals. This does not go well with 
India’s stated positions at different multilateral forums where a strong focus on the 
health perspective is a top priority. Recently, an Indian Parliamentary Committee has 
recommended several amendments to the Protection and Utilisation o f Public Funded 
Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (India) after surmounting criticism from academics and
415
non-governmental organizations.'" The actual scope and impact of these changes will 
not be known unless a modified Bill is tabled before the Parliament. However, it reflects 
the problematic approach which the Indian government is adopting in the arena of 
innovation and its commercialisation. It is recommended that India should find its niche 
in alternative modes of incentivising research and development.
At a domestic level, four specific recommendations can be made with regard to Patents 
Act 1970 (India). First, India should shun all internal and external pressures to change or 
modify Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 (India). With the introduction of this 
section in 2005, India took a major step to counter evergreening and dubious quality 
patents. Starting with Novartis’ Gleevec case, the Indian patent office has now 
developed expertise in determining the exact scope of Section 3(d) and its multifaceted 
implementations. Nonetheless, India is facing constant pressures to amend or repeal this 
provision.
The Report of the US-India Business Council and the Coalition for Healthy strongly 
advocates the deletion of Section 3(d) in its current form by alleging that it 
disadvantages Indian innovators who mainly rely on incremental inventions.958 It 
concludes that: ‘Reforming Section 3(d) to encourage and protect incremental 
pharmaceutical innovation would create such incentives and help India become a true
957 C.H. Unnikrishnan, ‘House Panel Suggests Drastic Changes to Innovation Bill’, The Wall Street 
Journal. June 7, 2010 at http://www.livemint.com/2010/06/07001522/House-panel-suggcsts-drastic- 
c.html
9"8 White & Case LLP and DUA Consulting, The Value O f Incremental Pharmaceutical Innovation: 
Benefits For Indian Patients and Indian Business, A Report Prepared for the US-India Business Council 
(June 2009) at
http:/Avww.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/U SI BCIncrementallnnovationRcportFinal.pdf
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powerhouse of innovation.’959 The same views have been expressed by the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) in its Special 301 
Submission 2010. According to PhRMA: ‘Some of the standards for patentability in 
India are inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement, depart from the mainstream of 
practice internationally, or are not transparent.’960 These attacks on Section 3(d) are 
aimed at discrediting the legality of India’s provision. Such pressures have intensified 
after the release of the report of Technical Expert Group on Patent Law Issues. 
Although this report categorically excludes the review of Section 3(d) from its mandate, 
its earlier version issued in 2007 was used by multinational pharmaceutical firms to 
highlight the problem of Section 3(d).961
The Technical Expert Group was established as a result of a compromise between the 
Congress led Indian government and the Left parties at the time of the 2005 
amendments in patent law. The report deals extensively with the issues of patentability 
of micro-organisms and new chemical entities. It raises the spectre of a violation of the 
requirement of technological neutrality under Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994: 
‘Reading this obligation in the light of the overall purpose of the Agreement, it appears 
that linking the grant of patents for pharmaceutical substances only to a new chemical
960 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Special 301 Submission 2010, 49 
at
http:/7vvww.phrma.org/sitcs/nhrma.org/;filcs/attachmcnts/2010 Special 301 Review Submission PhRM 
A .pdf
961 Shamnad Bashcer, ‘The “Mashelkar Committee Report” on Pharma Patenting Resurfaces’ on SpicyIP
(April 18, 2009) at http://spicyipindia.bloizspot.com/2009/04/mashelkar-committee-report-on- 
pharma.html
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entity or to a new medical entity may prima facie amount to “excluding a field of 
technology” even when they satisfy the basic requirements of patentability.’962
It is therefore recommended that the Indian government should not consider any 
revision of Section 3(d) and the patent office and Indian courts should be given 
considerable time to develop appropriate doctrinal interpretations in the field of 
pharmaceutical innovation.
A second recommendation regarding Indian patent law deals with its pre-grant 
opposition proceedings. The practice of the last five years proves that pre-grant 
opposition proceedings were highly useful in bringing actions against patent 
applications which were not qualified under Indian law.963 Feroz Ali Khader notes with 
regard to the purpose of pre-grant opposition, that:
Pre-grant opposition procedure can act as a touchstone to test the genuineness of 
an invention. It can be used to distinguish the real Black Swans from the ones that 
are painted black. Pre-grant opposition procedure is instrumental in checking the 
quality of patents and in notifying their boundaries. The procedure offers 
incentives to the competitors to bring patent related information into the Patent 
Office.964
962 Technical Expert Group on Patent Law Issues, ‘Report of the Technical Expert Group on Patent Law 
Issues’ (Revised March 2009) 3 at http: //w w w. p a t en to I'll ee.nic.in/
963 Tahir Amin, Tahir Amin, ‘Re-Visiting the Patents and Access to Medicines Dichotomy: An 
Evaluation of TRIPS Implementation and Public Health Safeguards In Developing Countries’ in O. 
Aginam, J. Harrington and P. Yu, (eds), Global Governance o f HIV/AIDS: Intellectual Property> and 
Access to Essential Medicines (Edward Elgar, Forthcoming 2010) at
http://papcrs.ssrn.coln/so 13/papers.cfm?abstract id -1573723.
964 Feroz Ali Khader, The Touchstone Effect: The Impact o f Pre-Grant Opposition on Patents (New
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It is interesting to note that in its Special 301 Submission 2010, PhRMA raised the issue 
of pre-grant opposition procedure and affiliated delays with regard to some countries 
but no reference was made about Indian law. It is perhaps for this reason that there are a 
number of other substantive issues in Indian law from PhRMA’s perspectives which 
require immediate attention. However, for the Indian government, the local generic 
industry and civil society organisations, the retention of this provision is extremely 
important from a public health perspective. This thesis has shown that the pre-grant 
opposition mechanism is effectively used by patient rights groups and other non­
governmental organisations, and such an oversight is crucial in a country which lacks 
institutional capacity in the examination of drug patents.
The third recommendation about Indian patent law deals with compulsory licensing 
provisions and its practical dimensions. Although India’s regulatory structure features a 
range of compulsory licensing provisions, such measures have not been optimally used 
in practice by Indian companies. It is expected that Indian companies will soon start 
filing compulsory licensing applications for domestic use. The issue of a compulsory' 
licence for export purposes needs serious attention by the Indian government. However, 
India should approach this issue from a broader and futuristic perspective. Despite the 
fact that Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) procures the bulk of its drugs from India, it 
had to contact Apotex to test the efficacy of the WTO’s Waiver Decision 2003. It can be 
argued here that for all practical reasons, India should assume a leading role in this 
regard by issuing compulsory licences for humanitarian purposes. It is therefore 
recommended that India should revise its existing strategy of non-engagement on 
compulsory licensing issues by easing the administrative difficulties in its domestic law 
in light of the outcome of the Natco case.
Delhi, India: LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa, 2009) 39.
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Our last recommendation is about the Indian Patent Office and its role in ensuring the 
issuance of quality patents according to the Patents Act 1970 (India).965 The Patent 
Office has multiple responsibilities in the form of grants of patents, opposition 
proceedings, administrative appeals, and the issuance of compulsory licences. There are 
growing institutional linkages between the Indian Patent Office and the United States 
Patents and Trademark Office. The undue influence of government officials is a 
growing concern and on June 7, 2010, nine non-governmental organisations wrote a 
letter to the George Washington University (GWU) regarding its India Project. The 
letter states that:
GWU ostensibly created the “India Project” with the intent to bring together 
academics, government officials and business leaders to discuss IP issues 
including the international and domestic aspects of patent law. Despite these 
objectives, in practice, GWU’s India Project has failed to present a balanced 
discussion on intellectual property, and especially the importance of protecting 
public health in developing countries. Instead, the Project, which receives funding 
from multinational pharmaceutical corporations and software companies, has 
misrepresented an industry-centered perspective as an independent academic 
exercise. These sponsors have vested interests in an outcome where India adopts 
stricter intellectual property rules and their presentations are indicative of heavy 
industry bias. Instead of offering a true forum for discussion and debate on these 
critical issues, these summits are one-sided and only seek to impose a U.S.-style 
IP regime on India.966
965 Peter Drahos, The Global Governance o f Knowledge: Patent Offices and Their Clients (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
966 Open Letter from Universities Allied for Essential Medicines et al to George Washington University
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This letter clearly reflects the nature of concerns which are associated with capacity 
building projects and joint initiatives. It is recommended that India should develop its 
own independent capacity building program with the support of patent offices of 
developing countries -  such as other members of the BRICS Group. It will also help 
India in sharing lessons about Section 3(d) and pre-grant opposition proceedings and 
other developing countries will benefit from this experience.
B. World Trade Organization
In the World Trade Organization, India can play a critical role, both through the 
strategic use of complaint mechanisms, and leading policy debate over the topic of 
patent law and access to essential medicines.
In May 2010, India and Brazil formally requested the initiation of a consultation process 
with the European Union on the issue of seizure of generic drugs in transit. These 
consultation requests which were made under Article 4.4 of the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding contain similar grounds challenging the legitimacy of the 
European Union’s internal laws and regulations which empower its Customs authorities 
to detain drugs in transit. In its communication, India submitted that:
Based on complaints of alleged infringement by alleged owners of patents over
the last two years, customs authorities in the Netherlands have seized a substantial
number of consignments of generic drugs from India in transit through the
Netherlands. India understands that these seizures were made by applying the so-
called “manufacturing fiction” under which generic drugs actually manufactured
in India and in transit to third countries were treated as if they had been
manufactured in the Netherlands. These consignments were initially detained and
Law School Dean to Cease Industry-Sponsored Intellectual Property Training in India, June 7, 2010 at 
http://keionline.oru node/863
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later, either destroyed or returned to India. In a few cases, the consignments were 
permitted to proceed to the destination country after considerable delay. Available 
evidence confirms that the customs authorities seized at least 19 consignments of 
generic drugs in 2008 and 2009 while in transit through the Netherlands, 16 of 
which originated in India.967
India also enlisted specific provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 along with other 
WTO legal texts which do not allow the seizure of generic drugs. Such a measure on 
part of the European Union, India argues, is particularly a violation of Paragraphs 2, 3, 
4, 5 and 7 of Article V of the GATT 1994. Furthermore, it is a violation of Article X of 
the GATT 1994.
India further relied on Article 28 read together with Article 2, Articles 41 and 42 and 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 to establish that the detention measures, in 
several respects, are inconsistent with the obligations of the European Union. It was 
submitted that:
India considers further that the measures at issue also have a serious adverse 
impact on the ability of developing and least-developed country members of the 
World Trade Organization to protect public health and to provide access to 
medicines for all. Accordingly, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement referred to 
above must be interpreted and implemented in light of the objectives and 
principles set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted on 14 
November 2001 and in the light of Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on
967 European Union and a Member State -  Seizure o f Generic Drugs in Transit, WTO Doc WT/DS409/1, 
IP/D/29, G/L/922 (19 May 2010) (Request for Consultations by India).
422
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recognizes the right of all persons to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.968
This intervention shows that India is seriously pursuing its role as a leading developing 
country which is ready to take up trade disputes impacting its pharmaceutical exports. 
The timing of this move is also crucial from the point of view India-EU free trade 
agreement negotiations which are at final stage. Although the European Union had 
earlier indicated that the issue of the detention of generic drugs can be bilaterally 
settled, India and Brazil have preferred to start WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
India’s leadership role in the area of pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines 
needs to be further explored and consolidated. This thesis clearly establishes that India’s 
role as an agenda-setting member of multilateral trade bodies is somehow compromised 
and there is a strong need to revisit certain aspects of the domestic and international 
approaches.
At a meeting on the 8th to 9Ih of June 2010, members of the World Trade Organization 
discussed the issues of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, public health and patent law 
enforcement in a meeting of the TRIPS Council.969 During the meeting, many 
developing countries -  including Pakistan, Brazil and a group of African countries -  
expressed their concerns about the implementation of the Waiver Decision 2003. India 
and China have raised a number of specific objections about the impacts of draft ACTA 
provisions on public health and the access to medicines.9 0 These concerns about the
969 World Trade Organization, ‘Council debates anti-counterfeiting talks, patents on life’ (WTO, 2010 
News Items: 8 and 9 June 2010) at http://wwvv.wto.org/english/news e/news 10 e/trip OHjunlO e.htm.
0 India’s Intervention to the WTO TRIPS Council: TRIPS plus Enforcement Trends (June 9, 2010) at 
http://keionlinc.org/node/864
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implications of TRIPS-plus enforcement agenda in the form of ACTA negotiations 
contain multiple threats for developing countries.971
India specifically highlighted the potential impacts of stricter enforcement rules on 
access to generic medicines with reference to transit drugs and border measures. The 
member countries also discussed the state of implementation of the Waiver Decision 
2003 and the proposed Article 3 Ibis of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. Developing 
countries expressed their concerns about the implementation of the Paragraph 6 solution 
and asked for an open and candid debate on the effectiveness of this mechanism. In this 
regard, they have proposed to arrange a public workshop to discuss Paragraph 6 
mechanism in the presence of all stakeholders including industry and non-governmental 
organisations. The Intellectual Property Watch reports that: 'Developing countries have 
expressed doubts on the effectiveness of the paragraph 6 mechanism given its limited 
use so far, and have begun to seek a discussion on it, including outside experts such as a 
company that tried to use the system.’972
India also raised the issue of the compulsory licensing scheme under the Paragraph 6 
mechanism and clarified its position.
India told Intellectual Property Watch that it was misquoted as what was really 
said was that “there have been several efforts” made, not that several countries 
had tried the system. This also does not appear in the prepared statement of India. 
The delegate said those efforts related mainly to the efforts of Medecins Sans 
Frontieres (Doctors without Borders) trying to help the paragraph 6
971 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, [2011] ATN1F 22, not yet in force.
972 Catherine Saez, ‘Health Waiver, IP Enforcement Discussed at Lively WTO TRIPS Council Meeting’, 
Intellectual Property Watch (10 June 2010) at http://www.ip-watch.oru/weblog/2010/06 10/health- 
vvaiver-ip-enforcement-discussed-at-livelv-wto-trips-eounci 1-meet in«;/'
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implementation in its only use with Canada before getting weary of the process 
and deciding to bypass the mechanism and asking an Indian generic drug 
company to supply Rwanda with an AIDS medicine ....973
The last point which India has raised is extremely pertinent and brings the WTO into the 
centre of debate of patents and access to medicines. The Waiver Decision 2003 was 
definitely a compromised deal among WTO member countries but now it is time to re­
evaluate the effectiveness of this mechanism. This system could not simply work and 
deliver the objectives which were mentioned in Doha Declaration 2001. In fact just 
before the TRIPS Council meeting, the WTO Secretariat released an updated note about 
members’ notifications of the acceptance of the Protocol amending the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994. It shows that only 29 countries have notified their acceptance leaving 
a large number of developing and least developing countries unmoved on the 
implementation of proposed Article 3 Ibis.474
What should be done within the WTO to resolve these concerns of developing countries 
about the failure of the Paragraph 6 mechanism? Indeed, the failure of this system is not 
an unexpected outcome and many commentators have already predicted this problem, 
realising the limitations of the Waiver Decision 20033 ~ The practical problems
474 Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement Status o f Acceptances, WTO Doc I P/C AV/490/Rev. 6 (2 June 
2010) (Note from the Secretariat-Revision). According to the latest statistics updated on WTO website, 
thirty-one countries have notified their acceptance. See: World Trade Organization, Members Accepting 
Amendment o f the TRIPS Agreement (17 December 2010) at 
http://vvwvv.wto.org/english/tratop _ e/trips e/amendment e.htm
1 ’ Duncan Mathews, ‘WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?’ (2004) 
7( 1) Journal o f International Economic Law 73-103. Also see: Amit Gupta, ‘Patent Rights on
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associated with the Waiver Decision 2003 have been thoroughly discussed in this thesis 
to demonstrate that successful implementation of this mechanism is highly unlikely. 
This thesis presents three recommendations which may help the WTO to achieve the 
objectives of Doha Declaration 2001 in a relatively effective way.
First, in light of its cumbersome procedural and administrative details, there is a need to 
replace the Waiver Decision 2003 with a simple, quick and effective mechanism for the 
export of pharmaceutical drugs. An ideal solution would take the form of permanent 
waiver of obligation under Article 31(0 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 without linking it 
with conditions and limitations which are currently attached to it. WTO members 
should be allowed to determine the grounds and conditions on which they may consider 
the issuance of compulsory licences both for domestic and export purposes. It is 
recommended that a matter of compulsory licensing for an export puipose should not be 
unnecessarily linked with additional requirements. Most developed countries have 
already opted out of this system. Given the relatively small size of the pharmaceutical 
market in least developing countries, there is no evidence that exports from India and 
other developing countries will harm the substantial economic interests of multinational 
pharmaceutical companies. It is therefore important that a straightforward and simple 
compulsory licensing mechanism should be allowed.
The second recommendation of this thesis concerns the introduction of a product patent 
regime in least developing countries. As a part of Doha Declaration 2001, the deadline 
for least developing countries was further extended to 2016. It is recommended that a 
long term moratorium should be imposed in this regard to allow the importation of
Pharmaceutical Products and Affordable Drugs: Can TRIPS Provide a Solution?’ (2004) 2 Buffalo 
Intellectual Property’ Law Journal 127-153 and Haochen Sun, ‘The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some 
Reflections on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’ (2004) 15(1) European Journal o f International 
Law 123-150.
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generic drugs in countries which are economically and socially disadvantaged. None of 
the least developing countries has the technological base and infrastructure capacity to 
manufacture sophisticated drugs for HIV/AIDS and other epidemics. Such an extension 
of the transitional period will ease pressures on developing countries which are 
currently locked in the ambiguities of patents and compulsory licensing requirements.
The third recommendation of this thesis deals with patent law and enforcement issues. 
India and China have raised their concerns in this regard, but currently there is no 
collective movement among developing countries to counter the TRIPS-plus 
enforcement agenda emanating from the forum of the World Trade Organization. The 
WTO’s institutional structure provides some unique opportunities to member countries 
and the latest example is the generic drug seizure case which India and Brazil have 
recently initiated. However, the WTO is itself a member driven organisation and 
developing countries can greatly influence some of its outcomes and policy decisions. It 
is therefore recommended that India should assume a strong role to promote a proactive 
agenda for developing countries about patent law and public health issues.
C. World Health Organization
The constitution of the World Health Organization specifically identifies a critical role 
of this body in the control and eradication of communicable diseases.976 Disease 
surveillance is, therefore, a crucial aspect of the World Health Organization’s work plan 
which is implemented in the form of the Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response 
(EPR) Program.977 Currently the World Health Organization is monitoring nineteen
976 Jennifer Prah Ruger and Derek Yach, ‘The Global Role of the World Health Organization’ (Fall 
2008/Spring 2009) II (2) Global Health Governance 1-11.
9 For details see: World Health Organization, ‘Global Alert and Response (GAR)’ (accessed on 14 
September 2010) at http://w\vw.who.int/esr/en/
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emerging disease threats including Avian influenza, Hepatitis, Influenza, and Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome.1'7* Although the role of the World Health Organization in 
disease surveillance is largely appreciated, it is not free from political influence and 
other controversies.471' The efficacy and the relevance of some of the World Health 
Organization's guidelines and practices are criticised for the lack of transparency and 
conflicts of interest.4*0 There is no doubt that the organisation operates in a difficult 
political environment which impedes its ability to deliver satisfactory outcomes in 
certain cases. Patents and access to essential medicines is one area which has long been 
ignored by the World Health Organization before its recent attempts to catch-up.
The Sixty-third World Health Assembly was held in Geneva on 17-21 May 2010. On 
the final day of its meeting, the World Health Assembly took an important step towards 
financing research and development in the area of health innovation by establishing a 
Consultative Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and
Coordination.4*1 This Working Group is entrusted with the task of furthering the 
recommendations of an earlier working group by recognising the need to:
promote a range of incentive schemes for research and development including 
addressing, where appropriate, the de-linkage of the costs of research and 
development and the price of health products, for example through the award of 
978 Ibid.
474 David P. Fidlcr, International Law and Infectious Diseases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
980 Fiona Godlee, ‘Conflicts of Interest and Pandemic Flu (2010) 340:c2947 British Medical Journal 
(BMJ) at http://vvww.bmi.eom/content/340/bmi.e2947.full. Also see: World Health Organization, ‘WHO 
Director-General’s letter to BMJ editors’ (Statement, 8 June 2010) at
http://vvwvv.vvho.int/mediacentre/news/stateinents/2010/letter bnij 20100608/en/index.html 
4,sl World Health Organization, ‘Establishment of a consultative expert working group on research and 
development: financing and coordination’ (21 May, 2010) WHA63.28 (Sixty-Third World Health 
Assembly) at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WH A63/A63 R28-en.pdf
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prizes, with the objective of addressing diseases which disproportionately affect 
developing countries.982
In 2001, the World Health Assembly started referring to intellectual property rights in 
the context of access to medicines. The Resolution of the Fifty-Fourth World Health 
Assembly on Scaling up the Response to HIV/AIDS urges member states ‘to increase 
access to medicines’ and ‘to cooperate constructively in strengthening pharmaceutical 
policies and practices, including those applicable to generic drugs and intellectual 
property regimes’.983
In a separate Resolution on WHO Medicine Strategy, reference is made to the impacts 
of international trade agreements on access to essential medicines in developing 
countries.984 In 2003, the World Health Organization took a further step when its 
Secretariat submitted a report to the Fifty-Sixth World Health Assembly specifically 
referring to the flexibilities and safeguard provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
This report, Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health, stated that:
Rigorous analysis of the scientific, legal, economic, ethical, and human rights 
aspects of intellectual property as it relates to public health, and careful 
monitoring of this relationship in different national contexts could prove 
invaluable for national and international policies and practices that ensure both
,v' World Health Organization, Scaling up the Response to HIV/AIDS, WHA54.10 (21 May 2001) (Fifty- 
Fourth World Health Assembly) at http://apps.who.int/gb/arehive/pdf files/WHA54/ea54rl O.pdf 
,s4 World Health Organization, WHO Medicines Strategy, WHA54.11 (21 May 2001) (Fifty-Fourth 
World Health Assembly) at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/who/wha54.11 .pdf
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innovation to respond to unmet needs and access to existing technologies for 
health.985
In the light of this report, the World Health Assembly established a Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health which was tasked with the 
mandate of providing ‘an analysis of intellectual property rights, innovation and public 
health, including the question of appropriate funding and incentive mechanisms for the 
creation of new medicines and other products against diseases that disproportionately 
affect developing countries’.986
In 2006, the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
provided a comprehensive report on the topic of patent law and access to essential 
medicines: ‘We analysed the complexity of scientific challenges in biomedical 
innovation and sought reasons why, in spite of a greater effort, R&D has not yet 
produced the results hoped for, or even expected, for the people of developing 
countries.’987 The composition of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation and Public Health and the representation of corporate stakeholders had 
made it clear at the very outset that its recommendations would be compromised 
solutions. Two members of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation 
and Public Health, Professor Carlos Correa and Pakdee Pothisiri, wrote their separate 
commentaries and observed that:
986 World Health Organization, Intellectual Property' Rights, Innovation, and Public Health, WHA56/27 
(May 28, 2003) (World Health Assembly Res. 56.27)
987 WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, Public Health 
Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights (Geneva: WHO Press, 2006) X at 
http://vvwvv.vvho.int/mtellectualproperty/documents/thereportT.NPublicHealthReport.pdf
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We regret the Commission was not able to elaborate in more detail proposals for 
mobilizing the financial resources and the scientific talent, particularly that 
available in developing countries, necessary to address the diseases that 
predominantly affect the poor. This report will fulfil its objective, however, if it 
helps WHO member countries and other stakeholders to set R&D priorities and 
develop a global sustainable framework to respond to that imperative.988
As compared to earlier resolutions and statements of the World Health Organization, the 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health first time 
elaborated the limitations of global intellectual property norms and its possible impacts 
on research and development.
This process finally culminated in the form of the Intergovernmental Working Group on 
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (IGWG) which was created in 2006 
to develop a medium-term framework on the basis of recommendations suggested by 
the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health. 98 9  After 
two years of deliberations and regional consultation, the outcome of this working group 
surfaced in the form of a draft strategy which was ultimately adopted by the Sixty-First 
World Health Assembly in 2008. The Global Strategy’ on Plan o f Action on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property contains the following eight key elements:
1. Prioritizing research and development needs
2. Promoting research and development
3. Building and improving innovative capacity 
988 Ibid. 201-202.
,89 World Health Organization, Public Health, Innovation, Essential Health Research and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Towards a Global Strategy> and Plan o f Action, WHA59.24 3 (May 27, 2006) (World 
Health Assembly Resolution).
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4. Transfer of technology
5. Application and management of intellectual property to contribute to 
innovation and to promote public health
6. Improving delivery and access
7. Promoting sustainable financing mechanisms
8. Establishing monitoring and reporting systems.9411
The World Health Organization is still in the process of devising a plan of action to 
implement the Global Strategy on Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property. It is anticipated that this process will take place between 2009 and 
2015 with an estimated cost of US$2.1 billion.991
Even after ten years of its first resolution, the practical impact of the World Health 
Organization’s work on patents and access to medicines is very marginal. It is still 
locked in the process of implementation modalities, monitoring and evaluation 
processes, budgetary allocation and administrative bottlenecks without a single concrete 
step towards establishment of an alternative health innovation system. It is also crucial 
to note that throughout this period, the role of the World Health Organization has been 
virtually non-existent when major controversies have emerged about patents and generic 
medicines. A full length TRIPS-plus regime has in fact emerged during the last ten 
years or so with huge public health consequences, but the World Health Organization
990 World Health Organization, ‘Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property’ (May 24, 2008) WHA61.21 at 
hnp://apps.vvho.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/A61/A61 R21 -cn.pdf
991 World Health Organization, Executive Board, 124th Session, Public Health, ‘Innovation and 
Intellectual Property: Global Strategy and Plan of Action: Proposed Time Frames and Estimated Funding 
Needs’ (Jan. 21,2009) EB124/16 Add.2.
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could not be moved. The World Health Organization could have assumed a leading role 
after the announcement of the Doha Declaration 2001 in terms of suggesting better 
alternatives to its member states which ultimately failed to agree a solution. It was again 
missing recently when the generic drug detention controversy emerged and the World 
Health Organization could only issue a weak statement on this issue.992
This thesis shows that, despite its shortcomings, the role of the World Health 
Organization is extremely important at least in one area of access to medicines: 
addressing the challenges of the research and innovation gap. Unlike other institutions 
discussed in this thesis, the World Health Organization has an institutional mandate to 
act on this issue by devising alternative incentive models and resource mobilisation.
There are already indications that the World Health Organization is gradually moving in 
this direction through the Global Strategy on Plan o f Action on Public Plealth, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property. However, there are two concerns in this regard. 
First, the pace of the World Health Organization’s initiative on innovation and 
intellectual property is prohibitively slow, leaving the needs of millions of poor patients 
unattended. Although it is a consensus-driven member organisation, the United Nations 
agency can do much better on issues of patents and access to medicines, given its 
funding, and infrastructure of regional networks.
Second, the World Health Organization has equivocated over support for alternative 
models of medical innovation. After almost ten years of deliberations, it is not clear to 
the World Health Organization what alternative models will be suitable for bridging the 
gaps of pharmaceutical innovation. It is recommended that the World Health 
Organization should focus on prizes and open source drug discovery projects with full
99' World Health Organization, ‘Access to Medicines’ (Press Statement, 13 March, 2009) 
http:/7vvww.\vho.int/mediacentre/nevvs/statements/2009/aceess-mcdicines-20090313/en/index.html
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financial and institutional support. The patent pool initiative has already been launched 
from the platform of the UNITAID and the World Health Organization can play a 
significant role in boosting the potential of alternative models.
The World Health Organization can also help in tackling the problem of economies of 
scale in the case of compulsory licensing. It has been noticed in this thesis that despite 
legal avenues, the issuance of compulsory licences is restricted for reasons related to 
market dynamics and large scale commercial production. This problem can hardly be 
resolved individually by countries who are interested in importing drugs for access to 
medicine programs. The World Health Organization has significantly downplayed its 
role in strengthening and facilitating compulsory licensing regimes in its members’ 
countries despite the fact that these measures are absolutely legal under the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994. The organisation should find its niche in this area with the help of 
leading generic manufacturers in India and other developing countries.
D. World Intellectual Property Organization
While delivering his speech at the World Bank Conference on Judicial and Legal 
Development, Professor Amartya Sen said:
In making effective use of the approach of Comprehensive Development 
Framework, there is a good case for bringing in the freedom-based considerations 
explicitly into the accounting. This gives an immediate reason to ask about the 
end product of legal and judicial reform and other institutional changes, and the 
need to be clear about what they are aimed at. This is where the foundational 
objective of the expansion and consolidation of human freedom becomes central 
as constitutive of development. It is in these ways that the freedom-based
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approach can effectively supplement the [comprehensive Development 
Framework] strategy. 994
This statement was made in the context of development strategies which was evolved 
and implemented by the World Bank, but it contains a broader message for global 
development initiatives. To Amartya Sen, the role of international institutions, including 
the United Nations and its affiliated organisations, is critical in adopting freedom-based 
developmental considerations.944 Amartya Sen’s conception of development and justice 
can provide illuminating insights for ongoing discourse in the area of intellectual 
property and development. Amartya Sen provides two key objectives for any 
development discourse in the form of justice and capability enhancement.
In his acceptance speech to the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), Dr Francis Gurry, Director General of the WIPO, shared his 
vision about key issues of global intellectual property framework. He specifically talked 
about the potential and direction of the WIPO Development Agenda and stated that:
No less important are developments that call upon the IP system to broaden its 
horizon and to make its mission more attuned to the collective consciousness of 
the international community. First and foremost is the question of how IP can 
contribute to the reduction of the knowledge gap and to greater participation on 
the part of the developing and least developed countries (LDCs) in the benefits of 
innovation and the knowledge economy. IP alone is not going to bring about the 
solution to differential levels of development, but the recent consensus on the
99 ’ Amartya Sen, ‘What Is the Role of the Legal and Judicial Reform in the Development Process? 
(Address at the World Bank Conference on Legal and Judicial Development, 2001) 25 at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.oru/lNTLAWJUSTlNST/Resourees/lettalandiudicial.pdf 
994 Amartya Sen, The Idea o f Justice (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009) 409.
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WIPO Development Agenda provides a wonderful opportunity for the 
Organization to be part of the solution. For the WIPO Development Agenda to 
fulfil this promise, I believe that it is essential that we translate the political 
consensus into concrete and effective projects.995
He further elaborated the relevance and importance of this issue and stated that: ‘There 
is also a dimension to the Development Agenda which calls for a continual analysis and 
reflection on the best means of making IP work to the advantage of all countries, 
regardless of their level of development.’996
The WIPO Development Agenda has attracted considerable global attention as a key 
countervailing strategy by developing countries to the onslaught of the TRIPS-plus 
bilateral and regional agreements.
Since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, there was a strong feeling of loss and 
undue compromise among many developing countries and these feelings became 
prominent during the implementation of the national patent laws. Developing countries 
have questioned the rationale of global intellectual property policies and their 
implications on public health, access to knowledge and public goods. In this regard 
references were made to the failure of existing institutions to devise balanced 
intellectual property norms. The Report of United Kingdom’s Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights finds that:
The danger for developing countries is that harmonisation would be around 
developed country standards of protection, which may not be suitable for them.
995 Francis Gurry, ‘Address to the WIPO General Assembly’, 6 (December 2008) WIPO Magazine at 
http://\vw\v.wipo.int/wipo mauazine-'en/20()8/06/ariicle 0002.html
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For developing countries the concern must be to ensure that they do not accept in 
these discussions new international rules further limiting their freedom to design 
appropriate patent policies, unless it can be shown it is in their interests to do so.997
The role ot the World Intellectual Property Organization has been frequently discussed 
to reflect upon the gains and losses of the Uruguay Round Negotiations.998 Some 
attempts have also been made to construct a totally new and different theoretical 
approach towards intellectual property norms, and the objectives of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994, mentioning Article 7 and Article 8, were discussed in this regard.
The mere rhetoric of materialising the objectives of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 was not sufficient on the part of developing countries, and they were 
expected to suggest concrete steps. The breakthrough in this regard was achieved in 
2004 when Brazil and Argentina along with 12 other developing countries floated the 
proposal of Development Agenda on the forum of World Intellectual Property Rights 
(WIPO).m There were four main components to the original proposal aimed at
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and 
Development Policy (London: September 2002) 23 at 
http://www.ipreommission.org/paDers/pdfs/final rcport/CIPR Exec Sum,pdf.
" s Daniel Gervais, ‘TRIPS and Development’ in Daniel Gervais (Ed), Intellectual Property, Trade and 
Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS-Plus Era (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). Also see: Jeremy De Beer ‘Defining WIPO’s Development Agenda’ In Jeremy 
De Beer (ed.), Implementing WIPO’s Development Agenda (Ottawa: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 
2009) 1 and Neil Weinstock Netanel, The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual Property and 
Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). For a general discussion on the role of 
the World Intellectual Property: Christopher May, The World Intellectual Property Organization: 
Resurgence and the Development Agenda (Routledge, 2007).
World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a 
Development Agenda for WIPO’, (Geneva, August 27, 2004) WO/GA/31/11. The proposal was later
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integrating the notion of development in the body of existing and future WIPO 
initiatives.
The first component deals with the institutional mandate and direction of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization and suggests that WIPO should review its function in 
the light of United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. It was stated that:
The proposal for the establishment of a “Development Agenda” is also based on 
the premise that development concerns should be given emphasis in WIPO 
activities, so that the Organization may comply with its UN mandate. One of the 
intentions of the “Development Agenda”, therefore, is to promote a deeper 
reflection on the development implications of current and new approaches to 
different IP policy choices and international norm setting, as well as a more 
accurate and pervasive discussion on the consequences of their adoption by 
countries at different stages of social, economic and technological development. It 
is important to promote a critical examination of the implications for developing 
countries of the adoption of increased IPR protection, rather than seek to approach 
this highly controversial issue as if it were governed by absolute truths, solely 
under the one dimensional perspective of the private rights holders, ignoring the 
broader public interest.1000
This idea of integrating intellectual property policy-making with the developmental 
objectives of the United Nations was fresh thinking in the context of the WIPO’s
elaborated through a further document; see, World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Proposal to 
Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document 
WO/GA/31/11, (Geneva, April 6, 2005) IIM/1/4 at
http://vvww.vvipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/iim 1/iim 1 4.doc
1000 Ibid. Annex, 3.
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approach. It was generally believed that WIPO’s capacity building initiatives and 
technical assistance programs operating in developing countries serve this purpose and 
these countries could therefore cope with the challenges of intellectual property policies. 
However, this proposal has for first time, articulated a strong case for the 
comprehensive development agenda at the level of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization.
The second component of the original proposal deals with treaty-making and the norms- 
setting process at the World Intellectual Property Organization. The rising level of 
patent protection, especially the negotiating process of the Substantive Patent Law 
Treaty, and its implications for economic development should be considered as a 
fundamental concern.
The third component proposed a critical re-evaluation of policies related to the transfer 
of technology and innovation. Questioning the efficacy of objectives laid down in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, the proposal seeks the development of 
effective and corrective measures to address this problem. Existing standards of 
intellectual property protection have failed to facilitate the dissemination of technology 
and caused adverse effects on developing countries. It was said that:
Intellectual property law and policy as well as other regulatory regimes relating to 
innovation and transfer of technology have implications beyond the regulation of 
monopoly rights over inventions, copyrights, trademarks and other related subject 
matter. They impact on a much wider range of issues from access to education 
and learning materials to the availability and affordability of essential medicines 
as well on the efforts to bridge the digital divide and the technological gap. When 
rules and standards touch upon such fundamental issues, they cannot be
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formulated in accordance only with the expertise and concerns of specialized IP
lawyers and rightholders groups. 1001
The last component dealt with the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The 
enforcement regime should be balanced and informed by the needs and requirements of 
different countries. Any enforcement regime without appropriate safeguard provisions 
would complicate the problem of access to knowledge and essential medicines in 
developing countries. 1002
In its reaction to the proposal of the WIPO Development Agenda, the United States tried 
to downplay the significance of this suggestion and alternatively suggested a WIPO 
Partnership Program, an ‘internet-based tool to facilitate the strategic use of intellectual 
property by developing countries and to maximize WIPO’s positive impact on 
development’ . 1001 The United States further questioned the rationale of launching a 
development initiative at WIPO level and asserted that the development objectives 
could only be marginally achieved through intellectual property policies. Reference was 
also made to other specialised agencies of the United Nation with a clear message that 
WIPO was not the proper forum to discuss development related issues. 1004 In fact, this 
response was not completely unexpected. The United States has an old and traditional 
position on the role of intellectual property rights and in that context, patents and other 
forms of intellectual property rights have never been construed as development policy 
instruments.
100! Ibid. 12.
1002 Ibid. 8
1003 World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Proposal by the United States of America for the 
Establishment of a Partnership Program in WIPO’ (Geneva, March 18, 2005) 11M/1/2, 3 at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/iim 1/iim 1 2.doc
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It is also important to note that India was not among the sponsors of WIPO 
Development Agenda but it showed full support to the objectives laid down in the 
proposal. In its official response, the Indian delegate stated that:
Given the huge disparities existing across the world it is open to question whether 
IP harmonization benefits developing countries. The developed countries to pay 
lip service to “development"’ in the context of Intellectual Property protection, but 
they do so rather self-servingly. The term “development” as used by these 
countries, including in WIPO, means quite the opposite of what developing 
countries understand when they refer to the “development dimension” ... A WIPO 
Development Agenda would, obviously need to take into account any possible 
negative impact on the users of IP, on consumers at large, or on public policy in 
general, not just the promotion of the interest of Intellectual Property owners. It is 
vital to inject this balance and equity into the various WIPO bodies.1005
In the subsequent process of negotiations and formalisation of the WIPO Development 
Agenda, India has played a significant role along with several other developing 
countries and this process culminated in the form of 45 agreed recommendations.1006 
These recommendations are arranged under six different clusters dealing with technical 
assistance and capacity building; norms-setting, flexibilities, public policy and public 
domain; technology transfer, information and communication technologies and access 
to knowledge; Assessment evaluation and impact studies; institutional matters including
l()(b Statement by Debabrata Saha, Deputy Permanent Representative of India, Item 12: Proposal for 
Establishing a Development Agenda for WIPO (October 1,2004) at 
http://vvwvv.cptech.org/ip/wipo/indiaI 0012004.html
1006 World Intellectual Property Organization, The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO 
Development Agenda (WIPO General Assembly 2007) at http://wwvv.wipo.int/export/sites/wwvv/ip- 
development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf
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mandate and governance and other issues.1007 It is apparent that developing countries can 
raise patents and access to essential medicines issues under various clusters. However, 
their success depends upon future negotiations, and the process of implementation will 
actually reflect upon the efficacy of these recommendations.1008
The future of the WIPO Development Agenda, and its possible implications in 
redesigning the global intellectual property standards, needs a thorough assessment. The 
institutional capacity of the WIPO and its willingness to harness the resources required 
for an effective implementation of the proposed recommendation, is doubted. Our 
discussion and analysis in this thesis reveals that like the World Health Organization, 
the role of the World Intellectual Property Organization in dealing with patents and the 
access to medicines issue is marginal and sidelined. A series of events have highlighted 
the problems which developing countries are facing since the adoption of the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 but the role of the World Intellectual Property Organization was 
completely invisible throughout this time. This is an alarming situation for both the 
United Nations bodies, but especially for the World Intellectual Property Organization 
which is specifically mandated in this regard.10"1'
1008 Peter K. Yu, ‘A Tale of Two Development Agendas’ (2009) 35 Ohio Northern University' Law 
Review 466-573.
1004 On the role of World Health Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization and other United 
Nations agencies see: Jack Lerner, ‘Intellectual Property and Development at WHO and WIPO’ (2008) 34 
American Journal o f Law and Medicine 257-277. Also see: Hans Morten Haugen, ‘Access Versus 
Incentives: Analysing Intellectual Property Policies in Four UN Specialized Agencies by Emphasizing the 
Role of the World Intellectual Property Organization and Human Rights’ (26 May 2010) Early View 
Access The Journal o f World Intellectual Property at
http://ww\v3.interscience.wilev.conviournal/l 23476731 /'abstract?CRETR Y= 1 &SRETR YM)
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With the emergence of the WIPO Development Agenda, it is a good opportunity for this 
body to realign itself with the needs of developing countries. From the perspective of 
developing countries, the World Intellectual Property Organization is currently 
operating as a global royalty collection agency. The WIPO needs to change this 
impression by taking initiatives indicated in the Development Agenda. Three distinct 
recommendations are therefore suggested in this regard. First, it is extremely important 
that the World Intellectual Property Organization should chalk out a clear plan of action 
on Development Agenda proposals. The role of the Secretariat is extremely important in 
this regard. During the debates on the WIPO Development Agenda, developing 
countries raised concerns about some of Secretariat’s policies. 1010 It is important to 
change this culture and align the organisation with developmental objectives.
Second, the ongoing negotiations on the Substantive Patent Law Treaty need to be 
carefully considered because they have the potential to culminate in a multilateral 
TRIPS-plus regime. Any attempt to trade-off between the Development Agenda and the 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty would be undesirable. The last recommendation deals 
with the existing capacity building programs of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization. Most of these programs are merely co-ordinated by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization and conducted through leading intellectual property offices 
around the world. This creates a critical mass of intellectual property maximalists 
among the officials of patent offices and intellectual property policy makers. This 
practice should be immediately curtailed, and adopting an alternative capacity building 
policy in the light of the objectives of the Development Agenda.
1010 Sangceta Shashikant, ‘WIPO: Concerns over Secretariat’s approach to Development Agenda’ 6692
(Monday 4 May 2009) SUNS at
http://vvvvvv.tvvnside.oru.se/title2/intcllectual property/info.servicc/2009/twn.ipr.info.090502.litm
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IV. Future Research
This research has explored the link between patent law and access to essential 
medicines by identifying India as a key player in providing access to affordable drugs in 
developing countries. This significance of the Indian generic drugs is traced in an 
historical context and then analysed in the light of different changes and developments 
which are re-shaping India’s role as the pharmacy of the developing world. The 
analytical template used in this thesis cut across crucial themes of regulatory changes, 
domestic practices, use of safeguard provisions and the emerging norms of research and 
development. This thesis also makes several policy recommendations for key 
stakeholders which have emerged throughout our analysis.
In the process of conducting this research to contextualise India’s role as pharmacy of 
developing world, new areas of potential research have been identified. There is a 
growing literature on Indian patent law and its access to medicines regime but several 
important linkages are still missing. The Indian pharmaceutical industry is rapidly 
transforming amidst mergers, acquisitions, and product development partnerships. 
There is a need for ongoing empirical research on the evolution, development and 
diversification of the Indian pharmaceutical industry.
Another area which needs systematic and in-depth research deals with patents-related 
jurisprudence produced by Indian courts during the last five years. Some of these cases 
are referred to and analysed in this research but there are now many cases which 
provide a sufficient basis for doctrinal analysis. Such work may be especially relevant 
from a public health perspective as the Indian jurisprudence on fundamental rights and 
the right to health is immensely rich.10" It would also be interesting to expand upon the
10,1 To see Indian jurisprudence on right to health: People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union o f India 
(1997) 1 SCC 301, ESC Ltd v. Subhash Chandra Bose (1992) 1 SCC 441 at 462, Bandhua Mukti Morcha
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contribution of this thesis in the area of alternative models of pharmaceutical 
innovation. With substantial indigenous resources and the booming Indian economy, 
prizes and open source drug discovery models can be further studied.
Further research is needed on data exclusivity and its impact on Indian generic industry.
I have argued in this thesis that India should refrain from adopting a data exclusivity 
regime similar to the one which United States has been advocating through bilateral 
trade agreements. This will, however, not ease pressures on India to overhaul its 
existing data protection system and there is a strong likelihood that India will be asked 
to revise its existing practices. India currently maintains that its existing system is fully 
compliant to Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. We have seen that India’s 
major trading partners including the European Union are not satisfied with this regime 
and they are demanding for the justification of India’s regulatory system. Though 
currently India is not ready to change its domestic data protection regime but there are 
several questions about the effectiveness of Indian system. It is important to carry out 
future research on following questions in Indian context: what is the difference between 
data exclusivity and market exclusivity in terms of IP legislation? Should India introduce a
v. Union o f India (AIR 1984 SC 802), State o f Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Chawla (1997) 2 SCC 83, 
Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State o f West Bengal (AIR 1996 SC 2426 at 2429 para 9), State 
o f Punjab v. Rani Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC 117, Sheela Barse v. Union o f India (1986) 3 SCC 596, 
Mehta v. Union o f India (1987) 4 SCC 463; MC Mehta v. Union o f India (regarding emission standards 
for vehicles) (1999) 6 SCC 12, Vincent v. Union of India (AIR 1987 SC 990, Vikram v. State o f Bihar 
(AIR 1988 SC 1782), Death of 25 Chained Inmates in Asylum Fire in 77V In re v. Union o f India (2002) 3 
SCC 31,5'. Mittal v. State o f UP (AIR 1989 SC 1570), Parmanand Kataria v. Union o f India (1989) 4 
SCC 286; AIR 1989 SC 2039, 5. Lai v. State o f Bihar (1994 SCC [Cri] 506), Consumer Education and 
Research Centre v. Union o f India (1995) 3 SCC 42, Common Cause v. Union o f India and Others (AIR 
1996 SC 929), Murli S Deora v. Union o f India (2001) 8 SCC 765, Mr X  v. Hospital Z 1998 (6) SCALE 
230; 1998 (8) SCC 296; JT 1998 (7) SC. 626).
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data protection regime within IP framework or it should revise and develop a system under 
pharmaceutical regulations? What should be an appropriate term of data protection for 
pharmaceuticals? Do clinical trials undertaken by pharmaceutical companies for introducing 
new indications of existing drugs qualify for data protection?
The impact of emerging bilateral and regional trade agreements on the Indian medicines 
sector is another important area which needs further research and academic focus. The 
ongoing negotiations on the ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
2011 will impact upon the future agenda of intellectual property norm-setting. It is 
crucial to evaluate the implications of such agreements from the perspective of India 
and the access to medicines. India is currently negotiating a bilateral trade agreement 
with the European Union.1012 More work is needed to contextualise and understand the 
Indian patent regime in the light of these developments. There has also been much 
concern about whether the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement -  covering a 
number of nations in the Pacific Rim; but not India as yet - will have an adverse impact 
on access to essential medicines. Future research should consider whether such a 
regional agreement will affect intellectual property norms and public health standards in 
the region of the Asia-Pacific.
More focused research and analysis is required on the ongoing discussions over the 
need for a European Union-India free trade agreement. These negotiations started in 
2006 and in view of recent high level summit in New Delhi, it is anticipated that a final
1012 Michael Gasiorek et al, Qualitative analysis o f  a potential Free Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and India (Sussex, United Kingdom: Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at 
Sussex and CUTS International, Undated) at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/does/2007/iune/tradoc 135 101 .pdf
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deal will be signed in near future.101' The European Union is currently the largest trading 
partner of India. It will be critical to see how trade influences will reshape India’s 
domestic policies after a free trade agreement is concluded between India and the 
European Union. The EU is no longer demanding data exclusivity and patent term 
extensions but there is a strong push for stricter enforcement provisions related to 
injunctions and border measures.1014 Future studies should evaluate how India’s 
enforcement system is compatible with the TRIPS Agreement 1994 and why India 
should not go beyond minimum enforcement mechanism envisaged under TRIPS. This 
thesis also shows that Indian judicial decisions are helpful in creating necessary policy 
and functional space for generic companies. Future studies should consider whether an 
European Union-India free trade agreement will change or disrupt the delicate balance 
achieved through various cases under Indian domestic law.
Our case studies do not deal with the challenges of new infectious diseases such as 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Avian Influenza and Porcine Influenza. 
Future research on the impact and cures of these diseases is important for variety of 
reasons. With a huge population influx and poor health conditions, the possibility of 
disease outbreak in India is significant.1015 The battles over patenting the SARS virus
1013 European Council, ‘EU-India summit -  A partnership for prosperity’ (Press Release 9 February 2012) 
at http://curopa.eu/rapid/pressRelcascsAction.do?refcrence=:PRES/12/37&typc=HTML
1014 Medecins Sans Frontieres, ‘The Enforcement Provisions of the EU-India FTA: Implications for 
Access to Medicines’ (February 2012) MSF Briefing Paper at
http://vvwvv.iiisfaccess.org/content/enforcement-provisions-eu-iiidia-fta-implications-acccss-medicines 
BBC, ‘India confirms first SARS case’ (17 April 2003) at 
hnp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/2955337.stm. Also see: World Health Organization, ‘Avian 
influenza -  situation in India’ (21 February 2006) at 
hnp:/7\v\v\v.vvho.int/csr;don/2006_02_ 2 1/en/index.html
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and its impact on the access to medicines regime need to be further explored. 1016 There 
has also been much debate about access to viral samples of influenza, and benefit­
sharing; as well as issues about stockpiling key pharmaceutical drugs, such as 
Tamiflu. 1017 India has traditionally played a significant role in manufacturing generic 
versions of cancer and HIV/AIDS medicines. How will this role be balanced in future 
with the advent and spread of new infectious diseases? The question of pandemic 
planning and the role of patents are becoming increasingly crucial as a greater number 
of patent applications are granted in relevant fields. The facilitating or inhibiting role of 
these patents needs to be judged before developing nations move to adopt a domestic 
strategy. 1018
The opportunities and challenges in the field of gene patents also need to be fully 
explored in the Indian context. 1014 With massive national scientific resources, India is 
experiencing increasing internal and external pressures to ease regulatory control over
1016 Matthew Rimmer, ‘The Race to Patent the SARS Virus: The TRIPS Agreement and Access to 
Essential Medicines’ (October 2004) 5(2) Melbourne Journal o f  International Law 335-374 at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstraet id^603234; and James H.M. Simon et al, ‘Managing 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Intellectual Property Rights: The Possible Role of Patent 
Pooling’ (September 2005) 83(9) Bulletin o f  World Health Organization 707-710 at 
http://www.scielosp.org/pdf/bwho/v83n9/v83n9al7.pdf.
1017 Dennis D. Crouch, ‘Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: Nil: The Value of Patents in a Major Crisis 
Such as an Influenza Pandemic’ (2009) 39 Seton Hall Law Review 1125. Also see: Edward G Saravolac 
and Jonathan P Wong, ‘Recent Patents on Development of Nucleic Acid-based Antiviral Drugs against 
Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza Virus Infections’ (June 2007) 2(2) Recent Patents on Anti-Infective 
Drug Discovery 140-147.
1018 Eileen M. Kane, ‘Achieving Clinical Equality in an Influenza Pandemic: Patent Realities’ (2009) 
Seton Hall Law Review 1137-1172.
1019 For a detailed discussion, see Matthew Rimmer, Intellectual Property and Biotechnology: Biological 
Inventions (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008)
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gene patents. There has been much controversy in the United States over the validity of 
patents held by Myriad Genetics in respect of BRCA1 and BRCA2, which are related to 
breast cancer and ovarian cancer. A challenge by the American Civil Liberties Union to 
the validity of the patents is currently under review.1020 There is a need for further 
research to determine India’s future plan of action in this field. There is also a need to 
further consider the ramifications of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States on patentable subject matter in Bilski v. Kappos, for medicine and 
biotechnology.1021 There is a need to evaluate whether the scientific and medical benefits 
are being shared evenly with developing and least developed countries.
Beyond the challenges of international agreements and infectious diseases, India can 
gain substantially from new scientific disciplines to strengthen its pharmaceutical sector 
and technological base. These new disciplines -  such as bioinformatics1022, 
nanotechnology1023, stem cell research1024 and synthetic biology1025 -  can open enormous
1020 Association for Molecular Pathology, et al v United States Patent & Trademark Office et al, United 
States District Court Southern District Of New York ( March 29, 2010) at 
http://vvvvw.aclu.org/Tiles/assets/2010-3-29-AMPvUSPTO-Qpinion.pdf
1021 Bilski v. Kappos 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
1022 T. Lave, N. Parrott, H. P. Grimm and A. Fleury and M. Reddy, ‘Challenges And Opportunities With 
Modelling and Simulation in Drug Discovery and Drug Development’ (2007) 37(10-11) Xenobiotica 
1295-1310.
1023 Mark A. Lemley, ‘Patenting Nanotechnology’ (2005-2006) 58 Stanford Law Review 601-603. Also 
see: C. Sri Krishna, Patenting o f Nanotech Inventions: A Debate (Hyderabad, India: The ICFAI 
University Press, 2008)
1(1 4 Matthew Rimmcr, ‘The Attack of the Clones: Patent Law and Stem Cell Research (2003) 10 Journal 
o f Law and Medicine 488-505; and Karl Bergman and Gregory D. Graff, ‘The Global Stem Cell Patent 
Landscape: Implications for Efficient Technology Transfer and Commercial Development’ (2007) 25 
Nature Biotechnology 4 19-424 at http://\vww.nature.com/nbt/iournal/v25/n4/full/nbt0407-419.html 
lll2> Arti Rai and James Boyle, ‘Synthetic Biology: Caught between Property Rights, the Public Domain,
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opportunities for the Indian drug industry to develop indigenous R&D capabilities. With 
a strong pharmaceutical industry, India has a comparative advantage in developing 
collaborative initiatives with the international research community. It is, however, not 
clear whether patents in these new areas will compromise India’s access to cutting-edge 
technologies.
India has also experienced difficulties with the issues of bio-prospecting and bio­
piracy. 1026 With the introduction of the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, 102 India 
has taken a lead to check future incidences similar to the Basmati rice patent. 1028 
However, the questions about the future of pharmaceutical innovation and bio­
prospecting are yet to be fully explored in the Indian context. India possesses a great 
potential in this field and Indian firms have already started the use of intellectual 
property protection to launch and market their products. So, the simple solution of 
denying patent protection on such subject matters would no more be a feasible policy 
option and the Indian government will soon be confronted with tough choices.
Lastly, there is a need to develop a comparative perspective on patents and access to 
medicines regimes in BRIGS economies. 1020 It is beyond the scope of this research to
and the Commons (March 2007) 5(3) Public Library o f  Science (PLoS) Biology doi:
10.1371/journal.pbio.0050058 at http://www.ncbi.nhmnih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC I «S21064/
1026 Grant E. Isaac and William A. Kerr, ‘Bioprospecting or Biopiracy?: Intellectual Property and 
Traditional Knowledge in Biotechnology Innovation’ (2004) 7( 1) The Journal o f  World Intellectual 
Property 35-52. Also see: Lowell B. Bautista, ‘Bioprospecting or Biopiracy: Does The TRIPS Agreement 
Undermine The Interests Of Developing Countries?’ (2007) 82 Philippine Law Journal 14-33.
1027 Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Government of India, Traditional Knowledge Digital 
Library at http://vvww.tkdl.res.im,tkdl/langdelault/common/Home.asp?GL=Eniz
1028 Michael Woods, ‘Food for Thought: Biopiracy of Jasmine and Basmati Rice’ (2002-2003) 13 Albany 
Law Journal o f Science & Technology> 123-143.
1029 Peter K. Yu, ‘Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances and Collective Action’ (2008) 34 American
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work on this aspect but an analysis about the future of Indian generic exports cannot be 
completed without studying trends in other BRICS countries. 1030 India is one important 
source of generic drugs and it is important to study the future of access to medicines in a 
broader context.
.Journal of Law and Medicine 345.
1030 Robert C. Bird and Daniel R. Cahoy, ‘The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons from Intellectual 
Property Negotiation and Enforcement’ (Summer 2007) 5(3) Northwestern Journal o f Technology and 
Intellectual Property 400-425.
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